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SUPPLEMENT VI

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Section 1 General
Section 2 History of the Communist Party of India
Section 3 Organization
Section 4 Role in National Political Life
Section 5 Penetration of Labor and Agrarian Movements
Section 6 Infiltration and Exploitation of Miscellaneous Groups
Section 7 Covert Organization, Illegal Activity, and Government Infiltration
Section 8 Personalities
Section 9 Comments on Principal Sources

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
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This Supplement was prepared for the NIS by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.

GLOSSARY

ABBREVIATION	TITLE	REMARKS
AIADL	All-India Association of Democratic Lawyers	Communist front
AIBEA	All-India Bank Employees' Association	Communist-dominated
AIBEF	All-India Bank Employees' Federation	Independent
AIDCEF	All-India Defense Civilian Employees' Federation	Communist-dominated
AIFEA	All-India Federation of Education Associations	Communist-infiltrated
AIIEA	All-India Insurance Employees' Association	Communist-infiltrated
AIKS	All-India Kisan Sabha (Peasants' Association)	Communist front
AIKC	All-India Kisan Committee	Executive body of AIKS
AIPC	All-India Peace Council	Communist front
AIPWA	All-India Progressive Writers' Association	Communist front
AIR	All-India Radio	Government-operated nationwide network
AIRF	All-India Railwaymen's Federation	Affiliated with HMS; non-Communist
AISF	All-India Students' Federation	Communist front; affiliate of IUS
AISWU	Asansol Iron and Steel Workers' Union	INTUC controlled
AITUC	All-India Trade Union Congress	Communist-front labor federation
AIWC	All-India Women's Conference	Pro-Congress Party
ATLA	Ahmadābād Textile Labor Association	INTUC affiliate
CCP	Communist Party of China	
CEC	Central Executive Committee	CPI executive body
CIB	Central Intelligence Bureau	Nationwide security organization controlled by G.O.I. Home Ministry
CID	Criminal Investigation Department	State-level organization concerned with crime and subversion
CKC	Central Kisan Council	Executive body of AIKS
CMC	Colliery Mazdoor Congress	HMS affiliate
CPGB	Communist Party of Great Britain	
CPI	Communist Party of India	
CPN	Communist Party of Nepal	
CPP	Communist Party of Pakistan	
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union	
CPTUC	Central Provinces Trade Union Congress	AITUC state unit in former Central Provinces
CSP	Congress Socialist Party	Former Socialist wing of the Congress Party
DF	Dravidian Federation	Separatist party in Madras State
DPF	Dravidian Progressive Federation	Separatist party in Madras State
FIY	Federation of Indian Youth	Communist front
G.O.I.	Government of India	
GPO	Gujarati People's Organization (*Mahagujarat Janata Parishad*)	United opposition front in Gujarāt region of Bombay State
HAEA	Hindusthan Aircraft Employees' Association	Communist-dominated
HMS	*Hind Mazdoor Sabha* (Indian Labor Congress)	Labor federation controlled by the PSP and Socialist Party
IAAAS	Indian Association for Afro-Asian Solidarity	Communist front
IADL	International Association of Democratic Lawyers	International Communist front
ICFA	India-China Friendship Association	Communist front
ICFTU	International Confederation of Free Trade Unions	Non-Communist international labor group
IMF	International Monetary Fund	
INC	Indian National Congress	Official name for the Congress Party
INTUC	Indian National Trade Union Congress	Federation controlled by the Congress Party
IPCS	Indo-Polish Cultural Society	Communist front
IPS	Indian Police Service	Administered by G.O.I. Home Ministry
IPTA	India People's Theater Association	Communist front
ISCUS	Indo-Soviet Cultural Society	Communist front
IUS	International Union of Students	International Communist front
JMU	Jamshedpur Mazdoor Union	AITUC affiliate
MARS	*Mahila Atma Raksha Samiti* (Women's Self Defense Organization)	Communist-controlled organization in West Bengal
MGKU	Mumbai Girni Kamgar Union (Bombay Mill Workers' Union)	Communist-infiltrated
MLA's	Members of state legislative assemblies	
MP's	Members of Parliament	
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization	
NFIW	National Federation of Indian Women	Communist front
NFPTE	National Federation of Posts and Telegraph Employees	Communist-controlled

GLOSSARY (*Continued*)

ABBREVIATION	TITLE	REMARKS
NUS	National Union of Students	Both Communist-controlled and non-Communist organizations use this name
PDF	People's Democratic Front	Communist-front party in Andhra Pradesh and Bombay states
PEPSU	Patiala and East Punjab States Union	
PPH	People's Publishing House (Private), Ltd.	Communist-controlled
PPHB	People's Publishing House of Bihār	Bihār State branch of PPH
PSP	Praja Socialist Party	Nationwide democratic Socialist party
PTTI	Posts, Telegraphs, and Telephones International	Non-Communist international labor group
RILU	Red International of Labor Unions	Former Communist international labor group
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization	
SRLU	Southern Railway Labor Union	AITUC affiliate
SRSP	Self-Respect Samadharma Party	Former anti-Brahmin party in Madras State
TCTUC	Travancore-Cochin Trade Union Council	AITUC unit in former Travancore-Cochin State
UCRC	United Central Refugee Council	Communist-controlled organization in West Bengal
UDF	United Democratic Front	United opposition group in Madras State in 1952
ULEC	United Leftist Election Committee	Alliance of major leftist parties in West Bengal during the 1957 elections
UMC	United Maharashtra Committee (*Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti*)	United opposition front in Maharashtra region of Bombay State
UNCOK	United Nations Commission on Korea	
UP	United Provinces	Became Uttar Pradesh in 1950
UTUC	United Trade Union Congress	Labor federation controlled by the Revolutionary Socialist Party
VOKS	All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries	Former ostensibly nongovernmental Soviet organization
WFDY	World Federation of Democratic Youth	International Communist front
WFSW	World Federation of Scientific Workers	International Communist front
WFTU	World Federation of Trade Unions	International Communist labor front
WHO	World Health Organization	
WIDF	Women's International Democratic Federation	International Communist front
WPC	World Peace Council	International Communist front
YWL	Young Workers' League	Former Communist front

1. General

The Commnist Party of India (CPI), like Communist Parties in other areas, functions in a dual environment: it operates as a domestic political organization and as a part and subservient instrument of the international Communist movement.

India, which was for centuries an object of Czarist ambitions, has remained an important target area for the Soviet Union. During the early years of the Bolshevik regime, India was viewed as an avenue of attack on the United Kingdom, the main enemy of the U.S.S.R., and as a susceptible market for the export of a revolutionary ideology owing to India's colonial status and poverty. In the early 1920's the Soviet Union and the Comintern, operating through a small Indian emigre colony abroad and a few radical intellectuals within India, launched the Indian Communist movement. This movement was formalized in 1928–29 by the establishment of the CPI through the assistance of three British citizens who were agents of the Comintern. In launching the Communist Party in India these agents capitalized on the penchant for terrorism in some areas of India (particularly Bengal and Punjab), the appeal of socialism as an ideology, the malaise of educated Indian youth, cultural-linguistic frictions, the lack of effective trade union and peasant organizations, and dissatisfaction among some Indian intellectuals with the pace of Gandhi's independence struggle.

In recent years Soviet interest in India has been motivated by a short-term desire to reinforce Nehru's neutralism and a long-range ambition to capture and employ for its own purposes India's economic and manpower potential and its influence within the Afro-Asian region. Sino-Soviet bloc efforts to further Communist policy objectives in India and to backstop the CPI have taken several forms. First, the U.S.S.R. extends financial aid and advice to the Indian Communists through the Soviet Embassy in New Delhi and through other channels. Secondly, it follows policies designed to gain popularity in India for the bloc and thereby for the CPI. The bloc has supported India in its disputes with Pakistan, and the Soviet Union has played up to Indian aspirations for great power status by urging India's inclusion in big power meetings. The Soviet Union has supported the basic orientation of India's foreign policy, and in the mid-1950's it instructed the CPI to temper its criticism of Nehru and to support him against "reactionary" internal forces. The Communist bloc has exploited Indian sensitivities by displaying an interest in Indian literature and art. Praise of India's cultural heritage has been a prominent theme in statements by the numerous bloc leaders who have toured India. In addition, concerted attempts have been made to tie India more closely to the bloc economically and culturally by increasing the bloc's share of India's foreign trade, sponsoring the exchange of several hundred official and unofficial delegations, and stepping up the Communist propaganda offensive toward India. Finally, the Soviet Union in particular has gained some goodwill in India by the grant of substantial economic aid for impact projects scheduled under India's second five-year plan.

These actions have contributed to the creation in India of a favorable image of the Sino-Soviet bloc and have redounded to the benefit of the CPI. However, the favorable impact of these actions on the Party has been in part offset by the negative aspects of its ties to international communism. The Party's slavish adherence to the international line on issues such as Soviet intervention in Hungary, pressure on Yugoslavia, and Chinese Communist military action in Tibet have created discontent within the Party and have reduced the effectiveness of its domestic propaganda stressing its independence from foreign control.

The CPI has invariably followed Moscow's guidance, although policy shifts resulting from external direction have frequently been preceded by intense inner-Party debate. In response to foreign guidance, it embarked in 1935 on a policy of infiltrating the Congress Party; in 1942 following the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union, it switched from militant opposition to the war effort to active support for a "people's war" against fascism; from 1948 to 1951, it attempted to spark an insurrection in India in response to advice from the Cominform, and in 1951 it was advised to abandon this strategy. More recently, following a visit by the CPI general secretary to Moscow in 1958, it resolved to place increased stress on its

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NOTE For a discussion of Communist activities in Nepal, see NIS 35, SECTION 57, Subversion.

covert organizational structure and to step up its attempts to infiltrate the Indian military forces and police.

Until the mid-1950's international guidance was usually conveyed to the Party through British Communists; during recent years the Soviet Communists have assumed direct control over the CPI. Although some Indian Communists are attracted by the example of Communist China, there is no evidence that Peiping plays a direct part in the formulation of CPI policies.

The political environment within which the Party functions in India includes many small semi-national or regional parties as well as four large parties designated as "national parties" by the Indian Election Commission in 1957: the Congress Party,* the CPI, the Praja (Tenants') Socialist Party, and the Jan Sangh (People's Party). All four suffer from ideological and personal factionalism in their leadership corps and from lethargy and indiscipline in their ranks, characteristics common to the Indian political scene.

The Congress Party, which stands for a "Socialist pattern of society," was founded nearly 75 years ago and was the main instrument of Indian nationalism before the achievement of independence in 1947. It commands an overwhelming majority in both houses of Parliament and controls 12 out of 14 states. The Indian-held region of Jammu-Kashmīr is ruled by the National Conference, a party which is in complete rapport with the Congress Party. Kerala—the only state actually under opposition rule—is controlled by the Communists.** Composed of conflicting economic and social elements held together by the dominating personality of India's Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, the Congress Party has been unable to resolve its inner contradictions and to meet popular aspirations on a number of major issues. Moreover, loss of its preindependence zeal and the preoccupation of its leaders with running the government have led to a serious deterioration in the efficiency of the party machine at all levels.

The Praja Socialist Party (PSP), the largest democratic Socialist party in India, was formed in 1952 by the merger of two organizations. Although it has attracted a dedicated youthful following, this party has an uninspiring national leadership and has been unable to produce a challenging alternative to the Congress program. Factionalism within the PSP centers primarily around personal rivalries and, ideologically, the advisability on the one hand of supporting the Congress government or on the other of entering into tactical cooperation with the Communists. The third of the non-Communist national parties, the communalist Jan Sangh, a rightist Hindu party, is effective only in northern India.

With an estimated membership in early 1959 of 250,000, the CPI is the largest opposition party in India. It is the only party, besides the dominant Congress Party, which is active in every state, and it constitutes the Congress' most dynamic adversary. Although the CPI itself is not now capable of unseating the Congress Party at the national level through elections, its potential political threat probably lies in gaining power through the formation of a united front and then, in the usual Communist manner, squeezing out its allies. This technique is particularly well adapted to India where one party holds an overwhelming national majority, the opposition is fragmented, and the system of parliamentary democracy is not yet firmly established. The CPI functions as an overt, legal organization, and, although its activities are kept under surveillance by Indian intelligence agencies, it is not restricted in its legal activities.

The Party's current strength is most readily apparent in the parliamentary arena. It polled nearly 12,000,000 votes (10% of the total) in the 1957 elections for the *Lok Sabha* (House of the People, the lower house of Parliament), the equivalent at that time of approximately 100 votes for every Party member. It emerged from the elections as the major opposition party in the *Lok Sabha* and in the West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh state assemblies; more importantly, it won control over the south Indian state of Kerala through alliance with five fellow-travelling independents and thereby gained an opportunity to test the validity of its present tactical line and to probe the Indian constitution for points of weakness. The Communist Party was the only national opposition party in 1957 to show significant growth over the 1951–52 elections.

The CPI is not at present in a position to challenge the national supremacy of the Congress Party, which captured 371 of the 494 elected seats in the *Lok Sabha* and polled more than 57,000,000 votes in 1957. However, it has a potential for further growth at the state level. Four states are particularly vulnerable to long-term Communist pressures. Even if the Communist government in Kerala State falls or retires from office, that state is likely to remain unstable owing to its endemic economic and social problems and to deep-seated animosities among non-Communist political groups. Communist infiltration of the state's administrative and police services during the period of Communist rule would probably add to the problems confronting a non-Communist successor government. In West Bengal the ruling Congress Party is beset by food shortages, rising prices, unemployment, and unrehabilitated refugees from East Pakistan. These problems have no ready solutions and provide a fertile field for disruptive Communist propaganda, particularly in Calcutta, where the Communists have considerable support. The Andhra Pradesh unit of the Congress Party is split, with a resultant decline in the effectiveness of the state government, and the Communists have strong footholds in the Telengana region of this state, site of a major Communist-inspired insurrection in 1948–51. The Congress Party has been weakened in Bombay State by the Indian Government's reluctance to divide the state between its two major linguistic groups.

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* The Indian National Congress (INC) is the official name but it is referred to throughout this Supplement as the Congress Party.

** The Communist regime in Kerala State was dismissed from office by the Government of India on July 31, 1959. New elections are scheduled for early 1960.

During its 30 years of national existence, the Communist Party has followed successively tactics of militant trade unionism, formation of a popular front with the Congress Party, cooperation with the British during World War II, and in the immediate postwar period support for and then opposition to the government headed by Nehru. Its militant strategy of attempting to seize power by force through tactics of guerrilla warfare and paramilitary activities, introduced in 1948, resulted in strong repressive measures by the government and in the loss of about two-thirds of the Party's membership. This lesson has not been lost on the CPI leaders, the majority of whom oppose the use of violence as a Party policy under present conditions. The basic framework for the present CPI tactical line was set in 1951 when the Party abandoned the use of force as a tactical approach and began to emphasize electoral-democratic methods over traditional revolutionary-conspiratorial techniques. The Party set as its immediate objective the formation of a Communist-led coalition "people's democratic" government composed of all "progressive" elements in the Indian body politic, including those within the Congress Party. This goal, an intermediate step in the road toward the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat, is to be achieved through broadening the Party's base, increasing its strength in elected bodies at all levels, and establishing formal united fronts or informal working arrangements with other parties and groups.

As a concomitant to its current moderate tactical posture, the Party has attempted during rerecent years to establish its bona fides as a democratic, indigenous political body. In April 1958 it completely revised its constitution to include the statement that the Party "strives to achieve full democracy and socialism by peaceful means." It adopted a democratic-appearing organizational structure which stressed the "democratic" side of democratic centralism, still the Party's motivating organizational philosophy. It encouraged Party members freely to express their views within CPI councils, and ostensibly discarded the system of fractions through which Communist parties have traditionally infiltrated non-Communist groups. In addition, while reiterating that the CPI is "guided by the philosophy and the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism" and "draws on the rich experience of the international working class movement," the new constitution stressed that the Party "formulates its policies and determines its line of action in accordance with the interests and needs of the people and is responsible to them for its decisions." Finally, the Party supports Prime Minister Nehru's basic foreign policies, and in order to remain in step with Indian sentiment it has approved the objectives—though not the means to achieve them—of his domestic plans for national reconstruction. However, these superficial changes in terminology and tactics, designed to enhance the Party's popular appeal, represent no basic change in the Party's foreign orientation or strategy. It retains the system of fractions, and its goal remains a complete revamping of the Indian economic and social structure by any means which are tactically feasible.

The Communist Party's present potential for extensive sabotage or paramilitary activity is limited. Its covert organizational apparatus has deteriorated since the 1951 tactical shift, and conditions in India are more stable than in the period following independence when the CPI succeeded in forming parallel governments in some regions of central and northeastern India. Communist infiltration of key sectors of the government is potentially more serious. Though infiltration is limited on the national level, it is significant in some states. In Kerala Communists have used their positions as the ruling party to infiltrate the state administration, police force, and teaching profession.

The CPI has several internal assets which facilitate progress toward its goal. Foremost among these are its capable leadership, its large trade union front, and its extensive propaganda media. The top CPI leadership, drawn almost entirely from the Indian intellectual class, is notable for its ability, dedication, and flexibility in weathering the Party's frequent tactical shifts. A high percentage of the most important leaders have been associated with the Communist movement for 20 to 30 years, most attended college, and a few were educated abroad. Some present-day Communist leaders received their start in political activity in the Congress Party's independence movement and served prison terms, as did the current Congress leaders, for their anti-British activities.

The CPI, which had its genesis in militant trade unionism, controls one of the largest labor federations in India, and this federation is growing more rapidly than those dominated by the Congress Party and Socialists. Of special significance are Communist inroads among labor in strategic sectors of the Indian economy, particularly in the defense industries centered around Bangalore in Mysore State and the iron and steel complex in Bihār and Madhya Pradesh.

The CPI publishes in English and the major vernaculars of India 8 daily newspapers and 10 weeklies as well as 6 biweekly or monthly theoretical journals. These have a combined circulation of more then 200,000, are on the whole ably edited, and reinforce the Party's activities among the literate segment of the Indian population. These publications reflect the international Communist line in denouncing the "war-mongering" policies of the United States and in playing up the "peaceful" policies of the Sino-Soviet bloc. In addition they stress certain lines tailored to the Indian reader: Afro-Asian solidarity, Western colonialism, discrimination against non-whites in the United States, Western "refusal" to agree to a limitation of nuclear weapons, and the tremendous economic strides in the "fellow-Asian" Soviet Union and Communist China. Domestically the Communists' propaganda output is designed to attract key target groups: it denounces the "anti-people" policies of the present government, and it promises, if the Communists or a Communist-dominated united front are voted into power, land for the landless, increased wages for labor, jobs for the educated unemployed, additional benefits for students, and a national cultural renascence. Sizable front groups reinforce the Party's peace, Afro-Asian, and cultural propaganda themes, but front organizations among students, the peasantry, and women are weak in most regions of India.

The Communist Party, which is essentially an intellectual-middle class organization with a labor base, has been unable appreciably to exploit the Indian caste system or Hindu-Muslim communal tensions but has capitalized on other vulnerabilities in Indian society. The Indian intellectual class, educated in the teachings of British Socialists, is inherently leftist and views socialism as a panacea for the economic ills of an underdeveloped nation. Congress Party support for socialism has to some extent undercut Communist propaganda, but at the same time present Congress policies have reduced the appeal of the democratic Socialist movement. Intellectuals dissatisfied with the pace of development have tended to gravitate toward the CPI as an alternative to the present ruling party. Communist strength among the urban middle class results basically from the insecurity of this small percentage of the total population, composed chiefly of white-collar workers who are caught between relatively fixed incomes and rapidly rising prices. Communists have also exploited the social dislocation caused by industrialization. For workers who have left their villages and traditional value systems to settle in expanding industrial areas, Communist propaganda offers not only a redress of grievances but a way of life. In addition, Communist labor organizers have succeeded to a greater extent than those representing other federations in identifying themselves with the interests of labor. Communists also exploit the leftist inclinations of Indian students (many of whom face unemployment following graduation), the pressure of population on land, and, particularly in bilingual Bombay State, regional particularism. Finally, Communists capitalize on the political naivete of those educated Indians who believe that Indian Communists differ from those in the Soviet Union and that Hinduism and the force of Indian traditions will deter the spread of an alien ideology.

The Party's most serious shortcoming is its failure to break the Congress Party's hold over the peasants in a country where 80% of the population is classified rural. The Indian peasantry remains primarily under the influence of local village headmen and conservative landowners who lean toward the Congress Party. The CPI's limited support in rural areas restricts its electoral prospects. Since the 1957 general elections, the CPI has stepped up its efforts to attract peasants with small holdings, though it has done little as yet among landless agricultural laborers.

Among inner-Party vulnerabilities, factionalism is the most serious. Since its early years, the CPI has been split into three ideological groups—rightists, centrists, and leftists. These factions now appear agreed that a tactical policy of violence is inadvisable under present Indian conditions. However, they continue to disagree on the basic feasibility of capturing India by constitutional means and, concomitantly, on the nature and extent of the Party's support for the present government. Rightists are of the opinion that the CPI should extend major support both to Nehru's foreign and domestic policies in order to strengthen him vis-a-vis reactionary forces within the Congress Party and to enhance the Party's prospects for concluding united front agreements with other opposition groups and, eventually, with the left wing of the Congress Party. Leftists maintain that the CPI should preserve its ideological purity, its revolutionary character, and its "distinctive" opposition role. Centrists, who now control the Party machine, draw on the views of both extremes. The extent of this schism was indicated by a basic CPI policy directive adopted in 1956 which states on the one hand that the united front envisaged by the Party "will not be an anti-Congress front" and on the other that the CPI "must act as a party of opposition to the present government." Despite continuing ideological frictions, as well as personal animosities and inner-Party power struggle, notable defections from the Party have been rare, and the few top leaders who were suspended or expelled for indiscipline have in most cases been readmitted to Party membership. Thus the CPI draws on the aggregate of its leadership corps.

A second serious liability is the uneven distribution of Party strength. More than half the total CPI membership is concentrated in three southern states containing about 20% of the total population while the Party is notably weak in the Hindi-speaking states of north-central India which contain some 40% of India's population.

Despite the CPI's size and internal factions, it poses a definite longterm threat to India's present form of government. However, Indian Communists themselves disagree over when the Party might be in a position to capture power. Some have spoken of gaining control over India within 5 years, while others have referred to a period of 20 years or longer. CPI General Secretary Ajoy Ghosh is reported to have commented during 1958 that the crisis in the Congress Party was mounting and that the party would be replaced following Nehru's removal from active politics. He acknowledged, however, that the CPI was not equal to the assumption of national power in 1958, and he had grave doubts, given reasonable actuarial estimates of Nehru's physical survival, whether it would be equal to the opportunity when presented. Past experience indicates that the Communists' ability to carry out their objectives depends in part on the maintenance of a balance among the various factions within the Party. However, of perhaps equal importance are other factors beyond the Indian Communists' immediate control. Among the latter are the success of the present government's efforts to raise economic and social levels, the political complexion of India after Nehru, and Indian attitudes toward and relations with the Sino-Soviet bloc.

2. *History of the Communist Party of India*

The history of the Indian Communist movement since the early 1920's, when a handful of Indians first began championing Communist points of view, has been one of shifting tactical approaches, erratic growth, and continuing factionalism. Following Moscow's lead, the Communist Party of India has employed at least five strategies, all of which have involved some form of attack on the Congress Party leadership: 1) attempts to seize the leadership of the preindependence nationalist movement by militant means, 2) a popular front with the Congress Party, 3) support for the British Government of India during World War II, 4) insurrection, and 5) achievement of power through primary reliance on the ballot box. The Party made substantial gains during its three periods of moderate strategy, while internal circumstances saved it from the full impact of the two potentially disastrous periods of militant exclusiveness. Since the adoption of a moderate tactical posture in 1951, the Party has made notable progress in expanding its popular appeal.

Since 1928–29, when the Indian Communists were first organized on a regular party basis, they have tended dutifully to conform to the Moscow line. They have sometimes interpreted this line—which has on occasion been imprecise—in a way unacceptable to Moscow but have always dropped their own interpretation once Moscow's position had been made clear. However, the periodic Soviet shifts between support for the extremist and more moderate factions within the CPI, as well as the very existence of these groups, have tended to handicap the CPI in adjusting quickly to changes in the international line. Inner-Party dissension was particularly acute during the period 1948–50 when the CPI, acting on Moscow's advice, attempted to foment insurrection in India after relying on some form of united front activity for more than a decade. Factionalism again assumed serious proportions in 1953–54 when Moscow's switch to a more conciliatory policy toward Prime Minister Nehru raised widespread fears among more radical CPI elements that Communist support for Nehru would cost the Party its revolutionary *élan*. Although factional differences continue over the characterization of the Indian ruling group, the extent of the Party's tactical reliance on parliamentary means, and the proper tactical line toward the Congress government and the CPI's other political rivals, the Communist Party—in contrast to most major Indian political movements—has not actually split over ideological differences and significant defections have been rare.

A. Early Communist activity, 1920–34

The Communist Party of India was first organized on a systematic basis in late 1928 and early 1929 by a small group of radical intellectuals acting under the guidance of British Communists sent to India in the mid-1920's. However, this formalization of the Communist movement in India was preceded by nearly a decade of activity by two small groups which were attracted to communism more by its theory of violent overthrow of imperialism than by its economic or social programs. Both groups were composed of individuals critical of Gandhi's leadership of the nationalist movement and particularly of his nonviolent methods.

The first of these groups consisted of Indian expatriates in Europe, foremost among whom was M. N. Roy, a Bengali terrorist who was in close touch with Moscow and the Comintern from 1920 to 1929. Roy disagreed with Lenin's thesis that Communists should support bourgeois democratic liberation movements in Asia, but owing to his recognized abilities he was nonetheless accepted by the Comintern as the external leader of the Indian Communist movement. With Soviet financial aid, he established a headquarters in Germany, where there was a small group of Indian exiles, and began publishing in English a Communist paper, *Vanguard*, which was smuggled into India. The second group, composed of a few radical intellectuals within India, constituted the main target for Roy's activities. Through articles in *Vanguard*, personal correspondence, and the despatch of some secret agents—mostly trained at the Communist University for the Toilers of the East in Moscow—Roy attempted to induce these Indians to organize a Communist movement that would seize the initiative from Gandhi and launch an all-out struggle against British imperialism.

Roy's efforts met with little success. Indian nationalist leaders opposed violence on practical as well as moral grounds. Roy's long-distance efforts to organize radical elements in India into a party were hampered because they were few in number, widely separated, and most of their contacts with Roy and with each other were known to the British authorities in India. Most of the financial aid and virtually all of the agents sent by Roy were intercepted.

Despite Roy's inability to form a party, communism as an ideology gained some adherents in India, particularly in scattered urban centers in Bombay, Bengal, and Uttar Pradesh states. By 1924 the Communist threat was considered sufficiently important to warrant action by British officials. In February of that year one of Roy's agents and the five principal Communist agitators in India were arrested for conspiring to deprive the British King-Emperor of sovereignty over India. They were indicted, along with M. N. Roy *in absentia,* and brought to trial in Cawnpore (this became known as the Cawnpore conspiracy case). One of the five turned state's evidence, and a second was too sick to stand trial. The conviction and imprisonment of the remaining three leaders along with Roy's agent brought the Communist movement in India to a virtual standstill.

Owing primarily to the unsatisfactory state of the movement and to Roy's continuing tactical differences with other international Communist leaders, Moscow replaced M. N. Roy as the external mentor of Indian communism in about 1927 by the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), in which Clemens and R. Palme Dutt, sons of an Indian father and Swedish mother, were active. The CPGB continued to guide the Indian Communist movement until the mid-1950's, when it was replaced by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) as the source of direct guidance.

In 1926–27 the CPGB sent to India three British Communists—George Allison, Ben Bradley, and Phillip Spratt—to help their Indian comrades organize. These agents, exploiting a particularly vulnerable labor situation, organized a militant leftwing labor movement which attracted sufficient support to call major strikes in the railroad and cotton textile industries. Once a base was established among the proletariat, the three agents helped found the first regular Communist Party of India. A preliminary meeting was held at the end of 1928, and in February 1929 a full-fledged organizational meeting was held and a constitution adopted.

In March 1929 the British authorities in India again moved against the Communists. They arrested and indicted 32 men for conspiring against British sovereignty and brought them to trial at Meerut (this subsequently became known as the Meerut conspiracy case). Fifteen members of this group were Communists, one was a fellow-traveller, and the remainder had participated actively in Communist-led strikes or in the radical Workers' and Peasants' Party, which preceded establishment of the CPI. The detention of the top Party leaders disrupted CPI organizational activity from 1929–34. However, the trial, which lasted for more than three years, probably worked to the longterm advantage of the Party. It gave the Indian Communists an unequalled opportunity to publicize their views and gained them prestige since their arrest was regarded by many Indians as a punitive measure against organized labor.

Party strategy during the early 1930's was generally ultraleftist. A "Draft Platform of Action" published in the Comintern publication *Imprecor* in December 1930 called the Congress Party a "class organization of the capitalists working against the fundamental interests of the toiling masses of our country" and recommended that the Party foment "revolutionary armed insurrection . . . around the banner and under the leadership of the Communist Party of India." This reversal of the previous policy, which had allowed loose cooperation with leftwing elements in the Indian nationalist movement, was variously interpreted by Indian Communists. The new Party, which was directed from prison during the years of the Meerut trial, was split between moderates, who argued that the policy applied to the political but not to the labor field, and militants who argued against any form of cooperation with non-Communist groups. This split was the genesis of one of the continuing ideological schisms within the CPI.

B. The united front, 1935–41

During the five years immediately preceding the outbreak of World War II, the CPI, which previously had been primarily a nuisance element, assumed a position of considerable importance. Party membership grew from an estimated 150 in 1934 to several thousand in 1939, and in 1935 the CPI began publication of its first regular Party newspaper, *Communist.* This growth in CPI strength and activities resulted primarily from the successful use of united front tactics, which helped the Party capitalize on the generally favorable reputation it had gained from its earlier trade union activities and enabled it to cooperate with other groups during a period of rapid expansion of the nationalist movement. However, it also reflected the capable leadership of the Party and its effective use of systematic political training and covert organizational tactics.

The 1934–35 Moscow shift to a united front policy, formally announced at the Seventh Comintern Congress, came at a particularly opportune time for the CPI. The last of the Meerut prisoners were released in 1935, and the Party began for the first time to function on an effective country-wide basis under the leadership of P. C. Joshi. Adoption of a moderate tactical line was welcomed in Indian nationalist circles as an indication of a genuine desire by the CPI to cooperate with non-Communist groups. On a purely political plane, Communist exploitation of the new tactical line was facilitated both by the Congress Party's desire to enlist the support of all groups—whether leftist or rightist—in the independence movement and by the vigorous efforts of the newly formed Congress Socialist Party (CSP), a part of the leftwing of the all-inclusive Congress Party organization, to unite leftwing elements in an attempt to force the Congress leadership to adopt a more socialistic program. Further, the outlawing of the CPI in July 1934 by the British Government of India actually aided the Communists by giving the Party an excuse in nationalist Indian eyes for functioning as a covert organization.

Under the united front strategy, the CPI objective once again became infiltration and capture of the Congress Party, which in the mid-1930's had an estimated membership of about 500,000. The best entree to the main Congress organization was provided by the CSP. In January 1936 the CPI accepted a CSP offer to form a "national front" against British imperialism under which major emphasis was to be placed on attracting increased leftist support among laborers and the peasantry. CSP membership was opened to Communists on an individual basis (an open alliance was impossible since the CPI was illegal); each party recognized the existing sphere of activities of the other; and it was agreed that there would be no efforts to proselytize. The exact number of Communists admitted to the CSP, and thereby to the parent Congress Party, has not been reported, but it was probably no more than a few hundred. However, by establishing a system of disciplined fractions within CSP units the Communists were able to exercise disproportionate influence and to capture control of some CSP branches.

Friction between the two groups developed within a matter of months after the CPI–CSP agreement. In late 1936 some Congress Socialists began to complain of Communist efforts to recruit CSP members and capture Socialist-controlled labor, youth, and peasant groups. In mid-1937 the Socialists discovered secret CPI documents alleging that the CSP was not a true Socialist party and outlining tactics for the capture of local party units. In August of that year the CSP National Executive, the party's top governing body, voted to cease admitting Communists—although those already in the CSP were not expelled—and subsequent contact between the two groups for a time was largely limited to formal exchanges between CSP General Secretary Jaya Prakash Narayan and P. C. Joshi.

In early 1939 the CPI joined with the CSP and the more radical Forward Bloc, also a component of the Congress Party, in the first serious bid to capture the Congress organization. With the support of individual leftists within the Congress, these groups defeated Gandhi's nominee for the Congress presidency and reelected Subhas Chandra Bose, a leader of the Forward Bloc. However, it became apparent, when the Gandhians refused to serve under Bose on the Congress executive committee, that the leftists could capture the party machine only at the cost of splitting it. Faced with this prospect, the Communists, who still hoped to influence or possibly capture a unified independence movement, backed down, as did the CSP, and Bose resigned from office.

During the summer of 1939 the CPI followed a moderate line toward the Congress Party leadership. Communists continued to express dissatisfaction with the dominant rightist element within that party but disavowed any intention of unseating it. The prevailing attitude was summed up by Harry Pollitt of the Communist Party of Great Britain as follows: "The question of paramount importance in India in our view is the unity of all national forces under the leadership of the Indian National Congress." This truce between the Communists and the Congress right wing, however, was short lived.

The crucial factor affecting the Communists' tactics and their relations with other parties after the Nazi-Soviet pact in August and the outbreak of hostilities in September 1939 was the attitude of these parties toward the war. Congress Party leaders adopted an equivocal policy which left the door open for further negotiations with the British and indicated possible support for the war effort if India were guaranteed postwar independence. Initially the Congress Socialists, Communists, and Forward Bloc were militantly opposed to aiding the war effort. In late 1939 the CSP National Executive suspended the party's provincial constitutions and brought provincial units under the direct control of the national headquarters in a move to prepare for underground activity should CSP opposition to the war evoke governmental repression. This move virtually forced the CPI to break away if it wished to retain control over those

CSP units it had captured. As a result of Communist obstructionism in carrying out this CSP directive, the already strained relations between the CPI and CSP deteriorated rapidly. In March 1940 Communists were formally expelled from the CSP ranks when the Socialist leader, Narayan, switched to a more conciliatory stand toward the war effort. CPI members remained within the main Congress organization until their expulsion in 1945.

During the slightly more than four years that the CSP and CPI were linked, Communist membership is estimated to have grown from a few hundred to between 3,000 and 4,000, a majority of whom were concentrated in southern India where Communists controlled the Andhra, Kerala, and Tamil Nad (Madras) branches of the CSP. At the time of the 1940 CSP–CPI split these units went over almost en masse to the Communist camp, and the democratic Socialist movement in south India has never recovered from this mass defection.

C. Wartime collaboration, 1942–45

The Soviet demand that all Communist Parties support the war against fascism following the Nazi attack on the U.S.S.R. in mid-1941 presented the CPI with a serious dilemma. This advice was at direct odds not only with the inclinations of the more radical Communist elements but also with nationalist Indian sentiment, which was increasingly insistent on guarantees of postwar independence as a precondition to supporting the war effort. Nevertheless, after several months of internal confusion the CPI reversed its policy, and in the spring of 1942, it extended full support to the British war effort and attacked the Congress Party for its obstructionist attitude. This time militant sentiment in south India handicapped the Communists. The south Indian branches of the CPI were the last to fall in line, trailing all others by several months.

The British Government of India welcomed the Communists' offers to help mobilize students and labor and to recruit volunteers for the army. The ban on Communist organizations was lifted in July 1942; those CPI leaders who had been arrested in March 1940 for militant opposition to India's participation in the war were released; and P. C. Joshi, then underground, emerged once again to assume open leadership of the Party.

On August 8, 1942, the Working Committee of the Congress Party adopted the so-called "quit India" resolution demanding an immediate end to British rule over India and threatening to launch a massive nonviolent resistance movement. As a result of this move the Congress Party was outlawed by the government, and most top party leaders were arrested. Since most CSP and Forward Bloc leaders were already in police custody or underground, the CPI was left with an open field for its organizational activities. At first progress by the Communists was slow, but by 1945 the Party had extended in breadth as well as in depth. During the period 1942–45 the Communists captured the leading Congress Party labor and peasant organizations—the All-India Trade Union Congress and the All-India Kisan Sabha (Peasants' Association). Party membership rose from an estimated 4,000 in the spring of 1942 to about 53,000 at the beginning of 1946.

D. Postwar interim, 1945–47

The position of the Communists was challenged shortly after the end of World War II when leaders of the Congress and of other political parties were released from prison. In December 1945 the Congress Party Working Committee expelled those Communists who remained within the party for violating party policy during the war years, and the uneasy collaboration between the two groups, lasting nearly a decade, was ended. The 1945–46 provincial elections, the first elections in which the CPI participated openly, demonstrated that the CPI had become a significant factor in Indian politics but was in no position to compete in overt political activity with the two major parties, the Congress and Muslim League. In these elections the Communist Party won only 8 seats in provincial assemblies, whereas it had hoped to capture 25, and polled about 2½% of the total vote.

The extent of popular disapproval of the Communists' wartime collaboration with the British was indicated by attacks in the immediate postwar period on CPI offices in Bombay and Calcutta and on Party workers selling Communist publications on the streets of the major metropolitan centers. International guidance was vague and imprecise during this period, owing undoubtedly to the Soviet Union's preoccupation with pressing problems. CPI leaders, left largely on their own, differed over their interpretation of the "correct" tactical line. However, in general, the Party followed a militant policy during the first year and a half after the war in an attempt to regain its reputation as a militant, anti-imperialist force.

The party's attempt to rehabilitate itself in the Indian political environment took two basic forms. First, it launched a concerted propaganda campaign to convince the people that the Party was the true heir of revolutionary tradition. Communist pamphlets and periodicals claimed credit for most pre-World War II revolutionary activity in India and asserted that many of the terrorists active in Bengal and Punjab during the 1920's and 1930's were close associates of the CPI. Secondly, it organized strikes and peasant demonstrations as a means of sparking an all-out struggle that would force the British to withdraw. This aggressive nationalist-sounding line did much to rehabilitate the CPI and to strengthen inner-Party morale. Communist relations with radical groups, such as the Forward Bloc and the Marxist but anti-Moscow Revolutionary Socialist Party, which had been badly fractured during the war, improved noticeably. Particularly useful in improving the Communists' standing with radical elements and even with some nonradical nationalists were actions such as the Party's strong press support for the Royal Indian Navy mutiny in 1946.* As an index to the success of these efforts, Party membership grew from an estimated 60,000 in early 1946 to about 90,000 at the beginning of 1948.

In early 1947, when it became clear that independence was imminent and that Jawaharlal Nehru would head the new government, the Communists shifted to a moderate line openly aimed at winning Nehru over to the Communist camp. Both Moscow and the CPGB** set forth the new line which was formally enunciated in a CPI Central Committee resolution which: stressed the need for "bringing new strength to the popular government for the realization of complete independence"; declared that the Communists would "fully cooperate with the national leadership"; and urged the national leadership to "join the world democratic camp led by the Soviet Union." When it became apparent, shortly after the achievement of Indian independence in August 1947, that Nehru would not join the Soviet bloc, the CPI Central Committee terminated its short-lived moderate tactical line and, following the policy announced at the first Cominform conference in Warsaw in September 1947, denounced the Congress Party regime as a government of "collaborationist *bourgeoisie* collaborating with Anglo-American imperialism."

E. Insurrectionary activity, 1948–51

In early 1948 the official Communist estimate of conditions in India was that the country was ripe for armed insurrection. The political resolution adopted at the second Party Congress in March denounced Nehru's policy of neutralism as "nothing more than a cover for collaboration with British and American imperialism" and called for a one-stage revolution to unseat the ruling group and smash landlordism and capitalism. The mechanism to achieve this goal was to be a "democratic" front from below, consisting of an alliance among the working class, the peasantry, and the progressive intelligentsia and including members of the Congress Party, Muslim League, and Socialist groups who were to be recruited "in opposition to their leaders."

P. C. Joshi, a moderate who had led the Party since 1935, was replaced as general secretary by B. T. Ranadive, head of the most radical faction within the Party. Although Joshi was prepared to admit errors of "right reformism" and to support an aggressive policy in line with the Cominform shift, he opposed the extremist position which advocated full-scale attack on all "bourgeois" elements in the Congress government. He subscribed to the view that the *bourgeoisie* was split into "nationalist" and "imperialist" elements, and he maintained that the extremist approach would force into active opposition many people who might be won over to communism or at least neutralized. Although a number of Party members supported the Joshi interpretation, this group was in a definite minority, and, when Joshi publicly appealed over the heads of the new Party leadership for intervention by foreign Communist parties, the new leadership ruled that he was guilty of serious indiscipline, suspended him from the Party in 1949, and expelled him in 1950. (He was readmitted in 1951.)

The CPI immediately launched an all-out attack on the new Congress government and on the draft Indian constitution, modeled on Western parliamentary lines. The Congress Party was charged with abandoning the people and selling out to monopoly capitalism and Western imperialism. The people were urged to oppose the constitution and the alleged Congress-imperialist conspiracy. In an effort to spark the final revolution, the CPI attempted to foment large-scale strikes in the cities, peasant disturbances in rural areas, and violent uprisings among tribal groups in the strategic border areas of eastern Assam.

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* The CPI now claims to have played a major role in the mutiny, but this claim—apart from the Party's news campaign supporting the struggle—rests primarily on the fact that Aruna Asaf Ali and some of her followers in the left Socialist movement who were active in leading the mutiny subsequently joined the CPI.

** The Communist Party in the United Kingdom was known as the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) from the time of its founding in 1920 until 1943, when the Comintern was dissolved and the Party sought to take on a national, rather than international, character. From 1943 to 1959 it was known as the British Communist Party (BCP). In the spring of 1959, it reverted to its original name. For the sake of simplicity, it is referred to as the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) throughout this Supplement.

The Congress-controlled state governments responded promptly. On March 25, 1948, only a few weeks after the close of the second Party Congress, the government of West Bengal declared the Communist Party illegal and arrested a number of its leaders on the grounds that the Communists were arming the people in an attempt to capture power. On April 2, 1948, the government of Bombay, following a search of Party files, took seven top Communists into custody and charged three with "activities dangerous to public safety." The government of Madras, which was particularly harassed by Communist activity in the Telegu- and Malayalam-speaking regions of that state, tightened its security measures and sent troops to the disturbed areas. Communists were taken into custody also at Cuttack, Orissa; Nāgpur and Amraotī in Madhya Pradesh; Jharia and Pātan in Bihār; and Simla in Punjab. In addition, the Party was declared illegal in the states of Travancore-Cochin and Hyderābād.

In late 1948 the CPI Politburo, meeting for the first time since the second Party Congress, formulated a program envisaging the immediate seizure of power through a general strike which was to be sparked by a national railway strike on March 9, 1949. The railroad strike was a total failure owing to repressive measures by the government, the refusal of Socialist-led railway unions to participate, and the lack of unanimity on the advisability of such a strike within the CPI itself.

In mid-1949 the Politburo began a wholesale reorganization of the CPI provincial committees under the pretense of "proletarianizing the Party" and eliminating "reformist" elements that had sabotaged the strike call. This was followed by the inauguration of a program of open subversion. Communists in prison were ordered to go on hunger strikes and to create disturbances in order to embarrass the government and enlist popular sympathy. Those outside prison were instructed to engage in violence to pave the way for the revolution. Detailed instructions were issued for the formation and training of guerrilla bands and shock brigades. Training camps were established in various parts of the country, and the manufacture of arms was begun in small workshops. The areas of greatest activity were the Telegu-speaking regions of Hyderābād (Telengana) and northern Madras (now united in the state of Andhra Pradesh), and the northeastern states of Assam and West Bengal. Police outposts were attacked, villages were raided, and cultivators were urged to defy the authorities and to refuse rent and revenue payments. Parallel governments were formed in a few rural areas, which effectively replaced the local legal governments in civil administration, and attempts were made to sabotage communications and public utilities.

Although the Communists made important gains among the peasantry in the Telegu-speaking area between 1948 and 1950, the net effects of the Party's strategy of violent revolution were to: 1) strengthen the government's determination to deal firmly with the Communist Party; 2) mobilize popular support behind the government and against the Communists; 3) aggravate dissension within the CPI; and 4) reduce Party membership and weaken Communist-front organizations. The militant policy had clearly not been successful. The wave of government arrests of Communist leaders drove the Party underground and broke Party communications almost completely. During this period CPI membership reportedly dwindled to below 30,000 as compared with 90,000 in early 1948.

The failure of these CPI tactics led to a steadily increasing agitation within the Party for the adoption of a new political line. This agitation was brought to a head when a November 1949 Moscow directive and a January 1950 Cominform publication failed to support the existing CPI policy and recommended that the Party follow the successful "Chinese path" to power by concentrating its activities among the peasantry and by attempting to gain support among the urban petty *bourgeoisie*. The first step in this direction was taken in May 1950 when the Central Committee was reconstituted. B. T. Ranadive, who was critical of the policies of Mao Tse-tung, was removed as general secretary and replaced by C. Rajeshwar Rao, leader of the Andhra group—which favored concentration on the peasantry—and a strong proponent of the Chinese tactical line. The revised Party strategy was still based on the assumption that a "revolutionary situation" existed in India, but it combined partisan warfare in certain rural areas where the Communists were strong with legal tactics and organization in the rest of the country. This tactical approach was particularly popular with the Andhra-Telengana section of the CPI, which had substantially increased its strength in the 1948–50 period and was in virtual control of a number of areas in the Telegu-speaking region. However, it was opposed by other Indian Communists, notably S. A. Dange and Ajoy Ghosh, who argued that, despite certain shifts of emphasis, this was essentially the same policy of violence and revolution as that advocated by Ranadive and would also end in failure. Opponents of the Andhra group received official recognition in late 1950 when R. Palme Dutt, the British Communist leader, urged the CPI to drop armed struggle and work for the establishment of an anti-imperialist national front.

F. Parliamentary activity, 1952–59

By 1951 most Communists recognized that the effort to seize power by force had failed, and, under continued pressure from Moscow, the CPI switched to the moderate policy which has subsequently been its basic tactical framework. The Policy Directive adopted in 1951 announced that although the Communist brand of "socialism" was still the Party goal, the CPI was not demanding its establishment "in the present stage of development." The Party renounced violence as an immediate tactic and set as its goal replacement through peaceful means of the present "antidemocratic" and "antipopular" Congress government by a "people's democracy" consisting of a coalition of all "democratic, antifeudal, and anti-imperialist forces in the country." This formulation represented two basic shifts in the CPI approach to Indian politics. First, it returned to the concept that the "revolution" (the seizure of power) could take place in two stages; the Party would first capture political power in a leftist coalition government, and later eliminate its allies and establish a Communist regime. Secondly, the CPI redefined its potential "allies"—those who could help achieve the first stage of the revolution—to include four classes: the peasantry, proletariat, "petty *bourgeoisie*" (white collar workers and small tradesmen), and "national *bourgeoisie*" (the "anti-imperialist" section of the capitalist class). On the international level the 1951 statement called for a dual struggle against the United Kingdom, to which India allegedly remained subservient, and against the United States, "the chief enemy of peace and advocate of an aggressive war."

The Central Committee of the CPI was reorganized during 1951, and Ajoy Ghosh, whose special talents lie in the fields of parliamentary tactics and inner-Party conciliation, was elected general secretary.

The Communists first tested their new tactical line in the 1951–52 general elections, India's first national elections since independence. By playing on local grievances and shrewdly concentrating their efforts in areas where their strength was greatest, the Communists captured 23 seats in the central *Lok Sabha* (House of the People). In addition, two independents, elected in Travancore-Cochin where the Party was still illegal, also joined the Communist parliamentary bloc. Although the CPI won only 5% of the total seats, it was the largest single opposition group in Parliament. It also won a significant number of seats in West Bengal and in four state legislatures in South India. (For further information on these and subsequent elections see this Supplement, SECTION 4, under Role in Elections.) This performance, which was highly creditable considering the Party's loss of popular support during the 1948–51 period of violence, confirmed the wisdom of following a moderate policy and further strengthened the moderate faction which had assumed control over the Party apparatus only a short time before.

The history of the CPI from 1951 to 1958 was one of gradual evolution toward the right, increasing tactical reliance on the ballot box to attain power, and a concerted campaign to gain respectability. However, this period was also characterized by intense inner-Party friction centering on three interrelated issues: 1) the Communists' attitude toward Nehru and his government; 2) the extent to which the Party should follow constitutional methods; and 3) the determination of India's "main enemy."

Between 1951 and 1953 a few P. C. Joshi followers favored Communist support for some of Prime Minister Nehru's most popular policies as a tactical move, but the bulk of the CPI supported the 1951 Party line of attacking Nehru as well as the entire Congress-controlled government as reactionary. However, the magnitude of the Congress Party victory in the 1951–52 elections, Nehru's growing international stature, and India's increasingly active role on international issues produced a softening in the international Communist attitude toward Nehru and his government. In mid-1953 a Moscow directive instructed the CPI to stop criticizing Nehru; this was an attempt to encourage his government to support Communist objectives in the international field.

This directive seriously aggravated the CPI's internal differences. The moderates, including the rightist Joshi faction, were prepared to support Nehru's policy of neutrality, but leftists within the Party opposed such a move on both ideological and practical grounds. Some believed it would be apparent that this reversal of a basic policy followed since 1947 had been dictated by Moscow and that the Party's reputation would thereby be damaged. Others, notably the extremist Ranadive faction and the Andhra group, which hoped to capture control of the new Andhra State carved out of Madras State in October 1953, expressed the fear that the new line of conciliating Nehru would be tantamount to abandoning all opposition to the Congress Party and that the CPI would thereby lose its distinctive opposition character.

This difference was brought before the third Party Congress held in Madura (Madras state) in December 1953 and January 1954. At this meeting Ghosh and Dange, with the support of the British Communist leader, Harry Pollitt, took the lead in formulating the Party line. On the Party's attitude toward Nehru, the political resolution adopted at Madura stated that although "certain acts and declarations of the Nehru Government . . . have been helpful to peace," the "situation does not warrant that all democratic forces should uncritically and unconditionally give general overall support to the governmental policies even in the international sphere." This line represented an uneasy compromise between the Ranadive and Andhra group on the one hand and, on the other, the P. C. Joshi faction which by this time advocated Communist support for Nehru on a number of domestic as well as foreign policy issues. The Madura resolution reiterated the 1951 dictum that the CPI should fight a dual struggle against the United Kingdom for the attainment of full Indian freedom and against the United States, described as the "major menace on the international front." However, it placed greater emphasis on the latter and as a concomitant called for increased stress on the Communist "peace" campaign.

Inner-Party dissension reached a peak during the months following the third Party Congress. Rivalry between the moderates and leftists resulted in some defections and expulsions and reportedly in the disruption of internal alliances. The radical Andhra group, in contravention of the Madura thesis that the Party concentrate on the formation of a "democratic united front," reportedly formed illegal Communist local governments in a number of villages and engaged in terrorism in parts of Telengana. On the other hand, there were unmistakable signs in the direction of the program favored by Moscow. In one or two areas the hammer and sickle emblem was dropped from the flags of Communist peasant organizations in an attempt to enhance their popular appeal. Communists organized meetings to publicize Nehru's opposition to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, his proposal for seating Communist China in the UN, and his statement that Communist China had a legal right to Taiwan. The fellow-travelling newspaper *Blitz* began to praise certain aspects of Nehru's domestic as well as foreign policies.

In October 1954 the Cominform printed an article by R. Palme Dutt which made two main points: 1) India had actually achieved independence, and 2) CPI efforts should be directed against the United States as the major menace to world peace. Since one of the major Communist arguments previously had been that the Congress Party was subservient to British imperialist interests and hence must be ousted before India could achieve real freedom, the article appeared to imply that the domestic fight against the Congress Party should be subordinated to the problem of mobilizing Indian opinion against the United States. The CPI reportedly received supplementary detailed comments from R. Palme Dutt which also emphasized the necessity of pushing the anti-U.S. campaign in India.

In December 1954, General Secretary Ajoy Ghosh, following his return from Moscow, announced that Nehru's foreign policy had shifted to a more truly neutral position, as demonstrated by India's opposition to the U.S. military aid agreement with Pakistan, and that the Congress-initiated five year plan, which the CPI had previously denounced, was achieving some economic improvement. These kind words for some of the Congress government's domestic as well as foreign policies by the CPI's official spokesman evoked noticeably less opposition from the radical faction than in 1953. However, it was nonetheless clear that, despite the apparent modification of the Madura thesis, the dual line of struggle was for all practical purposes still in effect, and that the CPI would continue its domestic political fight against the Congress.

The February 1955 special elections in Andhra State demonstrated that the CPI had made considerable progress towards achieving united action despite its inner disputes. The Party rallied all its resources to contest the elections in the hope of establishing a Communist-dominated state government. "Leftists," "centrists," and "rightists" united to conduct an intensive, well-financed campaign which netted the CPI 31% of the popular vote. However, the Congress Party, through mobilization of its own out-of-state financial and organizational resources and conclusion of an electoral alliance with two minor parties, defeated many Communist candidates and reduced CPI strength in the state legislature from 40 to 15. Although the Andhra election results were a hard blow to the morale and finances of the Andhra branch of the Party, it was indicative of the changing attitude of the radical faction that it did not take the defeat as a signal to push for a return to a strategy of violence.

By the time of the fourth Party Congress, held at Pālghāt in the Malabar district of Madras State in April 1956, it was clear that radical elements within the CPI had been largely won over to supporting legal tactics—at least as a temporary strategy—although they continued to differ with the rightists and centrists over the extent of support to be given to the Nehru government and over the degree to which the Party should rely on parliamentary means to achieve power. The political resolution adopted at the Pālghāt congress represented a compromise among various groups within the Party and indicated two major shifts of emphasis from the line established at the 1953–54 Party Congress. First, India's foreign policy was described as vacillating but essentially independent and as a policy of peace. Ajoy Ghosh observed before the 1956 Party Congress that the Party's 1953–54 interpretation was "sectarian" in that it failed to take into account the "direction in which the government's foreign policy was moving" and the opportunities for CPI exploitation of the Indian government's opposition to the U.S.-Pakistan mutual security agreement. The CPI claimed credit for the "progressive" features of Indian foreign policy and emphasized the need to further this trend by strengthening India's relations with the "peace-loving" Communist nations and by opposing Anglo-U.S. "imperialist" influences which were attempting to draw India into the "war camp." Secondly, on the domestic front, the CPI formally recognized that "progressive elements" in the Congress government were trying to industrialize and to push economic, social, and cultural reforms, but stated that the achievement of these objectives was seriously handicapped by concessions made under the influence of "reactionary" elements to foreign "imperialists" and to domestic "feudal" and "monopoly capitalist" interests. Accordingly, the CPI set as its goal the formation of a broad "united front of peasants, workers, and national *bourgeoisie*" that would cooperate in attempting to curb these concessions and would press for accelerated national development. Despite its support for "progressive" features of the government's domestic and foreign policies, the CPI stated clearly that it would function as a "party of opposition."

This elaboration of the Party line, with its emphasis on legal tactics, clearly defined support to the government, and maintenance of the CPI's role as an opposition party, had the triple advantage of 1) making the CPI appear to have abandoned its doctrinaire opposition to all non-Communist groups, 2) providing the Party with a nationalistic sounding argument for leading the attack on "anti-people" policies of the Congress government, and 3) simultaneously aiding the Communist effort to woo Prime Minister Nehru and "progressive" elements in the Congress. The political resolution adopted at Pālghāt made it clear that the CPI "while resolutely fighting for every progress that can be made under present conditions," would push on to its ultimate goal. It spoke of using the comparatively peaceful and legal tactics of "mass propaganda" as the means for achieving a "people's democratic" government that would "complete the tasks of democratic revolution" and "put the country on the path to socialism."

Although the resolution incorporated most of the ideas of the Joshi faction, which believed that the Party's best chance for growth was to become identified with nationalistic sentiment, it also made some concessions to radical elements which were concerned lest Communist endorsement of certain governmental policies prevent the CPI from waging a strong campaign against the Congress Party and its government.

The Pālghāt Party Congress was followed by an Extraordinary Party Congress held at Amritsar (Punjab State) in April 1958. Bolstered by its performance in the 1957 general elections, in which the CPI polled nearly 10% of the vote and captured control over Kerala State, the Party continued its evolution toward a moderate, rightist strategy. The prime purpose of the Amritsar Congress was to adopt a new moderate-appearing constitution to aid the CPI in 1) persuading other political groups and the unsophisticated Indian voter that the CPI was a bona fide indigenous political party, and 2) developing the special organizational framework required for building a mass party while retaining and, if possible, strengthening actual central direction and control.

The constitution adopted at Amritsar proclaimed that the Party "strives to achieve full democracy and socialism by peaceful means." Organizational terms with connotations of dictatorship and subversion, such as "Politburo" and "cell," were dropped in favor of names like "Secretariat" and "branch." An ambiguous section was also included indicating that if the Communists came to power they would guarantee "the widest possible extension" of individual liberties, and also the right of political organization to all, including those in opposition to the government, "as long as they abide by the constitution of the country." Much was also made at the Amritsar Party Congress of the "new freedom" of inner-Party debate in accordance with Moscow's 1957 recognition of "national roads to socialism."

At the same time, Communist leaders made it clear that there had been no fundamental change in the Party's goals, its external loyalties, or its organizational methods. Subsequent policy statements indicate that strong central direction and control continue to be used and that violence is not ruled out as a future tactic if the Party should deem such action necessary. Reminders that the CPI was still pledged to full-fledged communism and that violent tactics could be resumed seemed primarily aimed at justifying continued authoritarian control and at discouraging Party members from taking seriously Party propaganda that the CPI is a democratic organization. Like earlier Party pronouncements, the political resolution adopted at Amritsar emphasized the need to "combat individualism and restore discipline" in the Party, and in October 1958 the Central Executive Committee warned against the "heavy inroad of alien ideas," including not only "bourgeois nationalism," "reformism," and "sectarianism," but also what it termed "anarchistic concepts of organization."

In the year since the Amritsar Party Congress there has been no basic change in Party line or tactics. The CPI has continued to reiterate the goals of combatting the "U.S. menace to peace" and of striving "to achieve socialism by peaceful methods." In working for these objectives it has also continued to stress the tactics of organizing "a powerful mass movement" based on the "working class and its allies" and "backing it with mass sanctions" to overcome the resistance of "reactionary" forces both inside and outside the Congress government. Since the Amritsar Congress, however, the CPI attitude towards Prime Minister Nehru has become more critical. In October 1958 the CPI Central Executive Committee, replying to charges by Nehru that Communist rule had contributed to a sense of fear and insecurity in Kerala, accused the Prime Minister of distortion of fact, partisanship, and unconstitutional interference in the affairs of a state government. Although the Communists have continued to treat Prime Minister Nehru with respect and to draw a distinction between him and "reactionary elements" in the Congress, since mid-1958 there have been fewer notes of Communist praise for his "independent policies" and less mention of "progressive elements" in the Congress Party. Instead the CPI National Council at its October 1958 meeting spoke of the "bankruptcy of Congress policies," the "dwindling support for the Congress Party," and the growing "mass struggles and mass discontent." This development indicates that Party leaders may believe they went too far at the Amritsar Party Congress in supporting Nehru and his government. In late 1958 and early 1959 there were reports that the Party planned to place increased emphasis on covert organization and operational techniques. It thus appears likely that the CPI, while continuing to operate within the framework of its peaceful, parliamentary tactical line, may be reverting to a position of more doctrinaire opposition to the present Indian government. However, its ultimate course will, as in the past, be determined by the dictates of the Soviet Union.

3. *Organization*

A. Structure

1. Principles of organization

The CPI is organized on the basis of a constitution adopted in April 1958. The 1958 constitution is at least the sixth constitution adopted by the Party since 1929 and replaced a constitution drawn up in 1954. The organization of the Party under the 1958 constitution is shown in FIGURE 3-1. Like its predecessors, the 1958 document calls for five territorial levels of organization—national, provincial (state),* district, intermediate, and basic—and asserts the Communist concept of "democratic centralism" as the guiding principle of Party organization and operation.

In the field of Party structure "democracy" requires that all executive organizations be elected but "centralism" requires that these executives at each echelon except the very lowest be elected not by the membership but by the executives of the next lower echelon. Similarly, although all Party members may engage in free and frank discussion within their Party units of all questions affecting the Party and its work, the minority must carry out the decision of the majority, the lower Party organizations are responsible to and must carry out the decisions of the higher Party organs, and the individual must subordinate himself to the will of the collective. In the CPI, as in Communist parties elsewhere, centralism has been the dominating principle; a very small group of national leaders has determined Party policy; elections have been carefully controlled; and representative bodies, particularly at the national level, at their infrequent meetings have done little more than ratify the policies handed down to them from above. Despite the emphasis on strong central control, however, the CPI has consistently failed to achieve the strong monolithic unity to which it aspires largely because of factionalism, indiscipline, and indifference at all Party levels.

Much more than its predecessors, the 1958 CPI constitution emphasizes the "democratic" element in "democratic centralism" in accord with the Party's current effort to present itself to the public as peaceful and progressive rather than revolutionary. This new emphasis is reflected in organizational changes, primarily at the national level, in the abandonment of distinctive Communist terms, such as Politburo, cell, and fraction, and in the operating principles laid down to govern the behavior of the individual Party member.

The organizational changes adopted in 1958 are ostensibly directed toward broadening Party leadership and making it more responsive to the membership. Thus the 3-level system of national leadership under the 1954 constitution—a Politburo responsible to a Central Committee elected by and responsible to an All-India Party Congress—has been replaced by a 4-level system in which the highest echelon, the Secretariat is responsible to a Central Executive Committee elected by a National Council which is in turn elected by a Party Congress representing the provincial organizations. In effect the Secretariat, with 6 to 8 members, merely replaces the former 9-member Politburo, and the 25-member Central Executive Committee replaces the former 39-member Central Committee. Thus, at the very highest level of Party direction, and in its real focus of power, participation has been narrowed rather than widened, although this point has been obscured by Party propaganda describing the Secretariat as a new body, the Central Executive Committee as the new equivalent of the Politburo, and the 101-member National Council as replacing the Central Committee. Since the Party Congress remains, as it was in the past, the only body representing the next lower territorial echelon by election and theoretically the "supreme organ of the Party," the National Council appears to be the only really

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* The Party constitution provides for "state or provincial" units. The distinction in the use of these terms is not clear, but it appears that Party leaders intended that "state" should be used to describe organizations coterminous with the present Indian state boundaries, whereas "provincial" would be used for Party units in Bombay State where two Party units exist—the Maharashtra and Gujarāt provincial committees which correspond to the areas occupied by the two major linguistic groups in the state—and in the federal territories and federally-administered areas. In practice, the term "provincial," a holdover from the period of British rule, has been retained to describe all second-level administrative units in CPI publications and inner-Party documents, and this term is used throughout in this discussion. As a rule these provincial committees assume the name of the state in which they are situated with the major exceptions of Bombay and Madras states; in the latter the committee is called the *Tamil Nad* (land of the Tamils) Provincial Committee after the historical name of this region.


NATIONAL
NATIONAL PARTY CONGRESS
Presidium
Central Control Commission
NATIONAL COUNCIL (101 Members)
Central Executive Committee (25 Members)
Secretariat (6–8 Members)
Audit Commission
STATE OR PROVINCIAL
PROVINCIAL CONFERENCE
Presidium
Provincial Control Commission
PROVINCIAL COUNCIL (101 Members)
Provincial Executive Committee (25 Members)
Secretariat (7–9 Members)
Audit Commission
DISTRICT
District Conference
District Council
District Executive Committee
Secretariat
Audit Commission
INTERMEDIATE (Optional)
Intermediate Conference
Intermediate Executive Committee
Secretariat
BASIC
General Body Meeting of Party Branch
Branch
Secretary
Assistant Secretary
KEY
Election
Broad Party Control

FIGURE 3-1. ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA, 1958

new element in the national Party structure as established in 1958. Elected by the Party Congress from among its members and meeting semiannually, the National Council is the "highest authority" between the biennial congresses and has been presented as a means for developing "maximum initiative" at all levels and making the views of the membership known to the top leadership. Although the establishment of this new echelon may open up possibilities for change in the future, there has been no indication to date that its existence has in any way affected the dominant power of the Secretariat. Moreover, since the National Council elects the members of the Central Executive Committee and the Secretariat, a function previously performed by the much larger Party Congress, its establishment, like the decreased size of the two highest echelons, represents a restriction on rather than an expansion of the role of the Party's lower levels in the selection of national leadership.

As in the case of changes in Party structure, the increased emphasis on democracy in the "internal life of the Party" seems to have little if any genuine content. Although, as compared with the 1954 constitution, the 1958 document devotes much more space to emphasizing the resolution of differences by discussion and to reiterating the right of the Party member to make his views known and the obligation of the higher echelons to consider the views of lower echelons and individual members, the basic principle of complete subordination to Party decisions remains firmly fixed.

2. Central organization

The central organization of the CPI consists of two representative bodies, the Party Congress and the National Council, in which supreme power is theoretically vested, and the high command, which includes the Central Executive Committee, the Secretariat, the Central Control Commission, the Audit Commission, and a supporting headquarters staff. The establishment of the National Council has introduced a new element at the representative level since this body remains in existence between the sessions of the Party Congress which, in contrast, is elected anew for each of its meetings.

a. PARTY CONGRESS — Under the 1958 Party constitution the Party Congress is to meet once every two years at a place and time to be determined by the National Council. An Extraordinary Congress may be convened at the discretion of the National Council or when demanded by provincial Party organizations representing at least one-third of the total membership. Four regular congresses have been held since 1943, the first in Bombay in May 1943, the second in Calcutta in February 1948, the third in Madura in December 1953–January 1954, and the fourth in Pālghāt in

April 1956. In April 1958 a special congress was held at Amritsar which has also been referred to in Party literature as an Extraordinary Congress.

Membership in the Party Congress is of two types, ex officio and elective. Members of the Central Control Commission and the Central Executive Committee are the ex officio members of the congress; members of the National Council may attend its meetings but may not vote unless they have been elected as delegates by provincial conferences.

Under the 1958 constitution the National Council fixes the number of delegates each provincial conference is to elect to the congress on the basis of the number of members whose dues quota of 10% to the national organization has been paid. Information on the number of delegates elected to the first three congresses is incomplete, and reports of the numbers attending vary. Reportedly 139 delegates attended the first All-India Party Congress. The second was attended by 632 delegates, according to non-Communist press reports, and by 919, according to a Party newspaper. For the third congress, various reports put the number in attendance between 249 and 294. At the fourth congress, 427 delegates were elected and 395 attended, and at the Extraordinary Party Congress in April 1958, 596 were elected and 475 attended. At the third congress, representation was based on a ratio of one delegate for every 200 members on the rolls, with a minimum of 3 delegates for each unit qualifying as a provincial organization. The same formula cannot have been used for the fourth and Amritsar congresses; the Party's own membership figures for those years are 102,000 and 218,000, respectively, and the ratio would therefore have been on the order of 1 delegate to 238 and 365 members, without taking into account the number of national headquarters representatives (reportedly 17 attending the third congress and 44 elected to the congress of 1958) or any provision setting a minimum number of delegates from each state or province.

The constitution describes the Party Congress as the "supreme organ" of the Party. The congress discusses and acts on the political and organizational report of the National Council, passes on the reports of the Audit Commission and the Central Control Commission, and hears and decides on appeals from disciplinary action. It revises the Party program and constitution and approves the Party's policy and tactical line. It elects the Central Control Commission and the National Council, the latter by secret ballot, and a Presidium to conduct the congress; the Presidium ceases to exist when the congress adjourns. Until the establishment of the National Council in 1958, the congress also elected the members of the Central Committee and the Politburo.

In practice the congress has been less important than the prevailing constitution implied. A congress is convened only when the high command deems the time right for a large all-Party gathering. Relatively few of the delegates have any real impact on the proceedings except by voting, and many delegates do not bother to vote on the most important resolution, the political resolution. On the whole, the congress is largely a ratifying body.

The congress is not without significance, however, in several respects. Since the small leadership group actually determines the time of convening, and this group has chosen to call only five congresses during the Party's entire lifetime, the mere fact that a congress is summoned is likely to signalize some important development in the Party. It may mean the adoption of a changed policy or tactic or, as in the case of the congress held in 1958, of organizational changes. Dissension within the Party may have reached such proportions that the leadership feels compelled to honor the commitment to "inner-Party democracy" by calling a session of the "supreme" body of the Party. By the same token the calling of a congress is a demonstration to all Indians that the Party is "democratic" enough to submit proposed policies and plans to a sizable number of members.

The congress does provide a forum where policy and program are hotly debated, and the leadership has been at times under severe fire in these meetings. Important concessions have been sought and won by various factions. Usually, however, the prevailing leadership's steamroller has served to produce a result not too unlike that planned. Most amendments submitted by delegates to the important political and organizational resolutions, which are drafted by the high command, are withdrawn or defeated. According to available information the fourth congress, held in 1956, was the first at which an alternative political resolution was offered; this resolution was supported by about one fourth of the delegates. At the 1958 congress an amendment that would have undermined the intent of the draft political resolution, although defeated, won a surprisingly large vote—135 to 210. The vote on the political resolution itself was 450 to 20.

For most of the rank-and-file delegates the CPI congresses are probably high points in otherwise drab lives. There is a flurry of activity for some weeks or months both preceding and following a congress. Provincial conferences are held to elect delegates and to consider draft proposals that will be voted upon, which are usually circulated in advance by the high command. Afterwards many meetings are held by state and local Party organizations to hear reports of the proceedings and to make plans for carrying out congress decisions. Parades, rallies, mass meetings, and entertainments held in conjunction with the congress provide a festive atmosphere. In the business sessions, delegates have an opportunity to observe their national leaders in competitive action and to assess their qualities, forming impressions that may be conveyed to Party members back home. Any delegate may enjoy a moment of glory by offering amendments to proposed resolutions, even though most of them are withdrawn or defeated. At the 1956 congress more than 450 amendments were reportedly offered, and at the 1958 congress, more than 500.

The business sessions are held in great secrecy, with elaborate security precautions. Newsmen are provided with officially prepared résumés of the proceedings, which reveal nothing of inner-Party disputes, although by consorting with delegates they pick up enough to write fairly informative news reports. The Party leadership has become progressively more publicity conscious with each succeeding congress. The third congress in 1953–54 was the first at which the full text of the political resolution was released, after its adoption. The 1958 congress was the first for which the full Party publicity machinery was utilized before, during, and after the event. The general secretary of the CPI held press conferences, beginning weeks in advance, to publicize the congress. In unprecedented moves the leadership released the draft of the new constitution two months before the congress, and the draft political resolution the day after the congress opened but before it had been considered by the delegates. The monthly and weekly English-language Party organs devoted much space to the congress for several weeks. The weekly *New Age* carried many pages of "color" stories about the congress itself, and highly informative articles about the closed proceedings written by Party leaders. After the congress the decisions were interpreted in the monthly *New Age*.

b. NATIONAL COUNCIL — The National Council is to meet at least every six months or on demand of one-third of its members. Its membership, not to exceed 101, is elected by the Party Congress from a panel of candidates proposed by the outgoing National Council. The panel is to be prepared with a view to creating a "broad-based, capable leadership, closely linked with the masses, firm in the revolutionary outlook of the working class and educated in Marxism-Leninism"; is to bring together "the best talent and experience from all states, from mass fronts, and from other fields of Party activity"; and is to include at least two representatives from every state or province. The membership of the National Council elected at the Amritsar Party Congress is shown in FIGURE 3-4, under Reference Data.

The method by which the members of the first National Council were elected is not entirely clear. Reportedly every provincial delegation at the Amritsar Congress was asked to prepare a list of candidates for its area from which an election committee selected the final slate. Although a plan to elect the members on the basis of Party strength in the various states and provinces was abandoned before the 1958 constitution was put in final form, there is some relationship between the size of the provincial parties and the numbers identified with the region as shown in the following tabulation which lists the seven largest provincial committees.

	PERCENT OF TOTAL PARTY MEMBERSHIP	PERCENT OF TOTAL COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP
Andhra Pradesh	*23.9*	*14.8*
Bihār	*7.3*	*6.9*
Kerala	*26.0*	*15.8*
Madras	*9.2*	*7.9*
Maharashtra	*3.9*	*6.9*
Punjab	*4.2*	*4.9*
West Bengal	*11.2*	*7.9*

As is apparent, however, the relationship is far from precise. The two states having the largest membership, Andhra Pradesh and Kerala, although accorded the largest number of representatives, are not represented in proportion to their membership strength, while other states have greater representation than their membership alone would justify.

The National Council replaces the former Central Committee as the "highest authority" of the Party between congresses and replaces the Party Congress as the body by and from which the Central Executive Committee, the Secretariat, and the general secretary are elected. In addition it elects the Audit Commission which supervises Party finances and submits reports to the council and the Party Congress. It is empowered to fill vacancies in the Central Executive Committee, the Central Control Commission, and the Audit Commission, but no provision is made with respect to vacancies in the Secretariat.

The National Council is responsible for directing all Party work, for enforcing the Party constitution, and for carrying out the political line and other decisions adopted by the congress. It discusses and decides on the political and organizational reports and other matters put before it by the Central Executive Committee, and may take up any other matters. It submits its own political and organizational report and the Audit Commission's report to the congress.

The impact of the establishment of the National Council on the Party is not yet clear. By March 1959 it had held only one meeting since it was established at the Amritsar Party Congress in April 1958. The interposition of this new tier in the hierarchy between the Central Executive Committee and the All-India Party Congress in time could bring about greater decentralization of Party authority or could be the means of tightening central authority over state and local organization. The leadership which proposed the change may look upon the council as an experiment, conceived to demonstrate that the Party was becoming more representative not only to Indians generally but also to those rank-and-file members who had become more conscious of their individuality after the post-Stalin liberalization moves in the U.S.S.R. and the Party's own successes with "peaceful methods" in the general election of 1957.

What little evidence is available indicates that the council has thus far been firmly controlled by the Central Executive Committee. According to reports of the council's first meeting in October 1958, the Central Executive Committee prepared the agenda for the council, and council discussions centered chiefly on decisions taken by the Central Executive Committee meeting that immediately preceded the council session. The council was precluded from "thorough discussion" of an important report on the "crisis" of the government's five-year plan, according to General Secretary Ajoy Ghosh, because the Central Executive Committee failed to draft a resolution on the subject. Reports of the October meeting indicate, however, that the Party center was under fire for not implementing the Amritsar decisions more expeditiously. Some members, moreover, urged that the council meet more frequently than semiannually. Allegedly in order to "lighten the heavy burden" of the central Secretariat, subcommittees were organized to meet periodically (presumably oftener than the entire body) and review Party activities in the fields of education, trade unions, peasants, students and youth, women, culture, and peace. These specific and implied criticisms are not necessarily significant since criticism of a higher or lower body, part and parcel of self-criticism, is endemic in the CPI, and the proliferation of committees and subcommittees in any Indian organization is a customary substitute for action. Nevertheless, the provision for semiannual meetings, if observed, together with the fact that the council, unlike the congress, is a continuing body, may subject the operations of the high command to more frequent reviews than has been the case in the past. The existence of the National Council may on the other hand merely make available to the high command a larger corps of national workers under their own close direction.

c. THE HIGH COMMAND — The Central Executive Committee, Secretariat, Central Control Commission, and Audit Commission are the formally established components of the CPI high command. Under the new Party constitution all except the Central Control Commission are elected by the National Council; this commission, as under earlier constitutions, is elected by the Party Congress. The number of members on the Central Executive Committee is set by the constitution at not more than 25, and membership of the Secretariat, elected from among the members of the Central Executive Committee, is 6 to 8 including the general secretary. The number of Central Control Commission members under the new constitution is determined by the Party Congress, which in 1958 elected 5—the same number as specified in the 1954 constitution. The members of these bodies are listed in FIGURE 3–2.

The functions of the Central Executive Committee, which occupies a key position between the elite Secretariat and the broad-based National Council, are spelled out in considerable detail in the constitution. It is responsible to the National Council for its general operations and, in turn, meets every two months to consider the Secretariat's report of its work between Central Executive Committee sessions. In general it is responsible for carrying out the decisions and directives of the National Council and for directing Party work between council sessions. In this context,

FIGURE 3–2. CPI NATIONAL OFFICERS, MARCH 1959

CENTRAL SECRETARIAT (8):
- Ajoy Kumar Ghosh, General Secretary.
- Dr. Z. A. Ahmed.
- M. Basavapunnaiah.
- S. A. Dange.
- A. K. Gopalan.
- Bhupesh Gupta.
- P. C. Joshi.
- B. T. Ranadive.

CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (25):
- Above 8 members of Central Secretariat.
- Jyoti Basu.
- Phani Bora.
- Romesh Chandra.
- K. Damodaran.
- Sohan Singh Josh.
- Harekrishna Konar.

CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (*Con.*):
- M. N. Govindan Nair.
- E. M. S. Namboodiripad.
- Gurucharan Patnaik.
- P. Ramamurti.
- N. Prasada Rao.
- C. Rajeshwar Rao.
- Ravi Narayan Reddy.
- S. G. Sardesai.
- Bhowani Sen.
- Harkishen Singh Surjit.
- M. R. Venkataraman.

CENTRAL CONTROL COMMISSION (5):
- S. V. Ghate, Chairman.
- Harjah Begum.
- Abdul Halim.
- P. Narayanan Nair.
- U. Ramam.

it has authority to decide on any political or organizational question, although theoretically its decision could be reversed by the council. In addition, the Central Executive Committee is to perform the following specific tasks on behalf of the council: convene regular sessions of the council and prepare reports and resolutions for such sessions; guide and assist provincial committees and the Party press and publications program; direct the Party parliamentary group, the all-India mass organizations or fronts, Party education and financial affairs, and relations with fraternal parties.

Members of the Central Executive Committee are drawn from the top leadership of the Party and most have extensive experience in CPI activities. Sixteen of the present 25 members were serving on the Central Committee in 1951 or earlier, 7 joined this organization in 1953, and only 2 were first elected in 1956. This continuity of leadership is shown in FIGURE 3–5, under Reference Data.

The Central Executive Committee, appears to be meeting much more regularly than its predecessor, the Central Committee. Until the early 1950's Central Committee meetings were sometimes as much as a year apart; later, six months apart, although between 1956 and the adoption of the new constitution meetings were convened with somewhat greater frequency. During the first year following adoption of the 1958 constitution the Central Executive Committee met five times. It prepared the agenda for the one meeting of the National Council, discussed Party organizational affairs, considered substantive reports on various issues prepared by Party leaders, and passed resolutions among others: 1) expressing "strongest condemnation of U.S. aggression in Lebanon and that of Britain in Jordan"; 2) charging that "opposition parties and the Prime Minister have presented a distorted and misleading picture of the situation in [Kerala] state"; 3) recommending that appropriate steps be taken to "rouse public opinion against India's continued dependence on U.S. loans"; 4) expressing "deep concern over the food situation in the country" and warning that this "situation will deteriorate alarmingly if the present [governmental] policies are continued"; 5) calling upon the "democratic masses and all progressive elements" to agitate for the imposition of a ceiling on land holdings; and 6) praising the "heroic struggles" of depressed groups in various states.

The constitution does not specify in any detail the duties of the Secretariat or its top officer, the general secretary. It provides only that the Secretariat and general secretary are to "direct and carry out the current work . . . on behalf of the Central Executive Committee." No specific functions are given to the general secretary by the 1958 constitution, although in practice he remains, as before, the dominant figure within the Party. Secretariat members are to function collectively but with specific responsibilities assigned to each. They are to devote full time to national Party work and are expressly forbidden to belong to a provincial or district Party organ. The Secretariat is empowered to set up such Party bodies and "make such arrangements as are considered necessary" to guide day-to-day CPI activities. The description of the Secretariat in the constitution suggests a deliberate effort at vagueness—perhaps to provide latitude for its operations—and an attempt to dissociate it from the old Politburo, long known as the formal power center for the Party.

In practice, the relationship between the Central Executive Committee and the Secretariat appears to be as undefined as that between the former Central Committee and the Politburo. The record indicates, however, that although the Politburo occasionally issued statements in its own name, it tended to work through the Central Committee and that this body was the more frequent Party spokesman. This practice continues under the reorganization plan adopted in 1958. The statements attributed to the Secretariat, with a few exceptions, have been concerned more with organizational than with policy matters. However, within Party circles the Secretariat, like its predecessor, remains predominant. It includes most of the top organizational and ideological leaders within the CPI, and it continues to determine the direction of Party development.

Both leading bodies have been strongly criticized for their methods of directing Party activity and for the failure of their members, many of whom have strong local interests, to give adequate time to national Party affairs. A Party report in 1954 indicated that only two or three Politburo members were permanently attached to the center and that this small group made "vital" decisions for the Party as a whole. The draft organizational resolution presented at the third Party Congress in 1953–54 took Party leaders to task for "individual functioning" and asserted that a few Politburo members did not have authority to make decisions for the Central Committee. The Politburo, it continued, should confine itself to "implementing and interpreting" Central Committee decisions on major policy questions, although it might issue statements or make organizational decisions to meet "urgent requirements." Such actions, however, should be "nothing more than the minimum that is required" and a meeting of the full Central Committee should be called at the earliest opportunity to review them. A subsequent report surveying Party activities during the period 1956–58 observed that except for a short period between the fourth Party Congress and the end of the 1957 general elections, only two members of the Politburo (General Secretary Ajoy Ghosh and Bhupesh Gupta) devoted full time to central Party work; after the elections, a third member, Dr. Z. A. Ahmed, joined them. The organizational report submitted to the Amritsar Congress in 1958 said that only a few members of the high command bodies participated regularly in national Party work or attended the infrequently held meetings; central guidance to Communist members of Parliament, lower Party units, and mass front organizations (particularly peasant) was inadequate; and these executive bodies did almost nothing to improve the ideological education of Party cadres.

It cannot yet be determined whether the impetus provided by actions of the April 1958 congress will be any more effective than past strictures in improving this situation. It is not known, for example, whether Secretariat members are devoting full time to central Party work as the constitution requires. However, as of early 1959 none had violated the constitutional ban against accepting office on a provincial or district body. The Central Executive Committee meets more frequently than its predecessor, but as has been indicated, the center as a whole was roundly taken to task by the National Council in October 1958 for many of the same shortcomings described in the organizational report and resolutions of 1953 and early 1958.

The Central Control Commission is empowered under the constitution to decide on appeals against expulsion orders by any Party unit, against disciplinary action ordered by a provincial executive committee or council, and against the rejection of an appeal made to a provincial control commission. It may also investigate cases referred to it by the Central Executive Committee or Secretariat. In an unusually specific provision regarding qualifications for office, the constitution requires that a proposed member of the Central Control Commission be a Party member of at least 10 years' standing and that his experience in Party organizational affairs and "personal integrity" be taken into account. The National Council, which proposes the panel of names for election by the congress, also fills vacancies in the commission. The chairman of the Central Control Commission, elected by the other members, may attend meetings of the Central Executive Committee, and other commission members may attend meetings of the National Council.

The Central Control Commission, although apparently having some degree of autonomy because it is elected by the Party Congress rather than the Executive Committee, is formally subordinate to the Central Executive Committee, although somewhat less so then it was to the old Central Committee. Previously the commission's decisions had to be submitted within three months to the Central Committee for "endorsement," although the method of endorsement was not specified. Under the new constitution, a two-thirds majority of the Executive Committee may stay the implementation of a commission decision, which is then referred to the National Council for final resolution. Both old and new constitutions recognized the right of final appeal on disciplinary cases to the All-India Party Congress.

Only fragmentary information is available on the actual work of the Central Control Commission. It appears to concern itself mainly with minor inner-Party disputes at the local or provincial level, functioning somewhat in the manner of the Soviet Orgburo. It apparently exerts no restraining influence on the central leadership and has on occasion voluntarily referred cases brought before it to the Central Committee for decision. According to the fullest report available on the actions of this body, the commission elected in 1951 met four times in one and a half years and considered 10 cases. In some instances it examined witnesses, including the appellant, and in others it apparently limited itself to scrutinizing documents. It confirmed the actions of some provincial units, set aside those of others, referred several cases back to provincial units with a recommendation for reconsideration, and voluntarily decided to reopen two cases. The constitution of 1958 for the first time provided for control commissions at the provincial level. The decisions of these bodies are "ordinarily final," although the provincial committee may by a two-thirds vote stay implementation of the decision and either assume responsibility for the issue itself or refer it to the Central Control Commission. Establishment of these provincial commissions may mean that the Central Control Commission will have fewer cases brought before it.

The Central Control Commission, or its individual members, may be more important in central functioning than the constitution or available reports on its corporate work imply. The unusual specification of personal qualifications for membership, the caliber of its members (all five are reliable, long-time Party workers), and the fact that executing the limited functions enumerated in the constitution takes little of their time pose the possibility that this body may have additional responsibilities not listed in the constitution. If so, these are believed to lie in the field of covert Party operations (see this Supplement, SECTION 7, under Covert Organization).

The Audit Commission, the least important component of the high command, is elected by the National Council to "supervise over the disbursement of the central Party finances and report on the same to the National Council and the Party Congress." The membership and term of office of this body are not specified in the constitution. Little information is available on the functioning of this commission, but its functions are probably routine post-audits of Party finances.

d. NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS — The organization of the central office charged with providing day-to-day guidance to the CPI's all-India activities is not clearly set forth in Party statutes or organizational resolutions. The constitutions in effect before 1958 contained two stipulations bearing on this issue: 1) Members of the Central Committee were to function as representatives, organizers, and instructors to the provincial organizations and, in addition, were to divide among themselves the "various fields of activity of the Central Committee" (publications and press, mass fronts, Party education, finance, and special apparatus). 2) The Central Committee was empowered to elect such additional secretaries or organize "such departments and committees as may be considered necessary for most efficient work." The constitution adopted in 1958, in detailing functions, gave the Central Executive Committee responsibility for approximately the same activities as the old Central Committee but was so written as not to make guidance of provincial organizations the members' first obligation. In an attempt to strengthen central functioning, it stated that Secretariat members, to whom specific responsibilities were to be assigned, must devote themselves exclusively to central Party work. As under earlier constitutions, the Central Executive Committee was empowered to "set up such Party bodies and make such arrangements as are considered necessary." The organizational resolution adopted by the 1958 Party Congress spelled out this arrangement in somewhat greater detail. Central work, it said, was to be done not only by members of the Secretariat but also by National Council members and "above all" by Central Executive Committee members. The latter, it said, are responsible to the National Council which elected them for seeing that national Party work is properly conducted and that their own corporate decisions and those of the National Council are implemented by the state committees. These strictures on members of the executive body, although not entirely new, are somewhat more specific than past directives and indicate greater pressure toward the goal: members of central bodies are to think, act, and talk like representatives of the all-India Party, whether they are functioning from national headquarters in New Delhi or advising a provincial or district unit elsewhere.

Fresh attempts are now being made to persuade central leaders to abandon the old pattern of one individual acting as sole director of the functional activity that constituted his first interest. The organizational resolution of 1958 was quite blunt on this point. It said that the practice of "individual functioning, of no checkup has got to go," that members of the Secretariat should divide up work among themselves on the principle of "collective functioning, individual responsibility for implementation of decisions, and regular collective checkup." It said also that the central Party organization had to organize "proper Party life" for headquarters workers and to "decide about the form of organization at Party headquarters."

At various times Party directives have been adopted distributing responsibility for organization of the various Party activities between the central and provincial levels. According to the organizational resolution presented to the Party Congress in 1953–54, the peace front as well as labor and peasant fronts were to be directed by the center, while all other front organizations were to be directed mainly by provincial Party committees with only "very broad" direction from the center. Similarly, the organization resolution adopted by the Party in April 1958 specifically calls for central subcommittees to deal with labor and peasants but makes state and district committees responsible for directing all other front organizations, including the All-India Peace Council, with only general guidance from the center. It calls upon state and district committees to "pay serious attention" to front groups among women, students, and youth. On the subject of central responsibility, it says only that the national Party headquarters should convene meetings of leading comrades working on these fronts and "form subcommittees wherever necessary and possible." It clearly states, however, that these subcommittees "will not replace the committees of the mass organizations, nor issue directions to similar subcommittees in the states. Their function is to help the Party center to study problems and to enable the Party center to give guidance which should be through the state committees."

Fragmentary information indicates that the headquarters organization in early 1959 included the following subcommittees, most of them headed by members of the Secretariat:

- **AGIT-PROP**—Concerned with spoken and written propaganda designed to carry out Party aims; includes Party periodicals, newspapers, and pamphlets, speeches in Parliament and state legislatures, and explanatory verbal propaganda in meetings.
- **EDUCATION**—Concerned with education of Party members in order to develop efficient cadres through Party schools, publications, and speeches; has been assigned task of preparing a syllabus for an expanded system of Party schools.
- **FINANCE**—Recommends ways to raise funds and attempts to bring lower unit finances into an orderly pattern under closer central control than in the past.
- **PARTY HISTORY**—A new central activity; this subcommittee is responsible for collecting Party records in order to keep its history up to date and develop a "unified understanding" of the Party's performance.
- **PARLIAMENT**—Responsible for all parliamentary work, including discipline of MPs; on major political issues the Central Executive Committee guides the parliamentary subcommittee.
- **TRADE UNION FRONT**—To direct all trade union activities.
- **PEASANT FRONT**—To direct all peasant activities.
- **PEACE FRONT**—To advise such fronts as the friendship societies, all-India Peace Council, and Indian Association for Afro-Asian Solidarity.
- **WOMEN'S FRONT**—To advise existing women's front organizations and to stimulate greater participation by women in activities useful to the Party.
- **CULTURAL FRONT**—To supervise activities among existing front groups for writers, dramatists, artists, and musicians.
- **STUDENTS' AND YOUTH FRONT**—To supervise and expand Party activities among this target group.

Little information is available on the functioning of these subcommittees. The peasant front subcommittee, aided by representatives of state and district units especially concerned with peasant organization, during the summer of 1958 prepared a document on the Party's all-India peasant program. Reportedly the Party leadership reached agreement for the first time on the subjects covered in this document. On recommendation of the Central Executive Committee, this report was approved by the National Council in October 1958. Information is not available on the work of the education subcommittee in preparing a syllabus for Party education, although the organizational resolution adopted at the 1958 Party Congress singled out Party education as the most important of the leadership's tasks. It is not clear whether the subcommittee recently established to supervise the Party's major publications, the weekly newspaper *New Age* and the monthly periodical of the same name, functions independently or comes under the agit-prop subcommittee.

Staff work for the national headquarters is done by the Party Headquarters Unit (commonly called th PHQ) which is believed to consist of junior Party officials representing various fields of Communist activity. This organization, which is represented at the Party Congress, has occasionally opposed the prevailing Party leadership. It played an important role in rallying opposition against the militant Party line in 1950–51 by holding special meetings and by publishing a newsletter, the *PHQ Open Forum.* More recently, at the third Party Congress, the PHQ introduced a resolution criticizing the Central Committee for failure to submit to the congress a report on its activities.

In addition to the subcommittees listed above and the PHQ, the following functional groups are believed to be attached to the central headquarters:

- **LIAISON COMMITTEE FOR PAKISTAN**—Presumably this Committee carries out the CPI's obligation to guide the Communist Party of Pakistan (CPP), although closest contact with the neighbor party is probably maintained by the West Bengal unit of the CPI with the East Pakistan branch of the CPP. The liaison committee, at a meeting early in 1958, reportedly decided to advise the CPP to study the progressive changes in the Indian Party's policy over the past 10 years, with a view to adopting the current parliamentary path of the CPI should the CPP become a legal party within Pakistan.
- **PARLIAMENTARY PARTY OFFICE**—This office is the center for planning the Party's parliamentary activity and functions as a service bureau for Communist members of Parliament. In mid-1957 it had an attached Research Bureau with a staff of five supervised by three Politburo members. This bureau gathers background information for speeches in Parliament and also services the Party as a whole (see this Supplement, SECTION 4, under Organization for Activity in Parliament).
- **RESEARCH SECTION**—The CPI reportedly had a good research section at one time with a staff of about 100, but by late 1958 this had become depleted because many staff members had been called back to their home states to carry on organizational work. The unit utilized overt sources of information—publications of the Indian Council of World Affairs, the Delhi School of Economics, and the Government of India—to provide background information on various political issues for Party leaders.
- **ECONOMIC RESEARCH UNIT**—Early in 1957 this unit reportedly had a staff of three, headed by Ajit Das Gupta, reportedly a leading CPI economist who frequently wrote for Party publications.
- **CENTRAL COMMITTEE INFORMATION BUREAU**—This unit as of mid-1957 reportedly consisted of two Party members whose main duty was to clip newspapers and maintain indexed files of press reports and background material. A secretariate of seven members and three clerks, described as a part of the information bureau, handled internal and external correspondence, maintained files dealing with the organization, looked after accounts, and generally kept the office going.

PARTY PUBLICATIONS OFFICE—This unit supervises the Party's publication of books, pamphlets, and so forth, presumably in coordination with the Agit-prop subcommittee of the Party headquarters.

In May 1958 the Central Executive Committee established the following allocation of functions among Secretariat members in accordance with the constitutional provision that "specific responsibilities" should be assigned to each member:

AJOY GHOSH—General responsibility for Party affairs; serves on *New Age* (weekly) editorial board; member of agit-prop and Party education subcommittees.

DR. Z. A. AHMED—Main responsibility for peasant work; chairman of the peasant and member of the finance subcommittees.

A. K. GOPALAN—Member of the peasant subcommittee.

BHUPESH GUPTA—Main responsibility for parliamentary work; serves on the editorial staff of *New Age* (weekly) and on the agit-prop and Parliament subcommittees.

M. BASAVAPUNNAIAH—Main responsibility for Party education; member of the Party education subcommittee; attends to routine work in the central Party office.

B. T. RANADIVE—Main responsibility for *New Age* (monthly); chairman of the Party education and member of the agit-prop subcommittee.

S. A. DANGE—Main responsibility for trade union activities; active in the Party press and publications program; chairman of the trade union and a member of the agit-prop, Party education, and finance subcommittees.

P. C. JOSHI—Main responsibility for *New Age* (weekly); on agit-prop, Party education, and Party history subcommittees.

The various central headquarters staffs operate from a number of different offices in New Delhi. Main Party headquarters is at 4/7 Asaf Ali Road. The editorial work on the monthly and weekly *New Age* publications is apparently carried on at this office. The trade union front, the All-India Trade Union Congress, has a small staff at this address, and the peasant front, the All-India Kisan Sabha, has a desk. The offices of the parliamentary group are at 2 Windsor Place. The Party offices serve not only as working quarters but also as social centers for Party workers and members of Parliament and, in the case of some of the latter, as living quarters. In 1954 the Party reportedly acquired six modern buildings in the Ajmer Gate section in order to provide close coordination for the parliamentary group elected in the first general elections. The average monthly cost of maintaining the national offices was estimated at that time at US$8,400.

The total number of paid workers in various central Party offices is not available. According to a reliable estimate, in 1954 there were 150 full-time workers, paid the equivalent of from US$6.30 to $42 per month. This figure probably included only staff members, and not those working as clerks and messengers. In 1949 there were 28 holding editorial positions on the four language editions of the Party weekly alone.

3. Provincial, district, and local organization

Below the national bodies, the CPI is organized on three main levels—by province or state, by district, and by local area and institution. An optional, fourth or intermediate level may be formed according to the Party constitution between the district organization and the basic branch. FIGURE 3-1 shows the place of the various subnational units in the formal organizational structure.

The principal changes in organization below the national level introduced in 1958 were: 1) the establishment of provincial and district councils paralleling the National Council; 2) the establishment of control commissions at the provincial level; 3) abandonment of the requirement that the selection of secretaries at the provincial level be confirmed by the national executive; 4) withdrawal of the right of secretariat members at all levels to hold office in lower bodies; and 5) substitution of the term branch for cell to designate the basic unit and much greater emphasis on organization of the basic units on a territorial rather than functional basis. Although, like the changes on the national level, these alterations were propagandized by the Party as moves in the direction of greater democracy, there are no indications in the reports of provincial and lower level operations that the centralized chain of command has been weakened.

Most of the provincial and many district organizations have held conferences since the Amritsar Party Congress, and they appear to have taken the first steps to bring their organizations into line with the plan adopted at Amritsar. (As early as the summer of 1957 the old Central Committee directed reorganization by branches, rather than by cells, and in some states the process was well under way before the Amritsar Congress which formally approved the change.)

The development of provincial and lower organizations along the lines specified is uneven, however. Some previously poorly organized state branches have produced elaborate rosters of officers and subcommittees, but these may be only paper plans. Some state units were slow to undertake the changes, in some cases because they opposed certain aspects of the organizational plan. In West Bengal there was strong opposition to substituting branches for cells, mainly on the ground that trade union work would suffer; factory cells, members argued, had been the most effective recruiting agency for the Party. In Andhra Pradesh elements supporting the long-time activist P. Sundarayya were reluctant to reorganize because the new plan represented a further step toward reliance on parliamentary means to achieve power, a tactic which they opposed. In the Maharashtra area of bilingual Bombay State competition for power among two national leaders from the state—B. T. Ranadive and S. A. Dange—complicated matters. However, the wheels of reorganization have been set in motion, and all Party units now appear reconciled to trying the experiment.

The provincial organization as described in the constitution is almost an exact replica of the national. It consists of the following bodies:

PROVINCIAL CONFERENCE—The "highest organ" of the state apparatus; functions similarly to the Party Congress on the national level; normally meets every two years and is composed of delegates elected by district conferences with the basis of representation determined by the provincial council.

PROVINCIAL COUNCIL—Consists of a maximum of 101 members elected by the provincial conference from a panel of names submitted by the outgoing provincial council; functions as the "highest authority" between provincial conferences; meets at least every four months (compared with every six months for the National Council).

PROVINCIAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE—Consists of no more than 25 members elected by the provincial council from among its members; has authority to "carry on the work" of the provincial council between its meetings.

PROVINCIAL SECRETARIAT—Consists of 7 to 9 members, including a secretary (comparable to the general secretary on the national level), elected by the provincial council from among the members of the provincial executive committee; empowered to "direct and carry out the current work . . . on behalf of the . . . provincial executive committee."

PROVINCIAL CONTROL COMMISSION—Elected by the provincial conference; has powers on the state level similar to those of the Central Control Commission on the national level.

PROVINCIAL AUDIT COMMISSION—Elected by the provincial council; has authority "to supervise . . . the disbursement of provincial Party finances. . . ."

A provincial organization may be exempted by the National Council from forming a provincial council, presumably if Party organization in the area is too rudimentary to warrant a complex organizational structure, in which case a provincial committee elected by the provincial conference carries on Party work between conferences. This committee, in turn, elects a secretary and secretariat to "carry on current work." The provincial secretaries are the most direct link between the center and the lower organization. All of them are believed to be members of the National Council or Central Executive Committee and are expected to attend meetings of those bodies, to report on them, and to transmit their directives to lower units. They or other members of provincial secretariats, insofar as they carry out their obligation to elicit regular reports of Party activities from district Party officials and, through them, from the branches which are in closest touch with individual Party members, are in a key position to report on and interpret grassroots Party activities and sentiments. The provincial secretaries as of March 1959, were as follows:

STATE
  Andhra Pradesh—C. Rajeshwar Rao
  Assam—Phani Bora
  Bihār—Yogendra Sharma
  Bombay
    Maharashtra—S. G. Sardesai
    Gujarāt—Dinkar Mehta
  Kerala—M. N. Govindan Nair
  Madhya Pradesh—Laxman R. Khandkar
  Madras (Tamil Nad)—M. R. Venkataraman
  Mysore—N. L. Upadhyaya
  Orissa—Gurucharan Patnaik
  Punjab—Harkishan Singh Surjit
  Rājasthān—H. K. Vyas
  Uttar Pradesh—Shankar Dayal Tiwari
  West Bengal—Jyoti Basu
TERRITORIES
  Himachal Pradesh—*n a*
  Manipur—Bira Singh (1955)
  Tripura—Dashrath Deb
DELHI (federally administered)—M. Farooqi

In addition to the above, V. Subbiah is listed as general secretary of the Communist Party in Pondicherry, the French enclave which has been transferred to India for administrative purposes but remains legally a part of France pending action by the French assembly effecting *de jure* transfer. The Communist organization in this area functions semiautonomously, and Pondicherry is not normally listed among CPI provincial committees in inner-Party documents. The Party organization in Himachal Pradesh, included in the above tabulation, may not qualify as a separate provincial unit. According to one report, delegates from that territory joined with those from Punjab in their provincial conference some time in 1957 or 1958.

District organizations (the districts are the largest administrative units within the Indian states and are roughly similar to counties in the United States) are to establish parallel bodies to those which exist at the provincial level with the exception of control commissions which do not exist below the provincial level. Their functions correspond generally to those of comparable provincial bodies, but the constitution allows greater flexibility in details. For example, the district conference sets the number of members of the district council, and the latter decides the number of members of the district executive committee and secretariat. The district council is free to decide how frequently it will meet. As at the state level, a district organization may be exempted from forming a council if the state council or executive committee so decides, in which case the district conference elects a district committee to carry on work between conferences, and the district committee elects a secretary and a secretariat.

The Party branch, the so-called "primary unit," is organized on the basis of local governmental units or by factory, occupation, or institution. An individual may be a member of two local branches, one based on residence and the other on place of work, but may vote in only one and is considered an associate member of the other. The General Body, a meeting of the entire branch membership, is the "highest organ" of the primary unit and corresponds roughly to the conferences at the district and provincial levels and to the Party Congress at the national level. The General Body, which meets at least once a month, elects the branch secretary and assistant secretary to conduct current work. A branch whose membership exceeds 25 is to elect a branch committee, similar to the executive committees at higher levels, and the branch secretary and assistant secretary. Members of a branch may be divided into "groups of convenient size," each with its own convenor. The function of a "group" is to "distribute and check up [on] the work of individuals" and, when necessary, organize preliminary discussions to facilitate political debate in the branch meeting.

The constitution emphasizes particular powers and functions for all organizational levels, distinct from the elective functions shown in FIGURE 3–1 and the general obligation as parts of the chain of command to carry out the policies laid down by the Party Congress and the National Council. The provincial conference is to "determine the line of the Party and mass work" in the state, and is charged with suggesting "changes in the all-India policies and the general line of the Party." The state executive committee, in addition to guiding district committees, is to direct the state Party press and publications program, the work of members of legislative assemblies, state Party work in mass organizations, Party education, and Party finances.

The district conference is to determine the line of Party and mass work for the district in conformity with the decisions of higher bodies. The district executive committee is specifically charged with "checking up the work of lower units," giving guidance and "practical assistance" to mass organizations, directing Party members who serve on local governmental bodies, promoting circulation of Party journals and literature, and organizing district Party schools.

The optional intermediate stage of organization between the basic and district units, which has been similarly provided for in past constitutions, is to have a local conference of delegates elected by conferences of branches in the area and is to be directed by a local committee which elects its secretary. This organization works under the direction of the district executive committee. It is specifically charged with responsibility for coordinating the work of branches directly under it.

The branch, which Party leaders claim has replaced the traditional cell, is responsible for maintaining direct day-to-day contact with "the masses" and for organizing work at the lowest level. Its particular functions are to "win the masses" in its locality or sphere of activity to support Party activity, to "build up and participate in mass organizations," to sell Party journals and publications, to collect dues and raise other funds, to draw into the Party "sympathizers and militants," and to increase literacy among Party members. The secretary of a branch is to submit a bimonthly report to the next higher committee on new candidates and full members.

Information on the number of organizational units below the provincial level is available for only a few provincial committees, as follows:

	NUMBER OF DISTRICT COMMITTEES	NUMBER OF INTERMEDIATE AND BASIC UNITS
Andhra Pradesh	24	1,967 branches 175 town and *taluk* (a group of villages) committees
Bihār	16	900 branches 50 local committees
Kerala	9	1,600 branches 16 *taluk* committees
Madhya Pradesh	31	*n a*
Maharashtra	26	*n a*
Orissa	13	*n a*
Punjab	*n a*	1,125 branches
West Bengal	16	*n a*

The Calcutta, West Bengal, district committee in 1958 reported 75 branches, 3 local committees, and 2 special units. Houghly district in West Bengal reported 39 branches and 2 special units.

All state and some district organizations, city units, and local branches maintain offices, but very little information is available as to their organization or the size of their staffs. District offices are a relatively new development. As recently as 1953 a central directive said that district secretariats were unnecessary.

In addition to the headquarters staff at all levels, there probably are from 3,000 to 4,000 paid Party workers throughout the country, working at various levels either part or full time. In 1943, according to a Party report, there were 2,600 paid workers, and the Party aspired to a total of 6,000; available information does not indicate whether that goal was ever reached. Secretary General Ghosh told the Amritsar Congress in 1958 that the total number of paid workers had decreased. The distribution of such workers, state by state, is uneven. Kerala, for example, reportedly has 500 paid workers plus an unknown number recruited for by-election campaigns and other special activities. In some states there are probably only a handful. A Party report of 1958 from Andhra Pradesh said that there were 476 full-time workers in that state. A total of 258 paid workers, 123 of them part time, reportedly attended the Bihar provincial conference late in 1958. The Punjab state unit reported 415 full-time workers at about the same time.

Although much more effectively organized at the local level than any other Indian party, the CPI is far from satisfied with the state of its local organization. The paucity of reliable cadres is attributed by national leaders to the failure of lower level units to educate members and keep them steadily at work. If Party self-criticism may be accepted at anything approaching face value, well over half the membership is almost wholly inactive, and most of the day-to-day work is done by poorly paid workers. Party work in front groups and other "mass" organizations has been almost totally neglected in some areas.

B. Leadership*

Conformity with the international Communist line, experience in Party work, and to a lesser degree rank-and-file approval are the three main factors determining the leadership of the CPI. The second—experience—is the only stable factor in the process of creating leaders. The international line changes, and rank-and-file approval, largely *pro forma,* can always be manipulated in inner-Party debate. A change in Party policy has sometimes resulted in a change in leadership, but more often it has only changed the balance of power among factions within the leadership.

Despite intense factional struggles, the CPI has seldom permanently discarded dissenting leaders. It has in some cases suspended or expelled dissidents, but the period of ostracism has not been long. Most of those deprived of the Party's confidence rehabilitated themselves by subsequently accepting the official line and were in time restored to leadership status. Thus the Party utilizes the aggregate talent and experience of practically all those who have served as leaders. This continuity at the top is a stabilizing force that helps maintain the loyalty of certain membership elements. At the same time it has probably contributed to the Party's popular appeal. Many Indians probably lump the names of P. C. Joshi, B. T. Ranadive, S. A. Dange, and Ajoy Ghosh—to name a few—with the names of Socialist and Congress Party leaders as among the group of politicos who have competed through the years for popular support.

The CPI has developed, on the whole, an outstanding corps of national and provincial leaders. In comparison with the leaders of other parties they stand out particularly for discipline, for willingness to sacrifice personal interests to those of the Party, for intellect, for political competence, and for general ability. Most have made the Party their sole career, and few have made notable contributions to the arts, literature, or philosophy as have some other Indian political leaders. In the broad spectrum of Party activities leaders with many different specialties have emerged: organizers, speakers and orators, writers, theoreticians, economists, covert operators, individuals with truly expert knowledge of trade unionism and peasant problems, and agile parliamentarians.

[redacted] As shown in this Figure, 22 of the 36 are veteran Communists who were active in the Communist movement in the 1920's and 1930's. An additional six joined the Party about 1940. Nine were Party founders and several others were admitted during the first few years following the founding meeting. Eleven served on the earliest Central Committee for which names of members are available, the committee selected in

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* Detailed information on individual Party leaders is included in this Supplement, SECTION 8, which includes biographic reports on the 101 members of the National Council and other leading Indian Communists and fellow-travellers.

1943 (see FIGURE 3–5). Some of these leaders started political activity in the Congress Party, moved into the Congress Socialist Party formed within the Congress organization in 1934, and left it when the exercise in Congress Socialist-Communist cooperation collapsed in 1940. Many served in prison, together with leaders of the Congress and Congress Socialist Parties, because of their preindependence activities. The majority of this leadership group is middle-aged; 19 of the 36 listed in FIGURE 3–6 are in the 45–55 age bracket and 8 are over 55. The 3 youngest are 42, 39, and 26 years old. The proportion of middle-class "intelligentsia" in the leadership group is striking. Of the 24 for whom information regarding level of education is available, 15 have college degrees and 4 others attend universities; 5 were educated in Europe. Twenty-two are known to have traveled abroad. Almost all speak English, and most know more than one of the Indian languages. Only one woman, Hajrah Begum, a member of the Central Control Commission, is included in this leadership group. Twenty-two of those for whom religious affiliations are known are Hindus, including 6 Brahmins (members of the highest Hindu caste); 4 are Muslims, and 1 is a Sikh. On a geographical basis, 22 are from northern India and only 14 are from the south, although more than half the total Party membership is concentrated in the latter region. This predominance of north Indian leadership is explainable historically. The Party originated in urban industrial centers of the north because the foreign Communists who aided in its founding concentrated on those centers as the best recruiting grounds. Thus Party leaders in this region have more influence within CPI circles than those in the rural south where the movement did not become important until the late 1930's. Four of the five men who have served as general secretary are from the north.

Among the top Party leaders, two major types stand out—the "bureaucratic" leader who operates best in the Party's internal organizational affairs, and the "popular" leader who can sway crowds. The general secretaries, listed below, have been primarily of the first type:

Dr. G. M. Adhikari—1933–1935 (Provisional)
P. C. Joshi—1935–1948
B. T. Ranadive—1948–1950
C. Rajeshwar Rao—1950–1951
Ajoy K. Ghosh—1951–present

The first three of these leaders, all of whom are still active in the Party, most readily lend themselves to group characterization, representing as they do the "old Bolsheviks" in the CPI. All three have been active in the Party since its formation 30 years ago and all are skillful theoreticians, propagandists, and writers. In addition, each has been identified with a particular Party "line."

[redacted]

the top central leadership group. C. Rajeshwar Rao and P. Sundarayya (see FIGURE 3–6, under Reference Data) both important national figures, are the top CPI leaders in Andhra Pradesh; M. N. Govindan Nair heads the Party unit in Kerala; S. A. Dange and S. G. Sardesai direct Party affairs in Bombay State; and Jyoti Basu and Bhowani Sen compete for top honors in West Bengal. Little information is available on CPI leadership below the state level. The situation is believed, however, to parallel that at the state level, with members of the top state executive bodies conducting Party affairs at the district level and members of the district bodies controlling the intermediate Party organs and branches. In general, leaders at the local level are less sophisticated, less well educated, and have a shorter history of Communist activity than the Party's national leadership. Being closer to the grassroots level they occasionally disagree with national Party policies which have adverse local reactions (e.g., CPI endorsement of Soviet intervention in Hungary) but are prevented from making their wishes felt by the strong tradition of democratic centralism within the Party.

There are numerous factors that divide national and local CPI leaders and encourage factional groupings to promote the special interests of various elements within the organization. These factions are based primarily on ideological grounds, are aligned behind the major theoreticians within the CPI, and differ primarily over the degree of militancy to be employed by the Party, and, concomitantly, its attitude toward the ruling party and the government. In some areas, particularly West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh, ideological differences are further complicated by personal rivalries. In addition, friction frequently arises from the various vested interests within the Party. Those leaders whose chief concern is trade unionism usually favor militant defense of working-class interests but oppose extremes of violence that would bring about repressive actions by the government. Some spokesmen for the peasant population, in promoting the interests of that group, urge the use of violence on the Communist Chinese pattern, while others advocate a moderate line in order to gain the cooperation of all segments of the agrarian population including small landholders. Leaders who speak for the middle class tend to follow a more moderate ideological line based on class collaboration. Conflicting regional pressures, corresponding to the general language-ethnic divisions of India, at times have plagued the Party, but are now troublesome in only a few areas. Also, the CPI—like other parties—contains numerous individuals who aspire to power. In early 1959 the most obvious aspirants to become general secretary were B. T. Ranadive, P. C. Joshi, and S. A. Dange. Their ambitions put them in competition with one another and with Ajoy Ghosh whom each hoped to replace.

Despite the melange of overlapping personal rivalry and conflicting pressures and special interests, a workable balance among the various groups has generally been maintained. However, on a few occasions such a balance was not achieved, the Party leadership became badly split, and factional fighting came out into the open. At such tense periods in the Party's history, the debate was not so much in terms of the conflicting interests of various factions within the Party but focused more broadly on the question of the proper line for the time, given Moscow's current line and the existing situation in India. The leaders tended to line up according to their experience and theoretical views, each claiming his interpretation to be the one blessed by Moscow and suitable for India.

The most important factional struggles have been described in SECTION 2 of this Supplement, and the major proponents of various lines have been identified. In 1958 the leadership seemed generally to have reached agreement on one basic issue; all elements appeared agreed that violence was not the proper tactical line under current circumstances. However, factional bickering continued over the degree to which the Party should rely on the parliamentary path to power and over whether or not this tactic would ever actually enable the CPI to form a people's democratic government in India. In general, depending primarily on the extent of their advocacy of parliamentary means, Party leaders fell roughly into the following three categories in 1958:

LEFTIST
B. T. Ranadive
P. Sundarayya
Bhupesh Gupta
M. Basavapunnaiah
C. Rajeshwar Rao

CENTRIST
A. K. Ghosh
S. A. Dange
E. M. S. Namboodiripad
P. Ramamurti
Dr. G. M. Adhikari

RIGHTIST
P. C. Joshi
Dr. Z. A. Ahmed
A. K. Gopalan
S. S. Josh
Harkishen Singh Surjit
Narayan Reddy

During late 1958 and early 1959 some of these leaders appeared to shift ground, probably in an attempt to enlarge their personal followings within the Party, and adopted postures inconsistent with those which in the past permitted characterization, however imperfectly, of individuals as rightists, centrists, or leftists. B. T. Ranadive, long considered leader of the leftist, proviolence group, defended the resolution adopted at the Party Congress of 1958 which endorsed parliamentary methods. M. Basavapunnaiah, previously known as a "firebrand" leftist, at times seemed to stand with the centrist group. P. C. Joshi, leader of the rightists for many years, occasionally called for a measure of opposition to the government which would place him among the centrists. In general, the three factional groupings appeared in early 1959 to be tending toward convergence at the center, and factionalism was tending to be more personal and more over tactical differences than over basic problems of Party strategy.

C. Membership

1. Principles governing Party membership

The CPI invites as members any Indian citizen over 18 years of age who accepts the program and constitution of the Party and who agrees to work in one of the Party organizations, pay dues of one rupee (US$0.21) per year, and carry out Party decisions. Applications for membership may be submitted to a Party committee at any level (basic, intermediate, district, provincial, or national), must be submitted at least a month before the recruit expects to be admitted, and must be endorsed by two Party members. Decisions of the committee to which the prospective member applies are normally final, except in the case of former "leading members from another political party" whose applications must be approved by the next higher committee.

If approved, the applicant is regarded as a "candidate member" for six months during which he has the same rights and duties as full members except the right to vote and to hold elective office. The committee accepting a candidate member is charged under the constitution with arranging for his elementary education on the program, constitution, and current policies of the Party and with observing his potentialities for development. After six months the local unit may admit the candidate to full Party membership or, if his performance has not been satisfactory, prolong the probationary period for an additional six months. All candidates and full members sign the following Party pledge:

> I accept the aims and objectives of the Party and agree to abide by its constitution and loyally to carry out decisions of the Party. I shall strive to live up to the ideals of communism and shall selflessly serve the working class and the toiling masses and the country, always placing the interests of the Party and the people above personal interests.

On admission to full membership, each member is given a Party card, the form and content of which is determined by the Central Executive Committee. Party membership, under the constitution, carries clearly defined rights and duties. The obligations of Party membership are, among others, to: 1) participate in Party activities, read Party publications, and cultivate "comradely relations" with other Party members; 2) study Marxism-Leninism; 3) observe the Party constitution and Party discipline; 4) practice self-criticism; and 5) maintain vigilance against the "enemies of the working class and the country." Among the rights of Party members are the following: 1) to participate in Party elections and hold office within the CPI; 2) to criticize Party committees and leaders at Party meetings; and 3) to address an appeal or complaint on any matter to a higher Party body, including the Party Congress.

Indian Communist leaders in dealing with problems of Party membership are caught in a dilemma: the membership should be sufficiently large to attract popular attention at all levels and, if possible, influence governmental policy by any means the leaders decide; at the same time, it should be sufficiently small and disciplined to respond quickly and unitedly to central directives. The trend during recent years has been toward building a "mass party" while at the same time retaining disciplined cadres capable of moving the somewhat unwieldly mass base of the Party into concerted action.

The most successful CPI recruitment drive during recent years was the one begun in 1957, when the leadership called for doubling the 100,000 membership by the time of the next national Party Congress. This target was achieved, and by mid-April 1958, the month during which the Amritsar CPI Congress was held, membership reached nearly 230,000. The success of the membership campaign, however, posed numerous problems. The requirement that applicants for membership serve a six-months' period as candidate members before achieving full Party status was abandoned during the drive, and uniform standards for enrolling members were not applied throughout the country. As a result, according to a report by the Kerala unit of the Party, the new recruits were not "fanatical" and operated more as "associate" than regular members. An Andhra Pradesh report complained that most of the new recruits were illiterate and therefore could not read Party literature, and lacked "political consciousness" and "seriousness." Some Party leaders complained about trying to "mix water with milk."

National leaders also were clearly uneasy over the rapid growth in membership, fearing that cracks in CPI solidarity would widen, diversity of opinion would grow, and the perennial problem of illiteracy at the base—now intensified—would be a burdensome weight on the Party. General Secretary Ghosh's organizational report to the Amritsar Congress noted the "heavy inroad of alien ideas inside the Party, of bourgeois nationalism, of reformism and sectarianism, of anarchistic concepts of organization and general slackness. . . . While the influence of the Party has expanded, Marxist-Leninist consciousness of the Party membership has registered a decline." Bhupesh Gupta, central Secretariat member, wrote in mid-1958 that the new members added in recent years "by and large . . . remain ignorant of the fundamental teachings of Marxism-Leninism."

Perhaps as many as 10,000 of the estimated 250,000 Party members in early 1959 are intelligently aware of Communist ideology and of the problems of running the CPI; these are the Party's hard-core members. In addition, certain areas where the Party is best organized and where participation in Party-directed work has become a habit over the years—for example, Kerala, metropolitan Calcutta, and Andhra Pradesh—provide perhaps 30,000 more reliable, responsive members even though they may not be well educated ideologically and may require leadership. This record compares favorably with that of the Congress Party which claims 3,800,000 members, only 75,000 of whom are considered active. CPI membership outnumbers that of the two other national opposition parties—the Praja Socialist Party with 140,000 members and the communalist Jan Sangh with only a few tens of thousands. The percentage of active members in these parties is probably lower than in the CPI.

CPI leaders at the time of the Amritsar Congress said privately that they hoped to enroll 500,000 members by 1960 and 750,000 by 1962, the scheduled year for the third general election. The organizational resolution adopted said: "Notwithstanding the Party's growth, our Party even now is too small." The Party may eventually find that it has to make a choice—expanded membership and a moderate policy, or a restricted membership consisting primarily of disciplined cadres for eventual direct action. It is reasonable to assume that the oft-repeated problems—indiscipline, ideological ignorance, and lethargy—of dealing with a membership of 250,000 would be compounded if CPI membership were doubled or tripled.

2. Composition

a. SIZE AND GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION — In early 1959 the CPI had the largest membership in its history, but this did not result from steady growth since the formation of the CPI in 1928–29, as shown by the following tabulation of Party membership through the years:

1934	150
1942	3,000
1943	16,000
1944	25,000
1945	30,000
1946	53,000
1947	60,000
1948	90,000
1950	20,000
1952	30,000
1953	45,000
1954	*50,000
1956	*100,000
1958 (January 1)	217,942
(April 14)	229,500
1959 (March) *est*	250,000

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* Plus 25,000 candidate members.

These fluctuations reflect mainly changes in the Party's policies and the government's reaction to them and to some extent recruitment drives, rather than organized defections, group expulsions, or periodic screenings. The slow growth from 1934 to 1942 reflected the Party's status as an illegal, underground organization. The tenfold expansion of CPI membership during World War II resulted from the fact that the Party became legal in 1942 and had an open field for organizational activity owing to the wartime imprisonment of leaders of most other Indian political parties (see this Supplement, SECTION 2). The precipitate decline from 1948 to 1950, which cancelled about five years' growth, resulted from the unpopularity of the Party's experiment with militant insurrectionary tactics, but following the adoption of a moderate tactical line in 1951 Party strength grew steadily, surpassing the previous 1948 peak in 1956.

CPI membership by states and territories as of January 1958 is shown in FIGURE 3–3. This table shows that CPI membership is unevenly distributed throughout India. It is largest in the rural south. More than half the members are concentrated in three southern states, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, and Madras, which have a combined population of about 72,000,000 or 20% of the total Indian population. In West Bengal, mainly in the metropolitan area of Calcutta, is another large cluster of 25,000 members, and in each of the states of Bihār, Punjab, and Uttar Pradesh there are more than 10,000. The Party is weakest in proportion to total population in the Hindi-speaking belt (Bihār, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Rājasthān), which contains more than 40% of the total population.

The distribution of CPI membership also varies within the states of greatest Communist concentration. In Kerala, which has more than a quarter of the total Party membership, CPI strength is concentrated in the central region of the state as shown by the following membership figures by districts in 1958:

Cannanore	9,000	Trivandrum	5,500
Quilon	8,500	Kozhikode	4,900
Alleppey	7,800	Pālghāt	3,600
Kottayam	7,800	Ernākulam	3,000
Trichūr	5,800		

In Andhra Pradesh, the state with the second highest Party membership, CPI strength is concentrated in the coastal region (the first four districts in the following tabulation) and in the center of the abortive Telengana uprising (districts five through seven). The following tabulation gives CPI membership figures for this state by districts and major areas in 1958:

Guntūr	7,470	Chittoor	816
Krishna	7,394	Karīmnagar	793
West Godāvari	5,987	Mahbūbnagar	733
East Godāvari	3,281	Vijayavādā	700
Nalgonda	3,242	Hyderābād City	600
Khammam	3,105	Cuddapah	459
Warangal	3,022	Srīkākulam	425
Nellore	2,904	Kambam area	335
Visākhāpatnam	1,546	Nizāmābād	180
Medak	1,390	Bhadrāchalam	150
Ādilābād	1,035	Hyderābād district	90
Kurnool	860	State center	1,100

FIGURE 3–3. CPI MEMBERSHIP BY PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE AREAS, 1953, 1956, AND 1958

	APRIL 1953		APRIL 1956		JANUARY 1958		INCREASE OR DECREASE, 1956–58
	Number of members	Percent of total	Number of members	Percent of total	Number of members	Percent of total	
States:							
Andhra Pradesh	12,400	*24.6*	28,043	*27.7*	52,000	*23.9*	23,957
Assam	1,000	*2.0*	1,383	*1.4*	4,793	*2.2*	3,410
Bihār	2,600	*5.2*	6,027	*6.0*	16,000	*7.3*	9,973
Bombay							
Gujarāt	600	*1.2*	418	*0.4*	527	*0.2*	109
Maharashtra (including Bombay City)	4,600	*9.1*	5,557	*5.5*	8,473	*3.9*	2,916
Kerala	9,000	*17.9*	21,854	*21.6*	56,743	*26.0*	34,889
Madhya Pradesh	1,200	*2.4*	985	*1.0*	1,602	*0.7*	617
Madras	3,000	*6.0*	7,764	*7.7*	20,080	*9.2*	12,316
Mysore	600	*1.2*	1,057	*1.1*	2,006	*0.9*	949
Orissa	500	*1.0*	932	*0.9*	2,530	*1.2*	1,598
Punjab	2,600	*5.2*	6,391	*6.3*	10,000	*4.6*	3,609
Rājasthān	600	*1.2*	319	*0.3*	1,313	*0.6*	994
Uttar Pradesh	4,000	*7.9*	6,000	*5.9*	12,210	*5.6*	6,210
West Bengal	6,000	*11.9*	10,875	*10.7*	24,448	*11.2*	13,573
Federally administered:							
Delhi	600	*1.2*	500	*0.5*	1,000	*0.5*	500
Territories:							
Himachal Pradesh	25	*insig*	35	*insig*	180	*0.1*	145
Manipur	200	*0.4*	595	*0.6*	581	*0.3*	−14
Tripura	800	*1.6*	2,435	*2.4*	3,456	*1.6*	1,021
Total	50,325	*100.0*	101,170	*100.0*	217,942	*100.0*	116,772

NOTE Figures for 1953 do not include candidate members, numbering about 25,000. Figures for 1956 do. Figures for 1958 represent totals reached during a time when the probationary period was temporarily abandoned. State figures for 1953 are less reliable than those for later years.

In West Bengal, Party strength is concentrated in the city of Calcutta and in three neighboring districts (24-Parganas, Midnapore, and Howrah). However, 5,000 of the 14,000 new members recruited between 1956 and 1958 were in the northern rural regions of the state, traditionally a stronghold of the Congress Party. This increase was particularly apparent in Darjeeling (from 599 to 1,586 members), West Dinājpur (416 to 1,385), and Jalpaiguri (336 to 1,063). CPI membership in West Bengal as of 1958 is tabulated by districts as follows:

Calcutta	3,977	Nadia	831
Midnapore	3,203	Bīrbhūm	543
24-Parganas	2,155	Mālda	537
Howrah	1,630	Cooch Behār	500
Burdwān	1,606	Bānkura	306
Darjeeling	1,586	Murshidābād	139
Hooghly	1,418	Purūlia	93
West Dinājpur	1,385	State center	449
Jalpaiguri	1,063		

b. CHARACTERISTICS — Although fairly reliable data are available on the social composition of the delegates to the various CPI congresses, only two reports, both released during the 1940's, give an index to the makeup of the entire membership. The first, released at the time of the first Party Congress in 1943, analyzes the total membership—16,000. The second provides an analysis of membership in three provincial units in 1946—Gujarāt, Assam, and Delhi. The number of members in these states was, respectively, 184, 957, and 133, totaling 1,274. These analyses provide the following information in percentages on the Party membership:

	1943	1946
Class origin		
Working	*26*	*10*
Peasants and agricultural laborers	*36*	*44*
Middle	*25*	*46*
Other	*13*	. . .
Education		
Nonmatriculated	*n a*	*n a*
Matriculated	*n a*	*23*
College graduates	*n a*	*9*
Full-time Party workers	*16*	*12*

Although delegates to the various Party congresses are probably atypical of the general CPI membership in that they come from a higher economic group and include a higher proportion of potential leaders and professional Party workers, the composition of these delegations provides some indication of social and economic stratification within at least the upper echelon of the CPI. An analysis of delegates to three All-India Party Congresses of the CPI, held in 1943, 1956, and 1958 is given in FIGURE 3–7, under Reference Data. Comparison of the delegates to the 1943 congress with the membership at the time, shown in the tabulation above, indicates that bourgeois elements were less prominent among rank-and-file members than among the delegates. Indeed, the most striking characteristic of the analysis of delegates to all three congresses is the large proportion of middle class and peasantry. This distinction between membership and delegates, which can be shown statistically for 1943 only, probably continues, judging from the characteristics ascribed to delegates to the congresses of 1956 and 1958. The relatively few delegates to the first Party Congress, numbering only 139, must have constituted the Party leadership. The Party membership at the time was topheavy with full-time functionaries as 2,600 of the total membership of 16,000, or 16%, were described as full-timers or "professional revolutionaries who spend all their working hours educating and organizing Party membership." Among the delegates to the congresses of 1956 and 1958 was a high proportion of middle-level and lower-level Party leaders, along with the group of national leaders and full-time paid Party workers. Further, a not inconsiderable number held elective governmental positions which would undoubtedly put them in a higher income group than the average for the membership. Of some 400 delegates attending the Pālghāt congress in 1956, 357 were members of central, provincial, and district committees; 17 served on *taluk* or local committees and only 29 were listed simply as Party members. Eighteen were members of Parliament, 35 were members of state legislatures, 16 were municipal councilors, and 14 were district and village councillors. The breakdown for about 475 delegates attending the 1958 congress is similar: 408 were members of central, provincial, and district committees; 40 were members of *taluk* or local committees, and 26—a smaller percentage than at the 1956 Party Congress—were listed as members only. The data on age and duration of membership in the Party indicate that delegates have "grown up" in the Party, since the preponderance of young delegates has declined. At the first congress 70% of the delegates were under 35. At the 1956 and 1958 congresses about two-thirds were over 35, but since only 13 and 15 delegates, respectively, were over 55 years of age at the two congresses, the CPI remains a "young" Party.

3. Discipline and training

Inner-Party discipline and ideological purity have become increasingly important during recent years as the CPI has expanded its membership and adopted some superficial trappings of a democratic organization. According to *New Age*, the official Party journal, the Party's objective is as follows: "We have to build not merely a mass party, but a mass Communist Party, a mass party of the working class, on firm ideological foundations, in the spirit of proletarian internationalism, and in conformity with the principles of Marxism-Leninism." To achieve this objective Party leaders have followed the dual policy of attempting to educate and indoctrinate new recruits and those already within the Party fold and of establishing detailed disciplinary mechanisms for use if indoctrination fails.

Since its early years the CPI has been plagued by chronic resistance and occasional defiance of central authority and established policies, both among the leadership group and the articulate membership. These instances of friction have usually been kept within manageable bounds and have seldom resulted in organized defections or notable expulsions, with several important exceptions. In 1948 General Secretary B. T. Ranadive suspended the entire Andhra unit of the Party for failure to support his militant strategy; P. C. Joshi was suspended from Party membership in 1949 and expelled in 1950 for indiscipline, and his successor as general secretary, B. T. Ranadive, was in turn suspended in 1951 after his fall from power; and Somnath Lahiri, a former Central Committee member, has twice been suspended for activities contravening the prevailing Party line or for indiscipline. In addition, some members of provincial and local units have been suspended or expelled for "failure to perform their duties with sincerity," "factionalism," "non-Party actions," and so forth. As a rule, however, expulsions and suspensions from the PCI have been reserved for top Party leaders who carried their opposition to the prevailing line outside normal Party forums. Less severe types of discipline, such as censure or public criticism, have usually sufficed to keep rank-and-file members in line.

The Party constitution adopted in April 1958 is more explicit than earlier constitutions in defining discipline and establishing disciplinary procedures. According to this document, discipline is "based on conscious acceptance of the aims, the program, and the policies of the Party" and is "indispensable for preserving and strengthening the unity of the Party, for enhancing its strength, its fighting ability and its prestige, and for enforcing the principles of democratic centralism. Without strict adherence to Party discipline, the Party cannot lead the masses in struggles and actions, nor discharge its responsibility towards them."

The disciplinary measures which may be taken against dissidents, in order of severity, are as follows: warning, censure, public censure, removal from Party positions, suspension from Party membership for a period not exceeding one year, removal from the Party rolls, and expulsion. The differences among these various degrees of disciplinary action are not defined, but it is likely, for example, that "removal from the Party rolls" is a less drastic measure which can be more easily cancelled at a later date than "expulsion." Local committees are empowered, subject to the affected members' right of appeal, to impose minor types of punishment, but any measure involving expulsion or suspension of a Party member becomes effective only after approval by the next higher committee.

In addition to these procedures for action against individual dissenters within the Party, the provincial councils, or in their absence the provincial executive committees, have the "right to dissolve or take disciplinary action against a lower committee in cases where a persistent defiance of Party decisions and policy, serious factionalism, or a breach of Party discipline is involved."

The CPI also monitors the personal lives of its members, and disciplinary action may be taken against a member for moral lapses. According to the constitution, "Party members found to be strikebreakers, habitual drunkards, moral degenerates, betrayers of Party confidence, guilty of financial irregularities, or members whose actions are detrimental to the Party and the working class, shall be dealt with by the Party units to which they belong and be liable to disciplinary action." The disciplinary measures which may be taken are identical with those applicable to those who violate Party policy. The constitution admonishes Party units to use the more severe types of disciplinary action with "utmost caution, deliberation, and judgment" and urges that attempts be made, even after disciplinary measures have been taken, to "help the comrade to correct himself."

A Party member against whom disciplinary action is proposed shall, in accordance with the constitution, be informed of the allegations against him and has the right to be heard in person by the Party unit in which his case is being discussed. In all cases the member against whom disciplinary action has been taken has the right of appeal to the provincial or Central Control Commission (see this Section, under Central organization), and theoretically he may carry his appeal to the Party Congress, although there are no known instances in which an appeal has been carried to this body.

Education of Party members has been conducted primarily through the Communists' publication program. Overt CPI periodicals and pamphlets appear in English and in all of the major Indian languages. These are on the whole well-written, inexpensive, and gain a wide circulation within Party circles. In addition, Party leaders have published strictly inner-Party journals to explain the prevailing Party line and elicit members' views on various problems. *Party Letter* and *Forum,* both published by the national headquarters, have appeared at various times in the past, but it is not known whether these are still published. *Party Organizer* is circulated in West Bengal, and *Sandesam* (Directions) is the theoretical organ of the Andhra Pradesh branch of the Party. Party publications, according to a CPI document, are useful in that they "activize the Party ranks, sharpen their understanding of Party policy, and unify them politically. . . . They make it possible to swing the entire Party into action in a disciplined and organized way."

The CPI does not rely entirely on the printed word for the political and psychological indoctrination of its members. Party publications, regardless of their caliber, have no direct impact on the illiterate masses within the Party, and these elements have become increasingly important since the 1957 membership campaign. Another device used by the Indian Communists is the Party school. However, available information indicates that Communist training schools are formed on an *ad hoc* basis and that the Party has not established a permanent hierarchical system of training establishments since disbanding of the guerrilla warfare training camps in 1951. Between 1953 and 1957 there were reports of short-term CPI indoctrination courses in Travancore-Cochin and Malabar (merged in 1956 to form Kerala State), Madhya Pradesh, Calcutta, New Delhi, and Bombay. Others were undoubtedly given in other areas. These ranged in length from one week to one month and the curriculum in most cases included Marxist philosophy, history, economics, Communist peasant and trade union activities in India, and important political and organizational problems confronting the CPI. The principal lecturers at these courses were E. M. S. Namboodiripad, B. T. Ranadive, Dr. G. M. Adhikari, and local Party leaders. A number of short training courses (3–5 days) were held throughout India in late 1957 to explain to Party members the proposed organizational changes to be considered at the April 1958 Party Congress, and this congress was in turn followed by additional lectures to explain the congress decisions.

Party educational methods since the Amritsar Party Congress have probably advanced furthest in Kerala where the CPI has controlled the state government since April 1957. In July 1958, a series of weekly study classes for local laborers were reportedly inaugurated in that state. These evening classes on the theory and practice of communism were reportedly conducted by the local branch secretaries, and attendance among the various branches varied from 2 or 3 to 100 students.

The absence of adequate training facilities was recognized in the organizational report submitted to the Amritsar Party Congress in 1958. This report recommended: 1) the organization of short-term Party schools (3–7 days) in each state; 2) the establishment of schools especially geared to the needs of cadres in "mass organizations" (trade unions and other front groups); 3) increased interstate visits by Party leaders to develop a national outlook among Party members; and 4) an improvement in the literacy and general educational level of Party members. This report set the following goal: "Sufficient knowledge should be imparted to all Party members within a year so that they are able to read and understand Party journals in the state and current national and international developments." In an effort to achieve these objectives, an Education Committee was established within the CPI high command, and work was begun on a syllabus for Party education. This committee is not known to have submitted its report by March 1959, and no known permanent Party schools have been established.

Foreign Communists are believed to have played a minor role in CPI educational techniques. Several Indian Communists were reportedly trained in the Soviet Union and Communist China during the period of CPI militancy (1948–51), but the only indication of foreign training—other than normal indoctrination received during the visits of various delegations to Communist-bloc countries—in recent years is the report that several Indians departed in late 1958 for "technical training" in Budapest and Prague. No foreign Communists are known to have participated in CPI education within India since the mid-1930's.

D. Finances

Statistical data on the expenditures and revenues of the Communist Party of India, including the provincial, district, and branch committees, are extremely fragmentary. Apart from the announcement of fund drives by some of the larger state committees in the Party press, occasional reports of amounts collected in such drives or other special campaigns, and perennial references to the difficulty of raising funds, the Communists have always been secretive about their financial operations. Most of the information available on Party finances relates to a few of the larger state and district committee budgets, to the number of "full-timers" and "part-timers" working for the Party, and to some of its more important front and propaganda activities. Using available information, however, it is possible to make some estimates of Party expenditures that probably give a fairly reliable picture of the general magnitude of these expenditures.

1. Expenditures

The CPI is estimated to be currently spending between 6,000,000 and 7,000,000 rupees per year (one rupee equals US$0.21), exclusive of its printing, publishing, and bookselling programs which are self-sustaining enterprises. In addition, the Party is estimated to be building up assets and savings at the rate of over 1,500,000 rupees per year. There is no firm basis for estimating the annual gross value of the CPI's printing, publishing, and bookselling enterprises, but these appear to be making profits of about 250,000 rupees per year, and the annual gross value of the business may run as high as 8,000,000 to 10,000,000 rupees, excluding expenditures on propaganda by Communist bloc countries in India.

Because of the Party's low pay scales and the relatively lower costs in the India market, the Party's rupee expenditures are comparable to at least equivalent dollar expenditures at U.S. prices. Although these expenditures are small compared with those of U.S. parties, the Indian Communists are spending three to four times as much as the major non-Communist opposition party, the Praja Socialist Party. More important, they are spending more on organizational work—and probably on trade union activities as well—than even the dominant Congress Party. In the 1957 elections, the Communists, with an estimated expenditure of less than 4,000,000 rupees, polled almost one-fourth as many votes as the Congress with its many big-business and well-to-do party backers. Furthermore, one of the CPI goals is now reported to be raising the Party fund to 15,000,000 rupees by the next general election in 1962.

The Party's financial history closely reflects its organizational growth. In 1942 when the Party first began to function as an effective legal organization, annual expenditures are estimated to have totaled 800,000 to 1,000,000 rupees. By 1947, owing to the Party's wartime expansion, expenditures rose to an estimated annual rate of close to 2,000,000 rupees distributed as follows:

Payments to Party workers	700,000
Rents, etc.	800,000
Net publishing expenses	200,000
Elections	*200,000
Party fronts and conferences	100,000

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* Prorated portion of the estimated 800,000 to 1,000,000 rupees spent by the Party in the 1946 elections.

At the same time the Party's investment in the publishing and bookselling business is estimated to have risen to somewhere between 600,000 and 800,000 rupees. By 1958 the rate of expenditure on CPI and front activities was estimated at more than three times the 1947 rate, or approximately 7,000,000 rupees. This expenditure was distributed as follows:

Central and state expenditures	2,300,000
District and local	1,100,000
Additional payments to Party workers	1,200,000
All-India Trade Union Congress	1,000,000
Other fronts	225,000
General, state, and by-elections*	1,100,000

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* Election expenditures and interest on election debt prorated over 5 years.

By the 1957 general election the CPI was able to raise or borrow over 3,000,000 rupees—over 3,500,000 if the 1955 special election in Andhra, now a portion of the unified state of Andhra Pradesh, is included. Furthermore, the Party's publishing, printing, and bookselling business is now self-supporting. The main publishing installations in Delhi and Bombay make annual contributions to the Party's exchequer that more than offset the combined deficits of several of the state enterprises. Finally, by 1958 the CPI was estimated to have built up the Party's assets to between 5,000,000 and 6,000,000 rupees. FIGURE 3–8 (under Reference Data) shows the distribution of these assets. More than 40% is invested in the publishing enterprises, slightly more than 10% is invested in building and property, and the remainder is held in Party funds.

Much of the recent financial expansion has been achieved since the Communists were elected to office in Kerala. By the end of 1957 the Kerala unit of the Party had apparently paid off its election debt and was reported to have built up its Party fund to 500,000 rupees. By the end of 1958 this fund was estimated to have risen to 1,500,000 rupees. The Kerala Provincial Committee earmarked 185,000 rupees in its 1959 budget for a building program to house not only its state headquarters and the *New Kerala* press but also the Party's numerous district and branch headquarters.

a. CENTRAL — Almost no details are available on central expenditures beyond the fact that separate accounts are now kept of the expenses of the "central executive" (presumably the Secretariat, Central Executive Committee, and National Council) as distinct from the expenses attached to its parliamentary work. All but a few of the members of the Central Executive Committee draw salaries as members of Parliament, employees of Communist publishing concerns, or All-India Trade Union Congress (AITUC) officials, so that it is presumed the center's wage bill is confined primarily to maintaining its small office staff. Since the bulk of CPI expenditures in Delhi are incurred by the publishing concerns, it is possible that these enterprises are charged with all rents as well as a number of other miscellaneous expenses. Probably the most important item of central expenditure is travel within India and by top Party leaders to Moscow and elsewhere within the Communist bloc. Expenses for meetings of the CPI National Council are borne primarily by the state where they are held. This may also be true of Central Executive Committee meetings. In 1954 the annual expenses of the 9-man Politburo were 100,000 rupees. It has been estimated that the expenses of the reorganized central executive as a whole have since risen to 250,000 rupees.

b. STATE — The most important item of expense at the state level is payment of the Party workers who run the Party organization and its various front activities. In 1958 the Andhra Pradesh Provincial Committee, which accounts for more than 20% of total CPI membership, allotted 180,000 rupees for the payment of full- and part-time workers as compared with 160,000 rupees for the rest of its current expenses covering such items as travel, rents, postage and stationary, Party newspapers, and so forth. Some provincial committees in areas where trade unions are well organized, notably Maharashtra and West Bengal, rely on the trade unions to maintain all or most of the full-time Party workers on the trade union front. Elsewhere expenses for these workers are apparently divided between the provincial committees and the trade unions, depending on their relative financial strengths. The provincial committees fix the rate of payment, and there are graduations based on seniority and family responsibilities. The present average rate for most states appears to be 50 rupees per month for full-time Party workers, and 80 rupees per month for those working on the trade union front. FIGURE 3–9 (under Reference Data) shows the estimated annual expenditures of the CPI and its front organizations for the center and the states in 1958. Information in this table is not definitive but includes approximations based on limited data. Estimates of AITUC expenditures are particularly rough, being based on the number of full-time workers that seem to be charged to trade union rather than provincial committee budgets and the broad assumption that total trade union expenditures probably approximate double the payment to these Party workers.

c. PUBLISHING ACTIVITIES — Because publishing, printing, and book distribution activities are a business enterprise, finances for these establishments require separate treatment. No information is available on the total expenditures of these enterprises, but rough estimates can be made of the size of the wage bill and the working staff, about 60–75% of whom are probably CPI members. FIGURE 3–10 (under Reference Data) shows a general picture of finances of these enterprises, the approximate number of workers employed, the estimated wage bill, the net profit or loss, and the approximate size of the CPI subsidy. Publishing enterprises of six Party units which were self-supporting in 1958 produced a profit of about 250,000 rupees, but this was in part offset by deficits, estimated at 100,000 to 130,000 rupees, incurred by the remaining units.

2. Revenues

There is a great deal of partial information on sources of funds for the CPI, but this is inadequate to permit assessment of the relative importance of the various sources. Most of the funds are probably raised locally; aid from the Communist bloc, largely concentrated on propaganda and front organizations, is estimated at less than one-fourth of the total.

The collection of dues and levies from Party members has been an important source of funds, with the various state committees fixing the actual rates. Dues range from 1 to 3 rupees per year (the national dues of one rupee are supplemented by provincial dues in some areas), while levies take the form of a graduated scale based on income earnings. The Uttar Pradesh Provincial Committee for example, has adopted the following rate of levies in percentages on income:

MONTHLY INCOME	RATE	
	Single persons	Families
(*in rupees*)		
Up to 50	*1*	Exempt
51–75	*2*	*1*
76–100	*4*	*1*
101–125	*6*	*2*
126–150	*7½*	*2*
151–200	*10*	*3*
201–250	*12½*	*4*
Over 250	*15*	*5*

In Andhra Pradesh, members who are employed are required to "donate" from 5% to 10% of their earnings, in addition to annual dues of one rupee.

As part of the levy system CPI members who are also members of the Indian Parliament (MP's) or of state legislative assemblies (MLA's) are assessed specific amounts. MP's are required to pay a monthly levy of 300 rupees, in which the Central Executive Committee, the provincial committee, and the district committee share equally. The levies on MLA's are set by the provincial executive committees. Many of the MP's and MLA's, however, have been slow to pay their levies, and pressure has had to be exerted on them. Other Party members who have political appointments are also assessed. For example, members who are appointed to the Legislative Select Committee and the Expert Committee in Kerala must "kick back" half of their daily earnings of 25 rupees to the Kerala Provincial Committee; in Calcutta, delegates to the biennial District Committee Conference of the CPI must pay a fee of 2 rupees per head to the Party. The percentage of total Party revenues raised from these sources is, however, small owing to the limited number of members affected.

A second internal source of CPI funds is voluntary contributions from Party members, sympathizers, and businessmen. Some members of wealthy landed or business families who have joined the CPI have turned over most of their assets to the Party. For example, E. M. S. Namboodiripad, Chief Minister of Kerala, is reported to have contributed 70,000 rupees from the sale of his land. In addition, a number of fellow-travellers, particularly in Bombay, contribute to the Party or its peace and Afro-Asian solidarity fronts. Finally, some small businessmen pledge financial support to the Communists in an attempt to ensure labor peace.

A third source is the annual general fund drive which is geared to collect money from labor union members at the time of their bonus payments and from peasants at harvest time. Such a drive was instituted in Andhra Pradesh in 1958, and the provincial committee collected 800,000 rupees, compared with an original target of 500,000. More than half of this collection, however, may have been profits earned through a rice purchase arrangement between Andhra Pradesh traders and the Communist government of Kerala. This general fund drive has to some extent replaced special drives for specific purposes, but special fundraising campaigns are still used to finance the purchases of new presses and plants for Communist publishing enterprises, Party headquarters buildings, Party congresses and conferences, and election campaigns. In states where the Communist Party is influential, such as Kerala and Andhra Pradesh, relatively little difficulty is experienced in raising the set quota; in others, the actual collections are frequently less than half the target.

A fourth local source of CPI funds—the use of official governmental influence or pressure—arises only in those states where Communists have acquired positions of importance. The Communist-controlled state of Kerala is the best example. In the first two years in office the Kerala branch of the Party is estimated to have collected between 4,000,000 and 5,000,000 rupees through official coercion, bribes, and kickbacks. Anti-Communist press reports allege that special fund drives in Kerala are designed to conceal the flow of government funds into the Party treasury.

Several provincial committees have attempted to raise additional funds through Communist-controlled business enterprises. To date the sale of books, pamphlets, and periodicals printed by local Party presses has netted a profit in only a few states. These enterprises are frequently operated at a loss, and the chief purpose of such projects is clearly propaganda rather than profit. The central publishing house has been the most profitable and is estimated to be contributing 50,000 to 85,000 rupees per year to the central Party headquarters. Some of this money, however, was used to repay the loan which the Party floated to build a 100,000-rupee building to house the enterprise. In Kerala the Party has been successful with some other types of business enterprises. CPI-sponsored labor cooperatives operate toddy shops, and peasant associations work on government projects, with the profits reverting to the Party.

Although the CPI's main income is derived from local sources—drives, and donations, levies and dues, and misuse of official positions—the Party also receives an undetermined amount of external aid from the Communist bloc, provided directly and indirectly. In recent years, there has been little proof of direct subsidy to the CPI from the U.S.S.R. However, a number of devices have been used to provide support indirectly. On occasion Soviet and bloc Embassies in New Delhi have been reported to make cash contributions via contact agents to avoid the appearance of a direct tie-up. Other assistance has been provided by paying advertising rates for carrying feature articles in the Communist press, by commissioning Indian editions of Russian books, and by providing virtually free of charge large quantities of books and pamphlets for sale by CPI book houses. Furthermore, the Soviet Embassy is reported to be paying high salaries to several CPI publications men who presumably serve as TASS employees. In 1958, 35,000 rupees worth of Soviet aid was forwarded through the People's Publishing House in Bombay to the Communists in Kerala to help finance a by-election. AITUC leader S. A. Dange receives 5,000–6,000 rupees per month as a salaried officer of the WFTU, and in 1957 he received 100,000 rupees for a memorial in honor of one of India's most prominent trade union leaders. There was no subsequent announcement on the use of this money, and it is assumed that most of it was spent on AITUC activities. In 1958 it was alleged that Dange had received a very large sum (6,800,000 rupees) from abroad. Although the rate of AITUC expenditures has certainly been increased in the past two years, this report appears to be exaggerated; the actual increase is approximately 50,000 to 100,000 rupees annually. Although these sums appear small, the general financial position of most Indian trade unions is so stringent that the addition of a few thousand rupees could prove decisive if used during a strike or critical period of jurisdictional rivalry.

E. Propaganda

1. Content

The main targets of Communist propaganda in India are the four broad classes which the Party visualizes as its potential allies in establishing a people's democratic government: the workers, the peasantry, the petty *bourgeoisie,* and the anti-imperialist "nationalist" *bourgeoisie.* Communist propaganda, both domestic and foreign, has a dual motivation: 1) it is designed to draw the Indian people into a broad national front against the United States and Western military alliances, and 2) it is designed to enlist for the Communists the support of particularly vulnerable target groups—the educated unemployed, landless agricultural laborers, minority linguistic and caste groups, and the unstable middle class.

Domestic issues upon which the Communist Party has centered its propaganda and agitation since 1951 have included the following of particular interest to peasants and agricultural workers: the periodic shortage of food, the need for price control, high rural indebtedness and tax burdens, the government's failure to provide adequate drought and flood relief, and the need for reform in land tenancy and eviction procedures. Particularly directed to workers have been the following propaganda themes: the need for increased wages and social security benefits, trade union rights, labor unity, opposition to retrenchment and unemployment, the desire for equal wages for men and women, and opposition to foreign business "monopolies" in India. Themes of special interest to students have been use of the mother tongue as the medium of instruction, reduction of tuition and examination fees, the right of students and teachers to participate fully in political activity, student freedom in matters of student union elections and activities, and increased facilities for technical, professional, and scientific training. On the woman's front the Communists have centered their propaganda and agitation on such issues as women's and children's welfare, abolition of the dowry system, increased educational opportunities for women, and government aid to women's organizations.

Other domestic issues on which the Party approaches various groups are the need for industrialization of India, linguistic and regional particularism, nationalization of banking and various industries, democratic liberties and civil rights, the desire for higher standards of living, corruption in government, national cultural advancement, and caste discrimination and communalism. National sovereignty, imperialism and colonialism, Afro-Asian solidarity, racialism, penetration of India by American capital, nuclear tests and weapons, praise for the Communist bloc, and world peace are the major international issues upon which the Communists focus their propaganda attention.

2. CPI media

Propaganda and agitation on domestic and foreign issues are carried out by the Communist Party in a variety of ways: the printing of news and comment in newspapers and periodicals; the production and distribution of pamphlets and books; the production and exhibition of films; the observance of such days as "Famine Day"; the organization of meetings, signature campaigns, demonstrations, fasts, and hunger strikes; the presentation of dramas and skits; speeches in Parliament and the state assemblies; and the newest method of all—actions taken by the government of Kerala.

CPI publishing houses in India turn out annually about 600 titles of books and pamphlets in a total of some 1,620,000 copies. The cost of this production is estimated at about 3,000,000 rupees. The cost of the Party's newspaper and periodical output probably does not exceed 5,000,000 rupees. Thus, total annual expenditure on the Party's publishing program is estimated at 8,000,000 rupees (US$1,800,000). Expenditures on other media are probably less than those on the publishing program, and it is thus likely that the CPI spends less than the equivalent of US$4,000,000 a year on propaganda activity.

a. **PRINTED MATTER** — Printed matter is the principal medium of mass communication exploited by the Indian Communists. The Party and its front organizations publish numerous newspapers and periodicals and a large number of pamphlets. However, of the more than 6,000 newspapers and periodicals in India only a few dozen are Communist sponsored, and a small additional number toe the Party line. Party newspapers rank among the top six in circulation only in Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, and West Bengal.

(1) *Newspapers and periodicals* — The CPI publishes a number of central and provincial organs. On the whole these are ably edited and have an attractive format. The most common lead article is a highly biased account of corruption in government or "antipeople" policies and statements by government officials, closely followed by articles praising the Sino-Soviet bloc, denouncing the United States, and reporting on CPI meetings and policy statements. The remainder of each issue is usually devoted to feature articles praising some aspect of life in the Sino-Soviet bloc, "exposing" reactionary governmental policies, and publicizing Communist-sponsored agitations in the various states. The central organs of the CPI are the responsibility of the Central Executive Committee while those at the provincial level are the responsibility of the provincial committees concerned. The CPI also publishes a few district organs, but district committees of the Party are not as a rule financially or organizationally able to publish their own journals.

The number of organs published by the Party depends on various factors, the two most important of which are its financial resources and the degree of political freedom it enjoys. After the CPI gained legal status in 1942, and even shortly before in anticipation of this event, a large number of Party journals sprang up throughout India. A weekly central organ, *People's War,* was started in English in Bombay, while provincial organs were started in the Bengali language (*Janayuddha*—People's War), Malayalam (*Deshabhimani*—Patriot), Oriya (*Muktiyuddah*—Freedom Struggle), Punjabi (*Jang-i-Azad*—Freedom Struggle), and identically named journals in Tamil, Telegu, and Kannada (*Janasakti*—People's Strength). The Party enjoyed complete freedom in developing its press during World War II and the immediate postwar period, but when it changed its tactics in 1948 it became the target of governmental repression, and the Party press was hard hit. Many of the publications which had come into existence prior to 1948 were forced to close down. In north India, the Bengali daily organ of the Bengal Provincial Committee, *Swadhinata* (Independence), was banned completely as were *Lokyug* (People's Age) in Marathi, *Janyug* (People's Age) in Hindi, *Janyug* (People's Age) in Gujarati, and *Naya Zamana* (New Age) in Urdu. In south India, Deshabhimani and all three language issues of *Janasakti* had to suspend publication. The Party's central organ (then called *People's Age*) was banned in February 1949, but although the provincial press was decimated, the central organ was able to continue its existence under various names with a break of only six months.

After the Party changed its tactics in 1951 and gained some measure of freedom, the Party press began to reappear. *Swadhinata* resumed publication in February 1951, and the Tamil version of *Janasakti* and the Marathi-language *Yugantar* (People's Age) began in September 1951 in an apparent attempt to revive these propaganda media before the 1951–52 general elections. During the elections the circulation of Party publications was greatly expanded, but this was done on a haphazard and unbusinesslike basis, and most journals ran into debt. During 1952 the Party attempted to meet the debts incurred during the election period and get the papers on a self-sustaining basis. *Yugantar* was suspended for several months and then restarted at double the price; *Swadhinata* had to sell its printing press and buy a cheaper one; and the Tamil *Janasakti* switched from daily to weekly publication in late 1952.

Since 1954 the Party has made strenuous efforts to raise the level of the Party press and put it on a sound financial footing. There have been drives to reequip the Party press with new machinery, to use better newsprint, and to make the organs less sectarian and more appealing to broad sections of the population. Available data on the official organs published by the CPI as of December 1957, the most recent date for which complete information is available, are presented in tabular form in FIGURE 3–11, under Reference Data. Since December 1957 the Party has started at least one new organ. This is *Sandesam* (Directions), a monthly theoretical and political journal of the Andhra Pradesh Provincial Executive Committee, supervised by an editorial board of 4 persons (Kambhampati Satyanarayana, the chief editor, Thammareddy Satyanarayana, Kadiyala Gopalarao, and Mahidhra Ramamohan). This monthly is published in Telegu and had a circulation of 1,100–1,200 in early 1959. The most important of the current publications are the weekly *New Age,* the official Party newspaper, which had a circulation of 40,000 in 1957 and is estimated to have exceeded 50,000 in early 1959, and the Party's theoretical journal, the monthly *New Age*. Both are edited by Party stalwarts. In early 1959 the Central Executive Committee formed an editorial board to supervise both publications; the board included P. C. Joshi (chief editor of the weekly), B. T. Ranadive (chief editor of the monthly), and M. Basavapunnaiah, Mohit Sen, Ziaul Haq, and Ramdas.

Like the CPI, many of the Party's front organizations have their own organs. The history of these organs has been much the same as that of the Party organs, for the fortunes of the front organizations are closely tied to those of the CPI. When the CPI faced government repression during the 1948–50 period the front organizations, too, were often repressed to the point of being almost completely disrupted. With the change in CPI tactics in 1951 and the concomitant revival of CPI front organizations, publications of Communist student, peasant, labor and other fronts began to appear. As of December 1957 six such organs were known, available information on which is presented in FIGURE 3–12, under Reference Data.

In addition to the organs of the CPI and its front organizations, there are a number of newspapers and periodicals which may be described as fellow-traveling. The most important of these is *Blitz*. It has an estimated circulation of nearly 60,000, is published in Bombay by the Blitz Publications Ltd., and is edited by the well-known fellow traveler, R. K. Karanjia. This sensational journal, which plays up racial conflicts in the United States, alleged evidences of aggressive U.S. policies, and scandals in the Indian government, has a particular appeal to the student community in India. Fellow-traveling newspapers and publications are published by enterprises which, if not controlled by Party members and sympathizers, are either subsidized or under contract to the CPI or significantly infiltrated by CPI members. Among the newspapers and periodicals mentioned in various intelligence reports as occasionally or consistently following the Party line are the following: *Andhra Prabha* (Light of Andhra, published in Madras City), *Andhra Praja* (People of Andhra, Bombay), *Janatha* (The Masses, Ernākulam), *Keralam* (Kerala, Kozhikode), *Nava Keralam* (New Kerala, Trivandrum), *Navrashtra* (New Land, Patna) *Orissa* (Bhubaneswar), *Delhi Times* (Delhi), *Panchshil Herald* (Five Principles Herald, Delhi), and a number of publications in Jammu and Kashmīr: *Jammu Lok Sabha* (Jammu Assembly), *Jammu Sandesh* (Jammu News), *Martand* (Sun), *Naya Aj* (New Day), *Srinagar Kong Posh* (Srinagar Saffron Flower).

Two fairly new publications, *Link* and *Daily Maratha*, may be examples of the direction in which the Communists are now expanding in an effort to reach a broader audience than that reached by purely Party publications. In late 1956 a new joint stock company was formed to publish the Marathi-language newspaper entitled the *Daily Maratha* which came out in support of the concept of a united Maharashtra state including Bombay City, a concept favored by the CPI. Although ostensibly an independent paper, *Daily Maratha* is reportedly Communist linked. Its editor, P. K. Atre, who has had a successful career both in journalism and motion picture production, was one of the members of an Indian film delegation which visited the U.S.S.R. The subeditor is V. M. Bhave, formerly associated with *New Age*. Two of the men active in the joint stock company which publishes *Daily Maratha* are M. V. Donde, who went to Moscow in October 1955 on a trip sponsored by the Indo-Soviet Cultural Society, and Lalje M. Pendse, a former member of the CPI and an All-India Peace Council delegate to the Helsinki Peace Festival in 1955. The CPI has reportedly given extensive financial assistance to this journal which, through supporting Maharashtrian aspirations, has become the most popular Marathi-language paper.

Link, a weekly news magazine similar in style to the American publication *Time*, was started in 1958 by a public joint stock company. Reported to be among its shareholders are Dr. A. V. Baliga, prominent Bombay surgeon and Communist supporter; Nargis, popular Indian film star and member of an Indian film delegation to Moscow as well as star of the joint Indo-Soviet film *Pardesi;* and Mrs. Aruna Asaf Ali, former CPI member who is still apparently sympathetic toward communism. The editor of *Link* is Edata Narayanan, a former CPI member, and the editorial staff is well sprinkled with active or former members of the CPI and fellow travelers; among them are: V. S. P. Kurup, a contributor to the CPI's *New Age;* O. P. Sangal, a CPI member; J. Swaminathan, a CPI member; V. V. Prasad, a fellow traveler formerly with the pro-Communist *Delhi Times* and *Panchshil Herald;* T. A. Balakrishnan, editor and printer of the *Delhi Times;* C. Ramachandran, CPI member who was formerly on the staff of *New Age;* A. Vishwanathan, CPI member and until recently on the staff of *New Age;* Bhat Bedi, CPI member and special correspondent for a Communist Urdu daily. *Link's* staff of foreign correspondents includes Iqbal Singh, well-known "progressive," and P. K. Tripathi, former staff member of TASS in New Delhi. *Link* has reportedly been backed by Defense Minister V. K. Krishna Menon, a leading light in the Congress Party's left wing, and 2,000 subscriptions are said to have been taken out by the Indian Defense Ministry for placement in service libraries and reading rooms.

Another new periodical of the *Link* type which may be Communist infiltrated is *Indian Foreign Affairs,* published and edited by Jatendra M. Aggarwal and printed on the Roxy Printing Press in New Delhi.

Another new field of Communist press activity opened with the CPI victory in Kerala. In mid-November 1958, it was reported that the Government of Kerala was making sizable government loans to some papers in that state, including *Deshabhimani,* organ of the Kozhikode District Committee of the CPI, which reportedly received a loan of 70,000 rupees. At the same time Krishna Iyer, Kerala Law Minister, admitted publicly in a press conference that the Kerala government had blacklisted certain opposition papers by withdrawing the placement of government advertisements, a major source of income for many small newspapers. In addition, the Kerala government gives a subsidy to the major Indian wire services to carry government handouts.

Another new venture of the CPI is the establishment of a Party-dominated news agency. In October 1957 it was announced at a meeting of the Kerala Newspaper Owners' Association that a press service had recently been established in New Delhi by the CPI and that an accredited representative had already been assigned to Trivandrum, the capital of Kerala. The organization of an indigenous Communist press agency at a time when India's leading press service, the Press Trust of India, was in danger of bankruptcy and trying to increase its rates was well timed, but there is no information on the extent to which the new Communist news agency, known as the Indian Press Agency, has succeeded in luring Indian papers to use its service. The agency is located in New Delhi, and David Cohen, an Indian who was formerly editor of *Unity,* the organ of the Communist-front Indian People's Theater Association, is listed as chief editor.

(2) *Nonperiodical literature* — Both the Central Executive Committee and the various provincial committees operate a number of publishing and bookselling houses, and a few district committees run bookstalls. In addition, there are a number of other publishers and booksellers in India who publish and distribute Communist literature.

Most of the Party publishing houses are private limited joint stock companies in which shares are held by a small group of individuals, usually leading Party members. The People's Publishing House (Private) Ltd. is the leading enterprise of this type. A few houses, like Janayugam Publications Ltd. in Kerala, are public limited stock companies in which the controlling interest is owned by Party members and the balance of shares are offered for sale to the general public. To save money which would otherwise go to the government in taxes, the Visalandhra Publishing House Ltd. in Andhra Pradesh is reportedly considering a change-over from a corporate structure to that of a public trust. Most of these enterprises seem to operate at a profit, bringing the Party an income estimated as high as 200,000–250,000 rupees a year. Data relating to leading CPI publishing and book houses are presented tabularly in FIGURE 3–13, under Reference Data.

These concerns publish in English as well as in vernacular languages, the central house specializing in English and the provincial houses in the languages of their particular region. They publish both books and pamphlets, and while the bulk of the output is purely Communist literature they are tending increasingly to publish non-Communist works. Some of the output is Indian in origin, and the remainder consists of translations or reprints of foreign works. The Party publishing house in West Bengal, the National Book Agency (Private) Ltd., for example, has through the Soviet Trade Agency in Calcutta, obtained the rights to translate and publish in Bengali many Soviet books, including numerous children's books. Similarly, the New Century Book House, the Party publishing house in Madras state, has translated and published in Tamil a number of Soviet works. These two houses, and presumably the other CPI publishing concerns, have translators who can not only translate from Russian but also from English and the various Indian languages.

CPI publishing houses are in a good position to obtain both foreign and domestic Communist works for publication, and they undoubtedly account for much of the nonperiodical Communist literature published in India. However, some Communist or "progressive" material, both foreign and domestic, is published in India by houses which cannot, on the basis of available information, be clearly identified as Communist. Star Publications in Madras, for example, has recently published in Tamil a significant number of Soviet books, although this concern is not known to be under Communist control. In West Bengal, the Eastern Trading Co., K. Ganguly and Co. Ltd., and the Popular Library have also published a significant amount of Communist literature. It is possible that these and such others as C. R.

Publications (Bombay), Jaico Publishing House (Bombay), Current Book House (Bombay), Socialist Literature Publications (Agra), Bharati Library (Calcutta), Chaudhuri and Sons (Banāras), Nellai Publishing House (Tirunelveli) and Shila Prakashani (Delhi) are non-Communist Party houses which publish Communist material, perhaps on contract, purely from a profit motive.

In the field of bookselling, each Party house retails not only its own output, but also material from other publishers, both Indian and foreign. The March 1952 "Catalogue of Important Books" issued by the New Century Book House in Madras (all of the CPI booksellers put out lists and catalogues of books for sale) lists a wide range of Communist and "progressive" literature published in India by various publishers and in the U.S.S.R., Communist China, the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States. The booksellers get a 40% discount on stock from other Indian publishers as well as a substantial discount from foreign publishers. Most if not all the Party booksellers have direct contact with Communist publishing houses abroad, and they periodically apply to the Government of India for allocations of foreign exchange for the importation of books. The People's Publishing House (Private) Ltd., and possibly some of the provincial houses, export books to Communist booksellers abroad.

There is a marked trend in all Communist bookhouses to handle non-Communist as well as Communist publications. In fact, the houses even sell publications from rival political organizations. They also handle textbooks approved by the local school textbook committees. In part this is done for profit motive, in part to reach a broader section of the people.

Some of the Party houses, such as the Prabhat Book House in Kerala, operate bookmobiles and set up temporary book stalls at festivals and exhibitions. In the sale of Communist literature they are helped by teams organized by the Party to conduct special sales drives among workers, peasants, and other groups. These teams commonly peddle their wares from door to door, sell them in the street, outside schools and factories, near streetcar and bus stops, and at railway stations.

While much Communist literature is sold through the Party houses, perhaps the bulk is sold through outlets which on the basis of available data cannot definitely be identified as Party enterprises and which may indeed not be Party houses. Among these are the Assam National Book Agency (Gauhāti), Bhauani and Sons (Delhi), Current Book Distributors (Calcutta), Popular Book Depot (Bombay), On Kay Bee and Company (Bombay), Oxford Book and Stationary Company (Calcutta), and the Delhi Book Centre (Delhi).

The largest CPI publishing and bookselling house is that operated by the Central Executive Committee, the People's Publishing House (Private) Ltd. (PPH). This is a corporation in which all the shares are owned by various members of this committee. No information is available on the capitalization of the enterprise, but S. A. Dange alone reportedly holds 50,000 rupees worth of shares. Dange has been in charge of the PPH since the 1958 Amritsar Party Congress. The main office of the PPH is in New Delhi where the national office of the CPI is also located. It has only one branch, in Bombay, where the main office was located before its transfer to New Delhi in 1954. A selective list of pamphlets and books published by the PPH in the 1956–58 period is presented in FIGURE 3–14, under Reference Data.

Although clearly a Communist publishing house both in management and output, the PPH aspires to be recognized as a national publishing concern. As a step in this direction, it is reportedly stepping up its output to a minimum of 24 books a year and diversifying to include not only Communist works but also nonsectarian items of literary merit which have a wider appeal.

With regard to the various publishing houses run by the provincial committees, the most complete information is available on the People's Publishing House of Bihār (PPHB) and the Visalandhra Publishing House in Andhra Pradesh. PPHB was started in Patna, Bihār, in 1946 on an initial capital of 2,000 rupees (US$400) donated by a Communist leader. In April 1956 the Bihār Provincial Committee of the CPI took over the management of the enterprise, perhaps because of the poor financial state of the publishing house which then had a bank balance of only 50 rupees. At that time it was decided that the PPHB would serve not only Bihār but also the eastern portion of Uttar Pradesh. During its first year under direct Party management, the PPHB appears to have published at least 9 titles for the Bihār Provincial Committee in Hindi and Urdu. These items were apparently pamphlets and folders priced at 25 naye paise (US$0.05) or less, and the number of copies ranged from 2,000 in the case of a 25 naye paise publication to 50,000 in the case of one selling for 13 naye paise. No definite information is available on what press printed these items for the PPHB, though it is thought to have been the Yatim Press in Patna.

Bookselling is the principal activity of the PPHB. The total value of sales was 57,555 rupees (US$11,311) during the year 1956/57 and 39,000 rupees during the year 1957/58. Some 64,000 foreign items valued at 33,000 rupees accounted for 89% of the 1957/58 sales, the remainder being composed of Indian publications. One-third of the 6,000 rupees accounted for by Indian publications represented textbooks. Some of the textbooks, like *Soviet Sang ki Communist Party* (The Communist Party of the Soviet Union), *Marxwad Kya Hai* (What is Marxism?) and *Janwadi Chin ka Bhumi Sudhar Kanun* (Land Distribution Law of People's China) were obviously published by Communist houses and had been approved by the Education Department of the non-Communist Government of Bihār.

The publishing activity of the Visalandhra Publishing House (Communist) in the state of Andhra Pradesh has been on a fairly large scale. During the first five years of its operation this house published 290 titles (including 30 reprints) totaling 766,680 copies. The distribution of this output by subject was as follows:

Theoretical	23
Political	88
About Andhra Pradesh	15
Cultural	12
Literature	17
Songs and poetry	12
Folk stories	23
Children's literature	23
Plays	18
Novels	*27
Short story collections	8
Others	24
Total	290

* Six original.

The publishing house claims that it pays royalties higher than the prevailing market rate and that authors, both Communist and non-Communist, are pleased to have it publish their works. The house prides itself on the number of children's books it has published, claiming the volume of output is unprecedented in the history of any publishing concern.

It sells books from a wide variety of publishers obtained on a consignment or credit basis in addition to its own publications. In 1956 the sale of other books far exceeded the sale of books imparting Marxist ideology. The house refuses, however, to carry anti-Communist literature, sex literature, and books which promote "superstitious and blind beliefs."

(3) *Party printing presses* — The CPI owns an undetermined number of printing presses. The largest of these is operated by the Party's Central Executive Committee in New Delhi and known as the New Age Printing Press. Some of the provincial committees, but apparently not all, also have presses which print some of the periodical and nonperiodical publications put out by the CPI and its front organizations. They also appear to do job printing for outsiders. Most of the Party presses appear to operate at a profit, often helping the Party to meet the deficits incurred by publications of newspapers. Available data on leading Party presses are presented in FIGURE 3–15, under Reference Data.

The Party printing enterprises appear to be in a period of growth which began in 1956. The Madhya Pradesh Provincial Committee, for example, has been trying to raise money to purchase its first press. The Bihār Provincial Committee has decided to acquire a press of its own and has made overtures toward the privately owned Yatim Press on which its organ, *Janasakti*, has been printed; the West Bengal Provincial Committee has been trying to acquire a new rotary press valued at 250,000 rupees; the Tamil Nad Provincial Committee has ordered large printing machinery from the U.S.S.R. and has been soliciting funds to construct a new building to house its press.

The Party and its front organizations have some of their printing done on presses which, on the basis of available information, cannot be definitely established as Party-controlled presses. Among these are the Roxy Press (New Delhi) which handles some of the printing for the All-India Peace Council and the Chinese Communist and Soviet Embassies; the Punjab Press (Delhi) which prints the Telegu edition of *Soviet Land* for the Soviet Embassy; the Baliya Press (Delhi) which prints the Tamil edition of *Soviet Land;* the New India Press (Delhi) which prints the Hindi version of *Soviet Land;* the Naveen Press (Delhi) which prints a Hindi fortnightly for the All-India Peace Council; the Guha Printing Works (Calcutta) which prints *Antarjatik* (Peace Review) for the West Bengal Peace Council; Usha Printers (Bombay) which prints *ISCUS* for the Indo-Soviet Cultural Society; the Sree Printing Works (Calcutta) which prints *Parichaya* (Knowledge); the Asha Lakshmi Press (Darjeeling) which prints *Agradoot* (Messenger) for the Communist Party; the Jai Hind Press (Ernākulam) and Central Cooperative Printers (Trivandrum) which print Party weeklies; and Cooperative Printings (Trichūr) on which is printed the daily *Navajeevan* (New Life).

b. MOTION PICTURES — Indian Communists and fellow travelers have established several companies to produce motion pictures. One of these, the Red Eagle Film Company Ltd. was organized in 1951. The formation of this company was heralded by the fellow-traveling *Blitz* in the following terms:

> To break the throttling grips of financiers who prostitute the art of the cinema in India to the box office gods, Mulk Raj Anand has floated a people's company to make pictures. The company will be financed entirely by small investors from among the people of the country, new shares being only 10 rupees each.

The first picture scheduled to be filmed was *Two Leaves and a Bud,* based on the book of the same name by Mulk Raj Anand, long active on the Communist cultural front. This production was apparently the first and the last to be produced by the company.

In mid-1957 the formation of another Communist motion picture company, the People's Cooperative Cine Society, was announced. The aim of this society appeared to be to produce one or two motion pictures based on Communist dramas, such as *You Made Me a Communist* and *Prodigal Son,* popularized by the Kerala People's Art Club, a Communist-front organization believed to be affiliated with the Communist-front India People's Theater Association (IPTA). The IPTA itself produced a feature film in 1946 entitled *Dharti Ke Lal* (Children of the Soil) which dealt with famine conditions in Bengal.

In 1957 Naya Sansar International, a joint Indo-Soviet film production venture, was organized in Bombay. This enterprise produced the color feature, *Pardesi,* a tale of alleged contact between Russia and India in the 15th century. The film was jointly directed by V. M. Pronin of the U.S.S.R. and Indian fellow traveler K. A. Abbas and was based on a screenplay by Maria Smirnova and Abbas. Indian film artists Nargis, Balraj Sahni, Prithviraj, and David (a past president of IPTA) starred with Soviet artists in the film. *Pardesi,* the production of which allegedly cost the equivalent of US$2,500,000, was to be followed by other motion pictures, but none had appeared by March 1959.

Despite their meagre film production, the Communists are able to influence India's motion picture industry through inducing some artists to accept the Communist propaganda line and through infiltration of top-echelon positions. An outstanding pro-Communist in the Bombay film industry is K. A. Abbas, a prolific writer who, in addition to producing screenplays himself, writes scenarios based on stories by others. Ismat Chugtai, Mulk Raj Anand, Rajendra Singh Bedi, Majruh Sultanpuri, Krishan Chandar, V. P. Sathe, Zia Sarhady, and Sardar Jafri are also Communist sympathizers who are frequent contributors to Bombay productions. Pro-Communist actors include—in addition to those who starred in *Pardesi*—Raj Kapoor, K. N. Singh, and Durga Khote. Directors and producers who follow the Communist line in Bombay include Shahid Latif, Phani Mazumdar, and Bal Chhabda. Pro-Communists are probably also numerous in the Calcutta and Madras film industries, but detailed information on these areas is not available.

There is no evidence that the CPI owns or operates commercial film distribution or exhibition facilities; feature films with a Communist theme are distributed and shown through commercial channels. However, the Party, and to an even greater extent its front organizations, have played a leading role in exhibiting films on a noncommercial basis for propaganda and educational purposes. Most films used for these purposes are of Soviet, Communist Chinese, or other foreign origin, although Communist organizations in India have begun to produce short propaganda films by using commercial facilities. The All-India Trade Union Congress, for example, recently exhibited its first documentary, *They Work and They Live.*

c. RADIO — Radio broadcasting in India is a monopoly of the central government conducted by All-India Radio, a department attached to the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. The only access to radio the Communists have is through infiltration of personnel or via scripts, musical compositions, or other material used voluntarily by the broadcasting agency. While there has been some infiltration (see this Supplement, SECTION 7), this has been limited, and radio is not a significant Communist propaganda instrument.

The CPI encourages the composition of propaganda songs for which purpose competitions have occasionally been staged. Such themes as peace or the visit of a foreign Communist cultural delegation to India are sometimes chosen. These songs are presented at cultural programs, worked into films and stage productions, and broadcast over *Radio Moscow* and *Radio Tashkent.* Sometimes they are recorded and sold commercially in India. In March 1954, five members of the Kerala People's Art Club visited Madras City at the invitation of His Master's Voice recording company to record hits from the drama *You Made Me a Communist.* It is not known whether such songs are broadcast over All-India Radio.

d. OTHER MEDIA — The Indian Communists appear to have made an extensive study of the forms of communication in rural India, adopting some of the more important folk forms for their own purposes. For example, in the Telegu-speaking areas, the Indian People's Theater Association makes use of such folk forms as the *burrakatha* (bardic recital and folk song) and of the *harikatha,* and *veedhi natakan* (open-air dramas). For the *burrakatha* which is usually presented by a principal singer and two other persons who provide choral and drum accompaniment, the IPTA has composed new ballads dealing with such themes as the life of the peasants, social reform, and the pre-independence famine in Bengal. Traditionally the *harikatha* is the narration, by an interweaving of song, poetry, prose, and dance, of the Hindu religious epics. While retaining the purity of the form of presentation for these narrations, the IPTA has supplied Communist subject matter. The *veedhi natakan* is similar to the *kathakali* of Kerala, an open-air, all-night dance drama, and is used for propaganda plays. In an attempt to capitalize further on these media, the Communist government in Kerala State has raised the Vallothol Academy, a Communist-infiltrated organization in the state for the training of performers of *kathakali* and other traditional arts, to the status of a state academy of music, dance, and drama.

The Communists have not overlooked the legitimate stage in urban areas. Prithvi Theaters, a traveling group whose mainstay is Prithviraj, well-known stage and screen actor and member of the All-India Peace Council, specializes in propaganda plays for the middle classes. One of the company's most effective productions is *Diwar* (Wall) which describes the transition from the good life of ancient India to the misery and wretchedness allegedly brought by foreign invaders. Other types of Communist stage activity in urban centers include ballets such as the *Birth of Urvashi,* the *Triumph of Life,* and *The Boon,* written by the talented Mulk Raj Anand who, among other pro-Communist activities, holds membership in the All-India Peace Council and the All-India Progressive Writers' Association.

3. Foreign Communist media

Little Communist material of a propaganda nature entered preindependence India. Since becoming independent, however, India has entered into diplomatic, trade, and other relations with the U.S.S.R. and subsequently with the East European satellites and Communist China, and the entry of printed matter and films from the Communist world has become commonplace, as has the exchange of delegations and missions.

Maximum Soviet expenditures on non-periodical publications in Hindi, Urdu, and Bengali and meant for distribution in India are estimated at about the equivalent of US$800,000 for the year 1957. This figure is based on an estimated output of 120 titles in a total of 2,000,000 copies. Soviet expenditures on periodical literature in Indian vernacular languages probably approximated the equivalent of US$400,000 for 1957. Chinese expenditures on Indian vernacular publishing appear to be a fraction of that of the U.S.S.R., judging from the relative output. The total expenditure of the two countries on the publishing program for India, including publication output in English, is probably, at the maximum, US$2,000,000 annually. Expenditures on other media probably raise the total foreign Communist expenditure on propaganda in India to about US$5,000,000.

a. PRINTED MATTER — Communist periodicals are imported into India from Communist and non-Communist countries. In addition, Communist-bloc nations publish some periodicals in India.

No reliable information is available on the volume of foreign Communist periodicals imported. Indian customs statistics reveal that 5,800 pounds of magazines and periodicals and 40,000 pounds of newspapers were imported from Communist China in 1957. No direct imports of periodicals or newspapers from the U.S.S.R. were recorded in 1957, although it is known that Hindi and Urdu versions of *Soviet Union* and *Soviet Woman,* both printed in the U.S.S.R., are distributed in India. Most imported Communist periodicals are printed in English, although not only the U.S.S.R., but also Communist China has facilities for publishing in Hindi and Urdu (issues of *China Pictorial* in both these languages are imported from China).

The Soviet Embassy in New Delhi issues a daily cyclostyled (a form of stenciling) publication in English entitled *News and Views from the Soviet Union,* subscription to which is 13 naye paise (US$0.03) per annum. On a tri-weekly basis the Embassy issues vernacular versions of this publication in Hindi, Bengali, Gujarati, Marathi, Telegu, and Urdu, and on a bi-weekly basis versions appear in Malayalam, Tamil, and Punjabi. The embassy also publishes in Delhi a fortnightly, *Soviet Land,* which is sold at 20 naye paise per copy. The languages of publication and estimated circulation of *Soviet Land* are as follows:

English	40,000	Marathi	14,000
Bengali	34,000	Telegu	14,000
Hindi	33,000	Malayalam	14,000
Tamil	18,000	Punjabi	8,000
Urdu	17,000	Oriya	6,000
Gujarati	17,000	Kannada	5,500
Total			220,500

The Chinese Communist Embassy issues a daily cyclostyled publication in English, *News from China.* It also publishes an English-language fortnightly, *China Today* (estimated circulation, 5,500), and its Urdu version, *Aj ka Chin.* In Calcutta two Chinese language dailies, the *China Review* and the *Chinese Journal of India,* are thought to be subsidized by Communist China. The *China Review* is printed on the Lita Press, reportedly owned by the Chinese Consulate in Calcutta, while the *Chinese Journal* is printed at the Kuna Ming Tang press.

Communist nonperiodical literature is imported from many countries, but available information prevents determining the quantity. Foreign trade statistics for 1957 show only 2,200 pounds of books imported into India directly from the U.S.S.R., and 1,800 pounds from Communist China, as compared with 1,345,500 pounds from the United Kingdom and 1,332,300 from the United States. The value of books and pamphlet imports directly from the U.S.S.R. in 1957 was only 8,661 rupees. This small volume and value suggest that Soviet material enters India via other countries.

Although most of the imported works are believed to be in English, the Soviet Union produces and ships to India books and pamphlets in Hindi, Urdu, and Bengali. A catalogue of the National Book Agency, Ltd., Calcutta, lists 56 titles published in Hindi in 1957 in the Soviet Union, 28 in Urdu, and 36 in Bengali. The books fell into the following categories:

	HINDI	BENGALI	URDU
Marxist-Leninist classics	2	4	2
Social and political literature	21	9	7
Fiction	33	23	19
	56	36	28

About 50% of the fiction in each of the three languages represented literature for children and youth. Characteristic of the books is their high quality and low price.

Of Communist literature published in translation by Indian publishing houses, both Communist and non-Communist, it appears that Russian titles far outnumber Chinese titles. While more than 20 translations of Soviet writers' works were thus published in 1957, there was but 1 translation from the Chinese. Reportedly, a total of over 80 translations of Russian works have been published in Malayalam in Kerala and 23 in Tamil in Madras. The number of Indian translations of Russian poetry, drama, and fiction, published in various languages of India in 1957 by various publishers, is presented in FIGURE 3–16 under Reference Data.

b. OTHERS — Only a small percentage of the motion pictures imported into India each year come from Communist countries. As shown in FIGURE 3–17 under Reference Data, about 14% of all 35mm and 8% of all 16mm foreign films certified by the Indian censorship board in 1957 were from Communist countries. The U.S.S.R. is the largest supplier of these films; Communist China and Czechoslovakia are approximately tied for second place, each accounting for about a third of the number supplied by the U.S.S.R. Insignificant numbers of films are imported from Hungary, Rumania, and other Communist countries. Until 1954 the U.S.S.R. had its own agent in Bombay to arrange for the importation and distribution of Soviet films. Sometime in 1954 or 1955 an Indian firm, K. T. Brothers, reportedly was appointed sole importing and distributing agent for Soviet motion pictures.

At the end of 1958 the U.S.S.R. was broadcasting a total of 59 hours and 45 minutes each week to South Asia (India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Nepal, and Afghanistan). China was broadcasting only 7, but has since added 7 more hours. As shown below, Soviet broadcasts to South Asia have steadily expanded since 1952, both in terms of hours per week and in number of languages:

	1952	1954	1958
English	10½	15¾	19½
Bengali	7¾	8¾	10½
Hindi	1¾	5¼	10½
Tamil	0	0	3½
Urdu	*n a*	*n a*	15¾

With the inauguration of 7 hours per week of Hindi-language broadcasts, the same amount as in English, Communist China has begun to expand its radio output to South Asia.

F. Reference data

The tables included in this Subsection present detailed statistical data in the general order of reference in the text.

FIGURE 3–4. MEMBERS OF THE CPI NATIONAL COUNCIL BY PROVINCIAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AREAS, 1958

CENTER (14):
- Dr. Z. A. Ahmed.*
- Hajrah Begum.
- Mrs. Renu Chakravarti.
- Romesh Chandra.*
- S. A. Dange.*
- S. V. Ghate.
- Ajoy Ghosh.*
- A. K. Gopalan.*
- Bhupesh Gupta.*
- P. C. Joshi.*
- Mrs. Parvathi Krishnan.
- Hirendra Nath Mukerjee.
- N. Prasada Rao.*
- Sajjad Zaheer.

ANDHRA PRADESH (15):
- M. Basavapunnaiah.*
- Maqdoom Mohiuddin.
- K. L. Narasimham.
- Guntur Bapanayya.
- C. Rajeshwar Rao.*
- D. Venkateswara Rao.
- M. Chandrasekhara Rao.
- M. Hanumantha Rao.
- Y. V. Krishna Rao.
- T. Nagi Reddi.
- N. Raja Sekhara Reddi.
- B. Yella Reddy.
- Ravi Narayan Reddy.*
- P. Sundarayya.
- T. Satyanarayana.

ASSAM (2):
- Achintya Bhattacharya.
- Phani Bora.*

BIHĀR (6):
- Ali Ashraf.
- Sunil Mukherjee.
- Jagannath Sarkar.
- Karyanand Sharma.
- Yogendra Nath Sharma.
- Indradeep Sinha.

GUJARĀT (2):
- Chiman Mehta.
- Dinkar Mehta.

KERALA (16):
- V. S. Achuthanandan.
- E. Imbuchi Bava.
- K. Damodaran.*
- C. Janardhanan.
- C. H. Kanaran.
- K. A. Keraleeyan.
- S. Kumaran.
- C. Achutha Menon.
- P. Balachandra Menon.
- M. N. Govindan Nair.
- P. K. Vasudevan Nair.
- T. C. Narayanan Nambiar.
- E. M. S. Namboodiripad.*
- Mrs. Rosamma Punnosse.
- C. Unni Raja.
- K. K. Warrior.

MADHYA PRADESH (2):
- Balkrishna K. Gupta.
- L. R. Khandkar.

MAHARASHTRA (6):
- G. M. Adhikari.
- Chandra Gupta Chaudhury.
- Sudam Deshmukh.
- S. G. Patkar.
- B. T. Ranadive.*
- S. G. Sardesai.*

MANIPUR (2):
- Thiam Meghchandra.
- Bira Singh.

MYSORE (2):
- B. V. Kakkilaya.
- N. L. Upadhyaya.

ORISSA (3):
- Gokul Moham Roy Churamani.
- Ramakrishna Pati.
- Gurucharan Patnaik.*

PUNJAB (5):
- Sohan Singh Josh.*
- Jagjit Singh Lyallpuri.
- Amtar Singh Malhotra.
- Master Hari Singh.
- Harkishen Singh Surjit.*

RĀJESTHĀN (2):
- Mohan Punamia.
- H. K. Vyas.

TAMIL NAD (MADRAS—7):
- P. Jeevanandam.
- M. Kalyanasundaram.
- P. Ramamurti.*
- K. Ramani.
- B. Srinivasa Rao.
- N. Sankarayya.
- M. R. Venkataraman.*

TRIPURA (2):
- Dashrath Deb.
- Biren Dutt.

UTTAR PRADESH (5):
- Shiv Kumar Misra.
- Kali Shankar Shukla.
- Jai Bahadur Singh.
- Shankar Dayal Tiwari.
- S. S. Yusuf.

WEST BENGAL (8):
- Muzaffar Ahmed.
- Jyoti Basu.*
- Indrajeet Gupta.
- Jolly Kaul.
- Harekrishna Konar.*
- Som Nath Lahiri.
- Bhowani Sen.*
- Ranen Sen.

DELHI (2):
- M. Farooqi.
- Yog Dutt Sharma.

* Also member of the Central Executive Committee.

FIGURE 3–5. MEMBERSHIP OF CPI CENTRAL COMMITTEE,* 1943–1958, AND YEAR OF ELECTION

NAME	1943 (22 MEMBERS)	1948 (INCOMPLETE)	1950 (TENTATIVE)	1951 (21 MEMBERS) (INCOMPLETE)	1953 (39 MEMBERS)	1956 (39 MEMBERS)	1958 (25 MEMBERS)
Adhikari, G. M.	X (PB)	X			X	X	
Ahmed, Muzaffar				X (PB)	X	X	
Ahmed, Z. A.				X	X (PB)	X (PB)	X (CS)
Ali, Aruna Asaf					X		
Basavapunnaiah, M.		X	X (PB)		X	X	X (CS)
Basu, Jyoti				X (PB)	X	X	X
Batliwala, S. S.	X						
Bharadwaj, R. D	X	X (died)					
Bora, Phani					X	X	X
Bose, Arun	X						
Chandra, Romesh				X	X	X	X
Damodaran, K						X	X
Dange, S. A	X	X		X (PB)	X (PB)	X (PB)	X (CS)
Deb, Dashrath					X	X	
Deshmukh, Sudan					X	X	
Deshpande, S. Y				X			
Chate, S. V	X	X					
Ghosh, A. K	X	X		X (GS and PB).	X (GS and PB).	X (GS and PB).	X (GS and CS).
Gopalan, A. K					X	X	X (CS)
Gupta, Bhupesh					X	X (PB)	X (CS)
Ismail, Mohammed		X					

See footnotes at end of table.

FIGURE 3-5 (*Continued*)

NAME	1943 (22 MEMBERS)	1948 (INCOMPLETE)	1950 (TENTATIVE)	1951 (21 MEMBERS) (INCOMPLETE)	1953 (39 MEMBERS)	1956 (39 MEMBERS)	1958 (25 MEMBERS)
Josh, Sohan Singh				X	X	X	X
Joshi, P. C	X (GS and PB).					X	X (CS)
Khandkar, L. R					X		
Krishnan, N. L	X						
Konar, Harekrishna							X
Kumaramangalam, M	X						
Lahiri, Som Nath	X	X (PB)	X				
Mehta, Dinkar					X		
Menon, C. Achutha					X	X	
Mirajkar, S. S					X		
Mukherji, Biswanath	X						
Nair, M. N. Govindan					X	X	X
Namboodiripad, E. M. S	X	X	X	X (PB)	X (PB)	X (PB)	X
Parulekar, S. V	X	X					
Patkar, S. G					X		
Patnaik, Gurucharan					X	X	X
Pillai, P. Krishna		X (died)					
Ramamurti, P				X (PB)	X (PB)	X (PB)	X
Ranadive, B. T	X (PB)	X (GS and PB).				X	X (CS)
Rao, C. Rajeshwar		X	X (GS and PB).		X (PB)	X (PB)	X
Rao, D. Venkateswara				X	X		
Rao, M. Chandrasekhara			X(PB)				
Rao, M. Hanumantha					X	X	
Rao, N. Prasada					X	X	X
Reddy, B. Yella						X	
Reddy, Ravi Narayan					X	X	X
Rizvi, Manzar	X						
Sardesai, S. G	X	X			X	X	X
Sen, Bhowani	X	X (PB)					
Sen, Ranen	X			X	X (PB)	X	X
Sharma, Y. D				X	X	X	
Sharma, Yogendra Nath						X	X
Singh, Iqbal	X						
Sundarayya, P	X	X	X	X	X	X (PB)	
Surjit, Harkishen Signh					X (PB)	X (PB)	X
Upadhyaya, N. L					X	X	
Vaidya, D. S	X						
Venkataraman, M. R					X	X	X
Vyas, H. K					X	X	
Yusuf, S. S		X		X	X	X	
Zaheer, Sajjad	X						

NOTE PB = Politburo, GS = General Secretary, CS = Central Secretariat. The names of those serving on the small central committees of 1933 and 1935 are not available.

* Known as the Central Executive Committee since 1958.

FIGURE 3-6. SELECTED DATA

NAME	DATE OF BIRTH AND BACKGROUND	EDUCATION	FOREIGN TRAVEL
Adhikari, Dr. G. M	1896	Ph.D. (Berlin)	Germany, United Kingdom
Ahmed, Muzaffar	1889 Bengal. Muslim.	*n a*	*n a*
Ahmed, Dr. Z. A	1898 Uttar Pradesh. Muslim.	Ph.D. (Cambridge)	Western Europe, Near East, U.S.S.R., Communist China, other bloc countries.
Basavapunnaiah, M	1914 Andhra Pradesh. Hindu. Kamma caste.	B.A	U.S.S.R
Basu, Jyoti	1914 Bengal. Hindu.	M.S	U.S.S.R., Communist China, Czechoslovakia.
Bora, Phani	About 1932 Assam. Hindu.	*n a*	*n a*
Chandra, Romesh	1919 Punjab. Hindu.	Educated in United Kingdom.	U.S.S.R., Communist China, Egypt, Eastern Europe.
Damodaran, K	1910 Kerala. Hindu. Nair caste.	Attended Banaras University.	U.S.S.R., Communist China
Dange, S. A	1899 Bombay. Hindu. Brahmin.	*n a*	Europe, U.S.S.R., Communist China, other bloc countries.
Ghate, S. V	About 1900 Andhra Pradesh.	*n a*	*n a*
Ghosh, A. K	1909 Uttar Pradesh. Hindu. Brahmin.	B.S	U.S.S.R., Near East
Gopalan, A. K	1904 Kerala. Hindu. Nambiar caste.	Limited	U.S.S.R., Communist China, Eastern Europe, Near East, Southeast Asia.
Gupta, Bhupesh	1914 Bengal. Hindu.	L.L.B. (London)	U.S.S.R., Western Europe

ON CPI LEADERS

DATE JOINED PARTY	PRESENT POSITION	REMARKS
1929	Party: National Council. Maharashtra provincial secretariat.	Extensive experience in agit-prop activities; reportedly has marital difficulties; is poor and dependent on wife's income.
1929	Party: National Council. West Bengal Provincial Committee.	Active in peasant front.
About 1940	Party: Secretariat. Central Executive Committee (CEC). National Council. Public: *Rajya Sabha.*	Leading CPI organizer in Uttar Pradesh; extensive experience in agit-prop and peasant activities.
About 1935	Party: Secretariat. CEC. National Council. Public: *Rajya Sabha.*	Active in Party education and organizational affairs.
1940	Party: CEC. National Council. Secretary of West Bengal Provincial Committee. Public: West Bengal Assembly.	Opposition leader in West Bengal Assembly and a prominent labor agitator.
About 1952	Party: CEC. National Council. Secretary of Assam Provincial Committee.	Former CPI student leader.
About 1942	Party: CEC. National Council.	Active in All-India Peace Council (AIPC) and Indian Association for Afro-Asian Solidarity; reportedly disliked by most CPI leaders; reported to have embezzled AIPC funds.
About 1937	Party: CEC. National Council. Assistant Secretary of Kerala Provincial Committee.	Editor of *Navayugam,* Malayalem CPI weekly; prolific writer in Malayalam and active in All-India Progressive Writers' Association (AIPWA).
1929	Party: Secretariat. CEC. National Council. Public: *Lok Sabha.*	Leading Communist labor organizer, general secretary of the All-India Trade Union Congress (AITUC), and vice president of the World Federation of Trade Unions; CPI leader in *Lok Sabha;* acting CPI general secretary during Ghosh's 1958 Moscow visit.
1929	Party: Chairman of Central Control Commission. National Council.	Extensive experience in CPI underground activities.
1933	Party: General Secretary. Secretariat. CEC.	Good organizer and compromiser; leader of "center" group within Party.
1937	Party: Secretariat. CEC. National Council. Public: *Lok Sabha.*	Effective speaker and peasant organizer; president of the All-India Kisan Sabha (AIKS) and deputy CPI leader in the *Lok Sabha;* member of the World Peace Council.
About 1935	Party: Secretariat. CEC. National Council. West Bengal Provincial Committee. Public: *Rajya Sabha.*	Effective debater, writer, and propagandist; leader of CPI bloc in *Rajya Sabha* and member of the *New Age* editorial board; bachelor.

FIGURE 3-6

NAME	DATE OF BIRTH AND BACKGROUND	EDUCATION	FOREIGN TRAVEL
Hajrah, Begum	Uttar Pradesh	*n a*	Austria, Egypt, Sudan
Halim, Abdul	About 1900 Bengal. Muslim.	*n a*	*n a*
Josh, S. S	1898 Punjab.	*n a*	U.S.S.R
Joshi, P. C	1907 Uttar Pradesh. Hindu. Brahmin.	L.L.B	U.S.S.R., Communist China, Western Europe, Nepal.
Konar, Harekrishna	1914 Bengal. Hindu. Mahishya (peasant) caste.	*n a*	*n a*
Mirajkar, S. S	About 1904 Bombay.	*n a*	*n a*
Nair, M. N. Govindan	1910 Kerala. Hindu. Nair caste.	B.A	U.S.S.R., Eastern Europe, Western Europe.
Nair, P. Narayanan	1906 Kerala. Hindu. Nair Caste.	High school	None known
Namboodiripad, E. M. S	1909 Kerala. Hindu. Namboodiri (Brahmin) caste.	Attended college	U.S.S.R., Communist China
Patkar, S. G	About 1904 Bombay.	Limited	U.S.S.R., Communist China
Patnaik, Gurucharan	Orissa	*n a*	*n a*
Ramamurti, P	1909 Madras. Hindu. Brahmin.	B.S	U.S.S.R., Communist China, Western Europe.
Ramam, U	1912 Andhra Pradesh. Hindu. Kshatriya caste.	Elementary school	*n a*
Ranadive, B. T	1904 Bombay. Hindu. Brahmin.	M.A	U.S.S.R

(*Continued*)

DATE JOINED PARTY	PRESENT POSITION	REMARKS
About 1944	Party: Central Control Commission. National Council.	Wife of Z. A. Ahmed (see above); specializes in propaganda work, particularly among women; general secretary of the National Federation of Indian Women.
1929	Party: Central Control Commission.	Active in West Bengal peasant front; extensive experience in covert operations.
1929	Party: CEC. National Council. Punjab Provincial Committee.	Communist worker since World War I with long experience in peasant activities.
1929	Party: Secretariat. CEC. National Council.	Capable organizer and effective speaker and journalist; CPI general secretary, 1935–48; outstanding theoretician; leans toward Chinese brand of communism; editor of weekly *New Age;* leader of "rightist" CPI faction.
1937	Party: CEC. National Council. West Bengal Provincial Committee. Public: West Bengal Assembly.	Member of AIKS central committee and general secretary of the West Bengal AIKS branch.
1929	*none*	President of the AITUC; served as mayor of Bombay 1958–59; wields considerable influence within Party although not currently on the CPI central executive.
1940	Party: CEC. National Council. Secretary of Kerala Provincial Committee. Public: *Rajya Sabha.*	Prominent trade union organizer; member of "leftist" CPI faction; opposes strict adherence to Soviet guidance.
1941	Party: Central Control Commission. Public: *Rajya Sabha.*	Prominent Party leader in the Malabar region of Kerala State.
About 1937	Party: CEC. National Council. Public: Chief Minister of Kerala State. Kerala Assembly.	One of the leading Party theoreticians; prolific writer on Communist ideology and peasant affairs and on Communist China; aligned with "center" faction within CPI.
About 1929	Party: National Council. Secretariat of the Maharashtra Provincial Committee.	Active since 1928 in the Bombay trade union movement.
Before 1949	Party: CEC. National Council. Secretary of the Orissa Provincial Committee.	Active in trade union activities in Orissa State; reportedly follows the lead of B. T. Ranadive.
About 1937	Party: Secretariat. CEC. National Council. Tamil Nad (Madras) Provincial Executive Committee.	Most prominent Communist leader in Madras State; able speaker, organizer, and trade union activist; aligned with "center" CPI faction; vice president of the AITUC.
1938	Party: Central Control Commission. Public: *Lok Sabha.*	Major peasant organizer in the coastal region of Andhra Pradesh.
1929	Party: Secretariat. CEC. National Council.	Leader of "leftist" Party faction for 25 years and CPI general secretary, 1948–50; a brilliant academician, excellent organizer, and persuasive speaker; editor of monthly *New Age.*

FIGURE 3-6

NAME	DATE OF BIRTH AND BACKGROUND	EDUCATION	FOREIGN TRAVEL
Rao, C. Rajeshwar	1914 Andhra Pradesh. Hindu. Kamma caste.	B.S	U.S.S.R
Rao, N. Prasada	About 1908 Andhra Pradesh. Hindu. Kamma caste.	B.A	Eastern Europe, Sweden
Reddy, R. Narayan	About 1908 Andhra Pradesh. Hindu. Reddy caste.	B.A	*n a*
Sardesai, S. G	About 1904 Bombay.	*n a*	*n a*
Sen, Bhowani	1912 Bengal.	*n a*	*n a*
Sundarayya, P	1911 Andhra Pradesh. Hindu. Reddy caste.	Attended college; no degree	U.S.S.R., Communist China
Surjit, Harkishan Singh.	1916 Punjab. Sikh.	High school	*n a*
Venkataraman, M. R	1903 Madras.	L.L.B	*n a*
Zaheer, Sajjad	1905 Uttar Pradesh. Muslim.	B.A	Western Europe, U.S.S.R

(Continued)

DATE JOINED PARTY	PRESENT POSITION	REMARKS
Before 1948	Party: CEC. National Council. Secretary of Andhra Pradesh Provincial Committee.	CPI general secretary 1950–51; leader of guerrilla activity during 1948–50 Telengana uprising; reported to be a good speaker but bad tempered and ideologically ignorant.
Before 1953	Party: CEC. National Council.	General secretary of the AIKS; dependent on Party salary for income.
About 1945	Party: CEC. National Council. Andhra Pradesh Provincial Committee. Public: Andhra Pradesh Assembly.	Reportedly a member of the "rightist" faction.
About 1933	Party: CEC. National Council. Secretary of the Maharashtra Provincial Executive Committee.	A leading trade unionist in the Marathi-speaking region of Bombay State.
1940	Party: CEC. National Council. West Bengal Provincial Executive Committee.	President of the West Bengal branch of the AIKS and member of the All-India Kisan Committee; challenging Jyoti Basu for leadership of the West Bengal Provincial Executive Committee.
About 1933	Party: National Council. Public: Andhra Pradesh Assembly.	Identified with leftist element within CPI; reportedly active in covert Party affairs.
About 1937	Party: CEC. National Council. Secretary of Punjab Provincial Executive Committee.	Punjabi peasant leader and labor organizer; member of the AIKS Central Kisan Council; plays leading role in guiding Communists in Kashmir.
1940	Party: CEC. National Council. Secretary of Tamil Nad Provincial Executive Committee.	Reserved temperament and seldom participates in CPI public meetings; author of numerous Party pamphlets; described as brain behind all CPI activities in Madras State.
1941	Party: National Council.	Former general secretary of the Communist Party of Pakistan, 1948–55; interests are primarily literary; active in organizing AIPWA and Indian People's Theater Association; responsible for CPI liaison with Communists in Pakistan.

FIGURE 3–7. CHARACTERISTICS OF DELEGATES TO THREE ALL-INDIA CPI CONGRESSES
(*In percentages*)

	1943 (139 DELEGATES*)	1956 (400 DELEGATES)	1958 (474 DELEGATES)
Class origin:			
Working	16	6	9
Peasants and agricultural laborers	18	25.5	24
Middle	**50	62	58
Landlords	4	6	7
Other	12	0.5	2
Education:			
Nonmatriculated***	n a	21	28
Matriculated	n a	42	38
College graduates	45–50	37	34
Date of joining Party:			
Before 1930	n a	2	2
1930–39	n a	30	32
1940–43	n a	38	34
1944–47	...	20	17
1948–51	...	5.5	11
1952–53	...	4	2
After 1953	...	0.5	2
Age:			
Under 35	70	...	...
Under 25	n a	0.5	0.2
25–35	n a	34	33
36–45	n a	47.5	44.8
46–55	n a	15	19
Over 55	n a	3	3
Holders of elective office:			
National legislature	n a	4	4
State legislatures	n a	9	7
Municipal councils	n a	4	6
District and village councils	n a	3	2
Position in Party:			
Members of central bodies	n a	9	8
Members of provincial bodies	n a	50	34.4
Members of district bodies	n a	30	43.6
Members of intermediate and basic bodies	n a	4	8.6
Ordinary Party members	n a	7	5.4

NOTE Percentages for various categories do not in all cases add up to 100 because information is incomplete.

* Of the 139 delegates, 13 were Muslims, 8 Sikhs, 3 untouchables, 2 Parsis, 1 Christian, and 1 Jain; the rest were presumably Hindu. Close to three-fourths had served jail sentences for an aggregate of 411 years, and more than half had had experience in underground work.

** Figure may be too high. It is based on Party characterization of 62% of the delegates as "intelligentsia." Arbitrarily these have been divided between "middle" and "other."

*** High school class work completed but examinations not passed.

FIGURE 3–8. ESTIMATED CPI FINANCIAL ASSETS, 1958
(In rupees)

CPI UNIT	PUBLISHING ENTERPRISES	PROPERTY AND BUILDINGS	PARTY FUND	TOTAL
Center	*650,000	100,000 to 200,000	250,000	1,000,000 to 1,100,000
Kerala	500,000	**250,000 to 500,000	1,500,000	2,250,000 to 2,500,000
Andhra Pradesh	300,000	*n a*	300,000	***600,000
West Bengal	†350,000	††200,000 to 300,000	300,000	850,000 to 950,000
Tamil Nad (Madras)	100,000	(50,000 to 100,000)	75,000	225,000 to 275,000
Bihār	10,000	10,000	*n a*	*n a*
Punjab	75,000	*n a*	*n a*	*n a*
Uttar Pradesh	20,000	*n a*	*n a*	*n a*
Maharashtra	10,000	*n a*	*n a*	*n a*
Assam	5,000	*n a*	*n a*	*n a*
Orissa	40,000	*n a*	*n a*	*n a*
Gujarāt	5,000	*n a*	*n a*	*n a*
Mysore	75,000	*n a*	*n a*	*n a*
Madhya Pradesh	5,000	*n a*	*n a*	*n a*
Others	5,000	*n a*	*n a*	*n a*
Estimated total	2,150,000	1,250,000	3,000,000	6,400,000

NOTE Figures in parentheses are from Party documents; remainder are estimates. The category "publishing enterprises" includes all Party papers, presses, publishing houses and book houses, exclusive of any buildings; the estimate for the Center, for example, includes the *New Age* (weekly and monthly), the New Age Press, the main People's Publishing House at Delhi together with its Bombay subsidiary, the Party's three book houses in Delhi and two book houses in Bombay but not the buildings housing these enterprises.

* Includes Party's reported 50,000 rupee interest in reorganized *Daily Maratha* (see below under CPI media) and its new Czechoslovakian press.

** In 1958 the Party was reported to have acquired 200,000 rupees worth of property in one deal alone; the Party is also known to own some cooperatives but there is almost no information on number or amount of assets.

*** Against these assets the Andhra Pradesh Provincial Committee is estimated to have an election debt of 300,000 rupees as of January 1959.

† Includes new press being brought from Communist China.

†† Includes Student Health Home.

FIGURE 3-9. ESTIMATED ANNUAL EXPENDITURES OF THE CPI AND COMMUNIST FRONT ORGANIZATIONS, 1958

(In rupees)

CPI UNIT	FULL-TIME PARTY WORKERS	PART-TIME PARTY WORKERS	ESTIMATED WAGE BILL	ESTIMATED OTHER EXPENDITURES	AITUC	PARTY CONFERENCES	ELECTIONS (1957/8)
Center	23	*n a*	60,000	250,000	75,000	(95,000)	50,000
Kerala	(500)	*0	300,000	600,000	100,000	(8,000)	480,000
Andhra Pradesh	(265)	(211)	(180,000)	(340,000)	55,000	10,000 (1957)	800,000
West Bengal	210	0	127,000	**280,000	125,000	15,000	750,000
Tamil Nad (Madras)	***100	100	34,000	75,000	85,000	*n a*	240,000
Bihār	(133)	(125)	36,000	50,000	†75,000	6,500	50,000
Punjab	(415)	400	330,000	500,000	25,000	15,000	150,000
Uttar Pradesh	40	40	29,000	45,000	25,000	*n a*	125,000
Maharashtra	††(124)	0	17,400	35,000	125,000	*n a*	750,000
Assam	30	30	6,000	10,000	20,000	*n a*	20,000
Orissa	30	30	9,000	20,000	20,000	*n a*	50,000
Mysore (1953)	†††30	†††30	6,000	12,000	45,000	(2,000)	10,000
Madhya Pradesh	25	25	5,500	10,000	20,000	*n a*	20,000
Rājasthān	20	20	4,000	7,500	7,500	*n a*	5,000
Gujarāt	75	0	9,000	20,000	40,000	*n a*	10,000
Delhi	(51)	*n a*	14,500	25,000	40,000	*n a*	3,000
Himachal Pradesh	20	20	1,200	3,000	...	*n a*	Included in Punjab
Tripura	25	25	6,100	12,500	7,500	*n a*	5,000
Manipur	15	15	3,000	5,000	5,000	*n a*	5,000
Total	2,131	1,071	1,178,000	2,300,000	895,000	120,000	800,000

NOTE Figures in parentheses are from Party documents; remainder are estimates. Election expenditures are prorated. Figures do not include expenditures on the separately organized and self-supporting press and publishing enterprises of the Party. Column entitled "Estimated other expenditures" includes deficits incurred for press and publications and all full-time and part-time employees paid by the Party to work in the various front organizations.

* Assumes enough jobs available through government patronage that 500 part-timers reported as working during 1957 elections have not been retained.

** The 1950 West Bengal budget paid the 105 full-timers an average of 25 rupees per month plus a family allowance; no payments were made to part-time workers. It is estimated that an additional 60–90 full-time workers are employed and paid by trade unions, publishing houses, and a few miscellaneous front budgets.

*** Assumes 50 full-timers paid by trade unions and 10 by press and book house.

† Assumes half the Bihār full-timers are paid by the trade unions and includes half of an estimated 40,000 to 60,000 rupees paid by AITUC to workers discharged in 1958 strike at Jamshedpur.

†† In 1958, 23 full-timers held legislative or municipal office, 25 estimated to have been paid by the Party; remaining 76 full-timers assumed to be paid by fronts or are self-supporting.

††† Assumes 40 full-timers and part-timers on trade union budgets and 15 with press and book shops.

FIGURE 3–10. ESTIMATED WAGE BILL AND PROFITS OF CPI PRINTING, PUBLISHING, AND BOOK DISTRIBUTING HOUSES, 1958
(*In rupees*)

CPI UNIT	NUMBER OF WORKERS	WAGE BILL	PROFIT OR LOSS	CENTRAL SUBSIDY
Center:				
Delhi (main)	175	242,000	(125,000)	Self-sustaining.
Bombay (branch)	(25)	(19,000)	(60,000)	*Do.*
States:				
Kerala	200	160,000	35,000	*Do.*
Andhra Pradesh	(150)	(120,000)	(20,000)	*Do.*
West Bengal	60	48,000	Deficit *n a*	35,000–65,000.
Tamil Nad (Madras)	50	40,000	5,000	Self-sustaining.
Bihār	10	4,000	5,000	*Do.*
Punjab	50	40,000	Deficit *n a*	25,000.
Uttar Pradesh	20	16,000	Deficit *n a*	15,000.
Maharashtra	*45	36,000	Deficit *n a*	15,000.
Assam	5	2,000	*n a*	*n a*
Orissa	30	18,000	Deficit *n a*	2,500.
Mysore	45	27,000	*n a*	Probably self-sustaining.
Madhya Pradesh	5	2,000	Deficit *n a*	2,500.
Gujarāt	5	2,000	Deficit *n a*	Self-sustaining.**
Total	875	1,076,000	250,000	100,000–130,000.

NOTE Figures within parentheses are from Party documents; remainder are estimates. The CPI is reportedly planning to start a publishing house in Rājasthān, but in 1958 there were no known separate CPI publishing or book distributing houses in Rājasthān or the federal territories of Manipur, Tripura, or Himachal Pradesh.

* Includes *Daily Maratha* of Poona in which the CPI is reported to have a 50,000 rupee interest.

** Expenses seem to be met by local Communist trade unions.

FIGURE 3-11. CPI NEWSPAPERS

TITLE	LANGUAGE	FREQUENCY	PUBLISHER AND PLACE OF PUBLICATION	PRINTER AND PLACE OF PRINTING
DESHABHIMANI (Patriot)	Malayalam	Daily	M. Govindankutty Kozhikode, Kerala.	M. Govindankutty Deshabhimani Press, Kozhikode, Kerala.
JANAYUGAM (People's Age)	Malayalam	Daily	N. Gopinathan Nair Puthen Madom, Quilon, Kerala.	M. Gopinathan Nair Janayugam Press, Quilon, Kerala.
NAVAJEEVAN (New Life)	Malayalam	Daily	K. K. Warior Trichūr, Kerala.	K. K. Warior Cooperative Printings, Trichūr, Kerlala.
JANASAKTI (People's Strength)	Tamil	Daily	S. Krishnaswamy 32 Broadway, Madras City, Madras.	S. Krishnaswamy Janasakti Press, Madras City, Madras.
VISALANDHRA (United Andhra)	Telegu	Daily	K. Rajagopala Rao Buckinghampet, Vijayavādā, Andhra Pradesh.	K. Rajagopala Rao Swatantra Art Printers, Vijayavādā, Andhra Pradesh.
SWADHINATA (Independence)	Bengali	Daily	Santosh Kumar Chatterjee 33 Alimuddin Street, Calcutta, West Bengal.	Santosh Kumar Chatterjee Ganasakti Printers (Private) Ltd., Calcutta, West Bengal.
NAWAN ZAMANA (New Age)	Punjabi	Daily	Gurbaksh Singh Central Lorry Stand, Jullundur City, Punjab.	Gurbaksh Singh Awami Printing Press, Jullundur City, Punjab.
NEW AGE	English	Weekly	D. P. Sinha 7/4 Asaf Ali Road, Delhi	D. P. Sinha New Age Printing Press, New Delhi.
NEW KERALA	English	Weekly	N. S. Menon Central Cooperative Printers, Trivandrum, Kerala.	N. S. Menon Central Cooperative Printers, Trivandrum, Kerala.
NAVAYUGAM (New Age)	Malayalam	Weekly	K. Damodaran Ernākulam, Kerala.	K. Damodaran Jai Hind Press, Ernākulam, Kerala.
JANASAKTI (People's Strength)	Kannada	Weekly	G. R. Krishna Rao 59 K. V. Temple St., Bangalore, Mysore.	G. R. Krishna Rao Janasakti Printers, Bangalore, Mysore.
ARUNA (Aruna)	Kannada	Weekly	U. N. Srinivas Bhatt Meena Mahal, K. S. R. Road, Mangalore, Mysore.	U. N. Srinivas Bhatt Aruna Press, Mangalore, Mysore.
NAYA DUNYA (New World)	Oriya	Weekly	Anant Charen Pradha Palitpara Lane, Cuttuck, Orissa.	Anant Charan Pradha Navayuga Press, Cuttuck, Orissa.
MATAMAT (Opinion)	Bengali	Weekly	Bimal Ghose 64A Lower Circular Road, Calcutta, West Bengal.	Bimal Ghose *n a*
SWADHINATA (Independence)	Hindi	Weekly	Suryadeo Upadhaya 33 Alimuddin Street, Calcutta, West Bengal.	Suryadeo Upadhaya Ganasakti Printers (Private) Ltd., Calcutta, West Bengal.
JANASAKTI (People's Strength)	Hindi	Weekly	Suresh Sharma Langartoli, Patna, Bihar.	Suresh Sharma Yatim Press, Patna, Bihār.
JAN YUG (People's Age)	Hindi	Weekly	Ramesh Sinha 22 Kaisarbagh, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh.	Ramesh Sinha Adhikar Press, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh.

See footnotes at end of table.

AND PERIODICALS, DECEMBER 1957

KEY PERSONALITIES	PRICE*	CIRCULATION	COMMENTS
V. T. Induchudary (editor)	7 np	11,800	Organ of the Kozhikode District Committee of the CPI.
N. Copinathan Nair (editor)	8 np	15,600	Organ of the Kerala Provincial Committee of the CPI.
K. K. Warior (editor)	6 np	*n a*	Organ of the Trichūr District Committee of the CPI.
P. Joevanandam (editor)	6 np	15,000	Organ of the Tamil Nad Provincial Committee of the CPI. S. Krishnaswamy officially listed as owner.
K. Rajagopala Rao (editor)	6 np	13,200	Organ of the Andhra Pradesh Provincial Committee of the CPI. *Visalandhra Vignana Samiti* (United Andhra Cultural Committee) officially listed as owner.
Saroj Mukharji (editor)	2 np	13,900	Organ of the West Bengal Provincial Committee of the CPI. The sixth largest paper in West Bengal in circulation.
Sohan Singh Josh (editor)	7 np	*n a*	Organ of the Punjab Provincial Committee of the CPI.
P. C. Joshi (in 1958)	25 np	40,000	Organ of the Central Executive Committee of the CPI.
Editorial board: A. K. Gopalan (chairman). C. Unniraja. K. K. Warior. K. Unni Krishnan. M. S. Devadas (editor).	20 np	*n a*	Organ of the Kerala Provincial Committee of the CPI. Started in 1957.
K. Damodaran (editor)	20 np	*n a*	Probably an organ of Ernākulam District Committee of the CPI in Kerala. K. Damodaran officially listed as owner.
G. R. Krishna Rao (editor)	13 np	*n a*	Organ of the Mysore Provincial Committee of the CPI.
U. N. Srinivas Bhatt (editor)	16 np	*n a*	Organ of the South Kanara District Committee of the CPI.
Ram Krishna Pati (editor)	13 np	*n a*	Organ of the Orissa Provincial Committee of the CPI.
Pramatha Bhowmick (editor)	13 np	*n a*	Organ of the West Bengal Provincial Committee of the CPI.
Suryadeo Upadhaya (editor)	10 np	*n a*	Organ of the West Bengal Provincial Committee of the CPI.
Ali Ashraf (editor)	20 np	*n a*	Organ of the Bihār Provincial Committee of the CPI. Faltering in 1957 for lack of funds.
Ramesh Sinha (editor)	20 np	*n a*	Organ of the Uttar Pradesh Provincial Committee of the CPI.

FIGURE 3–11

TITLE	LANGUAGE	FREQUENCY	PUBLISHER AND PLACE OF PUBLICATION	PRINTER AND PLACE OF PRINTING
AGRADOOT (Messenger)	Napali	Fortnightly	Ananda Prasad Pathak Office of the Communist Party, Chowk Bazar, Darjeeling, West Bengal.	Ananda Prasad Pathak Asha Lakshmi Press, Darjeeling, West Bengal.
NEW AGE	English	Monthly	D. P. Sinha New Age Printing Press, 5 Jhandevallan Estate, Rani Jhansi Road, New Delhi.	D. P. Sinha New Age Printing Press, New Delhi.
WORKER	Telegu	Monthly	J. Satyanarayana Swatantra Art Printers, Vijayavādā, Andhra Pradesh.	J. Satyanarayana Swatantra Art Printers, Vijayavādā, Andhra Pradesh.
YUGANTAR (New Age)	Marathi	Monthly	Gangadhar Moreshwar Adhikari Raj Bhawan, V. P. Road, Bombay.	G. M. Adhikari New Age Printing Press, Bombay.
PHULWARI	Punjabi	Monthly	Hari Singh Pakka Bagh, Jullundur City, Punjab.	Hari Singh *n a*

n a Data not available.

* One hundred naye paise (np) equal one rupee (US$0.21).

FIGURE 3–12. ORGANS PUBLISHED BY CPI

TITLE	LANGUAGE	FREQUENCY	PUBLISHER
TRADE UNION RECORD	English	Fortnightly	K. G. Srivastava AITUC Office, New Delhi.
SHANTI SAMACHAR (Peace Review).	Hindi	Fortnightly	Dwijinder Nandi 14 Munshi Nikatan, Kamala Market, New Delhi.
PEACE REVIEW	English	Monthly	S. Kaul Munshi Nikatan, Kamala Market, New Delhi.
ANTARJATIK (Peace Review)	Bengali	Monthly	Biswas 46 Dharamtalla St., Calcutta, West Bengal.
PARICHAYA	Bengali	Monthly	Rabindra Majumdar 3/1 Baman Pura Lane, Calcutta, West Bengal.
ISCUS	English	Quarterly	D. C. Home I–D Naaz Building, Bombay.

(Continued)

KEY PERSONALITIES	PRICE*	CIRCULATION	COMMENTS
Ananda Prasad Pathak (editor)	13 np	*n a*	Communist Party organ. No information as to which committee is responsible for it.
B. T. Ranadive (editor in 1958)	50 np	*n a*	Theoretical journal of the Central Executive Committee of the CPI.
J. Satyanarayana (editor)	12 np	*n a*	Probably an organ of the Andhra Pradesh Provincial Committee of the CPI. M. Mohiuddin officially listed as owner.
G. M. Adhikari (editor)	12 np	*n a*	Organ of the Maharashtra Provincial Committee of the CPI.
Hari Singh (editor)	50 np	*n a*	Probably an organ of the Punjab Provincial Committee of the CPI; Cultural journal.

FRONT ORGANIZATIONS, DECEMBER 1957

PRINTER	KEY PERSONNEL	CIRCULATION	COMMENTS
K. G. Srivastava New Age Printing Press, New Delhi.	K. G. Srivastava (editor)	*n a*	Organ of the All-India Trade Union Congress.
Dwijinder Nandi Naveen Press.	Om Prakash (editor)	400 (Feb. 1958)	Organ of the All-India Peace Council. Started in late 1957. O. P. Palivan may now be editor.
S. Kaul Roxy Printing Press, New Delhi.	Pundit Sundarlal (editor)	*n a*	Organ of the All-India Peace Council.
Biswas Guha Printing Works, Calcutta, West Bengal.	Biswas (editor)	*n a*	Organ of the West Bengal Peace Council.
Rabindra Majumdar Sree Printing Works, Calcutta, West Bengal.	Gopal Halder and Nani Bhowmik (editors).	*n a*	Probably the organ of the West Bengal branch of the All-India Progressive Writers' Association; Parichaya (Private) Ltd. officially listed as owner.
D. C. Home Usha Printers, 6 Tulloch Road, Bombay.	Dr. A. V. Baliga (editor)	*n a*	Organ of the Indo-Soviet Cultural Society; started in 1954.

FIGURE 3-13. LEADING CPI PUBLISHING AND BOOK HOUSES, 1958

NAME	ADDRESS	MANAGEMENT	COMMENTS
People's Publishing House (Private) Ltd.	Rani Jhansi Road, New Delhi.	CPI Central Executive Committee. S. A. Dange and S. V. Ghate own shares. P. Sanyal (general manager).	Owns New Age Printing Press. The P.P.H. moved to Delhi in 1954. S. A. Dange has been in charge of the P.P.H. office since the Amritsar Party Congress. Profit of about 100,000 rupees per year goes to the CPI National Council. Plans to publish 24 books a year on various subjects.
People's Publishing House (Bombay) Ltd.	190-B Khetwadi Main Road, Bombay City, Bombay.	B. D. Gujarati (general manager).	Only branch of the P.P.H. Commonly known in Bombay as the "P.P.H. book stall." Operates 2 subbranches: 421 Sardar Vallabhai Patel Road and 15 Coswaji Patel Street, both in Bombay City. Sales in 1957/58 were approximately 400,000 rupees; the profit was about 45,000. Profit goes to CPI National Council.
Janayugam Publications Ltd.	Quilon, Kerala	Kerala Provincial Committee of the CPI. Board of Directors: C. Achutha Menon (managing director). M. N. Govindan Nair. P. K. Vasudevan Nair. K. C. George. N. Gopinathan Nair. P. Gangadharan. S. Kumaran. M. N. Ramachandran Nair. P. R. Madhavan Pillai.	Established mid-1956 and has an authorized capital of 300,000 rupees. All nine directors are top-ranking members of the Communist Party in Kerala. Has acquired control over the Janayugam Press which prints and publishes *Janayugam*.
Prabhatam Printing and Publishing Company (Private) Ltd.	Ernākulam, Kerala	M. Padmanabhan (managing director).	Established January 1953; authorized capital 100,000 rupees. Managing agents for Prabhat Book House (see below).
Prabhat Book House	Ernākulam, Kerala	Subsidiary of Prabhatam Printing and Publishing Company (Private) Ltd.	Has branches in Trivandrum, Quilon, Kottayam, Alleppey, Kozhikode, Cannanore, and Mangālore. Distributes publications of the Kerala government and the Prabhatam Printing and publishing Co. (Private) Ltd.
Deshabhimani Printing and Publishing Company, Ltd.	Kozhikode, Kerala	P. Narayanan Nair (managing director).	Branches in Kozhikode, Cannanore, Tellicherry, and Cheukonnu.
Janasakti Publishing House.	Madras City, Madras	Tamil Nad Provincial Committee of the CPI. A. S. K. Ayyangar (manager).	Has at least 2 full time workers for translation work. Major part of sales is through the New Century Book House in Madras. Operates at a profit.
New Century Book House	199 Mount Road, Madras City, Madras.	Tamil Nad Provincial Committee of the CPI. S. Krishnaswamy (manager).	Dealt solely with Communist literature but falling sales forced it to convert into a general book seller in 1956. During period April 1951–March 1954 sales amounted to 32,000 rupees.

FIGURE 3-13 (*Continued*)

NAME	ADDRESS	MANAGEMENT	COMMENTS
Visalandhra Publishing House, Ltd.	Buckinghampet Post Office, Vijayavādā, Andhra Pradesh.	Andhra Pradesh Provincial Committee of the CPI through the *Visalandhra Vignana Samiti* (United Andhra Cultural Committee). K. Subha Rao (assistant manager).	Largest publishing house in Andhra Pradesh. Started in 1953 or 1954; has an authorized capital of 300,000 rupees. Has a virtual monopoly in Andhra Pradesh on the publication of books of a general nature. Output in the past 5 years was 290 titles in a total of 766,680 copies. It operates also as a general bookseller and has book stores in Vijayavādā (opened in about 1956) and Guntūr and an agency in Hyderābād City. Sales amount to around 30,000 rupees annually in the Vijayavādā store. The total book sales operation was earning a profit of about 2,000 rupees a month in early 1958.
National Book Agency (Private) Ltd.	12 Bankim Chatterjee Street, Calcutta, West Bengal.	West Bengal Provincial Committee of the CPI. Sunil Basu, Sudhan Dutta, and Muzaffar Ahmed (board of directors).	Combination publishing house and book store. Book store formerly sold only Communist publications, but during recent years it has carried non-Communist books as well. Translates and publishes Soviet books. Total 1954 sales estimated at 90,000–100,000 rupees. Has one branch at Madan Street, Calcutta. Maintains a business office at 2 Suriya Sen Street in Calcutta.
People's Publishing House of Bihār.	Patna, Bihār................	Bihār Provincial Committee of the CPI.	Started in 1946; was taken over by the CPI in 1956. Serves Bihār and eastern Uttar Pradesh. Annual sales in 1956/57 were 57,555 rupees and in 1957/58, 39,000 rupees. Foreign publications accounted for 57% of the 1956/57 sales.

FIGURE 3-14. SELECTED LIST OF PAMPHLETS ISSUED BY THE PEOPLE'S PUBLISHING HOUSE, 1956–58

TITLE	AUTHOR	DATE OF PUBLICATION	PAGES	PRICE*
Pakistan Portent..............................	Ajoy Ghosh....................	December 1958....	22	20 np.
Some Aspects of the Agrarian Question...........	National Council of the CPI....	September 1958...	18	20 np.
Truth About Kerala............................	Central Executive Committee of the CPI.	August 1958......	21	15 np.
Amritsar Congress of the Communist Party.......	Ajoy Ghosh....................	May 1958........	18	n a
The Kerala Agrarian Relations Bill...............	C. Achutha Menon............	March 1958.......	51	50 np.
Resolutions of the Communist Party of India adopted at the Extraordinary Party Congress, Amritsar, April 1958.	National Council of the CPI....	May 1958........	44	35 np.
Constitution of the Communist Party of India.....	.....*do*.........................	May 1958........	33	25 np.
The Mahatma and the Ism......................	E. M. S. Namboodiripad.......	January 1958.....	130	2.50 rupees.
Review of the Second General Elections..........	Central Committee of the CPI..	July 1957.........	41	25 np.
Communists in Parliament......................	A. K. Gopalan and Hirendra Nath Mukerjee.	January 1957.....	54	3 np.
Focus on Monopoly............................	Amar Sen.....................	January 1957.....	27	13 np.
Focus on the Public Sector......................	Sailen Ghosh..................	January 1957.....	46	25 np.
Do Ends Justify Means?........................	Howard Selsam...............	January 1957.....	29	32 np.
Second Five-Year Plan—a Critique...............	Bhupesh Gupta...............	January 1957.....	107	50 np.
Two Systems—A Balance Sheet..................	Ajoy Ghosh...................	November 1956...	n a	65 np.
Some Forms of Transition from Capitalism to Socialism.	A. Sobolev....................	October 1956.....	43	n a

* One hundred naye paise (np) equal one rupee (US$0.21).

FIGURE 3-15. CPI PRINTING PRESSES, 1958

NAME	LOCATION	OWNERSHIP	COMMENTS
Aruna Press	Mangalore, Mysore	*n a*	Prints *Aruna*, a weekly issued by the South Kanara District CPI Committee in Mysore State.
Awami Printing Press	Jullundur City, Punjab	Thought to be owned by the Punjab Provincial Committee of the CPI.	*Nawan Zamana*, organ of the Punjab Provincial Committee of the CPI, is printed by this press, as was the *Kisan Bulletin*, journal of the All-India Kisan Sabha (now believed to have ceased publication).
Deshabhimani Press	Kozhikode, Kerala	Deshabhimani Printing and Publishing Co.	Prints *Deshabhimani*, organ of the Kozhikode District Committee of the CPI.
Ganasakti Printers (Private) Ltd.	Calcutta, West Bengal	*n a*	*Swadhinata*, organ of the West Bengal Provincial Committee, is printed on this press. In February 1959 the firm planned to purchase a new rotary press from Communist China, priced at equivalent of about US$48,000, if it obtained the neccessary import license. Its payroll in 1957 was 1,000 rupees a month.
Janasakti Press	32 Broadway, Madras City, Madras.	*n a*	The Janasakti Press owns the *Janasakti* Tamil newspaper which is printed on its presses. In early 1959 the firm was constructing its own building in McKay's Garden, Madras City. Larger printing machinery has also been ordered, reportedly from the U.S.S.R.
Janasakti Printers	Bangalore, Mysore	*n a*	Prints the Kannada-language *Janasakti*, organ of the Mysore Provincial CPI Committee.
Janayugam Press	Quilon, Kerala	Janayugam Publications Ltd., Quilon, Kerala.	Prints *Janayugam*, published by the Kerala Provincial Committee.
Navayuga Press	Cuttuck, Orissa	*n a*	Prints *Naya Dunya*, organ of the Orissa Provincial Committee.
New Age Printing Press	Rani Jhansi Road, New Delhi.	People's Publishing House (Private) Ltd.	*New Age*, weekly and monthly, are printed on this press. It was formerly located in Bombay but moved to New Delhi in 1954.
Swatantra Art Printers	Rajagopalachari Street, Vijayavādā, Andhra Pradesh.	*Visalandhra Vignana Samiti* (United Andhra Cultural Committee).	*Visalandhra*, organ of the Andhra Pradesh Provincial Committee, is printed on this press. The press was acquired in 1954 or 1955, and is the largest press in Andhra Pradesh outside Hyderābād City. It was operating at a profit of 1,000 rupees a month in late 1957. Employs 100 workers.

FIGURE 3-16. NUMBER OF TRANSLATIONS OF RUSSIAN-LANGUAGE LITERARY WORKS, BY LANGUAGE AND PUBLISHER, PUBLISHED IN 1957

PUBLISHER	BENGALI	HINDI	MALAYALAM	ENGLISH	TAMIL	PUNJABI	TOTAL
Eastern Trading Co., Calcutta	4	4	0	0	0	0	8
K. Ganguly & Company, Ltd., Calcutta	6	1	0	0	0	0	7
Popular Library, Calcutta	4	1	0	0	0	0	5
National Book Agency Ltd., Calcutta	4	0	0	0	0	0	4
Prabhatam Printing & Publishing Co. (Private) Ltd., Ernākulam	0	0	3	0	0	0	3
Chaudhari & Sons, Banāras	0	3	0	0	0	0	3
Mangalodayam, Trichūr	0	0	2	0	0	0	2
Nollai Publishing House, Tirunelveli	0	0	0	0	2	0	2
Devadatta & Company, Calcutta	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Bharati Library, Calcutta	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Shila Prakashani, Calcutta	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Subodh Prakashan, Delhi	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Navyug Publishers, Delhi	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
New Literature, New Delhi	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Jaico Publishing House, Bombay	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
O. U. P. Madras	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
R. D. Nair, Kottayam	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Total	21	10	6	3	2	1	43

FIGURE 3-17. COMMUNIST AND OTHER FOREIGN FILMS CERTIFIED BY THE INDIAN CENSORSHIP BOARD, 1955–57

ORIGIN	1955				1956				1957			
	35mm		16mm		35mm		16mm		35mm		16mm	
	Number	Percent of total	Number	Percent of total	Number	Percent of total	Number	Percent of total	Number	Percent of total	Number	Percent of total
Communist countries	186	*17*	25	*3*	95	*9*	56	*5*	125	*14*	82	*8*
Other countries	868	*83*	899	*97*	918	*91*	1,266	*95*	790	*86*	1,026	*92*
Total	1,054	*100*	924	*100*	1,013	*100*	1,322	*100*	915	*100*	1,108	*100*

4. *Role in National Political Life*

A. Extent of role

1. Present position

The Communist Party of India occupies an important position in the Indian political scene. In the 1957 national elections for the *Lok Sabha* (House of the People), the lower house of Parliament, it polled approximately 10% of the total vote as compared with 5% in the 1951–52 general elections. Although its strength in the *Lok Sabha* is small (29 seats out of 494 elected members), the CPI is nonetheless the largest opposition party in this house as well as in the upper house of the national Parliament. The CPI was outpolled among opposition parties in the 1957 *Lok Sabha* elections only by the Praja Socialist Party (People's Socialist Party, PSP). That party received approximately 12,500,000 votes, compared with slightly less than 12,000,000 for the CPI, but captured fewer seats owing to dispersion of the Socialists' limited resources.

Communist legislative strength is even more apparent and of more immediate significance in several of the Indian states. The CPI is the largest opposition party in the West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh state legislatures. It captured 30.9% of the vote in the 1955 special elections in the Andhra region of Andhra Pradesh (elections were not held in this area in 1957) and 35.6% in the Telengana region of the state during the second general elections in 1957.* In West Bengal, the Party polled 17.9% of the vote in the 1957 state assembly elections, compared with 10.3% in 1951–52. More importantly, the CPI won a plurality of seats in the Kerala State assembly in 1957 and subsequently formed a Communist-dominated government by enlisting the support of five fellow-traveling Independents. Its position in Kerala has given the CPI an opportunity to test its present tactic of seeking to capture control over India through constitutional methods and has substantially reinforced its ability to maneuver within a democratic framework from a position of strength.

The Party's major failure to date in the political arena has been its inability to break the Congress Party's electoral hold over the peasantry in many parts of India. The illiterate peasants, who remain largely under the control of village headmen and local landowners, tend to vote according to the dictates of these leaders, many of whom have a vested interest in continued Congress Party rule. Moreover, as the Communist Party has progressively devoted its major energies during recent years to united front tactics and winning elections, its front groups among students and women, though still larger in most states than similar groups organized by other parties, have dwindled. In addition, the geographical distribution of CPI support is extremely uneven. It is strong in West Bengal, the south Indian states of Kerala and Andhra Pradesh, and the Federal Territory of Tripura and has significant pockets of strength in Punjab and Bombay states. It is weak on a statewide basis in Assam, Rājasthān, Mysore, and the "Hindi belt" (the North Indian states of Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Bihār in which Hindi is the dominant language). Finally, the CPI has been handicapped by its exterritorial loyalties and the adverse reaction within India to certain Soviet policies and actions.

Despite these shortcomings, the CPI is India's most dynamic national opposition party. The increase in the Communist vote between 1952 and 1957 resulted in part from the Party's abandonment in 1951 of tactics based on the belief that India was ripe for revolution in favor of a program of replacing the Congress regime through parliamentary means by a Communist-dominated alliance of all "progressive" groups and parties. Following this shift, the CPI, which in 1951 stood discredited after two years of abortive revolutionary activity, made slow but steady progress in gaining support among the electorate. The Party's gains, however, have resulted equally from factors inherent in a country with a land-hungry peasantry, a growing unemployed or underemployed educated class, and a large body of idle laborers. Popular aspirations are rising in India, but economic development is hampered by such factors as inadequate capital and limited technical knowledge. In addition, the ruling Congress Party has lost its preindependence *elan* and has become faction ridden, corrupt, and lethargic. Leaders of that party are finding it increasingly difficult to accommodate landless peasants and landlords, laborers and industrialists, and doctrinaire Socialists and capitalists within one organization. Effective governmental action on popular issues, such as land reform, has become increasingly difficult. Furthermore, the democratic opposition in India remains fragmented, thus providing an opportunity for the use of united front tactics by the CPI. The history of the democratic Socialist movement has been one of repeated mergers and schisms and continuing factional squabbles. The Socialist vote is now split between two parties, the PSP and its splinter group, the Socialist Party. Finally, the Communists benefit from the political naivete of many of the educated Indians. Some Indians believe that Indian Communists differ basically from their counterparts in the U.S.S.R. and Communist China, and still others, including many who are staunchly anti-Communist, believe that the force of Indian traditions and the inherent individuality and religiousness of the people will, in themselves, deter the spread of the Communist ideology within India.

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* The former state of Andhra, formed in 1953 from the Telegu-speaking portion of the composite Madras State, was merged with the Telegu-speaking region of the former Hyderābād State (commonly called Telengana) to form Andhra Pradesh in accordance with the general reorganization of Indian state boundaries on a linguistic basis on November 1, 1956.

During 1958 the CPI extended its operations in two areas in an effort to overcome its prime weaknesses. It launched or participated in a series of joint opposition agitations against the government in many rural regions in an attempt to break the Congress Party's hold over the peasantry. In most states the CPI derived little immediate benefit from these agitations, but in West Bengal it gained some support in the countryside. West Bengal is one of the Communists' major target areas for the next national elections, scheduled for 1962, and a rural base to complement its strength in Calcutta would make the CPI a serious threat to continued Congress Party control in that state. Secondly, the CPI stepped up its activities in the "Hindi belt" by participating in antigovernment agitations and by entering an increasing number of candidates in local elections. The Party gained some local support through these efforts, but it has not been able to challenge effectively the Congress Party in this region.

2. Role of the Sino-Soviet bloc

The CPI is only one facet of the total Communist effort to subvert India. India is a significant factor in the formulation of international Communist strategy toward neutral nations by the Sino-Soviet bloc which hopes ultimately to capture that nation's economic and manpower potential and to make use of India's strategic position and its cultural influence in much of the Afro – Asian area. Thus, the Soviet Union, Communist China, and to a lesser extent the East European satellites have attempted to reinforce the CPI by increasing India's economic and cultural ties with the Communist bloc. The external features of Soviet and Chinese Communist foreign policies toward India are much the same. But the impression is given—by Moscow's willingness to give India aid which China needs, the Soviet Union's more open support for India's position in the Kashmīr dispute, and the continuing Chinese Communist refusal officially to recognize the Indo – Chinese border along the generally accepted MacMahon line of 1914—that the U.S.S.R. has been more eager during recent years than Peiping for partnership with Nehru.

Until recent years the international Communist movement followed a policy of strict opposition to the Indian government, which was viewed as still under imperialist control. The first evidence of softening occurred during the early 1950's, when the CPI was instructed to follow a slightly more constructive approach toward Nehru, but the Soviet Union did not openly alter its own basic policy until late 1954, following Nehru's visit to Communist China. In January 1955 an editorial in *Pravda* praised India as a peace-loving, independent state, and the following month Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov referred in a speech to the "independent foreign policy of the sovereign state of India." This switch came at an embarrassing time for the CPI, which was then engaged in an election campaign against Nehru's party in Andhra State. These Soviet statements probably contributed to the Communist Party's defeat in these elections and clearly indicated that the Soviet Union, in announcing policy shifts, paid little heed to the immediate problems of the CPI.

The impact of the Sino-Soviet bloc on India and on the Indian Communist Party has both positive and negative features. On the one hand, continued Soviet interference in the East European satellites and pressure on Yugoslavia, repeated purges in the U.S.S.R., and the impact of the de-Stalinization campaign, and Chinese Communist repression in Tibet have created unrest among intellectuals within and on the fringes of the CPI and have had an adverse effect in India in general. However, Indians have had no immediate experience with Soviet imperialism and are impressed by the economic and technological progress in this "fellow Asian" nation. The CPI and foreign Communists have succeeded in capitalizing on the readiness of many Indians to accept, often unquestioningly, the extensive claims to progress made by the Soviet Union and Communist China and to believe that India can learn much from the example of these nations where conditions are supposedly similar to those in India. On balance, the impact of the Sino-Soviet bloc and the success of the Sino-Soviet economic and cultural offensive toward India have been assets for the CPI.

The Sino-Soviet attempt to gain popularity and prestige within India during the past four years has taken numerous forms. Nehru received red-carpet treatment during visits to Communist China in 1954 and the Soviet Union in 1955, and Bulganin and Khrushchev, Chou En-lai, Ho Chi-minh, and premiers of several of the East European satellites have toured India. The immediate impact of most of these visits was negligible, with the one major exception of Chou En-lai, but taken together they flatter Indians and contribute to increased respectability for the Communist bloc. By the end of 1958 the bloc had extended approximately $315,000,000 in economic aid and credits to India, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia contributing about 98% of the total. This aid has gone primarily into the construction of heavy industries scheduled under the second five-year plan. Aid from Communist sources has received disproportionate publicity in India and has brought to the country several hundred Soviet technicians who have enhanced Soviet prestige by their ability, friendliness, and abstention from political activity. The bloc's most successful project is the iron and steel plant at Bhilai (in Madhya Pradesh State), the construction of which is being supervised by Soviet technicians and financed by a loan from the U.S.S.R. When the first blast furnace was inaugurated in February 1959, a leading Indian newspaper, in an obvious thrust at the construction of similar mills by the British and West Germans, wrote that "in Bhilai, Russian experts are all praise for Indian engineers and technicians who have been associated with construction work. In this respect, Bhilai is claimed to have provided more scope for Indian engineers to work in responsible positions and gain vital experience in erection work than anywhere else." Another important newspaper observed that the Soviet technicians "are setting an example by mixing with local workers and people. Although they have a separate school for their children, they have no exclusive club or hospital as at Rourkela" (site of the German-constructed mill).

By December 1958, India had trade agreements with 10 bloc countries, including the Soviet Union and Communist China. Bloc trade with India remains small but has shown a significant increase since 1955 both in volume and in percentage of India's total trade. Imports from the bloc rose from US$25,200,000 in 1955 (1.8% of India's total imports) to $86,400,000 in 1957 (4% of total imports), whereas exports to the bloc increased from $28,100,000 in 1955 to $60,900,000 in 1957 (an increase from 2.2% to 4.5% of total exports). During 1958 the U.S.S.R. stepped up its purchase of Indian pepper, cashew nuts, and coir—the major products of Kerala—in an obvious attempt to help raise the economic level in this Communist-controlled state.

Since 1955 several hundred Communist bloc delegations, ranging in size from 50-member cultural troupes to small delegations of educators, scientists, or journalists, have toured India, and an even larger number of Indian groups have been invited to the bloc, particularly to the Soviet Union. In 1958 alone, 58 Communist delegations toured India, and 81 official or unofficial groups from India visited the Soviet Union, Communist China, or the East European satellites. The nature of the delegations from India is shown by the following tabulation:

TYPE OF DELEGATION	NUMBER OF DELEGATIONS
Athletic	1
Cultural and professional	23
Economic	17
Governmental	6
Science and technology	3
Tourist	8
Trade union	4
Communist Party and front groups	19
Total	81

In 1956 the Czechoslovakian Embassy in New Delhi offered Czech currency at one-third the usual rate to encourage Indian tourists and industrialists to visit an industrial exhibition in Prague, and *Intourist,* the Soviet travel agency, offered 16-day tours of the U.S.S.R. at the low all-inclusive price of 2,750 rupees (US$585.00). Several hundred Indians participated in these tours before the Soviet Union withdrew the concessionary price in October 1958. Similar package tours of Communist China, which were never particularly popular owing to their higher costs, were also discontinued in late 1958. In early 1959 the U.S.S.R. offered to conclude a bilateral travel agreement with India to encourage tourism. Under this proposal, India would allocate foreign exchange for a specified number of tourists to the Soviet Union which would in turn send a "large number" to India, presumably by utilizing rupee balances built up under the trade agreement.

Since 1955 there has been a steady flow into India of printed literature designed to publicize the cultural, economic, and technological progress of the bloc. Forty-five known bloc periodicals were circulating in India on a regular basis at the end of 1958. An indication of the total number of English-language books imported from the bloc or published by the bloc in India is given by the increase in the size of the annual catalogue of the Communist-operated People's Publishing House in New Delhi. This catalogue increased from 30 pages at the beginning of 1957 to 111 pages in early 1958 and was supplemented by numerous lists of new arrivals throughout the year. The bloc's propaganda efforts also include motion pictures and the Soviet Union's expanding broadcast schedules in English and the major Indian languages. Further information on Sino-Soviet bloc propaganda activities may be found in this Supplement, SECTION 3, under Propaganda.

B. Strategy

Theoretically CPI strategy is based on an application of Marxist-Leninist principles to conditions in India. In actual practice, since the Party line is ultimately approved by Moscow, Indian Communist strategy is essentially a projection of the policy interests of the Soviet Union and the Sino-Soviet bloc as a whole. The CPI, in defining a method of operation, has thus been forced not only to evaluate conditions in India but also to interpret Soviet directives which have occasionally been ambiguous, particularly in the period immediately following World War II (see this Supplement, SECTION 2, under Postwar Interim).

In 1951, following the failure of its attempt to foment revolution, the CPI adopted a new policy directive which is one of the basic documents in the evolution of Party strategy and which set the broad tactical framework within which the Party now functions. This directive, representing as it did a major tactical shift, affected all Party operations but had particularly important implications for its parliamentary strategy. Under the new tactical line the CPI announced that while it still adhered to the goal of "socialism" (communism), it was "not demanding the establishment of socialism in our country in the present stage of development." The downgrading of the use of violence as a tactical approach for the immediate future contained in this directive together with the Party's decision to seek replacement of the present "antidemocratic and antipopular government by a new government of people's democracy" based on a coalition of all "democratic, antifeudal, and anti-imperialist forces" was put into practice almost immediately. Before the 1951–52 general elections the Party began working for the establishment of a united front with other opposition parties and redefined its program and objectives to appeal not only to the working class and peasantry but also to the middle class and the "nationalist *bourgeoisie*," defined as the anti-imperialist section of the capitalist class.

Although the general tenor of the 1951 policy directive was moderate, the CPI retained some facets of its former "leftist*" strategy, and its new policy was ambiguous in several important respects, particularly with regard to adherence to constitutional methods. The Party continued to follow a "hard" line toward the Indian government, which was termed "antidemocratic" and "antipopular." It retained the view that India was not independent but remained subservient to British interests. Further, Party leaders observed that the "road that will lead us to freedom and peace" will not be found by parliamentary means alone. However, these interpretations were subsequently modified as the CPI, under Moscow's guidance, continued its evolution toward a more open "rightist" (cooperative and peaceful) strategy. In 1954 the Party recognized Indian independence from British control and as a natural concomitant began to concentrate its efforts against the United States as India's "main enemy." In 1956 it gave almost unqualified support to Nehru's foreign policies and praised some of his "progressive" domestic policies. And in the same year General Secretary Ajoy Ghosh came out in a Party pamphlet in favor of almost exclusive reliance on the parliamentary path to power.

Espousal of parliamentary means reached its highest point at a special Party Congress held at Amritsar (Punjab State) in April 1958. At this conference the Party laid the groundwork for attracting mass support by playing down its subservience to the Soviet Union, discarding names such as "cell" and "Politburo" which have a foreign connotation, and stating in the new constitution that the Party "strives" to win power peacefully. However, subsequent statements by CPI leaders and inner-Party documents indicate clearly that the Communists' adherence to parliamentary methods is qualified and that the Party's goal, once control over India is achieved, remains a complete revamping of the Indian social, political, and economic structure in accordance with classical Communist principles.

In functioning within a democratic framework in recent years, the Communist Party has placed major emphasis in carrying out its political strategy on united front activities. Parliament and the state assemblies, although useful as propaganda forums, have been of limited value in enabling the Party to influence national policies or attract new supporters. By contrast, its united front activities, although of only moderate success thus far, have enabled the CPI to expand both into new geographical areas and among new target groups. In early 1958, E. M. S. Namboodiripad, then Communist Chief Minister of Kerala, described the importance which the Party attaches to its united front efforts in the following terms:

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* The "leftist" and "rightist" factions are described in detail and the major proponents of each are identified in this Supplement, SECTION 3 under Leadership.

> Winning India province by province is not the chief thing. Our real object now is to bring about a broad alliance with the Congress and Indian Socialist parties. We shall try to get them to alter their programs and policies to fit in with ours and, finally, to adopt our methods on an all-India basis.

The basic CPI tactical approach, which follows classical Communist formulations, is one of attempting to "unite with" and simultaneously "struggle against" other opposition parties in an attempt to neutralize them or, if possible, draw them into alliance with the CPI in election campaigns as well as in joint antigovernment agitations on local or national issues. For example, the political resolution adopted by the CPI in April 1958 recommended "firm ideological-political struggle" against the leaders of the democratic Socialist parties and at the same time urged the development of "common actions" with their followers. The CPI has been more successful during recent years in concluding agreements with regional parties or local branches of national parties than with national parties themselves. Presumably the price it would have to pay for a national coalition with the Praja Socialist Party, for example, would be too high. In carrying out its united front tactics the CPI insists on retaining its freedom of action. A policy directive in 1954 warned against becoming submerged in a united front organization, thereby "preventing the Party's immediate mobilization of the people under its own banner."

The Party's application of the strategy adopted in 1951 and supplemented by political resolutions at Party congresses in 1953–54, 1956, and 1958 has not gone unquestioned within its ranks. On the one hand, the "rightist" faction has called for even greater emphasis on parliamentarianism and increased support for the central government in an effort to strengthen and attract "progressive" elements within the Congress Party; on the other, the "leftist" faction has questioned some of the basic principles of the parliamentary strategy and has favored more doctrinaire opposition to the Indian government. Few CPI members favor an immediate return to revolutionary activity, but many disagree with the extent to which the Party has publicly pledged to use peaceful means to achieve power. The "leftists" (P. Sundarayya, Bhupesh Gupta, M. Basavapunnaiah, and others) fear that posing as a democratic party may cost the CPI its revolutionary *elan* and that the expansion of Party membership may further reduce dedication and discipline within the organization. This faction believes the CPI should not play down its revolutionary role solely to win votes, facilitate united front agreements, or remain in power in Kerala. The more moderate and dominant group, which includes Ajoy Ghosh and E. M. S. Namboodiripad, believes that the Party's capture and retention of power in Kerala, plus the lesson of the abortive 1948–51 insurrection, prove that a moderate tactical posture is, in the long run, the more successful policy.

During recent years, the basic problems confronting the Party have increasingly been resolved in favor of the "rightists." This trend reflects the dominant Communist view that Congress Party strength is eroding, that the CPI is best qualified to benefit from that party's losses, and that primary reliance on a moderate tactical posture will enable the CPI to gain respectability and eventually benefit from political polarization between the Communists and the Congress. In addition, the Party's moderate line and its support for the Nehru government have been dictated by the Soviet policy toward India and the importance which the U.S.S.R. has placed on continued Indian neutralism.

During 1958, "leftist" sentiment within the Party registered a slight increase owing to certain local developments. The Party encountered increasing difficulty in attempting to rule Kerala. Nehru became more outspoken in his criticism of developments in that state and of international communism. The rise of military regimes on India's eastern and western flanks, in Pakistan and Burma, increased the Communists' awareness that they must devote more attention to a long-range strategy for use after Nehru's departure from the scene. Finally, increased Western aid to India appeared to ensure fulfillment of a major portion of the second five-year plan, thereby weakening the impact of the Communists' strong criticism of G.O.I. performance in the economic sphere. As a result of these and possibly other factors, the CPI began during the latter part of 1958 to criticize Nehru, who had not been criticized on a personal basis during recent years because he was considered to be "progressive." In addition, Party leaders attempted to remove confusion within CPI circles over the extent of the Party's actual reliance, as contrasted with its announced reliance, on constitutional means. A Party document circulated in West Bengal during the year observed that there is a "heaven and hell" difference between the "reformist concept" that the final goal of socialism can be achieved through parliamentary, peaceful methods and the orthodox interpretation which claims that only limited advances toward socialism can be achieved through peaceful means. This document continued with the observation that "Socialist reconstruction is not possible only by working inside the legislatures or through elections. To a truly revolutionary party, the basic work has always been and is, even today, to create a mass struggle." Finally, to remove any remaining doubts about its true objectives, the CPI launched a concerted attack during 1958 against "revisionism," which one Party spokesman described as an attempt to "turn the Party to the path of class collaboration and reformism within the framework of bourgeois society." Thus, CPI strategy, as it had emerged by the beginning of 1959, was one of public support for constitutionalism and parliamentarianism in an attempt to win votes and enhance the Party's prospects for concluding united front agreements, but actually the Party had not abandoned classical Communist principles and objectives.

C. Relations with other parties

1. The united front tactic

The Communist Party's tactical approach toward other Indian political parties is based on the classical Bolshevik concept of attempting to ally with and simultaneously fight against these parties. Its first venture into the field of united front activity took place in 1936 when Communists reached agreement with the Congress Socialist Party, a leftwing faction led by Jaya Prakash Narayan which functioned within the all-India Congress Party structure. Under this arrangement, individual Communists (the Party was then illegal) were admitted to membership in the CSP. By successful use of "fractions" the Communists by 1940 had captured CSP units in the Andhra, Madras, and Kerala regions (Andhra and Kerala did not then exist as separate states) thereby establishing the basis for Communist strength in south India (see this Supplement, SECTION 2, under The United Front, 1935-41). In 1948 the Communists employed a different united front approach. Believing that India was ripe for revolution, the Party called upon members of the Congress, Muslim League, and Socialist parties to support a revolutionary movement "in opposition to their leaders." When the masses failed to respond, the CPI again switched its tactical line, adopting in 1951 the dual united front approach (simultaneous appeals to the leaders and members of other parties) which has remained its basic strategy.

The attempt to enlist the support of all Indian "progressives," which is a major plank in the Communists' current tactical platform, has placed its mark on virtually all activities of the Party and its major front groups. This tactical approach has not been limited to election campaigns but has been employed between elections in almost continuous attempts to induce other parties to support CPI activities and policies. Every anti-government agitation sponsored by the Party has been as broad based as possible. In every state or national election since 1951 the Party has attempted to conclude electoral agreements with other opposition groups based, if possible, on a mutually acceptable minimum program or at least an apportionment of seats to avoid splitting the non-Congress Party vote. By securing the assistance of other opposition parties and groups in elections and agitations, the CPI hopes to convince these elements, particularly the Socialists, that they can gain power only in alliance with the Communists. Although CPI leaders have publicly stated that they will not cooperate with parties formed primarily to represent the interests of religious and caste groups, with "feudal" landlords, or with the "imperialist *bourgeoisie*" (that portion of the *bourgeoisie* which, in contrast to the "national *bourgeoisie*," is allied with international capitalism and imperialism), in actual practice they have attempted to conclude agreements with virtually any amenable group. The only significant reservation that the CPI attaches to its united front activity is the stipulation that the Party must retain its freedom of action and its distinctive character.

Several factors in the Indian political environment have aided the Communists in carrying out their united front tactics. First, the overwhelming predominance of the Congress Party on the national level makes Communist united front proffers more attractive to other opposition parties than might be the case in a more equally balanced party system. Non-Communist opposition parties can see little prospect for gaining power under the present Indian political alignment, and many are thus sympathetic toward Communist efforts to confront the ruling party with a united front, thereby capturing more seats than would be the case were the non-Congress vote split. Secondly, the Communists' moderate tactical posture plus the Indian government's ambivalence toward international communism have given the CPI increased respectability and enhanced its prospects for concluding united front agreements. In addition, the general currency of Socialist doctrines in India and the inability of some educated Indians to distinguish between socialism and communism have increased the Communist Party's maneuverability. Finally, the CPI has exploited the inherent weakness, factionalism, and lack of inner-party discipline of many opposition groups.

The Indian political spectrum consists of six main non-CPI elements: the Congress Party, which polled 47.7% of the vote in the 1957 *Lok Sabha* elections; the democratic Socialists, 12.8%; Independents, 12.8%; communal and rightist parties, 9.9%; minor and regional parties, 5.4%; and radical leftists not affiliated with the CPI, 1.5%. Among these, the democratic Socialists and radical leftists are the main targets for CPI united front efforts.

Indian Socialists have remained fundamentally apart from the Communists on any general program for India or on sharing power in a coalition government, but they are vulnerable to exploitation by the CPI owing to basic weaknesses within the democratic Socialist movement. Indian Socialists differ among themselves on basic ideology. Some are pseudo-Marxists, others favor Fabian socialism, and still others are attracted by Gandhian economic concepts. In 1952 the two Socialist parties existing at that time—the Indian Socialist Party and the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party (Peasants', Workers', and Tenants' Party)—merged to form the Praja Socialist Party. However, the merger never developed firm roots. Factional rivalry coalesced over the attitude toward the ruling Congress Party, and in 1954 Dr. Lohia, leader of the faction favoring militant opposition to that party, was expelled for indiscipline. The following year he founded the Socialist Party. In the 1957 *Lok Sabha* elections this party polled approximately 3,000,000 votes, nearly a quarter of that polled by the PSP. Socialist Party candidates outpolled the PSP in Andhra Pradesh, Punjab, and Rājasthān, and in the federal territory of Manipur.

The Socialists have encountered increasing difficulty in formulating an appealing program that would present a clear alternative to the Congress Party and the Communists. They have been caught between the Congress Party's advocacy of a "Socialist pattern of society" as its prime economic and social goal and the Communists' gradual drift toward the right. Finally, the Socialists have few leaders of national stature. Jaya Prakash Narayan, founder of the Socialist wing within the Congress Party in 1934 and former leader of the PSP, has withdrawn from politics to devote full time to Vinoba Bhave's *Bhoodan* (land redistribution) movement. Acharya J. B. Kripalani takes no active interest in purely party affairs, and several other former Socialist leaders have either retired from politics or joined the radical leftists. As a result, the Praja Socialist Party has no leader of national stature capable of welding the diverse factions within the party into a homogeneous unit, although it has good secondary leadership and a band of dedicated, youthful followers.

Dr. Lohia's Socialist Party at every level has rejected all Communist overtures, but local units of the PSP have cooperated with the CPI in election campaigns and mass agitations. The Communists' attitude toward the PSP registered a marked shift in 1953. Previously the CPI followed an accommodating policy toward the national leadership of that party in the belief that a nationwide agreement between the two groups was possible. However, the Praja Socialists' refusal to aid the Communist attempt to form leftist coalition governments in Travancore-Cochin and Madras States following the 1951–52 general elections forced the Communists to revise their estimates. In March 1953, the CPI Central Committee publicly announced that the PSP leadership "has abandoned all pretense to Marxism, is pursuing an antistruggle policy, and is striving for coalition with the Congress Party."

The results of the 1954 state elections in Travancore-Cochin, the most outstanding example of electoral cooperation between the CPI and PSP, proved a further disappointment to the Communists. The major gainer from cooperation between the PSP and the Communist-dominated United Front of Leftists was not the CPI, which dropped from 25 assembly seats to 23, but the PSP, which rose from 12 to 19. The PSP further antagonized the Communists by defecting immediately after the elections to form a ministry supported by the Congress Party. As a result of this experience, the Central Committee of the CPI issued a circular in April 1954 calling the PSP the "second line of defense of the ruling classes" and laying down the following policy guidance for the Communists:

> Instead of appeals to the ranks and lower units to bring pressure on the all-India leadership to join hands with the Communist Party and the democratic forces, appeal to them to fight and defeat their leadership in order to make unity possible.

The CPI has also made frequent overtures toward the numerous small radical leftist parties standing between the Communists and democratic Socialists. These parties, which usually combine some element of Marxism with virulent nationalism, have resulted from successive fragmentation of the radical left, frequently over minor ideological issues. They are concentrated primarily in West Bengal, long the center of Indian radical-ism, and Bombay. Most are weak and have little potential for significant growth. The Revolutionary Socialist Party, Forward Bloc, and Marxist Forward Bloc, all of which differ with the CPI primarily over that Party's subservience to the Soviet Union, have cooperated with the Communists during election campaigns and joint agitations in West Bengal where they are strongest. However, other branches of these parties have frequently opposed the Communists as, for example, in Kerala where the Revolutionary Socialists oppose the Communist government. The largest of these splinter leftist parties, the Peasants' and Workers' Party, limited primarily to Bombay State, cooperates with the CPI within the United Maharashtra Committee but has been careful to retain its independence. (Further details on these parties will be found in CHAPTER V, SECTION 53.)

At one time the Communists hoped to effect leftist unity among these radical parties, but such prospects appear to be diminishing. As the CPI has grown in strength, these small parties have become increasingly aware of their vulnerabilities, and they fear absorption by the Communists. As a result, they have become less amenable to close cooperation with the CPI, and there were reports in early 1959 that several were attempting to unite in order to prevent inroads by the Communists.

Despite its announced policy, the CPI has attempted on several occasions to enlist the support of regional communal parties or state or local branches of such organizations. The Communists' success in this effort has been limited (see below), although during 1958 there was a marked increase in cooperation between the CPI on the one hand and the Hindu extremist Jan Sangh and Hindu Mahasabha on the other hand in village, city, and district elections. The Communists have frequently supported Independent candidates in areas in which there was no Party nominee. In addition, Communists and fellow-travelers have occasionally contested as Independents in areas where the CPI label might be a handicap.

One of the major conflicts within the Communist Party in recent years has centered around its attitude toward the Congress Party. At the fourth Party Congress in April 1956 the CPI went farthest in its characterization of the split within the ruling party, describing its attitude toward the Congress Party in the following terms:

> Although the Congress is the political party of the *bourgeoisie*, which has taken many landlords into its fold, it has among its members a vast number of democratic elements. It has an anti-imperialist and democratic tradition . . . Our approach toward the Congress and the method of criticism of its political policies . . . have to be such as do not repel honest Congressmen but draw them toward unity. They have to be such as strengthen the forces that however haltingly, are taking a relatively progressive stand.

By 1958 the CPI had shifted to a position of more doctrinaire opposition to the Congress Party. The political resolution adopted at the special Party Congress in April of that year continued to refer to the "democratic forces in the Congress Party" and concluded that "there is common ground for united activity between the masses following the Congress and our Party." However, the major emphasis was on the growth of "right reaction" within the ruling party: "Increasingly isolated from the advanced democratic masses, corroded from within by dissensions and factional squabbles, the Congress Party is in a state of political and moral decline, in a state of chronic crisis . . . [Reactionary elements are] securing increasing grip over the Congress Party's organization, [and] the extreme right . . . cannot be defeated without a simultaneous battle, waged with determination and vigor, to defeat the antipeople policies of the Government" (i.e., the Congress Party).

The CPI reportedly hoped to conclude an electoral agreement with the Congress Party in Kerala in 1957, but these efforts were apparently rebuffed by leaders of that party. The Communists have never succeeded since Indian independence in reaching an electoral arrangement with the Congress Party on the national, state, or, so far as is known, local levels. They have, however, occasionally supported individual Congressmen (they covertly supported Defense Minister V. K. Krishna Menon for election to the *Lok Sabha* in 1957 against his opponent, a Praja Socialist running as a nominee of the United Maharashtra Committee).

2. The united front in election campaigns

a. 1951–52 — As the Party's tactical pattern for the 1951–52 general elections took shape, it became evident that the Communists would join forces with virtually any group. They directed their efforts mainly toward regional parties or local units of national opposition parties rather than toward these national parties themselves, presumably in an attempt to capitalize on the weak discipline within these groups and the political naivete of many local politicians. Communists attacked the national leaders of the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party, a Socialist group formed shortly before the elections by Acharya J. B. Kripalani, a former president of the Congress Party, but expressed their willingness to negotiate with "elements or individual leaders in the Praja Party or even with units of the Praja Party." Eventually the CPI reached agreement on the apportionment of seats with branches of this party in the Andhra and Malabar regions of Madras State.

The problem of contesting the elections was particularly acute for the Communists in two states, Travancore-Cochin and Hyderābād,* in which the Party was illegal. In Travancore-Cochin the CPI sponsored the formation of a United Front of Leftists including two other Marxist parties and a group of sympathetic independents. Members of the front captured 32 seats in the 108-member state assembly, of whom 25 eventually declared their Communist affiliations when the CPI became a legal party shortly after the elections. The United Front of Leftists was revived during the 1954 special elections in Travancore-Cochin, at which time it received cooperation from the PSP, but has since been inactive. In Hyderābād, the Communists were instrumental in forming the People's Democratic Front, an alliance of six local leftist parties, which won 42 seats in the 175-member state assembly. This organization survived until 1958 when it officially merged with the CPI.

Of even greater importance for the Communists' purposes was the network of bilateral agreements, usually limited to mutual support for each other's candidates, with a host of regional parties ranging from Marxist groups to the separatist Dravidian Federation, an anti-Brahmin and anti-north Indian party in Madras State. According to a report issued by the Central Committee after the elections, the CPI concluded agreements with the following local or minor parties: the Left Socialist Group in Bombay; the Forward Bloc (Marxist) in West Bengal, Bihār, and Orissa; the Kisan Party in Bombay and parts of Hyderābād; the Peasants' and Workers' Party in the city of Sholāpur, Bombay State; the Revolutionary Socialist Party in Uttar Pradesh; the Lal (Red) Communist Party in the Punjab; and the Dravidian Federation and Tamil Nad Toilers' Party in Madras. Although the Communists were disappointed over their inability to conclude agreements with a greater number of local units of national parties, their performance was nonetheless an impressive start in covering India with a web of united front agreements with regional organizations.

b. 1957 — The CPI formulated its strategy for the 1957 general elections well in advance. In July 1956, the Party issued an appeal to all left-wing parties to "come together on the basis of a mutually agreed minimum program around which can be drawn all patriotic forces opposed to the Congress Party." General Secretary Ajoy Ghosh set as the Party's major goal "breaking the monopoly position of the Congress Party" and toward this end he urged the adoption of a "flexible" united front policy suited to local conditions in each area, stating:

> Our general strategy is to make every effort to build up a united front whenever possible—otherwise an electoral alliance or adjustment, whichever is feasible. There is no harm in arriving at an unwritten agreement on distribution of seats where nothing else is possible.

As in 1951–52, the CPI directed its major efforts toward the Socialists and radical leftists, but it also attempted, without success, to conclude an agreement with the Akali Dal, a militant communal party among the Sikh community in Punjab State. In a published commentary on the results of the second general elections, the Central Committee noted that except in West Bengal and Bombay the Party's success in building "democratic unity" was "of a limited character and . . . mostly in the nature of local adjustments." According to the committee report, the CPI had electoral agreements with local units of the PSP in parts of Assam, Madras, and Punjab and had an adjustment with the Scheduled Castes Federation in the last-named state. In Uttar Pradesh and Bihār "only progressive individuals could be brought together in a united front, thanks to the antiunity attitude" of the Praja Socialist Party. The committee concluded that "tactics of united front were not followed by the Party with the required consistency and vigor in many states."

The Party's failure appreciably to extend its network of united fronts in 1957 was in part offset by its success in entering broad-based coalitions in West Bengal and Bombay. In West Bengal the major opposition to the Congress Party consisted of the United Leftist Election Committee (ULEC), an alliance of the "big five" leftist parties in the state: the CPI, Praja Socialist Party, Forward Bloc, Marxist Forward Bloc, and Revolutionary Socialist Party. Member parties agreed on a common minimum program and pledged support to each other's candidates, although they retained the right to campaign as individual parties. Members of the ULEC won 80 seats in the 256-member assembly, of which 46 were captured by Communists. This organization continued to cooperate in by-elections in the state until January 1959 when the Forward Bloc, with the support of the PSP, defected and entered a candidate against the CPI nominee.

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* These two states, as well as several others, ceased to exist following the reorganization of Indian state borders on a linguistic basis in November 1956. A major portion of Travancore-Cochin was incorporated in Kerala State, whereas Hyderābād was divided among Andhra Pradesh, Mysore, and Bombay.

The CPI participates in two united fronts in Bombay State organized before the elections to agitate for partition of the state between its two major linguistic components. The more important of these, the United Maharashtra Committee (UMC—*Samvukta Maharashtra Samiti*), was formed in late 1956 as a loosely knit alliance of opposition parties united solely by a desire for the establishment of a separate Marathi-speaking state. Component parties include three communal groups, the Jan Sangh, Hindu Mahasabha, and Scheduled Castes Federation and four leftist parties: the CPI, Praja Socialist Party, Peasants' and Workers' Party, and the Lal Nishan (Red Flag) Party. The UMC captured slightly more than 100 seats in the 392-member legislature, of which 19* were won by Communists. That the Communists profited from their participation in this organization is shown by the fact that the CPI held only two seats in the Bombay legislature before the elections. The UMC continues to function as a united bloc in the Bombay assembly on issues related to the movement to divide Bombay State, but owing to friction between the Communists and Praja Socialists the PSP National Executive directed its members in April 1957 to function "as a separate entity" on other matters.

The Gujarati People's Organization (GPO—*Mahagujarat Janata Parishad*), a pressure group organized in the Gujarati-speaking region of Bombay State in September 1956, has never been as influential or popular as the UMC. The GPO, which is supported by most opposition parties and independent politicians in the Gujarati region of Bombay, is not a coalition of political parties but rather has itself many of the attributes of a bona fide party. It enrolls members as individuals but does not object to their retention of membership in another party, and all GPO candidates contested the elections under the same election symbol. The GPO won a total of 28 seats in the Bombay assembly. Two of the successful candidates were reportedly Communists, the first Communists ever elected to a state body from this region.

The CPI has been unable to break the dominant position of the PSP in either of these organizations but has made definite gains in extending its organizational strength through association with these popular movements. Of particular significance, it has begun to expand in rural areas, whereas previously the CPI was limited almost entirely to Bombay City and a few other urban centers in the state. During 1958 the CPI launched an intensive drive to recruit additional Communists into the UMC in an attempt to capture local units. The results of these efforts are not known.

c. LOCAL — The Communists have also made every effort to form electoral alliances with other parties in local elections at the district, city, and village levels. Information on the success of this phase of the Communists' program is spotty, but it appears that the Party has had considerable success in some areas. Party labels frequently mean little in these campaigns in which local issues and personalities predominate. As a result, regional parties and local branches of national parties have been particularly amenable to cooperation with the CPI. The fragmentary data available on local elections are included under Parliamentary Role, below.

3. The united front in mass agitations

The second phase of the Communists' united front strategy—mass agitations on pressing local problems—has received increasing emphasis since the second general elections. In virtually every instance the Communists have appealed for, and frequently received, support from other opposition groups. Where leaders of other parties have rejected their overtures, the Communists have appealed directly to the members for cooperation. These agitations, which have on the whole been peaceful, have utilized the Gandhian techniques of passive resistance and courting arrest against the "antipeople" policies of the Congress Party-controlled state governments.

The political resolution adopted at the special Party Congress in April 1958 stressed the importance of "mass struggles and all-sided activities" in order to combat the "ever-growing attacks" on the people by "vested interests and the government." The resolution listed 15 subjects for "national" campaigns (presumably these can be augmented by local campaigns on local issues). Included in the subjects for nationwide agitations are "realization of the targets" of the five-year plan "in a democratic way"; "penetration of American capital"; the state governments' food policies; the need for "radical agrarian reforms"; corruption; "popularization of the achievements of the Kerala ministry"; and the refugee rehabilitation policies of the state governments.

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* Since some Communists contested as Independents, it is difficult to identify all Party members in the legislature. The figure is taken from published Communist sources and is believed to be substantially correct.

During 1958 the CPI launched or participated in multiparty agitations to protest against the shortage of basic foodstuffs in Delhi and in portions of Bihār, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Punjab. Agitations against the existing landholding system were conducted in Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, and Rājasthān. In Assam the Party continued a mass movement begun the previous year to ensure that the proposed G.O.I. oil refinery was constructed in that state. In the summer of 1958 the CPI was instrumental in reviving in West Bengal the Anti-Price Rise and Famine Relief Committee, originally formed in 1956 and including the Praja Socialists, CPI, and nine splinter leftist groups. In September this committee, headed by a Praja Socialist, launched a series of mass demonstrations designed to "impress upon the state government the need for relieving the distress of the people." The agitation ended after 11 days, when the Chief Minister agreed to increase the funds set aside for loans to peasants and establish all-party advisory committees on food distribution at various levels in the state. Approximately 4,000 persons, of whom an estimated one-half were Communists, were arrested during this period. In late 1958 the PSP withdrew from this committee owing to tactical differences with the other component parties. Other mass agitations in West Bengal during 1958 included a protest launched by the United Central Refugee Council, an alliance of all leftist parties except the PSP and Revolutionary Socialists, against the proposal to resettle Bengali refugees from East Pakistan in other states; a mass protest by leftist student groups against the proposed increase in tuition fees in several Calcutta colleges; and a strike of streetcar workers led by a joint committee of representatives of labor unions controlled by the Congress, PSP, and Communist parties. In most of these agitations the Communists, through their greater discipline and concerted use of their propaganda media and front groups, gained major credit for the concessions which were given.

D. Role in elections

1. CPI electorial strength and tactics

Since 1951, Communist Party leaders have devoted increasing attention to winning elections. However, elections are not viewed as an end in themselves but rather as a means through which to increase the Party's bargaining power and enhance its prospects for eventually forming a coalition national government. FIGURE 4–4, which appears at the end of this Section, shows by states and federal territories the percentage of the total vote polled by the CPI in all state and national elections since 1951. In this table, as in the case of other statistics cited in this Section, unless otherwise indicated, the 1951–52 election results and those for special state elections have been adjusted to correspond to the new state boundaries created in 1956. Thus, the same geographical areas are compared throughout.

On a nationwide basis, the Party doubled its vote between the first and second general elections, and in the 1957 campaign for the *Lok Sabha* it polled nearly 12,000,000 votes (9.9% of the total) at a time when Party membership stood at approximately 125,000. The Congress Party polled more than 57,000,000 votes (47.7%) in this election. The results of the two general elections are compared for the major Indian parties in FIGURE 4–2, under Reference Data. This table shows that all major political groups except the non-Communist left and Independents increased their percentage of the state assembly vote between 1951–52 and 1957. The CPI, with a 3.5% gain, registered the highest percentage increase, closely followed by the Congress Party (3.4%). The total vote for candidates of the democratic Socialist parties contesting for state assemblies declined by 1,000,000 between the 1951–52 and 1957 elections, whereas the CPI vote increased by more than 4,000,000. The percentage of votes polled by the Socialists declined in 11 states, remained constant in one, and increased only in Assam, while the CPI gained electoral support in 12 of the 13 states. The Socialist and Communist vote in the two general elections is compared in FIGURE 4–3, under Reference Data.

The CPI, in contesting elections, is bound by the same legal provisions as those applying to other parties, and it does not appear that Indian election laws affect the Party's performance. The Communist Party does benefit from the provision that any party polling more than 3% of the total national vote is recognized as a "national" party, i.e., it is granted a uniform election symbol which appears on its ballot boxes in all states to aid the illiterate voter in identifying the party of his choice. However, this provision also works to the advantage of the PSP and Jan Sangh which, together with the CPI and Congress Party, constitute the four officially recognized "national" parties.

Group voting is a common occurrence in India, and the personal choice of a candidate by the individual voter is limited by existing traditions and social patterns. Caste unity and ties to religion, family, and the native village are undergoing fairly rapid changes, particularly in urban areas, where the Communists have capitalized on the existing state of social flux to attract supporters. However, at the village level the choice of a party or candidate is still frequently advised, if not dictated, by the village headman, caste leader, or elder of a joint family. Since these local leaders frequently have a vested interest in the status quo and tend to be conservative by nature, this practice probably redounds to the benefit of the Congress Party and helps to explain the Communists' failure to improve their electoral position appreciably among the peasantry in many regions. However, the Communists' victory in 1957 in Kerala, the most literate of Indian states, indicates that this traditional loyalty system can be disrupted, even in rural areas.

In attempting to increase its electoral appeal, the CPI has followed several procedures which differ from those of other opposition parties. It has concentrated its resources where its strength and potentialities are greatest, whereas most other parties enter candidates in every possible constituency, an approach which not only spreads their propaganda resources too thinly but also cuts into their finances, since candidates for state assemblies and the *Lok Sabha* must deposit 250 and 500 rupees (US$53 and $106), respectively. These deposits are forfeited if the candidate fails to poll at least one-sixth of the total vote in his constituency. In the 1957 campaign nearly 25% of the Communist candidates for the *Lok Sabha* were elected, whereas only 10.1% of the Praja Socialists and 3.1% of the Jan Sangh nominees won. Forty-six candidates from each of these other parties lost their deposits. The Communists base their campaigns on pressing local problems and have not dissipated their energies discussing political ideologies or international affairs, neither of which is of particular interest to the vast majority of the electorate. Communist Party workers have tended to remain in a particular village for weeks or months in order to become identified with the villagers' needs, whereas workers for most other parties usually spend only a day or two in a particular village. The Communists have also employed numerous tricks to gain votes. One of the most effective—although this may eventually backfire on the Party in the case of Kerala—was to ask landless peasants to stake out that portion of the landlord's property they would like to have when the Communists come to power.

Since the population of India is approximately 80% illiterate and political parties are denied extensive use of the government-controlled radio, campaigning is conducted primarily through mass rallies, processions, and house-to-house contacts. In the first two methods the Congress Party has been more successful than its rivals, but the Communists have a decided edge in individual contacts. In many states the CPI has an extensive network of local "volunteer" workers who carry the Communist message to the voters and, even more importantly, get out the vote on election day. The CPI has supplemented its other activities by corrupt practices where possible, but it probably has not improved its relative position by these tactics. Local units of virtually all Indian parties have resorted to false registration and purchase of votes. That the Congress Party would profit most by these methods is suggested by the fact that its financial resources are greater than those of other parties.

2. Techniques employed in major election campaigns

The Communist Party was largely isolated at the end of World War II owing to its wartime collaboration with the British. It used the 1945–46 provincial assembly elections—the first in which it participated as a legal party—to test its popular appeal and to regain respectability. Although the CPI hoped to conclude a popular front agreement with the Congress Party or Muslim League, its overtures were rebuffed. The CPI thus contested alone on an election manifesto designed to appeal to regional particularism and to enlist the support of workers, peasants, middlemen, and employers.

Only 8 Communists were elected for the 1,585 provincial assembly seats, and 7 of the Party's victorious candidates were in constituencies reserved for representatives of labor. The CPI polled 666,723 votes (2.5% of the total) and emerged as the third-ranking party, albeit a poor third, in popular vote behind the Congress Party and Muslim League. This was, however, a creditable achievement considering the fact that only about 14% of the adult population was enfranchised, the primary qualifications being based on property and income.

The Communist Party's moderate tactical line was first effectively employed in the 1951–52 general elections, held from October 1951 through February 1952, to select members of the state legislative assemblies and the central *Lok Sabha*. The Communists' election manifesto for this campaign promised something for each of the four classes. It promised land for the peasant, better wages for laborers, greater benefits for the middle class, and concessions for the "national *bourgeoisie*." The manifesto contained a clear call for establishment of a united front in order to "develop a powerful mass movement which alone can break the power of those who rule over us all." The united fronts concluded by the Communists in these elections are discussed above under The United Front in Election Campaigns.

The CPI concentrated its efforts in those areas in which it had a reasonable prospect for success. Excluding their front parties, the Communists entered only 49 candidates for the *Lok Sabha,* of whom 16 (34.5%) were successful; only 9 Communists forfeited their electoral deposits. By contrast, the Indian Socialist Party entered 256 candidates but elected only 12 (4.7% of the party's nominees); 103 Socialists lost their deposits. In addition to the 16 Communists elected to the *Lok Sabha* under the CPI label, an additional 7 were elected by the People's Democratic Front in Hyderābād, and 2 Independents elected by the United Front of Leftists in Travancore-Cochin later revealed their Communist affiliations. With 25 of the 489 elected seats in the *Lok Sabha,* the CPI emerged as the largest single opposition party. Three of the successful Communist candidates were underground, and five others were in prison during the campaign. Charges against these eight were withdrawn shortly after the elections, when the CPI became a legal party in all states.

In assembly elections, the Communists achieved several notable successes, emerging as the principal opposition party in Madras State, Hyderābād, Travancore-Cochin, and West Bengal. The Party also won a scattering of seats in Orissa and Punjab and made a strong showing in Tripura, a small federally administered territory located along India's border with East Pakistan. The four southern states (Madras, Travancore-Cochin, Hyderābād, and Mysore) accounted for 74% of the Communists' seats in the *Lok Sabha;* the Party showed particular strength throughout Travancore-Cochin (now a part of Kerala State); in Warangal and Nālgonda districts of Hyderābād, center of the abortive Telengana uprising; and in six districts of Madras: Tanjore (now in Madras State), Malabar (now in Kerala), East Godāvari, West Godāvari, Krishna, and Guntūr (the last four districts form a contiguous area in what is now Andhra Pradesh). Contributing causes for the Communists' success in this region were the prevalence of strong regional sensitivities, widespread factionalism and corruption within the Congress Party, and stringent economic conditions.

Evaluating the election results, the Central Committee of the CPI noted that the Party's performance was best where it had less mass struggles "in the face of terror and repression" (e.g., the Telengana region of Hyderābād State), where it had succeeded in attracting substantial support from the peasants, and where it had made effective use of the "national" factor, i.e., appeals to linguistic particularism. The Central Committee also noted the success of the Party's "flexible" united front tactics.

Although these elections revealed substantial support for the CPI, they also indicated two major areas of weakness—an industrial area, containing Bombay City, and a belt stretching from Bombay to Calcutta through the central portion of India. In the states of Bombay, Rājasthān, Uttar Pradesh, and Bihār—four states which contain approximately 40% of the total Indian population—the Party elected only one candidate to a state assembly and none to the *Lok Sabha.* The CPI's performance in the 1951–52 and 1957 general elections is compared in FIGURE 4–2, under Reference Data.

By 1957 the CPI had gained considerable sophistication in parliamentary activity and election campaigns. It had participated in the 1951–52 general elections, in special state elections in Travancore-Cochin and in the Patiāla and East Punjab States' Union in 1954 and Andhra in 1955, and in numerous local government elections. It began preparations for the 1957 campaign earlier than other parties, and it was effectively campaigning while most parties were still selecting their candidates and formulating their election strategies. The Party's efforts were directed primarily towards defeating the Congress Party in as many constituencies as possible and, if possible, forming "alternative governments" in one or more states. Writing shortly before the elections, CPI General Secretary Ajoy Ghosh said, "All our efforts in the election should be directed toward breaking the monopoly position of the Congress Party." Ghosh recommended that the Party avoid entering candidates in "all senseless contests" and concentrate on electing Communists in areas where the Party was strong and forming united fronts elsewhere. To coordinate the Party's efforts, P. C. Joshi was given responsibility for conducting the campaign in north India and E. M. S. Namboodiripad, who later assumed office as Chief Minister of Kerala, directed Party activities in the south.

The CPI election manifesto issued in January 1957 denounced the central government's internal policies in strong terms, criticizing its "half-hearted measures for agrarian reforms," its inability to resolve the food shortage, and its failure to root out "blackmarketing, profiteering, and corruption." The government was dubbed a "repressive apparatus" which follows "antipeople policies" and crushes "every manifestation of popular resistance." Tribute was paid in the manifesto to "progressive" features of India's foreign policy, but the CPI attempted to arrogate credit for these policies by stating that "this is precisely the orientation for which the Communist Party of India, in alliance with other patriotic and democratic forces, fought." In addition to demanding equal rights for women, increased benefits for refugees and scheduled castes and tribes, and better emoluments for the armed forces and police, the manifesto strongly reflected the four-class approach, as shown by the following excerpts:

> A national minimum wage should be fixed, and workers should be assisted to secure fair wages in all organized industries. Pending such fixation, an immediate increase of 25% should be granted to workers on the basis of already increased productivity of labor.
>
> The Communist Party demands that the slogan of land to the tiller should be implemented without any further procrastination or delay. Further, there must be substantial reduction of the burden of rent and taxes.
>
> The middle class has a special role to play in the rebuilding of the nation. But it is denied the necessary opportunities and is tormented by growing unemployment and economic difficulties. The Party will fight for expansion of employment and other opportunities so that the economic distress of this class is relieved and its talent and potentialities are fully tapped for the rejuvenation of the country.
>
> The Communist Party recognizes that in the present stage of our development, patriotic-minded Indian capitalists can make an important contribution towards the economic development of our country. The Party desires that Indian industrialists should be protected against foreign competition, that all legitimate rights of the capitalists should be ensured, and that their active cooperation should be secured for implementation of the plan of national reconstruction.

The results of the 1957 state assembly elections are portrayed graphically in FIGURE 4–1, for the four parties recognized as national parties by the election commission and for minor parties and Independents. No results are shown for Jammu and Kashmīr since polling was not held until later and since the CPI does not function openly. The most spectacular result of the second general elections was the Communist success in Kerala where the Party won 60 of the 126 elected seats in the state assembly and increased its percentage of the total vote from 17 in 1951–52 to nearly 35. However, the CPI also registered notable gains in West Bengal, where it captured 46 seats in the 256-member Legislative Assembly, and in Bombay State, where participation in the United Maharashtra Committee and Gujarati People's Organization enabled the Communists to increase their legislative strength from one seat in the 1951–52 elections to 21. In the first general elections, more than half the total Communist vote was polled in Andhra Pradesh and Madras. In 1957 these two states accounted for only 35% of the Communist vote, and a higher proportion than in 1951–52 was polled in states in which local Party units had previously been weak or virtually nonexistent. The following tabulation compares by percentages the geographical distribution of the total Communist vote in the two general elections. The percentages given for Andhra Pradesh include the vote polled by the People's Democratic Front in both elections, and the 1957 figures include the results for the 1955 special elections in the Andhra region:

	1951–52	1957
STATES		
Andhra Pradesh	*38.6*	*28.7*
Assam	*1.2*	*1.6*
Bihār	*1.8*	*4.4*
Bombay	*2.6*	*5.1*
Kerala	*14.4*	*16.6*
Madhya Pradesh	*0.7*	*1.0*
Madras	*13.7*	*6.6*
Mysore	*1.4*	*1.2*
Orissa	*3.5*	*2.8*
Punjab	*4.7*	*8.1*
Rājasthān	*0.4*	*1.1*
Uttar Pradesh	*2.6*	*6.7*
West Bengal	*13.4*	*15.0*
FEDERAL TERRITORIES		
Himachal Pradesh	...	*insig*
Manipur	*0.1*	*0.2*
Tripura	*0.9*	*0.9*

The CPI improved its showing in 1957 among industrial workers in most regions of India, particularly in Bombay, Bihār, and West Bengal, but remained comparatively weak in rural areas. In comparison with its performance in southern and eastern India, the Party continued to make a relatively poor showing in the "Hindi belt." Although the Party improved its position in Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Bihār states over its showing in 1951–52, it polled only 1.8% of the total vote in Madhya Pradesh, 3.8% in Uttar Pradesh, and 5.3% in Bihār (see FIGURE 4–4, under Reference Data). The geographical distribution of CPI votes in the 1957 assembly elections is shown in FIGURE 4–7, a map appearing at the end of this Section. Wherever possible these results are shown by districts. For Bombay and Madhya Pradesh, where district results are not available, results are shown for the various historical "regions" which were merged to form these integrated states. Although two Party members were reportedly elected in the Gujarat area of Bombay State, no CPI vote is shown in this region since these candi-


PIE TOTALS ARE IN THOUSANDS
Pie Segments are Percentages
21,470
20.4
9.3
9.8
14.3
3.8
42.4
Uttar Pradesh
7,546
22.4
6.5
8.7
1.3
13.4
47.7
Punjab
847
31.2
41.3
7.8
3.9
15.8
Federal Territories
(1)—Himachal Pradesh
(2)—Manipur
(3)—Tripura
Jammu and Kashmir
(1)
(1)
Delhi
6,681
17.9
12.3
10.6
11.3
1.8
51.1
Madhya Pradesh
1,349
12.8
23.7
16.1
5.3
47.1
Bihār
2,498
16.7
8.6
13.4
8.4
57.9
Assam
Sikkim
(2)
(3)
4,744
30.7
13.2
5.5
2.5
3.0
45.1
Rājasthān
16,507
11.3
27.2
8.9
3.8
48.8
Bombay
10,470
12.6
13.5
9.8
17.9
46.2
West Bengal
4,271
11.3
31.6
10.5
8.3
38.3
Orissa
GOA (Port.)
12,260
13.3
10.1
5.6
29.4
41.6
Andhra Pradesh
6,354
22.0
9.6
14.0
2.4
52.0
Mysore
6,017
7.4
7.8
10.4
34.7
39.7
Kerala
11,130
19.0
25.6
2.6
7.5
45.3
Madras
Percentage of Votes Polled by Major Parties and Groups
Congress
Communist Party of India
Praja Socialist Party
Jan Sangh
Minor Parties
Independents

NOTE:
Andhra Pradesh figures are combined totals for 1955 special elections in the Andhra region and 1957 general elections in Telengana.
Results for all other states are from the 1957 elections.

FIGURE 4–1. PERCENTAGE OF VOTES POLLED BY MAJOR PARTIES IN THE 1957 INDIAN STATE ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS

dates contested as nominees of the Gujarati People's Organization, and their constituencies cannot be identified. A more detailed breakdown of the CPI vote by districts is included in FIGURE 4–6 appearing at the end of this Section. This table lists the CPI vote, by totals and percentages, for all districts in which the Party polled more than 10% of the total vote.

The Communists lost legislative strength only in two states. In the Telengana region of Andhra Pradesh (assembly elections were not held in the remainder of that state in 1957) it dropped from 36 seats in the first general elections to 22, although the CPI continued to poll approximately one-fourth the total vote. The Communists' inability to win additional seats in this area resulted from factionalism within the CPI and from the Party's inability to conclude an electoral agreement with the Socialists. In Madras State, CPI representation declined from 13 to 4 owing to the existence of an effective Congress Party machine, the enactment shortly before the elections of a bill reducing rents for tenant farmers, and crystallization of anti-Congress sentiment behind the separatist Dravidian Progressive Federation.

The CPI strengthened its position in the central *Lok Sabha,* capturing 29 of the 494 seats for which elections were held and polling nearly 12,000,000 votes. Once again it emerged as the largest opposition party in the house, although it is still overshadowed by the Congress Party which won 371 seats. Analyzing its performance following the elections, the Central Committee attributed the Party's gains to: 1) the increased "political maturity" and "seething discontent" of the people; 2) the popularity of the "mass struggles and campaigns" led by the Party, and the adoption of "realistic" and "flexible" united front tactics; 3) the "advance of the world Communist movement and of the ideas of socialism"; 4) the increases in Party activity among laborers; and 5) the fact that the Party's "propaganda was much superior to that of the Congress Party." The Communist Party demonstrated in these elections that it is capable of capitalizing on the ruling party's shortcomings and that under existing conditions it retains a potential for future growth.

E. Parliamentary role

India is a union of states ruled by a strong central government which, under the constitution, retains all residual powers. The bicameral Parliament includes an upper house, the *Rajya Sabha* (Council of States), which is indirectly elected by the state legislatures, has restricted functions, and is a continuing body since approximately one-third of its members retire every two years. This house furnishes another forum for CPI propaganda and gives the Party an opportunity to make up for chances missed during debates in the lower house. The more important *Lok Sabha,* which is directly elected for a term of five years—although it may be dissolved earlier by the Indian President acting on advice from the Prime Minister—has been the target of most Communist parliamentary activities during recent years. However, although the Communists have effectively utilized this house as a propaganda forum, they have been unable, in view of the smallness of their parliamentary bloc, appreciably to influence national policies.

The CPI has been more effective in influencing legislation or policies on the state level since it has considerable strength in several assemblies and since these bodies are more responsive than Parliament to internal or extralegislative pressures. However, the state legislatures, which may be either bicameral or unicameral (Kerala falls into the latter category), have limited and clearly defined functions. Central control over the states is assured by the fact that the states are not financially self-sufficient and that the central government has the power to supersede any state government and impose "President's rule" if the national interest requires such action. Local administration, which is under the control of the various state governments, is rudimentary in most parts of India. Village *panchayats* (councils) have been revived only recently in most states and have functions which are not yet clearly evolved. Village self-government is handicapped by a lack of funds, excessive governmental control, and the absence of expert guidance and staff. In addition, many villagers are apathetic toward local administration, and party loyalties are frequently lax at the local level. These conditions have aided the Communists' attempt to gain a foothold in local government in some parts of India.

Before the second general elections, parliamentary activity was viewed by the Communists as an important but nonetheless ancillary weapon to broaden the base of CPI support, presumably in preparation for a seizure of power by other means. Although efforts to form united fronts continue to take precedence over CPI actions in Parliament, the Party's success in Kerala State in the 1957 elections demonstrated that parliamentary activity could, in itself, be a direct means to power. This development strengthened "rightist" sentiment within the CPI. Kerala is now one of the main fronts in the Communists' struggle for power in India.

Despite their increased emphasis on parliamentary activity during recent years, the Communists have never camouflaged their distrust of "bourgeois" parliamentary institutions in India or their basic belief that these institutions must be substantially altered before they can serve the people. Bhupesh Gupta, leader of the Communist bloc in the *Rajya Sabha*, wrote in an article in the July 1958 issue of the *New Age* (monthly):

> The *bourgeoisie* in general and the Congress Party in particular want to make out that Parliament is above classes—a kind of supraclass institution . . . It should be our task, in our ideological propaganda, to lay bare the real character of Parliament and its serious limitations. The danger of parliamentary illusions is not always properly recognized; sometimes loose talks about "parliamentary path" tend almost to idolize the *bourgeoisie* as the revisionists do. Yet the reality is that without combatting these illusions, we can never look forward to any fundamental change of our bourgeois parliamentary institutions so that they become genuine instruments of service to the masses and for social transformation.

1. Parliament

Eight Communists were elected to provincial legislatures in the 1945–46 elections, and one Party member, Somnath Lahiri, was elected indirectly to the Constituent Assembly. Lahiri's performance in the assembly was bombastic, but Communist representation in state and national legislatures was too small at this time to make a noticeable impact. It was not until the first general elections that the CPI devoted significant attention to its parliamentary strategy. The 25 Communist MP's who took their seats in May 1952 were distinguishable from their parliamentary colleagues primarily by their youth. Fifty-eight percent of the Communist members were under 40 years of age, compared with 27% for the Congress Party and 38% for the Socialists. They also differed from other MP's in their almost total lack of previous legislative experience. Ninety-six percent of the Communist MP's had never before served in a national or state legislature, whereas only 49% of the Congressmen and 76% of the Socialists were new to legislative work.

Since Communists formed the largest opposition bloc in the *Lok Sabha*, the CPI requested recognition as the official opposition party during the early days of the first session. This claim was rejected by the Speaker on the grounds that the CPI lacked the requisite number of seats to qualify for recognition as a "parliamentary party." The Speaker did, however, recognize the Communists as a "parliamentary group"* and permitted A.K. Gopalan, then Communist leader in the *Lok Sabha*, to occupy the seat which would normally be allocated to the leader of the opposition. This situation continued after the second general elections, in which CPI representation in the *Lok Sabha* rose to 29, and there is still no official opposition party although the Communists form the largest single non-Congress party. Communist representation in the less important and indirectly elected upper house, the 232-member *Rajya Sabha* (Council of States), stood at 12 in 1952 and at 14 in 1958.

a. ORGANIZATION FOR ACTIVITY IN PARLIAMENT — The CPI is the most elaborately and effectively organized of all parliamentary groups. Party tactics in both houses are formulated by a Parliamentary Executive Committee, under the leadership of Bhupesh Gupta. According to a resolution adopted at the Party Congress at Amritsar in April 1958:

> On major political issues, the Central Executive Committee and the Secretariat will guide the Parliamentary Executive Committee, which shall be responsible for all parliamentary work, including discipline of MP's.

Information is not available on the exact functions of the Parliamentary Executive Committee, but they are believed similar to those of the former Subcommittee on Parliamentary Affairs which guided the Party's parliamentary activities before the Amritsar congress. The work of this subcommittee was described in *New Age* (monthly) in September 1957 as follows:

> It will be the task of the subcommittee to give, in close touch with the Politburo, broad political guidance to the parliamentary group and, in certain cases, also discuss organizational and other practical questions in connection with the work in the Parliament and take necessary decisions

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* According to the rules of procedure in the *Lok Sabha*, three qualifications are regarded as necessary before a party can be officially recognized as a parliamentary party: a number of members equal to a quorum of the House (50), a unity of ideology and program, and the possession of an organization outside as well as inside Parliament. By these tests, only the Congress Party is eligible for recognition. The distinction between a "parliamentary party" and a "group"—a distinction which has been carried over from the preindependence Central Assembly—is somewhat vague. Both are considered equal from the point of view of opportunities to speak on the floor, and both are allotted blocks of seats in the chamber. The major differences, however, are two: only "parties" are given office space in Parliament House, and "groups" have only an undefined and limited right to be consulted on important issues of policy.

> on them. Final decisions on all major political questions shall, however, be taken in consultation with the Politburo.

Party leaders in the two houses of Parliament were given discretionary responsibility to set CPI policy "when decisions have to be taken in regard to any matter immediately on the floor of the house." However, such a decision was subject to review by the Politburo. Thus, the Party's organization for parliamentary activity is similar to its general organizational structure; effective control is vested in a small group at the top.

The Communist group in Parliament is well informed and has been able to marshal extensive factual data during debates. Their preparation is aided by the use of Party channels (the CPI Secretariat frequently requests state branches to supply data on police firings and other local developments) and through the assistance of the Research Bureau. This bureau, which is located in the Communist Parliamentary Office in New Delhi, employs five full-time workers and is organized on subject lines (labor, land reforms, budgetary matters, and so forth). The Research Bureau also aids coordination between the Communists' parliamentary front and other Party activities since it services the Party as a whole. Coordination of parliamentary and nonparliamentary efforts is further aided by the presence of numerous top Party organizational leaders in Parliament. Five of the eight members of the CPI Secretariat are MP's, and an additional 6 of the 25 Central Executive Committee members sit in Parliament. The CPI contingent in the *Lok Sabha* was led during 1957 and 1958 by S. A. Dange, member of the Party Secretariat and general secretary of the Communist-controlled All-India Trade Union Congress. There were reports toward the end of 1958 that he might be removed from this position owing to his failure on occasion to clear his plans with the Party high command. A. K. Gopalan, member of the Secretariat and a leader of the CPI peasant front, now functions as deputy leader in this house. Party affairs in the upper house are directed by Bhupesh Gupta.

The CPI exercises strict control over Party members in both houses of Parliament. According to a report in 1952, they are housed in a common hostel in New Delhi. Communist MP's are reported to mix freely with non-Communists in the lobbies of Parliament, but to maintain a clannish aloofness outside. Their duties and obligations are clearly spelled out, and all Communist MP's are expected to devote full time to parliamentary activities when Parliament is in session. A "Directive to Communist MP's" adopted by the Politburo in July 1957 imposes the following requirements on the Party's representatives in Parliament:

> (1) It will be the task of Communist members of Parliament to carry out the line of the Party inside the Parliament and they must speak and function in absolute conformity with the Party line.
>
> (2) The attendance in the House must be regarded as the most elementary duty of every Communist member of Parliament . . . They must not absent themselves from Parliament without the prior approval of the group of the CC (Central Committee) subcommittee. Discipline in this respect must be strictly enforced.
>
> (3) All our comrades in Parliament must be active on the floor of the House and otherwise.
>
> (4) Our MP comrades must divide up the various subjects for systematic study amongst themselves.
>
> (5) In both their public and private life the Communist MP's must practice simplicity and avoid all showiness and extravagance which are often a concomitant of bourgeois parliament life.
>
> (6) Communist MP's must pay Party levies regularly and without any default. These levies should be regarded as the first charge on their earnings.

b. TACTICS — The Communists entered the *Lok Sabha* in 1952 with little advance preparation but with a determination to use parliamentary institutions to further their own objectives. In this they have been successful within the limits provided by the parliamentary forum. In using Parliament to advance their propaganda and exert pressure the Communists have taken full advantage of parliamentary procedures as they have evolved in India. Three practices have been of particular benefit: 1) Proceedings in both houses of Parliament normally begin with a "question hour" during which ministers answer written queries forwarded in advance by members. Their answers may be followed by "supplementaries"—oral questions pursuing the same subject. This procedure gives the opposition a frequent opportunity to challenge and, if possible, embarrass the government. Communists have posed a number of queries far in excess of their proportional strength in Parliament. One Communist MP—Hirendra Nath Mukerjee—enjoyed the distinction of asking more questions than any other member during the 1952–56 Parliament. 2) Parliamentary rules of procedures provide that "adjournment motions" may be introduced to postpone scheduled business before the house and to undertake immediate discussion of an urgent matter. Communists introduced half of the 122 adjournment motions made during the 1952–56 Parliament. These dealt primarily with public disturbances or disasters in which some government fault could be alleged. A Party publication observed that "thanks to the eccentricities of parliamentary procedure, almost all of [the Communists' adjournment motions] were refused permission by the Chair. In spite of such refusal, however, we usually succeeded in forcing some discussion and a shakeup in the government's complacence." 3) Under another rule of procedure, an MP can demand a half-hour discussion on a "matter of public importance" which has elicited an answer in Parliament that is unsatisfactory or needs further elucidation. During the 1952–56 Parliament, Communists were responsible for 19 of the 34 half-hour discussions on such issues. Another rule provides for discussions of matters of public importance for a short period, but longer than a half-hour; of the 37 debates conducted under this procedure during the first Parliament, the CPI initiated 10 and participated in most of the others.

During their first few years in Parliament, the Communists frequently adopted dramatic postures to call attention to their cause, particularly in the lower house. They repeatedly accused the *Lok Sabha* Speaker of partiality and occasionally walked out of the chamber in protest against his rulings or against "reactionary" governmental policies. In addition, the Speaker often found it necessary to take Communist MP's to task for their unparliamentary behavior. One Communist member, K. Anandan Nambiar, had the dubious distinction of being the only MP ever forcibly ejected from the *Lok Sabha* for his conduct.

The Party's propaganda approach was set early in the first session when A. K. Gopalan called the President's inaugural address setting forth the government's program, "a declaration of war against the Indian people." During the next few years Communists in Parliament followed a characteristically negative policy. Their prime objective was to "expose" the government by playing up its "antipeople" policies, by championing popular grievances, and by introducing impossible legislation solely for its propaganda value. In July 1952, four years before the linguistic reorganization of Indian states, they demanded "immediate steps to distribute the states on a linguistic basis." In August 1953, they recommended that 500,000,000 rupees (about US$107,000,000) be appropriated to supply free rations to unemployed laborers during the following six months. They demanded revision of Indian policy to combat "Anglo-American imperialism" and charged that "Anglo-American spies [are coming to India] in the guise of experts, advisers, Ford Foundation and other institutional representatives, botanists and zoologists, geographers and explorers, and so on and so forth."

In 1955 the Communists in Parliament adopted a somewhat milder line in accordance with the Party's increased emphasis on moderation and its revised tactical view of Prime Minister Nehru. Since that time they have seldom showed open disrespect for parliamentary institutions and conventions and have tended to act more like a bona fide opposition. Walkouts have become less frequent, and the Speaker has found it less necessary to call the Communists to task for their behavior on the floor of the two houses.

The Communists claim credit for all "progressive" measures adopted by the Government of India, but it is unlikely that their small contingent in Parliament has had an appreciable effect on basic national policies. They rightly claim credit for certain administrative changes and minor shifts. Their activity in Parliament led directly to discontinuance of the practice of flying the British flag over Parliament House on certain holidays and to the withdrawal of facilities given the British for the recruitment of Gurkha troops on Indian soil. However, their major campaigns—against the acceptance of U.S. aid, against the Commonwealth link, for land reforms, and for spectacular measures to end unemployment—have failed to influence national policy, although in many cases they have been successful propaganda gambits. It is not likely that the Communists, given the present administrative structure in India and the fact that they have only 29 members in the *Lok Sabha,* aspire to make or importantly influence policy. Rather, Parliament to the Communists is merely one more propaganda medium and one more method of convincing the people that the present government is not oriented toward their best interests. In the classical Leninist context, they believe that participation in these institutions helps "to prove to the backward masses why such parliaments deserve to be dispersed; it helps their successful dispersal, and helps to make bourgeois parliamentarianism politically obsolete."

2. Kerala State

CPI control over the Kerala government (as of March 1959) may be better understood when viewed against a background of the political and social composition of the state and the factors in Kerala that have given the Communists their strength. One of the smallest and most unstable of Indian states, Kerala was formed in November 1956 under the linguistic reorganization scheme by merging two Malayalam-speaking regions, the former Travancore-Cochin State and the Malabar district of Madras. Both regions have histories of political instability, poverty, and regional-communal conflict. Travancore-Cochin established a record in India by having five separate ministries between 1949, when the state was formed by merging two former princely states, and March

1956, when the governmental machinery broke down completely, necessitating direct central government rule over the state. Each ministry contained a delicate balance of competitive regional and religious interests which survived, on the average, only slightly more than one year. Four of these ministries were formed by the Congress Party, and the fifth was organized by the Praja Socialists—the first PSP state government in India. Thus, at the time of the 1957 elections both these parties had demonstrated their inability to rule Travancore-Cochin effectively. Malabar district was equally unstable. The Congress Party won only 5 out of the 31 state assembly seats from this region in the 1951–52 general elections, whereas the socialists captured 11, and the Communists 7 seats.

Kerala's political instability stems from sociological and economic factors. Greatly overpopulated, with an average of 907 inhabitants per square mile, Kerala is the most densely populated state in India (the all-India average in 1951 was 281), and this density approaches 3,000 per square mile in the narrow cultivable coastal belt. Economic opportunities under the state's agricultural economy are totally inadequate for the rapidly expanding population. As a result, unemployment and underemployment are the highest in India. According to a statement by the Travancore-Cochin Finance Minister in 1956, only 44 out of every 100 men over the age of 15 are regularly employed; 31 have partial employment, and the remaining 25 are completely without gainful work. Kerala is also the most literate state in India owing primarily to the enlightened administration of the former princely rulers and to the activities of Christian missionaries; nearly 50% of the populace is literate, compared with an all-India average of less than 20%, and unemployment is of particular political import in Kerala among this educated group. Finally, the Kerala populace is divided into three large communal (religious) groups—Hindus, Christians, and Muslims—and into three regional segments—inhabitants of Travancore, Cochin, and Malabar. Deep-seated regional and communal cross-currents among these various factions have detracted from homogeneity in the democratic political parties in the state and from the ability of the successive governments in the regions which now comprise Kerala to deal effectively with the endemic problems of the area.

The Communist Party was first organized in the Kerala region during the period 1936–37 by former members of the Socialist wing of the Congress Party. It made considerable headway, particularly in Malabar, during World War II, when most of the Congress Party leaders were in prison. In 1946 it received a substantial boost in Travancore as a result of its participation in the Punnambra-Vayalar uprising which was designed to liberate the state from the Maharaja and his dictatorial *dewan* (adviser), Sir C. P. Ramaswamy Aiyer. The *dewan* ruthlessly suppressed the attempt, jailed the top Party leaders, and outlawed the CPI, a ban which lasted until 1952. However, the Communists turned this temporary defeat to their advantage. Many people in the state were impressed by their tactic of "direct action" which was in marked contrast to the do-nothing policies of the Congress Party in the state during this period. While the Party was banned, those CPI leaders who were free concentrated with considerable success on spreading the Communist line among the peasantry, and the Party was ready for the first general elections in 1951–52 which it fought covertly. When the ban on the CPI was removed following the elections, 25 members of the 108-member legislature who had been elected as Independents revealed their membership in the Communist Party.

Party membership in Kerala (56,000 according to official Party figures in February 1958) is the highest in India. The CPI's main supporters are industrial and agricultural laborers. On a communal basis its hard-core followers are primarily Ezhavas and Thiyyas (low-caste Hindus) and to a lesser extent members of the Scheduled Castes (outcastes). The Party is particularly active on the labor front, and it controls one of the largest trade union federations in the state. On a regional basis, the CPI is strongest in Qilon district, especially among laborers, and in the Malabar region, where it has attracted support among the peasantry. The CPI is the best organized and most efficiently operated party in Kerala, and it has been the most effective in appealing to the populace. Nearly all of its top leaders are excellent speakers and persuasive writers in English and Malayalam. In addition, the Party controls directly three excellent Malayalam newspapers and one English weekly which carry its message to the literate.

Although the CPI did not expect to win a majority in Kerala in the 1957 general elections, it went all out to make a creditable showing and to ensure that it at least emerged as the largest opposition group in the state assembly. The Party mobilized its excellent village structure behind the campaign, entered a record number of candidates, and began its campaign far earlier than other parties. Moreover, whereas the other all-India parties campaigned on the national platforms issued by their respective party headquarters, the CPI issued a separate election manifesto for Kerala advancing a comprehensive program designed to appeal to all low-income groups in the state. It promised *inter alia* immediate redistribution of land, imposition of a ceiling on income from land, substantial reduction in the rents paid by tenant farmers, and a 25% across-the-board wage boost for laborers. Although this platform won votes for the CPI, the exaggerated hopes it aroused have returned to plague the Communist state ministry.

The extent of the Party's success in these elections surprised even the Communists. The Party increased its popular vote from 17% in 1952 to 34.7% and captured 60 of the 126 elected assembly seats. This substantial gain was partially a protest vote against continuing poverty, land scarcity, and unemployment and against the successive failures of the Congress Party and Praja Socialists to improve conditions in the state, but it was also a tribute to the organizational ability and intra-party discipline of the CPI, which succeeded in channeling these frustrations to further its own ends.

By enlisting the support of five Independents who were elected with Communist support, the CPI achieved a slim legislative majority, and a Communist-dominated ministry was installed in office on April 5, 1957. The 11-member cabinet includes 9 Communists and 2 of the fellow-traveling Independents. Although lacking in governmental experience, the cabinet is a high-powered body including most top CPI leaders in Kerala. It is ably led by E. M. S. Namboodiripad, a Brahmin, a member at that time of the CPI Politburo, and one of the top theoreticians within the Party. This electoral victory gave the Communists a chance to probe the Indian constitution and its defenses, to experiment in using the powers of the government to increase the strength and finances of the Communist Party, and to convince the people of India that the CPI is a legal, respectable, and constitutional alternative to the Congress Party.

In attempting to use Kerala to enhance its prestige throughout India, the CPI has faced serious obstacles. First, this regime, in contrast to Communist governments in other parts of the world, functions without the backing of the state police force. In the second place, the Indian constitution and the strong central government impose serious restrictions on the Party's activities in Kerala and on its ability to adopt dramatic postures. For example, the proposal to nationalize foreign-owned tea, coffee, and rubber plantations in the state—a proposal which was embodied in the Party's election manifesto and reiterated at Chief Minister Namboodiripad's first press conference after assuming office—was abandoned owing to opposition from the Government of India. Of particular importance, the endemic economic problems of Kerala cannot be solved quickly, and the Communist ministry has thus not been able to make a striking improvement in living conditions in that state. Finally, the Party relies on a narrow two-vote majority in the legislature (excluding the Communist speaker), and the maintenance of discipline within the Party and the continued support of the five Independents are thus of utmost importance.

In governing Kerala since April 1957, the Communists have employed some of the time-tested techniques of international communism to consolidate their position. Overtly the Communist ministry has followed the following tactical approaches: 1) It has repeatedly stressed its "moderation," its adherence to democratic principles, and its support for the Indian constitution; in addition, until mid-1958 it adopted an accommodating stance toward the Congress Party-controlled central government and praised the G.O.I. for its "cooperative attitude" toward Kerala. 2) It established an initial reputation for efficiency and honesty in governing the state; even Congress Party members stated that "papers moved faster through the Government Secretariat" and that the Communist ministers took a serious interest in the problems of the people. 3) It attempted to consolidate the base of Communist support in the state by appealing to low-income groups and depressed classes and castes. The pay of several hundred thousand governmental employees at the state and local levels was increased; peasants were secured against eviction from land, and a comprehensive land reform bill was introduced (this had not been passed by the Legislative Assembly as of March 1959); and greater benefits in educational opportunities and employment rights were given to depressed groups. 4) The government granted additional powers to village councils (*panchavats*) and announced its intention to decentralize further by revamping the entire structure of local administration. The motive for this proposed "reform" is undoubtedly to aid the excellent CPI organizational apparatus at the village level. 5) The ministry adopted a posture of moderation toward private industry in an effort to attract capital to the state. In an appeal to foreign capital, Namboodiripad stated in Bombay in January 1958 that Kerala would not deviate from the central government's stand on nationalization and conceded that foreign capital should be invited to Kerala on terms "slightly more profitable" than those which the foreign investor might receive in his own country. 6) The government tightened its control over educational facilities in the state. The University Act, adopted shortly after the Communists assumed office, brought Kerala University under more direct supervision of the ministry. The Education Act, passed by the assembly in September 1957, empowered the government to take over any private school in the state. This highly controversial measure, aimed at Christian schools, was finally approved in February 1959 by the Indian President, whose assent is required before a bill of this type becomes law, in a slightly modified form although it still gives the government extensive control over the estimated 7,000–8,000 private schools. In addition to these two bills, the government increased the pay of the approximately 100,000 teachers in the state, revised "obsolete" textbooks to include favorable comments on Communist China and the Soviet Union, and brought the estimated 5,000 village libraries in the state under the direct supervision of the state government. 7) The cabinet established more than 1,200 committees, composed of Communists and non-Communists, to advise the government on virtually every facet of its operations. These committees created an aura of democratic operation, provided employment for deserving CPI members, and brought non-Communists and members of the opposition parties into association with the government. 8) The Kerala ministry established one of the most widespread propaganda machines in India. The Public Relations Department of the government was greatly expanded, the state government pays a stipend to the major wire services in India, and it holds a lever over the local press through the placement of governmental advertising, an important source of income for many small newspapers.

The regime's covert activities have been of even greater significance as a case study in the CPI's tactics as a ruling party. The Kerala Communists have infiltrated the government services and the police force and have used their control over the government to improve the position and finances of the Communist Party in the state. Shortly after assuming office, the Communist ministry removed the existing ban on employing Communists in governmental service. Subsequently, several hundred new positions of officer rank were created in the state government Secretariat. Many of these were staffed with Party members and sympathizers. In addition to new appointments, infiltration has been strengthened by promotions and transfers (see this Supplement, SECTION 7, under Government Infiltration). The Kerala branch of the CPI reportedly improved its finances by more than 4,000,000 rupees (US$851,000) during its first 18 months in office. This sum was reportedly raised in large part through: 1) kickbacks from those who received governmental contracts; 2) "contributions" from those appointed to serve on the numerous committees in the state; 3) the establishment of dummy cooperatives through which state funds are channeled to the Party; and 4) "donations" from industrialists desiring government-approved loans.

Many of the gains of the Kerala Communists have been made possible by the absence of an effective opposition in the state. The legislative opposition is divided among three separate parties: the Congress Party, the Praja Socialist Party, and the Muslim League. Although these parties have cooperated against the Communists on specific issues, effective long-range cooperation has been hampered by deepseated historical animosities. Further, the Congress Party, which was demoralized by its electoral defeat, had failed by March 1959 to resolve its own internal conflicts and to evolve a consistent and effective strategy to combat the Communists.

Although the Communists have made definite gains in both their overt and covert operations in Kerala, their rule in the state has not been an unqualified success. The ministry has been unable to make a dramatic improvement in living conditions. It has failed to solve the food shortage in the state, appreciably reduce unemployment, or attract significant outside investment to facilitate industrialization. It has also been unable to carry out many of its preelection pledges and, in addition, has been forced to adopt strong police methods to suppress opposition agitation. In June and July of 1958 a minor dispute between students and the state government over ferry rates was parlayed by the opposition into a major agitation resulting in violence between students and the police. Later in the same month police fired on a mob of demonstrating workers near the city of Quilon in the first such attack on laborers since the Communists assumed power. In October, police were forced to open fire against striking plantation laborers in another area of the state. This violence, involving two of the Communists' major target groups—laborers and students—created embarrassing pressures within the CPI and detracted from the Communists' earlier pledge that the police would not be used in an "antipeople" manner.

These adverse factors have no doubt cost the Communists some support, although this cannot be accurately measured since there has been no reliable gauge to the Communists' popularity on a statewide basis since April 1957. It appears likely, however, that the Kerala ministry has countered these losses by strengthening the Party machine in the state and by attracting support from teachers, low-paid government employees, and depressed castes and classes. Whether the

Kerala CPI has lost support or gained—and in neither case was the change decisive by March 1959—the ministry's shortcomings have produced three detrimental effects. First, the Communists had not succeeded by March 1959 in grooming Kerala into a nationwide showpiece which would appreciably enhance the Party's prestige throughout India. Secondly, the Communists' attempt to exploit democratic machinery to further their own objectives has brought them into direct conflict with the central government. By the end of 1958 the Kerala Communists had virtually abandoned their policy of moderation toward the Government of India. They were attempting to place the blame for the ministry's shortcomings on limitations in the constitution, indifference or discrimination by the central government toward Kerala, and the inefficiency of the Indian administrative apparatus. The central government, for its part, adopted a firmer attitude toward Kerala during 1958. Prime Minister Nehru publicly pointed to the "sense of insecurity" which Communist rule engendered, several additional bills were returned to the state government for revision, and conditions in Kerala were the subject of a heated debate in Parliament late in the year. In a thinly veiled threat, the weekly *New Age* commented during September 1958: "The Kerala people will look after the Kerala government for which they voted in their millions. They will defend it for all they are worth . . . " Finally, the effects of Communist rule have intensified frictions within both the central and state Communist Party organizations. Some Party leaders have had second thoughts on the advisability of forming a ministry in one state while another party controls the strong central government. Others have contended that the ministry, bound by constitutional limitations and conflicting interests groups within the CPI itself, has been too moderate and has failed to attempt drastic reforms. Cited as major examples of the ministry's deviation from communistic principles are the Kerala government's concessions to one of the large North Indian industrial firms to encourage construction of a rayon pulp factory in the state and the draft land reform bill, which imposes a modest ceiling on land holdings and provides full compensation for any excess land taken over by the state.

The Communists' prospects for remaining in office in Kerala until the 1962 national elections hinge primarily on their ability to satisfy local aspirations, on the attitude of the central Government of India, and on the balance between the two major factions within the CPI. During the first few months of 1959 there were signs of increased opposition within Kerala to the Communist regime. Small landowners announced their intention to oppose the draft land reform bill, and Christian and Nair groups became more articulate in opposing tightened governmental control over education. There were also indications of a hardening in the attitude toward Kerala of the central Government which has the power under the Indian Constitution to dismiss a state government and institute "President's rule" (direct administration by an appointee of the Indian President). In addition, the Kerala government's prospects could be affected by the left-right controversy within the CPI. Some Communist leaders apparently believe that the ministers should resign and that the CPI should revert to a position of doctrinaire opposition throughout India. M. N. Govindan Nair, leader of the Kerala unit of the CPI and a member of the "leftist" faction within the Party, stated in late 1958 that the ministry's policy had "occasionally been a failure," and reportedly favored resignation of the Kerala Government following the police firing on plantation workers in October. However, the Kerala state executive committee of the CPI, which is dominated by "rightist" elements, resolved in November 1958: "We cannot throw away the right to rule the state." CPI General Secretary Ajoy Ghosh reportedly believes that the Communists should strive to retain control over Kerala until shortly before the 1962 elections and should then resign voluntarily in order to have complete freedom of action during the campaign.

3. Other state assemblies

The CPI is the largest opposition party in West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh. It now has at least one Party member in each state assembly in India, whereas following the 1951–52 general elections the Party had no representation in four. The Communists increased their representation in 1957 over 1951–52 in 2 of the 3 federal territories and in 10 of the 13 states. In Punjab, CPI representation remained constant, and the Party lost legislative strength in Andhra Pradesh and Madras. It registered its most striking gains in Kerala, West Bengal, and Bombay. FIGURE 4–5 (under Reference Data) compares Communist strength in the various state legislatures immediately following the 1951–52 elections, the November 1956 linguistic reorganization, and the 1957 elections.

A Party document reviewing the work of the CPI contingent in the West Bengal assembly commented as follows on the role of state legislatures: " . . . the assembly today is one of the most important forums for the general political education of the people as a whole and, in combination with the growing militant and united mass movement, for the realization of important demands of the people." Party tactics in these bodies have been similar to those employed in Parliament, with several notable exceptions. Communists in state assemblies have concentrated to a greater degree, but with limited success, on achieving united action with other legislative groups. In most states other opposition parties have refused to be drawn into a united opposition front, although they have, on occasion, cooperated with the CPI on specific issues before the legislature. The United Maharashtra Committee and Gujarati People's Organization, both of which contain Communist members, function to a certain extent as united legislative blocs, although unity frequently breaks down on issues not immediately related to the move to divide Bombay State. In Orissa, where the minority Congress Party rules only by virtue of its alliance with the Jharkhand Party, the CPI and PSP have cooperated closely in their efforts to unseat the ministry. The other major opposition party in this state, the Ganatantra Parishad, has remained aloof from this informal CPI–PSP alliance.

CPI members in state assemblies have been more bombastic than their parliamentary colleagues at the center, and criticism of the state governments has been more vehement and more precise than that of the central government. No-confidence motions have occasionally been sponsored by Party members in the states, and walkouts are still frequent. Like the CPI faction in Parliament, Communist blocs in the various state assemblies are organized in accordance with the principles of democratic centralism, although this organizational structure is frequently less formal at the state level. Communist assemblymen are charged with responsibility for specific subjects and function under the general guidance of a committee appointed by the Party's Provincial Executive Committee. It appears, however, that greater discretionary authority is given Party leaders in the state assemblies than in Parliament.

In general, CPI assemblymen try to create the impression that the Congress Party is the party of "big money," that its budgets are oriented toward the privileged classes, and that these governments have done little for the common man. In West Bengal, under the leadership of Jyoti Basu, a member of the Central Executive Committee, the Communists have concentrated on criticism of the state government's food policy and its failure to resettle refugees from East Pakistan. The Andhra Pradesh branch has devoted its attention generally to the state government's alleged inefficiency and particularly to its failure to legislate effective land reforms. In Bombay, Party members have centered their attack chiefly on the government's refusal to divide the state between its two major linguistic components.

As a result of their numerical strength in several assemblies and the fact that state governments are more immediately responsive to public opinion, the CPI has been more successful in influencing policy at the state than at the national level. Some of its agitations, in which legislative demands are frequently reinforced by Communist-sponsored demonstrations outside the assemblies, have produced concessions from the state governments, particularly in West Bengal, and have occasionally resulted in the appointment of committees, including Communists as members, to recommend remedial action on pressing problems.

4. Local government

According to the draft political resolution submitted to the third Party Congress in December 1953, the Communist attitude toward organs of local government is as follows:

> By their limited spheres of action, the proximity to the very people who elect them, the day-to-day constant contact with the executive machinery which is not like the hardened bureaucracy of the state machine, the municipal and local bodies can be used for the direct benefit of the people by our representatives. However poor and meager be their powers, these small centers are centers of power, power to do good for the life of the people. Our representatives must learn the art of running them properly . . .

Detailed data on the composition of district boards and village *panchayats* are not available, but the CPI is known to be significantly strong in local bodies in Kerala and to have pockets of strength in local governmental bodies in Andhra Pradesh and in parts of Bombay, West Bengal, Punjab, and Madras. According to the weekly *New Age,* the Communists control approximately 1,600 *panchavats* in Andhra Pradesh. In addition, Communist-dominated united fronts have a majority in municipal councils of Vijayavādā and Guntūr, two important municipalities in that state. In district board elections in the Maharashtra region of Bombay in the spring of 1958 Communists captured only 8% of the seats, compared with 38% for the Congress Party, but showed significant strength in the two districts of Sholāpur and Ahmadnagar. In April 1957 the United Maharashtra Committee won 68 of the 131 seats in the Bombay Municipal Corporation Council (13 of these were won by Communists), and the following year S. S. Mirajkar, one of the founders of the CPI, became mayor through indirect election by the corporation council. However, beyond its obvious prestige value, this election is of little importance since the mayoralty is rotated annually among the various parties in the council.

In January 1956 a Communist-front United Citizens' Committee won 19 of the 22 municipal council seats in Chandernagore, a former French enclave now part of West Bengal, and later the same year a leftist united front, which included the CPI, won 30 of the 42 seats at stake in 8 other municipalities in the state. In May 1957 a leftist United Citizens' Committee captured 32 seats in the Calcutta Corporation Council, but the Congress Party, with 47 seats, retained control over this organization.

The CPI captured 8 seats in the 80-member Delhi Municipal Council in March 1958 and has been able to exercise disproportionate influence in this body since it holds the balance of power between the Congress Party and Jan Sangh. In April the Congress Party sided with the CPI against the Jan Sangh in electing as mayor Mrs. Aruna Asaf Ali, a former member of the CPI Central Committee who resigned from the Party in 1956 but remains sympathetic toward communism.

The Communists have stepped up their efforts to capture local bodies in northern India since the second general elections. In early 1958 they captured control over eight village *panchayats* in Darbhanga district of Bihār State, and later in the year they reportedly captured 28 additional *panchayats* bringing the total number in Bihār under Communist control to 233. In 1958 a united front including the CPI, PSP, Jan Sangh, Hindu Mahasabha, and Revolutionary Socialist Party, won three seats in the Indore Municipal Council and four in Gwalior, two municipalities in Madhya Pradesh. In Jodhpur (Rājasthān State) a united front of the CPI, Jan Sangh, and Independents captured 19 of the 37 seats on the district board in March 1958. Only one of the successful candidates was a Communist. In municipal elections throughout Orissa during the summer of 1958, a Town Committee, sponsored by the Praja Socialists and Communists, achieved some success in the coastal district of Cuttack, but failed to win control over any municipal boards. However, Communists emerged as the largest single party in Berhampur city. During the 1957 municipal elections in Uttar Pradesh for a total of 2,222 seats, Communists won only 21, compared with 856 for the Congress Party. However, during supplementary elections in December 1958 in 11 additional municipalities and 2 town councils, the CPI and People's Democratic Front won 29 seats, whereas the Congress Party won 75; the Communists achieved an absolute majority in Gangoh municipality in Saharanpur district. This, according to available data, is the Communist Party's first majority in a local body above the village level in Uttar Pradesh.

The Communists have some strength in "Pondicherry," which as now constituted by the Government of India includes the four settlements in southern India—Pondichéry (Pondicherry), Karikal (Kareikal), Mahé (Mahe), and Yanaon (Yanam)—formerly under French rule. This "state," which had a population of 317,163 in 1948, is administered by the Government of India through an appointed Chief Commissioner, but it has an elected assembly. (These four areas were transferred to India on a *de facto* basis in 1956, but *de jure* transfer awaits ratification of the treaty of cession by the French assembly.) In 1955 the Communist-dominated People's Front won 18 seats in the 39-member Pondicherry assembly and polled 39.3% of the total vote, compared with 20 seats and 18% of the vote for the Congress Party. This assembly was dissolved in late 1958 owing to continued political instability resulting from frequent changes in party alignments among non-Communist groups. New elections are scheduled for mid-1959.

The CPI undoubtedly has representation in many additional local bodies for which no information is available. However, with the exception of Kerala and parts of West Bengal, the number of such bodies of local administration in which the Party is sufficiently strong to make a noticeable impact is small. The greatest long-range danger lies perhaps in the fact that discipline among other opposition groups is frequently lax at the local level. The Communists have thus been able successfully to use united front tactics and to secure a foothold in numerous local bodies.

F. Communist activities in other areas

1. Jammu and Kashmīr

The disputed state of Jammu and Kashmīr presents a special problem for the Communists. Both the U.S.S.R. and the CPI support India's claims to the state against those of Pakistan. The Soviet Union has offered to provide special economic assistance, including technical advisers, to this strategically located state on India's northern frontier. However, the CPI is hampered in its operations within the state by the sensitivity of the Government of India toward Jammu and Kashmīr. There is no unit of the CPI in the state, and the Communists work through other parties to gain their objectives. Until late 1957 they operated within the National Conference Party, which is closely affiliated with the Congress Party. The National Conference Party, led by Premier Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, became the ruling party in 1947 after the Maharaja's regime was overthrown at the time of India's partition. Even before it assumed power, this party espoused radical economic and social reforms which the Communists supported, and until 1957 it allowed no other party to function if it became too critical of the government. Communists now apparently function within the Democratic National Conference Party formed in late 1957 under the leadership of Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq, a supporter of pro-Communist causes and a former deputy premier of the state. However, Sadiq does not want open ties with the Communists and reportedly has said he would oppose formation of a CPI unit in Jammu and Kashmīr. No information is available on the extent of Communist infiltration of Sadiq's party.

The National Conference won 68 seats (90.7% of the total) in the 75-member National Assembly in the March–May 1957 elections (it was subsequently reduced to 54 by defections, primarily to the Democratic National Conference). However, these election results probably do not accurately reflect popular attitudes, since 40 of the National Conference candidates were elected without opposition owing to repressive measures by the state government. The Democratic National Conference, with 13 seats, is the largest opposition group in the assembly. There has been some infiltration of the Kashmīr Government by Communists, but this is apparently not serious (see SECTION 7 under Government Infiltration).

2. Bhutan and Sikkim

Little information is available on Communist activities in these strategically located border states, both of which are *de facto* protectorates of India. The major threat to both probably comes from the possibility of subversion by the Chinese Communists. Although there is no firm evidence of Chinese Communist activity in these states, both are potentially vulnerable to such activities

FIGURE 4–2. INDIAN STATE AND NATIONAL

ELECTIONS	CENTER	RADICAL LEFT		
	Congress	CPI	Revolutionary Socialist	Forward Bloc (Marxist)
1951–52 *Lok Sabha:*				
Number of seats won	364	23	3	1
Percent of seats won	*75.4*	*4.5*	*0.6*	*0.2*
Number of votes polled	47,665,875	4,851,805	468,108	963,058
Percent of votes polled	*45.0*	*4.6*	*0.4*	*0.9*
1951–52 State assemblies:				
Number of seats won	2,246	148	6	17
Percent of seats won	*68.5*	*4.5*	*0.2*	*0.5*
Number of votes polled	43,802,546	5,493,254	251,288	818,061
Percent of votes polled	*42.2*	*5.2*	*0.3*	*0.8*
1957 *Lok Sabha:*				
Number of seats won	371	29	1	3
Percent of seats won	*75.1*	*5.9*	*0.2*	*0.6*
Number of votes polled	57,284,948	11,838,149	687,463	1,099,547
Percent of votes polled	*47.7*	*9.9*	*0.6*	*0.9*
1957 State assemblies:				
Number of seats won	1,938	203	3	2
Percent of seats won	*64.5*	*6.8*	*insig*	*insig*
Number of votes polled	51,583,622	9,876,475	424,942	108,904
Percent of votes polled	*45.6*	*8.7*	*0.4*	*0.1*

NOTE Praja Socialist vote for 1951–52 consists of combined vote for Indian Socialist Party and Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party. The Socialist Party (Lohia group) was formed in 1955 and thus no results are shown for this party for the 1951–52 elections. CPI vote in 1951–52 includes votes polled by the People's Democratic Front in Hyderābād State but excludes those polled by Communists contesting as Independents in Travancore-Cochin. Percentages do not total 100 because of rounding.

owing to their economic backwardness, historical, religious, and trade ties with Tibet, and the presence in both states of large groups which are racially akin to the Tibetans. In addition, growing resentment—particularly in Sikkim—against Indian hegemony provides a possible field for disruptive propaganda.

Bhutan, the larger of the two states (estimated population 700,000 in 1959), is one of the world's most backward areas. It has no political parties, no constitution, no courts, no codified system of law, and no modern facilities for communications. An absolute Maharaja sits at the top of the state's feudal administrative pyramid, and there is no reliable evidence of agitation within the state, by the Communists or by other groups, for representative government.

Sikkim (estimated population 150,000 in 1959), which has closer ties with India (an Indian official serves as chief executive officer of the state), is somewhat more advanced. Agitation for a more representative type of government has apparently grown during recent years. There are several non-Communist political parties in Sikkim, but no reliable evidence of Communist activity.

3. Offshore islands and Portuguese possessions

There is no evidence of Communist activity in the Laccadive, Andaman, and Nicobar islands. These remote and sparsely populated islands, which are "union territories" of India, are governed by administrators appointed by the Indian President. Opposition political parties are not permitted in the Portuguese possessions on India's western coast (Goa, Daman, and Diu) and there is no evidence of Communist activity in these areas.

G. Reference data

The tables in this Subsection present detailed data in the general order of reference in the text.

ELECTION RESULTS BY PARTIES, 1951-52 AND 1957

NON-COMMUNIST LEFT		COMMUNAL-RIGHTIST			OTHERS	
Praja Socialist	Socialist (Lohia)	Scheduled Castes Federation	Jan Sangh	Hindu Mahasabha	Minor parties	Independents
21	...	2	3	4	30	38
4.2	...	*0.4*	*0.6*	*0.8*	*6.1*	*7.7*
17,373,337	...	2,501,964	3,246,288	1,003,034	11,092,277	16,778,749
16.4	...	*2.3*	*3.1*	*0.9*	*10.5*	*15.8*
202	...	12	35	20	260	334
5.8	...	*0.3*	*1.1*	*0.6*	*8.3*	*10.2*
15,377,430	...	1,751,294	2,866,566	848,415	10,026,119	22,566,226
14.8	...	*1.6*	*2.7*	*0.8*	*9.9*	*21.7*
19	8	8	4	3	27	21
3.8	*1.6*	*1.6*	*0.8*	*0.6*	*5.6*	*4.2*
12,528,104	2,844,164	2,962,294	7,216,442	1,640,045	6,603,707	15,367,120
10.4	*2.4*	*2.5*	*6.0*	*1.4*	*5.4*	*12.8*
196	44	23	48	9	289	250
6.5	*1.4*	*0.7*	*1.7*	*0.3*	*9.6*	*8.3*
11,125,962	3,064,867	1,555,219	4,379,430	997,544	11,544,840	18,519,392
9.8	*2.7*	*1.4*	*3.9*	*0.9*	*10.2*	*16.2*

FIGURE 4-3. VOTING STRENGTH OF SOCIALIST AND COMMUNIST PARTIES IN GENERAL ELECTIONS, 1951-52 AND 1957, INDIA

(In percentages of the total vote for state and territorial assembly elections)

AREA	1951-52		1957	
	Socialist*	CPI	Socialist*	CPI
All India—average	*14.8*	*5.2*	*12.5*	*8.7*
States:				
Andhra Pradesh**	*18.5*	*20.5*	*5.6*	*29.4*
Assam	*14.3*	*2.8*	*19.1*	*8.4*
Bihār	*20.7*	*1.2*	*21.0*	*5.3*
Bombay	*14.2*	****2.5*	*10.6*	*3.8*
Kerala	*18.4*	*17.0*	*10.4*	*34.7*
Madhya Pradesh	*14.8*	*0.6*	*14.8*	*1.8*
Madras	*9.6*	*8.1*	*3.7*	*7.5*
Mysore	*20.8*	*1.5*	*16.4*	*2.4*
Orissa	*12.1*	*5.6*	*10.7*	*8.3*
Punjab	*4.1*	*4.4*	*1.8*	*13.4*
Rājasthān	*4.4*	*0.6*	*2.5*	*3.0*
Uttar Pradesh	*17.8*	*0.9*	*14.4*	*3.8*
West Bengal	*11.4*	*10.3*	*9.9*	*17.9*
Federal territories:				
Himachal Pradesh	*16.1*	...	*3.7*	*0.5*
Manipur	*6.6*	*3.8*	*25.1*	*12.4*
Tripura	...	*43.3*	*2.7*	*39.8*

* Combined totals for the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party and Indian Socialist Party in 1951-52 and for the Praja Socialist Party and Socialist Party in 1957.

** Percentages for the CPI include the vote for the People's Democratic Front, counterpart of the CPI in the Telengana region of the state. Since elections were not held in the Andhra region in 1957, the 1957 totals include results for the 1955 special elections in that area.

*** Includes 1.4% polled by the People's Democratic Front.

FIGURE 4-4. CPI VOTE IN INDIAN STATE AND NATIONAL ELECTIONS, 1951–57

AREA AND TYPE OF ELECTION	YEAR	PERCENT OF TOTAL VOTE POLLED BY CPI
Indian states:		
Andhra Pradesh		
State assembly	1951–52	20.5
Lok Sabha	1951–52	19.9
State assembly (Andhra region)	1955	30.9
State assembly (Telengana region)	1957	25.7
Lok Sabha	1957	24.1
Assam		
State assembly	1951–52	2.8
Lok Sabha	1951–52	...
State assembly	1957	8.4
Lok Sabha	1957	10.3
Bihār		
State assembly	1951–52	1.2
Lok Sabha	1951–52	0.4
State assembly	1957	5.3
Lok Sabha	1957	5.1
Bombay		
State assembly	1951–52	2.5
Lok Sabha	1951–52	2.5
State assembly	1957	3.8
Lok Sabha	1957	7.7
Kerala		
State assembly	1951–52	17.0
Lok Sabha	1951–52	15.5
State assembly (Travancore-Cochin region)	1954	16.8
State assembly	1957	34.7
Lok Sabha	1957	37.5
Madhya Pradesh		
State assembly	1951–52	0.6
Lok Sabha	1951–52	0.8
State assembly	1957	1.8
Lok Sabha	1957	0.4
Madras		
State assembly	1951–52	8.1
Lok Sabha	1951–52	5.1
State assembly	1957	7.5
Lok Sabha	1957	9.9
Mysore		
State assembly	1951–52	1.5
Lok Sabha	1951–52	1.7
State assembly	1957	2.4
Lok Sabha	1957	4.6
Indian states (*Continued*):		
Orissa		
State assembly	1951–52	5.6
Lok Sabha	1951–52	5.8
State assembly	1957	8.3
Lok Sabha	1957	4.8
Punjab		
State assembly	1951–52	4.4
Lok Sabha	1951–52	5.0
State assembly (PEPSU region)	1954	6.1
State assembly	1957	13.4
Lok Sabha	1957	16.8
Rājasthān		
State assembly	1951–52	0.6
Lok Sabha	1951–52	0.2
State assembly	1957	3.0
Lok Sabha	1957	1.6
Uttar Pradesh		
State assembly	1951–52	0.9
Lok Sabha	1951–52	0.4
State assembly	1957	3.8
Lok Sabha	1957	1.7
West Bengal		
State assembly	1951–52	10.3
Lok Sabha	1951–52	9.5
State assembly	1957	17.9
Lok Sabha	1957	19.7
Federal Territories:		
Himachal Pradesh		
State assembly	1951–52	...
Lok Sabha	1951–52	...
Territorial Council	1957	0.5
Lok Sabha	1957	2.7
Manipur		
Electoral College	1951–52	3.8
Lok Sabha	1951–52	8.6
Territorial Council	1957	12.4
Lok Sabha	1957	11.1
Tripura		
Electoral College	1951–52	43.3
Lok Sabha	1951–52	61.3
Territorial Council	1957	39.8
Lok Sabha	1957	45.1

NOTE Votes polled by the People's Democratic Front are included in the results for Bombay and Andhra Pradesh.

FIGURE 4-5. COMMUNIST STRENGTH IN INDIAN STATE AND TERRITORIAL ASSEMBLIES

AREA	TOTAL ASSEMBLY SEATS 1957	COMMUNIST REPRESENTATION			
		1951–52	November 1956	1957 elections	Percent of total seats 1957
States:					
Andhra Pradesh..	301	77	49	35	*11.6*
Assam..........	108	1	1	4	*3.7*
Bihār...........	318	0	1	7	*2.2*
Bombay.........	396	1	2	21	*5.3*
Kerala..........	127	32	*	60	*47.2*
Madhya Pradesh.	288	0	0	3	*1.0*
Madras.........	205	13	13	4	*2.0*
Mysore.........	208	1	1	2	*1.0*
Orissa...........	140	7	7	9	*6.4*
Punjab..........	154	6	10	6	*3.9*
Rājasthān.......	176	0	1	1	*0.6*
Uttar Pradesh...	430	0	1	9	*2.1*
West Bengal.....	256	28	29	46	*18.4*
Territories:					
Himachal Pradesh..........	41	0	0	0	...
Manipur........	30	2	2	4	*13.3*
Tripura.........	30	12	12	12	*40.0*
Total.........	3,208	180	129	223	*6.9*

NOTE Except for the People's Democratic Front, counterpart of the CPI in the Telengana region of Andhra Pradesh, figures do not include allied parties or fellow-traveling Independents. Totals differ from those cited in FIGURE 4-2 owing to inclusion in the above table of the 1955 Andhra election results.

* Assembly dissolved following imposition of President's rule in March 1956.

FIGURE 4–6. DISTRICTS IN WHICH THE CPI POLLED 10% OR MORE OF THE VOTE IN THE 1957 ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS

STATE AND DISTRICT	CPI VOTE	PERCENT OF TOTAL VOTE
Andhra Pradesh (20 districts):		
Ādilābād	44,033	*16.0*
Karīmnagar	151,948	*29.1*
Khammam	159,589	*44.7*
Mahbūbnagar	41,389	*10.5*
Medak	65,147	*17.6*
Nalgonda	260,043	*50.1*
Nizāmābād	29,950	*12.5*
Warangal	145,812	*31.3*
Anantapur*	181,399	*28.0*
Chittoor*	84,046	*13.3*
Cuddapah*	107,657	*21.8*
East Godāvari*	423,016	*37.7*
Krishna*	398,803	*43.4*
Krunool*	144,558	*22.5*
Guntūr*	452,231	*40.4*
Nellore*	295,222	*37.1*
Srīkākulam*	87,296	*12.8*
Visākhāpatnam*	131,608	*19.1*
West Godāvari*	371,963	*40.8*
Assam (12 districts):		
Cāchār	35,691	*10.0*
Kāmrūp	67,107	*13.1*
Lakhimpur	28,251	*11.0*
Nowgong	31,807	*11.6*
Bihār (17 districts):		
Bhāgalpur	53,830	*11.9*
Monghyr	117,072	*17.6*
Kerala (7 districts):		
Cannanore	258,003	*38.9*
Kottayam	229,276	*29.8*
Kozhikode	140,503	*18.1*
Pālghāt	258,993	*39.0*
Quilon	609,237	*37.7*
Trichūr	356,552	*36.3*
Trivandrum	237,054	*43.4*
Madras (13 districts):		
Coimbatore	166,290	*14.3*
Kanniyākumāri	21,163	*10.6*
Tanjore	256,033	*19.0*
Mysore (20 districts):		
Coorg	14,942	*20.8*
Kolār	44,209	*10.0*
South Kanara	47,553	*11.5*
Orissa (13 districts):		
Ganjām	81,054	*19.8*
Puri	117,274	*25.7*
Punjab (17 districts):		
Amritsar	100,220	*17.0*
Bhatinda	111,856	*29.0*
Ferozepore	148,351	*22.2*
Gurdāspur	69,893	*19.0*
Hoshiāpur	78,646	*12.3*
Jullundur	87,514	*14.1*
Kapūrthala	7,083	*12.2*
Lūdiāna	68,123	*16.6*
Rohtak	82,140	*14.5*
Sangrūr	105,286	*28.2*
Rājasthān (26 districts):		
Alwar	52,854	*16.5*
Jhūnjhunu	38,795	*18.6*
Uttar Pradesh (51 districts):		
Azamgarh	88,172	*12.1*
Ballia	79,225	*20.2*
Faizābād	51,733	*10.3*
Ghāzīpur	70,039	*16.2*
Unnāo	75,845	*21.9*
West Bengal (16 districts):		
Bānkura	98,350	*16.2*
Bīrbhūn	57,367	*13.4*
Burdwān	176,246	*21.0*
Calcutta	223,238	*27.0*
Darjeeling	35,711	*28.6*
Hooghly	130,542	*18.6*
Howrah	124,588	*20.2*
Jalpaiguri	44,730	*11.4*
Mālda	50,890	*16.0*
Midnapore	275,659	*18.2*
Nadia	86,230	*17.4*
24-Parganas	497,528	*25.1*

NOTE District election figures are not available for Bombay and Madhya Pradesh. However, since the CPI polled only 3.8 and 1.8% of the vote in these states respectively, the Party probably polled 10% of the vote in few, if any, districts in those states.

* Assembly elections were not held in these districts in 1957. Results given are from the 1955 special elections in Andhra.



INDIA

COMMUNIST VOTING STRENGTH IN THE 1957 ELECTIONS

NOTE: The percentage of the total vote polled by the Communists in the 1957 State Assembly elections is shown by district, except in the states of Bombay and Madhya Pradesh; in these states, results are not available by district and are shown by "region".

The Communist Party had no candidates in the areas where percentage figures are not given.

Sikkim and Bhutan are technically protectorates of India.

PERCENTAGE OF VOTE POLLED BY COMMUNISTS
0
5
10
15
25
35
50
4.5 Figures indicate the percentage of the district or "region" vote polled by the Communists
"Region" boundary
JAMMU AND KASHMĪR
(STATUS IN DISPUTE)
Election data not comparable
(See Section 1)
CHINA
NEPAL
BHUTAN
PAKISTAN
SIKKIM
Gangtok
Punakha
PUNJAB
HIMACHAL PRADESH
UTTAR PRADESH
RAJASTHAN
MADHYA PRADESH
BIHĀR
WEST BENGAL
ASSAM
NORTHEAST FRONTIER AGENCY
TRIPURA
MANIPUR
DELHI
Delhi
New Delhi
Jaipur
Lucknow
Patna
Calcutta
Shillong
Imphal
Agartala
Bhopal
CHAMBA
KĀNGRA
6.4
MANDI
MAHASU
AMRITSAR
17.0
19.0
12.3
HOSHIĀRPUR
14.0
10.6
FEROZEPORE
22.2
28.2
SANGRŪR
19.0
BHATINDA
PATIĀLA
6.8
AMBĀLA
7.8
KARNĀL
4.5
HISSĀR
7.0
ROHTAK
14.5
GURGAON
1.3
MEERUT
3.4
TEHRI GARHWĀL
GARHWĀL
ALMORA
BIJNOR
NAINI TĀL
7.5
MORĀDĀBĀD
BAREILLY
PĪLĪBHĪT
KHERĪ
BAHRAICH
SĪTĀPUR
HARDOI
4.1
ALĪGARH
5.6
MATHURA
ETAH
MAINPURI
AGRA
ETĀWAH
KĀNPUR
1.8
UNNAO
21.9
RĀE BARELI
BĀRA BANKI
6.1
FAIZĀBĀD
SULTĀNPUR
BASTI
DEORIA
AZAMGARH
BALLIA
GHĀZĪPUR
16.2
JAUNPUR
ALLĀHĀBĀD
BANDA
HAMĪRPUR
1.4
JĀLAUN
JHĀNSI
CHAMPĀRAN
SĀRAN
MUZAFFARPUR
DARBHANGA
PŪRNEA
1.9
MONGHYR
17.6
11.9
GAYA
SHAHABAD
HAZĀRĪBĀGH
SANTAL PARGANAS
MĀLDA
DARJEELING
28.0
JALPAIGURI
11.4
COOCH BEHAR
BURDWĀN
21.0
BĀNKURA
16.2
HOOGHLY
MIDNAPORE
20.2
27.0
25.1
CHURU
JHUNJHUNU
19.6
SĪKAR
8.2
ALWAR
16.5
JAIPUR
NAGAUR
AJMER
4.4
TONK
SAWAI MĀDHOPUR
BHARATPUR
BHĪLWĀRA
BUNDI
KOTA
MANDASOR
JHALAWĀR
MORENA
GWALIOR
BHIND
SHIVPURI
GUNA
RĀJGARH
UJJAIN
SEHORE
RAISEN
MANDLA
MAHAKOSHAL
GOĀLPĀRA
4.2
KĀMRŪP
13.1
DARRANG
5.4
NOWGONG
SIBSĀGAR
LAKHIMPUR
11.0
GARO HILLS
UNITED KHĀSI JAINTIA HILLS
NORTH CACHAR HILLS
UNITED DISTRICT OF MIKIR
NĀGA HILLS
CACHAR
12.0
12.4
39.8
KAMENG FRONTIER DIVISION
SUBANSIRI FRONTIER DIVISION
SIANG FRONTIER DIVISION
LOHIT FRONTIER DIVISION
TIRAP FRONTIER DIVISION
76
80
84
88
92
96
100
36
32
28
24

U. S. S. R.
IRAN
AFGHANISTAN
PAKISTAN
IRAN
JAMMU AND KASHMĪR
(STATUS IN DISPUTE)
Election data not comparable
See Section 1.
CH
NEPA
HIMACHAL PRADESH
CHAMBA
KĀNGRA
MANDI
MAHASU
SIRMUR
GURDASPUR
19.0
12.3
6.4
AMRITSAR
17.0
HOSHIĀRPUR
JULLUNDUR
14.6
FEROZPORE
22.2
LUDHIANA
16.6
SANGRŪR
28.2
BHATINDA
29.0
PATIĀLA
6.5
AMBĀLA
7.5
TEHRI GARHWĀL
GARHWĀL
ALMORA
SAHĀRANPUR
0.7
KARNĀL
4.8
GANGĀNAGAR
0.9
HISSĀR
7.0
MUZAFFARNAGAR
2.5
BIJNOR
8.3
NAINI TĀL
7.5
ROHTAK
14.5
MEERUT
3.4
DELHI
Delhi
New Delhi
MORADABAD
BULANDSHAHR
BAREILLY
PILIBHIT
BADAUN
GURGAON
1.5
BĪKANER
CHURU
JHUNJHUNU
18.6
SIKAR
8.2
ALWAR
16.5
JAISALMER
NĀGAUR
JAIPUR
Jaipur
RĀJASTHĀN
3.3
JODHPUR
ALĪGARH
5.6
ETAH
MATHURA
UTTAR PRADESH
KHERI
BAHRAICH
1.6
HARDOI
4.1
SĪTĀPUR
2.9
AGRA
MAINPURI
BARMER
AJMER
4.4
TONK
SAWAI MĀDHOPUR
BHARATPUR
BHIND
MORENA
GWALIOR
ETĀWAH
3.5
KĀNPUR
1.8
UNNĀO
21.9
Lucknow
BĀRA BANKI
6.1
RĀE BARELI
FAIZABAD
SULTANPUR
BASTI
2.4
GORAKHPUR
DEORIA
CHAMPARAN
9.3
SARAN
AZAMGARH
12.1
BALLIA
GHAZIPUR
16.2
JAUNPUR
3.1
PĀLI
3.6
BHĪLWĀRA
3.2
BUNDI
JĀLAUN
SHIVPURI
HAMĪRPUR
1.4
FATEHPUR
BĀNDA
ALLĀHĀBĀD
BANARAS
MIRZAPUR
JĀLOR
SIROHI
UDAIPUR
CHITTORGARH
KOTA
GUNA
JHANSI
REWA
SIDHI
VINDHYA PRADESH
DISPUTED
BANAS KĀNTHA
SĀBAR KĀNTHA
MEHSANA
SAURASHTRA
Gulf of Kutch
JHĀLĀWAR
HALĀR
KAIRA
PANCH MAHĀLS
BARODA
MANDASOR
RATLAM
UJJAIN
JHABUA
DHAR
DEWAS
SHAJAPUR
RĀJGARH
BHILSA
Bhopal
BHOPAL
SEHORE
RAISEN
MADHYA PRADESH
MAHAKOSHAL
SHAHDOL
MANDLA
BILĀSPUR
SURGUJA
RAIGARH
BETUL
BI
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
36
60
64
68
72
U. S. S. R.
U.S.S.R.
IRAN
AFGHANISTAN
32
PAKISTAN
28
IRAN
24
GANGANAGAR
BĪKANER
CHURU
JAISALMER
RĀJASTH
NĀGAUR
JODHPUR
BARMER
PĀLI
BHĪLWARA
JĀLOR
SIROHI
UDAIPUR
MANDASOR
BANĀS KĀNTHA
MEHSANA
SABAR KANTHA
DUNGARPUR
Gulf of Kutch
JHĀLAWAR
KAIRA
PĀNCH MAHALS
AHMADABAD
BARODA
DHAR


ARABIAN SEA
20
16
12
8
64
68
72
DIU (PORT.)
LACCADIVE, MINICOY AND AMINDIVI ISLANDS
NIS Area boundary
International boundary, demarcated
International boundary, delimited only
International boundary, indefinite
State or Union Territory boundary
District boundary
Treaty State boundary
National capital
State or Union Territory capital
Treaty State capital
0 50 100 200
Statute Miles
0 50 100 200
Kilometers
Boundaries and names are not necessarily those recognized by the U.S. Government.


ARABIAN SEA
BOMBAY
MAHARASHTRA
MARATHWADA
VIDARBHA
PRADESH
ANDHRA PRADESH
TELENGANA
MYSORE
MADRAS
KERALA
CEYLON
LACCADIVE, MINICOY, AND AMINDIVI ISLANDS
GOA (PORT.)
DAMÃO (PORT.)
DIU (PORT.)
MAHÉ
YANAON
Gulf of Mannar
Gulf of Cambay
GREATER BOMBAY
Bombay
8.6
ADILABAD 16.0
NIZAMABAD 12.5
MEDAK 17.6
HYDERABAD
MAHBUBNAGAR 10.5
KURNOOL 22.5
ANANTAPUR 28.0
CUDDAPAH 21.8
CHITTOOR 13.3
VISAKHAPATNAM 19.1
KORAPUT 9.3
GULBARGA 7.2
BIJAPUR
RAICHUR
BELLARY
CHITALDRUG
TUMKUR
KOLAR 10.0
BANGALORE
SHIMOGA
CHIKMAGALUR
HASSAN
MANDYA
MYSORE
COORG
SOUTH KANARA
NORTH KANARA
DHARWAR
BELGAUM
KOLHAPUR
SOUTH SATARA
NORTH SATARA
RATNAGIRI
KOLABA
POONA
AHMADNAGAR
THANA
BIR
OSMANABAD
SHOLAPUR
BIDAR
NANDED
PARBHANI
AURANGABAD
BULDANA
YEOTMAL
AMRAOTI
WARDHA
NAGPUR
BHANDARA
CHANDA
DRUG
RAIPUR
BASTAR
BETUL
NIMAR
EAST KHANDESH
WEST KHANDESH
SURAT
SORATH
NORTH ARCOT 4.4
SOUTH ARCOT
SALEM 5.5
COIMBATORE 14.3
NILGIRI
KOZHIKODE
PALGHAT 39.0
TRICHUR
KOTTAYAM 29.8
TANJORE 19.0
MADURA
RAMNAD
TINNEVELLY
Trivandrum
MADRAS
Madras
CANNANORE
AMINDIVI ISLANDS
Minicoy Island
NOTE: Elections were not held in the "Andhr
during the 1957 State Assembly elect
the 1955 special elections in what was
the "Telengana region" are for the 19
NIS Area boundary
International boundary, demarcated
International boundary, delimited only
International boundary, indefinite
State or Union Territory boundary
District boundary
Treaty State boundary
National capital
State or Union Territory capital
Treaty State capital
Statute Miles
Kilometers
Boundaries and names are not necessarily those recognized by the U.S. Government.
20
16
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72
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
PRADESH
BOMBAY
MAHARASHTRA
MARATHWADA
ORISSA
ANDHRA PRADESH
TELENGANA
MYSORE
MADRAS
KERALA
BAY OF BENGAL
Gulf of Cambay
Gulf of Mannar
CEYLON
SORATH
DIU (PORT.)
DAMÃO (PORT.)
GREATER BOMBAY
Bombay
8.6
GOA (PORT.)
WEST KHANDESH
EAST KHANDESH
BULDANA
YEOTMAL
CHANDA
AURANGABAD
PARBHANI
AHMADNAGAR
BIR
NANDED
POONA
OSMANABAD
SHOLAPUR
NORTH SATARA
SOUTH SATARA
KOLHAPUR
RATNAGIRI
KOLABA
THANA
BIJAPUR
BELGAUM
DHARWAR
NORTH KANARA
BELLARY
CHITALDRUG
SHIMOGA
CHIKMAGALUR
SOUTH KANARA
HASSAN
TUMKUR
KOLAR
BANGALORE
MANDYA
MYSORE
COORG
30.8
ADILABAD
16.0
NIZAMABAD
12.5
KARIMNAGAR
29.1
WARANGAL
31.3
MEDAK
17.6
NALGONDA
50.1
KHAMMAM
GULBARGA
MAHBUBNAGAR
10.5
RAICHUR
KURNOOL
22.5
ANANTAPUR
28.0
CUDDAPAH
21.8
NELLORE
CHITTOOR
13.3
GUNTUR
40.4
KRISHNA
43.4
WEST GODAVARI
40.8
EAST GODAVARI
37.7
VISAKHAPATNAM
19.1
SRIKAKULAM
12.5
YANAON
BASTAR
KORAPUT
GANJAM
19.8
CUTTACK
Bhubaneswar
25.7 PURI
MIDNAPORE
24 PARGANAS
Calcutta
CHINGLEPUT
3.4
MADRAS
Madras
NORTH ARCOT
SALEM
5.5
SOUTH ARCOT
Pondicherry
KARIKAL
TANJORE
19.0
TIRUCHIRAPALLI
5.4
COIMBATORE
14.3
NILGIRI
KOZHIKODE
18.1
MAHE
CANNANORE
MADURA
6.5
RAMNAD
5.6
TINNEVELLY
5.4
KOTTAYAM
29.8
TRIVANDRUM
Trivandrum
10.6
KANNIYAKUMARI
LACCADIVE, MINICOY, AND AMINDIVI ISLANDS
AMINDIVI ISLANDS
LACCADIVE ISLANDS
MINICOY ISLAND
72
76
80
84
88
NUMBER REFERENCES
ANDHRA PRADESH
1 SECUNDERABAD CANTONMENT AND SUBURBAN AREAS*
BOMBAY
2 AMRELI
HIMACHAL PRADESH
3 SIMLA
PUNJAB
4 KAPURTHALA
5 MAHENDRAGARH
UTTAR PRADESH
6 LUCKNOW
WEST BENGAL
7 CALCUTTA*†
† Exact limits unknown
oundaries and names are not necessarily
ose recognized by the U.S. Government.

NOTE: *Elections were not held in the "Andhra region" of Andhra Pradesh state during the 1957 State Assembly elections and the figures shown are for the 1955 special elections in what was then Andhra state. Figures for the "Telengana region" are for the 1957 elections.*



PRADESH
BOMBAY
VIDARBHA
MARATHWADA
ORISSA
BURMA
TELENGANA
ANDHRA PRADESH
MYSORE
MADRAS
BAY OF BENGAL
ANDAMAN SEA
ANDAMAN AND NICOBAR ISLANDS
ANDAMAN ISLANDS
NICOBAR ISLANDS
CEYLON
Gulf of Mannar
MIDNAPORE 20.2
18.2
Calcutta 23.1
MAYURBHANJ 6.9
SAMBALPUR 5.5
CUTTACK 16.0
Bhubaneswar 25.7 PURI
GANJAM 19.8
KALAHANDI
KORAPUT 9.3
SRIKAKULAM 12.8
VISAKHAPATNAM 19.1
EAST GODAVARI 37.7
WEST GODAVARI 40.8
YANAON
KRISHNA
43.4
KHAMMAM
ADILABAD 16.0
NIZAMABAD 12.5
KARIMNAGAR 29.1
31.3
MEDAK 17.6
WARANGAL
HYDERABAD
MAHBUBNAGAR 10.5
KURNOOL 22.5
28.0
ANANTAPUR
CUDDAPAH 21.8
NELLORE
13.3 CHITTOOR
KOLAR 10.6
BELLARY
CHITALDRUG
HASSAN
BANGALORE
Bangalore
3.4
MADRAS
Madras
CHINGLEPUT
NORTH ARCOT 4.4
SALEM 5.5
SOUTH ARCOT 1.5
Pondicherry
COIMBATORE 14.1
TIRUCHIRAPALLI 3.4
TANJORE 19.0
KARIKAL
MADURA 6.5
RAMNAD 5.0
TINNEVELLY 5.4
PALGHAT
TRICHUR
29.8
KOTTAYAM
QUILON 37.1
Trivandrum
AMRAOTI
NAGPUR
BHANDARA
BETUL
WARDHA
YEOTMAL
CHANDA
BASTAR
RAIPUR
PARBHANI
BIR
NANDED
BIDAR
GULBARGA
Port Blair
20
16
12
8
80
84
88
92
96

NOTE: *Elections were not held in the "Andhra region" of Andhra Pradesh state during the 1957 State Assembly elections and the figures shown are for the 1955 special elections in what was then Andhra state. Figures for the "Telengana region" are for the 1957 elections.*

NUMBER REFERENCES

ANDHRA PRADESH
1. SECUNDERABAD CANTONMENT AND SUBURBAN AREAS *

BOMBAY
2. AMRELI

HIMACHAL PRADESH
3. SIMLA

PUNJAB
4. KAPURTHALA
5. MAHENDRAGARH

UTTAR PRADESH
6. LUCKNOW

WEST BENGAL
7. CALCUTTA * †

* *Municipal area that does not necessarily have true district status*

† *Exact limits unknown*

5. *Penetration of Labor and Agrarian Movements*

A. Activity and strategy

Since its formation in 1928–29, the Communist Party of India has relied primarily on labor for its mass support. The All-India Trade Union Congress (AITUC), the labor arm of the Party, is one of the largest labor federations in India and is in a position to reinforce Party activity in urban and industrial centers throughout the country. In addition, AITUC is strong in certain key industries—communications, defense, petroleum, government services, and iron and steel, a situation which enhances the Communists' potential for engaging in espionage and for disruptive activity should the present moderate Party line change.

Party activities among the peasantry, which did not receive serious attention until the late 1930's, have been much less successful. Although Communists control the largest single peasant organization, the All-India Kisan Sabha (Peasants' Association—AIKS), this front group is not effective on a national scale. Communists recognize their inability to break the Congress Party's electoral hold over the peasantry (see this Supplement, SECTION 4, under Role in Elections) as one of their greatest shortcomings. The Political Resolution adopted by the CPI at the April 1958 Party Congress stated: "The failure to organize and develop *kisan sabha* and agricultural laborers' unions . . . constitutes the greatest weakness of the entire democratic movement. Without resolute measures to overcome this weakness, the democratic movement will not get built and the Party will fail to become a decisive force in the political life of the country."

Party propaganda aimed at laborers stresses two major points: the "ever-growing attacks" on workers' rights by "vested interests and the government" and the Communists' desire to secure for the labor force a greater share of national income. More precisely, the 1957 CPI election manifesto stressed the need for: 1) a national minimum wage and an immediate 25% across-the-board pay boost; 2) expanded social insurance and unemployment benefits; 3) workers' participation in the management of industrial concerns; 4) repeal of "restrictive" trade union legislation; and 5) the removal of all restrictions on collective bargaining. In the agricultural field, the manifesto called for the imposition of a ceiling on land holdings and redistribution of excess land among the landless peasants, reductions in rural rents and taxes, extension of cooperatives for rural credit and marketing of produce, and a prohibition on the eviction of peasants by landlords.

The Indian labor force of approximately 162,000,000 (official estimate in 1959) is about 72% agricultural (landless laborers, tenant farmers, and small landholders), 8% industrial, and the bulk of the remainder is engaged in small handicraft occupations. Trade union activity among the scattered handicraft workers has been ineffective, and they remain largely unorganized. The same is true of the peasants, and the Communists have been further handicapped in their efforts to capture this group by its general conservatism, its lack of political consciousness, the favorable impact in some areas of the government's village development schemes, and the lack of homogeneity within the agricultural class. There is a conflict of interest between landless agricultural laborers and the small landholders who are among their employers. This conflict in addition to caste differences (the landowners are usually of a higher caste), has thus far prevented combination of the two groups within the same organization. The AIKS is thus essentially a tenant and small landholder organization. Separate organizations for landless agricultural laborers have been formed by the Communists in Andhra Pradesh and Punjab states, but these are small and ineffective.

An estimated 13,000,000 workers are engaged in industry, and about half of these are organized. Perhaps 5,000,000 belong to large unions with more than 5,000 members, while the remainder are scattered among a host of small unions, most with less than 500 members. Many of India's industrial workers have only recently left their villages, and their caste and family ties and traditional value systems have been disrupted. This void has frequently been filled by energetic Communist organizers who have succeeded to a greater extent than representatives of other trade union federations in identifying themselves with the workers' aspirations. Industrial workers are susceptible to exploitation also owing to their low pay scales. In the more industrialized states average monthly earnings in industry range, [redacted] [redacted] from 67 to 123 rupees (US$14 to $26). It is estimated by this source that 166 rupees per month would constitute a living wage (i.e., it would provide adequate food, clothing, and shelter and a certain measure of frugal comfort and security). India has an oversupply of labor for its current level of development, and the workers' bargaining position is correspondingly reduced. These conditions, plus their inability to provide effective spokesmen for their interests from within their own ranks, have made workers vulnerable to exploitation and victimization by employers and have increased their general dissatisfaction.

Communists, in addition to exploiting the real grievances of the workers, have also benefited from the general nature of the Indian trade union movement. Union activity, which began shortly after World War I, has fallen mainly into the hands of politicians, who represent an educational and social level having little in common with the workers. The four main federations are all affiliated with political parties. The Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC) is closely identified with the ruling Congress Party; the All-India Trade Union Congress is the labor arm of the CPI; the *Hind Mazdoor Sabha* (HMS-Indian Labor Congress) is controlled by the Praja Socialist Party and the Socialist Party; and the United Trade Union Congress (UTUC) is associated with the Revolutionary Socialist Party and other radical leftwing groups. INTUC is often inhibited by its association with the ruling party from making exaggerated labor demands, the HMS suffers from lack of funds and organizational drive, and the UTUC is too small to provide effective nationwide competition for the Communists. As a result, the ably led AITUC, which is reinforced by the effective and dedicated Communist Party apparatus, has been able to make steady inroads among labor during recent years.

B. Penetration of industrial labor

1. Early activity

The Indian trade union movement began about 1919. Communist infiltration commenced almost immediately, particularly among Indian seamen who were recruited by agents of the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) in British ports. These seamen were probably used by the international Communist movement to carry messages and propaganda to the embryonic Communist movement in India.

Effective Communist trade union activity within India started in 1926 following the arrival of the British Communist George Allison, who was probably sent to India by the Red International of Labor Unions (RILU). Allison and another British Communist, Philip Spratt, were instrumental in organizing textile workers, railroadmen, municipal employees, dock workers, and pressmen, particularly in Bombay City. By the end of 1928, the Communist-dominated Girni Kamgar Union (Mill Workers' Union) which was led by S. A. Dange, now general secretary of the AITUC, had 54,000 members among Bombay textile workers. The Communist-controlled GIP (Great Indian Peninsula) Railwaymen's Union had a membership of about 41,000 in 1929.

2. All-India Trade Union Congress

a. BACKGROUND — The first national trade union federation in India, the All-India Trade Union Congress, which has been the labor arm of the CPI since the mid-1940's was founded in 1920. Its organizers were not Marxist revolutionaries, but bourgeois nationalists with close ties to the Congress Party. Most affiliated unions were headed by English skilled workers indirectly connected with the government or by humanitarian reformers; all were sadly lacking, from the Communist point of view, in a clear conception of the meaning of the class struggle.

Communist infiltration of the AITUC began in the mid-1920's, and by 1929 Communists were in a strong minority position, ranking behind representatives of the Gandhian and democratic Socialist wings of the Congress Party. The history of the AITUC during the 1930's was one of constant friction among these three groups and successive defections by various elements which formed rival federations. A semblance of harmony was created in early 1941 when all three groups agreed on a policy of noncooperation with the war effort of the British Government of India. However, this harmony was short-lived. Following the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union, the CPI switched to a policy of supporting the war, while leaders of the Congress Party and its Socialist wing, the Congress Socialist Party, were imprisoned for their continued obstructionism. By the time the nationalist leaders were released (1945–46) Communists had gained firm control over many of AITUC's constituent unions and were firmly entrenched in the national organization as well. Congress Party leaders, who failed in their attempt to regain control over the organization, withdrew in 1947 and formed the rival Indian National Trade Union Congress. They were soon followed by the Socialists, who withdrew in December 1948 to form the *Hind Mazdoor Sabha*, and AITUC became a strictly Communist front organization.

b. **ORGANIZATION AND FINANCES** — The present constitution of the AITUC was adopted in 1945 when the Congress Party and the Socialists were still nominally within the federation. It is clearly a Communist-inspired document. The constitution defines a trade union as "an organ of class struggle" and states that in the long run "labor and capital cannot be reconciled within the capitalist system." These passages were omitted when the document was amended in 1957, but there is no reason to believe that the basic objectives of the federation have changed.

The most important executive body, according to the constitution, is the General Session, theoretically a yearly conclave of representatives of all affiliated unions. FIGURE 5–1 shows the theoretical position of this body within the AITUC hierarchy. Under the amended constitution a union with less than 200 members is entitled to one delegate at the General Session; larger unions elect one delegate for each 200 members with a final fraction larger than 100 counting for an additional delegate. Despite their designation as "annual," these sessions have in practice been held much less frequently. Between 1942 and 1957 only seven sessions were convened, and actual direction of AITUC affairs has devolved on the higher officers.

The national officers elected at the General Sessions are the president; seven vice presidents (until 1957 the constitution specified five); a general secretary; a treasurer; and not more than five assistant secretaries (four prior to 1957). The constitution does not specifically define the functions of these officers except to indicate that they shall be *ex officio* members of the General Council (see below). In practice, however, the president has tended to become a figurehead, and principal power—as in the case of most Communist dominated organizations—has rested with the general secretary.


AITUC GENERAL SESSION
GENERAL COUNCIL
President
7 Vice Presidents
General Secretary
Treasurer
Secretaries*
Other Members
WORKING COMMITTEE
AITUC Officers and 35 Others
Political Committee
Affiliated NATIONAL TRADE UNIONS
Provincial Trade Union Congress Committee
1
2
KEY
1 Policy Direction and Election of all Members
2 Policy Direction and Election of 35 Members
Representation
*Maximum of five.

FIGURE 5–1. ORGANIZATION OF THE ALL-INDIA TRADE UNION CONGRESS, 1959

Membership on the General Council, the largest executive body elected during the General Sessions, has been by industrial category with proportional representation for each category on a sliding scale similar to that used in determining representation of session delegates. In 1954, 110 council members were elected; in 1957 there were 154. In the future, according to an amendment adopted in 1957, members will be elected from among the session delegates on a state basis, each state being entitled to one representative on the council for every 5,000 members up to 50,000, one for every additional 10,000, and one from each trade federation or group formed in the state by the General Council. The council may, also, within certain limitations, co-opt additional members. The General Council is supposed to meet at least once a year, and although its functions are not clearly indicated by the constitution, in practice it has determined or sanctioned AITUC policy during the intervals between General Sessions.

Within the General Council there is a Working Committee which, according to the constitution, is to consist of the national officers of the AITUC and 35 members (1957 amendment) elected by the General Council "by a system of cumulative voting." The constitution further provides that the Working Committee shall meet at least twice a year and that it has authority; 1) to take all necessary steps for carrying out the resolutions passed at the previous General Session; 2) to deal with any emergency that arises during the year affecting the interests of the working class; and 3) generally to advance and further the aims and objectives of the AITUC. The Working Committee may appoint from among its members a seven-man Political Committee to conduct "political propaganda" among the working class. No information is available on the functioning of this committee.

Communist Party control over the AITUC is ensured by the fact that the top leaders of the federation are also active in the major Party councils. The members of the CPI Central Executive Committee have traditionally divided responsibilities for the various types of Party work according to their own specialized interests and capacities.

For example, S. A. Dange, a member of this committee, and general secretary of the AITUC, has major responsibility for Communist trade union activity. Efforts are now being made, however, to abandon this pattern in favor of one that would provide more generalized central executive control over each major activity. For further details on central CPI control over Party activities in various fields see this Supplement, SECTION 3, under Central Organization.

In addition to its central organization, the AITUC has regional branches. The constitution provides that in every "provincial administrative unit" (state or federal territory) all unions affiliated with the AITUC shall form a Provincial Trade Union Congress (TUC) Committee. If a state consists of two linguistic units, two provincial TUC committees may be authorized by the General Council. Unions not affiliated with the AITUC may not become members of the provincial committee, but a union which "proposes to observe the constitution of the AITUC" without seeking membership may be enrolled by the provincial committee as an associate member, without voting or other privileges of AITUC-affiliated unions.

The AITUC is financed in part by contributions levied on member unions. According to the amended constitution, each affiliated union shall pay: 1) an annual contribution of 10 rupees (US$2.10) for a membership of 250 or less, 15 rupees for 251 to 500 members, 20 rupees for 501 to 1,000 members, and at a rate of two *naye paise* (2% of a rupee) per member for unions with over 1,000 members; 2) a World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) levy of 5 rupees per 1,000 members or major fraction thereof, with a minimum of 2.5 rupees for a membership of less than 500; 3) annual subscriptions to the *Trade Union Record* (the AITUC journal); 4) a delegation fee of 2 rupees per delegate to the General Sessions; and 5) such other levies as may be fixed by a vote of not less than two-thirds of the members of the General Council. Levies may be passed on to the individual workers rather than being paid out of the constituent union funds, and collection tactics at times involve considerable pressure.

Funds are also available to the AITUC from sources outside India, probably by way of the CPI in most cases. The AITUC is aided somewhat more directly by the Communist-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions. The substantial sum paid to S. A. Dange as WFTU vice president, ostensibly as salary, is reportedly turned over to the AITUC. Specific needs at times of crises are often partially met through WFTU contributions. Between July 1950 and May 1952, the WFTU contributed 20,000 rupees (US$4,200) to the defense of workers on trial for acts committed during the 1948–50 period of extreme militancy. The May 1958 strike by the Jamshedpur Mazdoor Union (JMU—see below), was reportedly financed by a large gift from the WFTU.

c. LEADERSHIP — From 1943 until 1947 the post of general secretary of the AITUC was held by a moderate non-Communist, N. M. Joshi; however, during this period CPI leader S. A. Dange twice occupied the president's chair and was one of five vice presidents during the remaining term. In late 1947 Dange formally took over and has since retained, the post of general secretary, which had become the locus of power within the organization. Another hardcore Communist with a long record of holding office in the AITUC is S. S. Mirajkar who was elected president in 1957. Like Dange, he is from the Bombay area and is a veteran member of top CPI executive bodies. The leadership of the federation from 1943–57 is portrayed in FIGURE 5–2.

FIGURE 5–2. AITUC LEADERS ELECTED

	20TH, NĀGPUR 1943	21ST, MADRAS 1945	22ND, CALCUTTA 1947
President	S. A. Dange	Mrinal Kanti Bose	S. A. Dange
Vice presidents	S. C. Sen	S. A. Dange	Aftab Ali
	S. K. Pramanik	V. Chakkarai Chettiar	S. S. Yusuf
	B. K. Mukherji	S. S. Mirajkar	S. S. Mirajkar
	Fazl-i-Ilahi Qurban	P. C. Bose	K. N. Joglekar
	Gulam Mohammed Khan	Juggun Khan	R. A. Khedgikar
General secretary	N. M. Joshi	N. M. Joshi	N. M. Joshi
Treasurer	R. A. Khedgikar	R. A. Khedgikar	Peter Alvarez
Assistant secretaries	Shanta Bhalerao	Shanta Bhalerao	Shanta Mukherju
	S. S. Mirajkar	Manek Gandhi	Manek Gandhi
	n a	N. V. Phadke	N. V. Phadke
	n a	N. V. Phadke	Dinkar Desai
	...	...	...

* Resigned in 1958.

The degree of Communist dominance over the AITUC is illustrated by the composition of the top leadership elected at the 24th General Session in 1954. Of the top eight offices, six were held by Communist Party members. Two (Dange and and Sen) were members of the CPI Politburo, and two more (Mirajkar and Aruna Asaf Ali) were members of the Central Committee. The president was a prominent Communist labor leader from Madras State, and the treasurer was a Communist M.P. from that state. The two remaining leaders had worked closely with Communists. The 1957 list of officers reveals similar Communist dominance. Of the top 10 officers, at least 6 are members of the CPI, and the remainder are representatives of closely cooperating groups. In 1958, the non-CPI element was further reduced when vice president Hemanta Kumar Bose, a member of the All-India Forward Bloc, resigned his position owing to "undue CPI influence" over the AITUC.

Liaison between the top leadership of the AITUC and the state and local committees and constituent unions appears to present problems. Many state leaders place regional loyalties ahead of national AITUC considerations, and cohesion within the federation is thus reduced. Attempts on the part of national leaders to keep in touch with the state organizations are frequently frustrated by lack of personnel and the pressure of work. Official Communist Party literature indicates that the AITUC has suffered from a shortage of trained leaders at the secondary level. The fact that Communist unions have been in general more effective than their non-Communist rivals, indicates that this shortage is not critical.

d. MEMBERSHIP — FIGURE 5–3 shows the membership claims, as of March 31, 1958, submitted by the AITUC and the three other all-India trade union federations to the Labor and Employment Ministry of the central government, as required by law. This ministry is responsible for investigating the competing claims and publishing official "verified" membership figures which serve as the basis for the government's determination of representa-

FIGURE 5–3. CLAIMED MEMBERSHIP OF MAJOR TRADE UNION FEDERATIONS BY INDUSTRY, MARCH 31, 1958, INDIA

INDUSTRY	AITUC	INTUC	HMS	UTUC
Textile	341,380	410,961	66,027	39,342
Iron and steel	47,134	34,368	3,834	484
Metal trades	2,593	17,521	3,559	687
Engineering	94,149	39,980	50,964	19,516
Transport	92,710	190,413	8,383	14,602
Railroads	32,016	0	11,094	0
Plantations	142,447	308,462	30,442	27,247
Mining (coal)	66,717	110,648	64,913	13,246
Quarrying (other than coal)	73,519	9,110	8,875	540
Agriculture	57,081	4,322	1,750	8,569
Sugar	22,990	50,528	30,027	10,636
Cement	9,778	19,360	3,048	731
Chemical	21,685	40,796	18,445	4,460
Building and construction	48,608	8,115	6,469	154
Food and drink	13,420	7,543	2,449	2,570
Tobacco	98,287	9,122	4,105	3,031
Tanneries and leather	9,699	12,395	2,035	296
Paper and paper products	220	7,892	1,078	349
Printing and publishing	38,090	9,226	5,110	10,686
Local governmental bodies	52,594	33,896	23,486	9,099
Glass and potteries	19,721	6,549	200	2,930
Petroleum	10,976	3,281	850	0
Salaried employees	6,488	51,438	6,212	11,218
Personal services	32,465	8,999	3,305	3,378
Bank employees	0	470	3,365	0
Port and dock	19,001	30,871	42,804	18,775
Shipbuilding and repairs	6,953	0	0	0
Miscellaneous	180,127	28,767	18,700	23,474
Total	1,540,849	1,455,033	407,509	225,980

NOTE For a discussion of the reliability of these figures see text.

AT THE GENERAL SESSIONS, 1943–57

23D, BOMBAY 1949	24TH, CACUTTA 1954	25TH, ERNĀKULAM 1957
V. Chakkarai Chettiar	V. Chakkarai Chettiar	S. S. Mirajkar.
n a	Ranen Sen	Hemanta Kumar Bose.*
n a	Satyapriya Bannorji	Ranen Sen.
n a	S. S. Mirajkar	P. Ramamuyrti.
n a	Aruna Asaf Ali	Kedar Das.
n a	R. K. Haldulkar	P. Balachandra Menson Parvathi Krishnan.
S. A. Dange	S. A. Dange	S. A. Dange.
M. S. Bakshi	K. Anandan Nambiar	T. B. Vithal Rao.
n a	Maqdoom Mohiuddin	K. T. K. Thangamani.
n a	P. Balachandra Menon	Raj Bahadur Gour.
n a	Arvind Ghoshal	Indrajeet Gupta.
n a	S. Krishnamurthi	Satish Loomba.
...	...	K. G. Srivastava.

tion on committees, boards, and other groups—local, national, and international—in which labor is a component. The 1958 verified figures had not yet been published by March 1959.

There is always a great discrepancy between claimed and verified figures. The central government official responsible for investigating the competing claims for 1958 told a U.S. official in February 1959 that in his opinion the AITUC claim of 1,540,849 members was exaggerated by about 40%; the INTUC claim of 1,455,033 by about 20–25%; the HMS claim of 407,509 by about 15%; and the UTUC claim of 225,980 by about 20%. If this assumption is correct, the relative membership strengths of the four federations is approximately as follows:

INTUC	1,164,000
AITUC	1,100,000
HMS	355,000
UTUC	188,000

While the INTUC claimed only a modest increase in membership since 1953 (1,347,000 claimed; 905,000 verified), AITUC gains, even allowing for exaggeration, have been substantial (1953 claimed membership 541,000; verified 225,000). This increase is discussed below under Organization and Infiltration of Local Unions.

Most informed observers in India doubt that the AITUC is larger than the INTUC. In any event, the Government of India officially recognizes the INTUC as the largest labor federation in India. A finding in favor of the AITUC would result in Indian labor being represented in international groups by a Communist organization.

The regional distribution of AITUC strength in India is suggested by the distribution of the 154 representatives (elected by industrial category) on the General Council of the organization, as indicated in the following listing:

	NUMBER	PERCENT
West Bengal	26	*16.9*
Tamil Nad (Madras)	20	*13.0*
Kerala	18	*11.7*
Bombay	15	*9.8*
Andhra Pradesh	13	*8.5*
Uttar Pradesh	9	*5.9*
Bihār	8	*5.2*
Punjab	8	*5.2*
Mysore	7	*4.5*
Delhi	7	*4.5*
Madhya Pradesh	6	*3.9*
Manipur	4	*2.6*
Orissa	4	*2.6*
Assam	3	*1.9*
Gujarāt	3	*1.9*
Rājasthān	3	*1.9*
	154	*100.0*

e. PRESENT POLICIES — The most explicit statements of AITUC policy are contained in the reports to the General Sessions by the general secretary, and in the resolutions passed at these sessions. In addition, AITUC policies which go beyond or modify the positions outlined in these reports and resolutions are implicit in other statements by federation leaders and in the stands taken by the AITUC or its member unions on particular questions.

AITUC policies are applications of CPI policies, which in turn are determined in part by the needs of international communism. AITUC makes no attempt to conceal its Communist affiliation. For example, the general secretary's report at the December 1957 AITUC session began by congratulating the Soviet Union for launching Sputnik, a development which proved that "the working class is advancing, the world of capitalism and imperialism receding." The report criticized the "American imperialists" and pointed with pride to the "generous" and "efficient" help received by India from the "socialist countries headed by the Soviet Union." It condemned the "antiworking class, antipeasant, antipeople" monopolist forces within and outside the Congress Party governments on the national and state levels but referred repeatedly to the "progressive" measures being instituted by the "working class" government in Kerala.

The AITUC's labor policies give expression to the CPI line for India, which as of early 1959, means a moderate approach, reliance on legal and parliamentary means, and support for some phases of the Congress Party government's economic program. Continuing the trend set at the fourth Communist Party Congress in April 1956, the AITUC in a resolution at its 1957 conference came out strongly in support of the second five-year plan, calling on the trade unions to launch a campaign to assure its success. The second plan was deemed more worthy of support than the first, which emphasized agriculture (and thus did not lead to economic independence) because: 1) a large part of the investment under this plan will be in the state sector; 2) heavy industry will be developed; 3) there will no longer be sole reliance on capitalist countries for aid; 4) land reforms are promised; and 5) the government "has adopted socialism as its objective." At the same time the resolution charged that since the plan is administered by bureaucratic agencies, it is not sufficiently amenable to "criticism and proposals of the democratic masses and their organizations";

these organizations must therefore seek to increase the degree of "democratic participation."

Another resolution adopted in 1957 pointed to the need for trade union unity, without which "a real victory in the working class struggle is not possible." In view of the "intransigent attitude" of the Congress-controlled INTUC, the AITUC set as its immediate goal persuading the HMS and UTUC to join in a united labor front. In an attempt to prove its *bona fides*, the general secretary's report to the General Session observed that "unity is a principle and not merely a tactic." Communist hopes for closer cooperation with these two federations are encouraged by the fact that both have refused to make common cause with INTUC. However, in early 1959 both HMS and UTUC leaders appeared to be wary of a national alliance with AITUC, and prospects for close cooperation were remote.

The publicly stated policy of the AITUC on strikes follows the current moderate line of the CPI. "Organize and unite, demonstrate and protest, negotiate and settle; if that fails, strike peacefully and as a last resort" is the recommendation in the 1957 general secretary's report. The Communist position in Kerala is also of importance in determining this viewpoint. The Chief Minister of this Communist-run state, E. M. S. Namboodiripad, a leading Party theoretician and member of the CPI Central Executive Committee, in his inaugural address at the AITUC conference in 1957, stressed that "long-term agreements to ensure industrial peace are of paramount importance." This moderate policy on strikes, is not however, without opposition. Some West Bengal labor leaders are especially strong in opposing this stand, and others would no doubt abandon it quickly should it cease to be of tactical advantage.

As regards wages and other issues between labor and management, the AITUC has also become more restrained. While continuing to demand more pay and additional benefits for labor, it has attempted, with a few notable exceptions, to keep these demands within the general requirement of moderation. As S. A. Dange has been quoted as saying, unions should not try to apply rigid formulas as to minimum wages and percentage increases in wages, but should in making their demands take into consideration the conditions of an industry. Here again, however, as in the case of the strike policy, the AITUC unions are not as circumscribed in their actions as are unions connected through the INTUC to the Congress Party government.

f. INTERNATIONAL AFFILIATION — The AITUC is a member of the Communist-front World Federation of Trade Unions, and S. A. Dange has been a vice president of the WFTU since 1949. Contact between the Soviet-controlled union and the Indian Communist trade union movement is also maintained through visits of Indian leaders to the U.S.S.R. S. A. Dange spent a portion of 1958 in Moscow, ostensibly for medical treatment. In the other direction, representatives of labor organizations in the Communist bloc visit India, particularly to participate in or observe meetings of the AITUC. At the December 1957 General Session of the AITUC, "fraternal delegates" included trade union representatives from the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Communist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam. In addition to these visits, regular contacts are maintained through the Soviet and other Communist-bloc embassies in India.

International contacts are limited by governmental measures restricting the number of trade unionists permitted to visit Communist countries. Often AITUC members are denied visas on the grounds that their invitations to visit Communist nations were not transmitted through the Ministry of External Affairs in accordance with existing regulations. However, in line with its foreign policy of non-alignment, the Government of India also restricts the number of Indian trade unionists visiting Western countries.

There appears to be relatively little direct contact with Communist labor organizations in other countries of Asia. In November 1949 a trade union conference of Asian and Australian countries was held in Peiping under the auspices of the World Federation of Trade Unions, but India was not represented. At the suggestion of the Soviet delegate, the conference resolved to establish a permanent liaison bureau to coordinate the activities of Asian and Australasian trade unions. This was to consist of four members, one each from the U.S.S.R., Communist China, India, and Australasia. There is no evidence, however, that an Indian member ever served on the bureau or that it actually began functioning.

In 1952 the Chinese Communists showed a specific interest in Indian trade unions by inviting a group of Indian labor leaders to Peiping for the May Day celebrations. Invitations were extended to individuals—including three members of the Central Committee of the CPI, other important Communists, and several influential fellow travelers—rather than to any of the national trade union federations. When the Government of India objected to this procedure, the Chinese government invited the three national trade union federations to send representatives. The INTUC turned down the invitation, but the HMS joined the AITUC in accepting. However, some of the Communist delegates, including S. A. Dange, were denied passports by the Government of India. In 1955 the All-China Federation of Labor again invited a group of Indian unionists for the May Day festivities. While the Soviet Union's influence on AITUC is clear, there is no evidence, despite the visits cited above, that Communist China exerts control over or has substantial influence on the organization.

3. Organization and infiltration of local unions

a. Factors affecting Communist success — As has been the case in many other countries, Communist organizers have often established greater rapport with the workers than have organizers for non-Communist unions. INTUC leaders have tended to remain aloof, but the Communists have mixed freely with the workers in their homes and at community gatherings. They have studiously maintained an unobtrusive standard of living. While INTUC leaders in Bangalore, for example, are reported to ride in state cars, the CPI labor leader rides a bicycle between his modest residence and the various factories. In avoiding acts that might alienate them from the workers by placing them too conspicuously on a higher social level, Communist organizers put themselves in a better position to influence the workers and to orient them toward the Communist Party.

Few of the members of a union need be Party members for the union to come under *de facto* Communist control. As elsewhere, many non-Communist workers are willing to accept Communist leadership because it appears to be more aggressive and more competent in seeking short-range gains than the alternative non-Communist leadership. The indifference of many other workers works to the advantage of the Communists; sparsely attended union meetings are often dominated by a small but disciplined Communist faction; non-Communist majorities are often split by running dummy candidates for organizational offices; whispering campaigns against non-Communist candidates or officers, and other devices are employed to undermine the opposition; if efforts to take over a union fail, it can be, and often is, split.

In addition to effective discipline within local unions, the Communists maintain tighter lines of control than non-Communist labor organizations between the national headquarters and local unions. Local union leaders operate under instructions from higher levels, and the entire movement is integrated under AITUC control. The leader who rides a bicycle rather than a car in the area of his direct leadership may nevertheless fly back and forth to higher union headquarters on weekends. When the penetration of an industry or an industrial complex, such as the iron and steel works at Jamshedpur (see below), is given high priority, top-level leaders play direct roles in planning the activities of the local unions. S. A. Dange, for example, visited the Jamshedpur area several times prior to the strike of 1958.

Communist unions benefit not only from their own qualities but in many cases from the ineptness of opposing unions, particularly INTUC-affiliated unions which are handicapped by too close identification with the Congress Party and the government. The necessity for following governmental labor policy and refraining from actions which might annoy the authorities prevents the INTUC from pursuing courses of action which would dramatically demonstrate interest in the workers' welfare. Local INTUC leaders tend to rely on the state rather than their own efforts to fulfill their objectives. As a consequence, concessions given to workers belonging to INTUC unions are frequently attributed by the workers to state intervention rather than to the effectiveness of the union.

Employers sometimes play into the hands of the Communists. Those who adopt an attitude of intransigent opposition to labor unions foster the belief, on the workers' part, that only through such opposition as the Communists provide can the employers be persuaded or forced to give way. Other employers, who are willing to deal with unions, sometimes prefer to deal with the Communists on the grounds that AITUC is more disciplined and dependable.

It has been argued that in the long run the cause of labor would be aided by cutting the INTUC loose from the government and by introducing a free ballot system similar to that used by the NLRB in the United States whereby Indian workers could choose their own union. The Government of India, however, refuses to adopt such a practice, apparently out of fear that a free trade union movement might not be amenable to government control. That there is no strong non-Communist trade union movement independent of the government in the meanwhile works to the advantage of the AITUC.

b. Areas of Communist strength — Communists have concentrated their efforts in selected fields of industry with the major criteria apparently being the susceptibility of workers to Communist blandishments and the strategic importance of the industry. It is often difficult to determine the exact degree of Communist control or influence in a union or in the unions of a particular industry. In the opinion of an American official, on the basis of personal experience and the testimony of a knowledgeable official of the Government of India Labor and Employment Ministry, Communist strength lies mainly in the following industries or parts thereof (though dominated by Communists or fellow travelers, the unions are not all affiliated with AITUC):

	ESTIMATED MEMBERSHIP
NOT AFFILIATED WITH AITUC:	
Post and telegraph	175,000
Banking	65,000
Insurance	20,000
Defense	150,000
Civil aviation	7,000
	CLAIMED MEMBERSHIP
AITUC AFFILIATED:	
Plantations (Kerala)	35,475
Iron and steel (Bihār and West Bengal)	46,720
Inland waterways (West Bengal)	9,900
Engineering (West Bengal)	45,705
Mining (gold and manganese)	66,717
Tobacco	98,287
Petroleum	10,976

Communist strength in post and telegraph, banking, and insurance enterprises is perhaps due to two main factors, apart from Communist interest in, and effort toward, domination of these key groups. First, these are governmental industries (post and telegraph entirely and the other two largely) and it is particularly difficult for INTUC unions, associated as they are with the ruling Congress Party, aggressively to represent the workers in a government industry. Secondly, many of the unions in these industries are composed largely of white-collar workers who are educated and who frequently are dissatisfied with the fruits of their education.

The first factor and to a lesser extent the second also help to explain Communist strength in the defense industry. Civil aviation is also government owned, and the union in this industry includes a high proportion of white-collar and skilled workers. It is significant that the Communist-dominated (or strongly influenced) unions in all of these government industries are not affiliated with the AITUC. Such affiliation would perhaps too clearly identify Communist influence and thus increase the unions' liability to Congress Party countermeasures.

The importance of the iron and steel industry has stimulated the Communists to an all-out, well-organized, and well-financed effort to gain control. In the remaining areas of Communist strength it would seem that localized and particularized factors have made for Communist success.

In certain additional key industries the Communists are sometimes credited with a strength they do not actually possess. They are weak, though not unrepresented, among port and dock workers and among engineering workers, except in the city of Calcutta. They appear on the whole to be weak among railroad workers, although they have pockets of strength in this industry. The Communists' overall position in the textile industry is weak, but they have made recent gains in Bombay (see below under Textiles).

(1) *Postal and telegraph* — The principal organization representing postal and telegraph workers is the National Federation of Posts and Telegraph Employees (NFPTE), which claims a membership of about 170,000 and has nine all-India affiliates. The NFPTE is not officially Communist, but most of its leaders are either Communists or are amenable to Party control or manipulation. The NFPTE is affiliated in India with the Confederation of Central Government Employees' Unions, which is non-Communist but in which Communist influence is sometimes apparent.

Before December 1955 the NFPTE was affiliated internationally with the non-Communist Posts, Telegraphs, and Telephones international (PTTI) but left that organization allegedly because the PTTI objected to the federation's sending fraternal delegates to a world conference of the WFTU and to other Communist-run meetings. However, there are indications that leaders of the federation would like to reaffiliate with the PTTI. In 1957 the NFPTE secretary general requested financial aid from the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and PTTI for the proposed strike of government workers (see below), and a resolution adopted during the federation's annual convention in January 1959 recommended reaffiliation. However, the PTTI Executive Board has not accepted these overtures. Its decision will be based in part on the report of a PTTI member who was sent to India in September 1958 to determine whether the NFPTE was Communist controlled and to ascertain the advisability of forming a rival federation, as had been suggested by two leaders of a non-Communist union of postal and telegraph workers in Calcutta. This representative reported that the great majority of workers in the local unions affiliated with the NFPTE are democratic in outlook but are ill equipped to combat Communist efforts in their midst. Commenting on NFPTE office holders, the PTTI observer said that the president, an independent attorney, is a "wavering Bombay independent" who has little actual interest in the organization and is inclined to surrender to CPI pressure. The secretary general, B. N. Ghosh, occasionally shows signs of independence but generally follows CPI directives. The secretary and treasurer of the federation are Communists. Of nine vice-presidents, five are definitely not Communists, but none of these is a strong leader. By contrast, one vice president, Om Prakash Gupta, is a hard-boiled Communist who exercises considerable influence within the NFPTE. The PTTI has apparently decided not to form a rival federation but will attempt to undermine Communist control within the existing organization.

The most recent manifestation of Communist influence among postal and telegraph employees was the threatened strike of central government employees in July and August 1957 as a result of the government's refusal to appoint a second Pay Commission and to concede certain wage and cost of living demands. The Communist AITUC joined the HMS and UTUC in extending support to the government workers, while the Congress-controlled INTUC did its cause little good by advising the workers to call off the threatened strike. The decision to strike was apparently made by the Communist-influenced NFPTE, with other groups following its lead. However, while negotiations were being carried on with the government, the *Lok Sabha* (lower house of Parliament) passed the Essential Services Maintenance Bill, which empowered the Government of India to declare illegal any strike in an essential industry and to arrest without warrant participants in such a strike. When it appeared that government workers were not prepared to strike under these conditions, the CPI switched its tactics and advised that the strike be called off. It is clear, however, that the Communists are in a position to carry out more aggressive policies should these become tactically advisable.

(2) *Banking and insurance* — The most important union in the banking field is the All-India Bank Employees' Association (AIBEA), a Communist-dominated organization with a claimed membership of 65,000. Although it is not affiliated with the AITUC, its major officers are Communists. Employees who were dissatisfied with the Communist domination of the AIBEA recently withdrew and formed the independent All-India Bank Employees' Federation (AIBEF). The leading union in the insurance field is the All-India Insurance Employees' Association (AIIEA), which claims a membership of 22,000. It claims to be independent, but its leaders are Communists or fellow-travellers.

In some areas, private sector unions of bank employees are Communist controlled. One example is the Bengal Provincial Bank Employees' Association which in 1957 led a strike of bank employees in Calcutta. The strike was broken by being placed under compulsory adjudication, apparently on the decision of Prime Minister Nehru and B. C. Roy, the Chief Minister of West Bengal. The government apparently preferred not to persuade the Calcutta bankers to make limited concessions to the workers—as it could easily have done—because this would have bolstered Communist union leadership and enhanced the CPI reputation for satisfying the demands of the workers.

(3) *Defense* — Communist infiltration of government defense and ordnance industries has reached the point where the central government regards the major unions in these establishments as Communist controlled. Communists have successfully infiltrated the only important federation in that field, the All-India Defense Civilian Employees' Federation (AIDCEF), which probably has about 150,000 members. S. M. Joshi, the general secretary of the federation and a member of the Praja Socialist Party, so neglected his duties that S. M. Banerjee, Member of Parliament from Kanpur and a fellow-traveling official of the local defense workers' union, became the most influential figure in the AIDCEF. Communist domination of the federation is somewhat concealed, since it is nominally independent and not affiliated with the AITUC. The government does not anticipate the restoration of non-Communists to power. Congress Party officials forced Mrs. Maitreyee Bose, president of the West Bengal INTUC and of the AIDCEF, to resign from the latter office, and the INTUC, in turn, with the support of Central Law Minister Asoke Sen, was in the process of establishing a rival INTUC defense workers' federation in March 1959.

(4) *Strategic plants* — The South Indian city of Bangalore (Mysore State), blessed by a temperate climate, has become a thriving industrial center. The Government of India has located four strategic government-owned plants in the city: Hindusthan Aircraft, Bharat Electronics, Hindusthan Machine Tools, and Indian Telephone Industries. Sensing the strategic importance of Bangalore, the Communists have made a major effort in this area. They have been aided by the weakness of the INTUC and the lack of effective action on the part of the ministries of the central government under which the factories operate. The INTUC state president in Mysore is reported to be inept, and the general secretary, while possessing ability and integrity, is preoccupied with holding his own against strong Communist unions in the Kolār Gold Fields, located a short distance outside Bangalore, and on coffee plantations in Coorg District. INTUC unions in Bangalore have

been handicapped, as in government establishments elsewhere, by being identified with the government and regarded as company unions. Management personnel in the plants have suffered, in their efforts to combat Communist infiltration, from lack of sufficient training and experience. The facts that the employees are skilled and largely literate and that many of them are from the Kerala area, in which Communist influence is strong, have also aided the Communists in organizing the plants.

Until about the end of 1957, the Government of India attempted to give special favors to the INTUC in all four plants. However, finding the INTUC unions weak and unrepresentative, government officials shifted to a policy of favoring so-called "independent" or unaffiliated local unions whose leaders supposedly had little or no connection with any national labor federation or political party. These unions were infiltrated or supplanted by Communist-controlled unions, and by the end of 1958 Communists controlled or dominated the unions in three of the four plants and were strong in the fourth plant.

Communist activity in these plants appears to be controlled directly by central AITUC officials. The leading local Communist organizer is M. S. Krishnan, treasurer of the Karnatak (Mysore) Provincial Trade Union Congress (the state branch of the AITUC) and secretary of the Bangalore district committee of the CPI.

Of the four government plants in Bangalore, only Hindusthan Aircraft Limited (HAL) has had serious labor difficulty. The Hindusthan Aircraft Employees' Association (HAEA), the local union, was organized during World War II by the management, which was then American, and all workers in the factory were members. Control over the association was vested in an executive committee of 25 members. At first there were few if any Communists on the executive committee, but, as a result of successful infiltration into the association, 13 members of the committee are now Communists. The membership of the association is about 10,000, of whom perhaps 5,000 are active. Communists probably account for no more than 5% of the active membership. However, the bulk of the membership is passive and has been neutralized by Communist intimidation. The small anti-Communist element lacks strong leadership and has been unable successfully to challenge the tightly organized Communist fraction.

Communists appear to have further strengthened their position within this organization as a result of 1957–58 labor disturbances at HAL which present an interesting case study of Communist labor tactics. When the central government failed promptly to accede to an 18-point demand for higher wages and improved working conditions, Communist leaders of the association organized protest demonstrations in Bangalore, and two Communist members undertook a "fast unto death" to call attention to their grievances. The hunger strikers and about 80 other union leaders were arrested. This action temporarily stopped the disturbances, but it further inflamed their resentment against management. Slowdowns by labor were met by the arrest of several more labor leaders, including M. S. Krishnan. This led in February 1958 to a sitdown strike by workers in one section of the plant and to popular demonstrations during which police opened fire on an unruly mob. The management retaliated with a lockout. The employees were subsequently forced by economic necessity to return to work without their grievances having been met. Some concessions were subsequently made by the government, apparently under pressure from Defense Minister V. K. Krishna Menon who visited Bangalore in March 1958. Despite these concessions, which were largely credited to the Communists, labor resentment has continued and has helped strengthen Communist control over the local union.

The Communists, also under the leadership of M. S. Krishnan, captured the union at Bharat Electronics in the latter half of 1958. In late 1958 about 80% of the 1,385 employees belonged to the union. The managing director and personnel director of the plant, under instructions from the central Defense Ministry, have refused to recognize the union but have been forced nevertheless to bargain with Mr. Krishnan and his lieutenants. The local management has been unable to carry out instructions from the Defense Ministry to break the union and set up an "independent" rival.

At Hindusthan Machine Tools (HMT), M. S. Krishnan was elected president of the HMT Employees' Association in May 1958, and Communists are now in effective control of the union. Labor relations have been relatively harmonious at this plant, and, as a result, the Government of India selected HMT as the first G.O.I. industrial establishment in which labor was given a voice in management through representation on a Joint Management Council. The G.O.I. did not reverse this decision when Krishnan became president of the union, despite the fact that he was among those charged with incitement to violence in the Hindusthan Aircraft disturbances, and when elections to the Joint Management Council were held in mid-1958, the Communists won a resounding victory by electing a majority of the labor representatives on the council. Included among those elected was M. S. Krishnan. Communist success in these elections reflected the extent of Communist control over the local union, and, more importantly, it also indicated the enhanced prestige of the Communists following the HAL disturbances.

Communist infiltration of the union at Indian Telephone Industries has so far been less than at the other three government plants in Bangalore. The Communists hold the key position of general secretary and several other posts, but the continuance of non-Communist influence is indicated by the recent reelection of a Socialist to the presidency of the union.

A new Central Industries Employees' Federation, including unions in the four plants and representing 20,000 workers, was formed at a conference in November 1958 in Bangalore. This conference was inaugurated by P. Ramamurti, member of the CPI Central Executive Committee and vice president of the AITUC. A prominent Socialist leader presided, indicating a Communist desire to represent the new federation as bipartisan as well as Communist recognition of continuing Socialist influence in the Bangalore factories, particularly, as noted above, in Indian Telephone Industries. Elected president of the new federation was F. Louis, president of the Communist-dominated union of Hindusthan Aircraft and one of the principal figures in the February 1958 disturbances at that factory.

(5) *The West Bengal-Bihār industrial complex* — During the last four years the Communists have conducted a concerted drive to capture the labor movement in the rapidly developing industrial area of northeastern India. Here, owing to the conjunction of large-scale coal and iron deposits, the Government of India has located a large share of the new heavy industry under the second five-year plan. Communist influence in, or domination of, labor in this area would give the CPI considerably more political leverage on a national scale. Thus far the Communists have not succeeded in establishing the AITUC as the recognized union in any key plant or mine, nor are the Communists yet in a position to disrupt, at will, production in this area where India's hopes for an industrial future are centered. The drive has, however, established the Communists as the principal challenger to the recognized non-Communist unions, most of which are affiliates of the INTUC, and has brought them close to a position of predominance in the two steel plants at Jamshedpur and Asansol, in the Bengal coalfields, and in the iron mines.

The importance the Communists attach to their penetration of this area is indicated by the fact that their efforts are under the personal supervision of AITUC General Secretary S. A. Dange. In the four months before the May 1958 strike at the Tata Iron and Steel Company (see below), Dange made at least nine trips to Jamshedpur, where the company's plants are located. In addition, he is the president of the Communist union in the Indian Iron and Steel Company at Asansol.

Prominent among those assisting Dange in this area are three members of Parliament from West Bengal: Mrs. Renu Chakravarti, Mohammed Ilias, and Sadhan Gupta. Between Dange and these national CPI figures on the one hand, and the local union organizers on the other there are three intermediate levels whose role is not always clear. The Bihār and West Bengal state AITUC organizations appear to play only peripheral roles in labor activity in these industries; this is in marked contrast to the deep involvement of the West Bengal provincial AITUC in trade union affairs in Calcutta. There are also two AITUC-affiliated industrial federations in this area: the Federation of Engineering and Metal Workers and the Indian Mine Workers' Federation. Information on these federations is meager, and even the CPI press does not publicize their functions. It is not clear what operational role they play, but it has been suggested that they probably supervise the day-by-day deployment of CPI funds and organizers in their respective spheres. In addition to its formal organization, the AITUC makes use of "action," "strike," and "coordinating" committees to carry on its activities in this region. These frequently include non-Communists willing to cooperate with the Communists for limited objectives. These committees are particularly active during crises but also carry on during interim periods in the name of trade union unity.

Communist methods in this area have included murder, assault, intimidation, sabotage, illegal strikes, and hunger strikes, but the success of the Communists here, as elsewhere, is mainly attributable to their closely knit organization and their ability to identify themselves with the workers. It is noteworthy that in this industrial area Communist labor activity has been limited primarily to matters immediately affecting the workers, and union platforms have not been used (as they were used in Calcutta) to support CPI positions on national and international issues. The Communist union approach to management in the West Bengal-Bihār industrial region is to offer continued agitation so long as the union is not recognized and relative industrial peace if it becomes the official bargaining agent.

(a) STEEL — The steel industry is the base for India's industrial aspirations, and it is here that the Communists have come closest to achieving their objectives in the West Bengal-Bihār industrial region. Both of the private sector steel mills—the Tata Iron and Steel Company and the

Indian Iron and Steel Company—have strong Communist unions. At the three public sector mills, which only recently began production, labor organization has so far been limited to construction workers.

On May 12, 1958, the Communist-led Jamshedpur Mazdoor Union (JMU), an affiliate of the AITUC, called a one-day token strike in the Tata Iron and Steel Company (TISCO), the largest Indian producer of steel, in an attempt to secure recognition by management as the workers' sole bargaining agent. Although the strike was declared illegal by the government of Bihār and opposed by the recognized union in the plant, the INTUC-controlled Tata Workers' Union led by Congress labor leader Michael John, it was an initial success in that about 80% of the plant's labor force did not report for work. This success stemmed from several factors: 1) worker support for the economic demands of the JMU; 2) the intense pro-strike campaign organized by the JMU; 3) effective intimidation of non-Communist laborers by some 5,000 Communist supporters, many of them Party workers imported from Calcutta; 4) lack of effective police protection of loyal workers; and 5) the limited duration of the strike which did not threaten the workers with serious economic losses.

Following the token strike, TISCO suspended over 40 JMU organizers, and labor-management tension increased. On May 15 the Communists launched a sitdown strike, which was accompanied outside the plant by large-scale intimidation and attempted sabotage. By May 19 production was so disrupted that TISCO closed most sections of the plant. This produced a number of acts of violence and arson in the town of Jamshedpur which were dealt with firmly by the police, who on three occasions fired on unruly crowds. On May 28, after law and order was reestablished, TISCO reopened the plant, and when it became clear that a large number of workers were reporting for duty, the JMU called off the strike. On June 12 normal production levels were reached. The loss in man-hours caused by the strike reduced the production of steel by 45,000 tons.

The failure of this second phase of the strike was a blow to Communist prestige among the workers. It led to the discharge of almost 500 active JMU supporters, and it reinforced TISCO's determination to deal firmly with future JMU agitations. With most of its top men in police custody or under indictment, the JMU has had to import temporary leaders from West Bengal. In early 1959 it was making strenuous efforts to win back the support of the employees and to secure the reinstatement of the suspended workers.

At the Indian Iron and Steel Company at Asansol the Communists in 1956 organized the United Iron and Steel Workers' Union (UISWU) following nearly 10 years of agitation against and unsuccessful attempts to capture the recognized INTUC-controlled Asansol Iron and Steel Workers' Union (AISWU). Since its formation the UISWU has gained the support of a large number of workers within the plant, and most observers now believe that it is stronger than the AISWU. The company management has at times negotiated directly with the UISWU to terminate specific agitations, slowdowns, and sitdown strikes. The willingness of management to deal with other than recognized representatives of the workers and the absence of a concerted UISWU attempt to force recognition have led to reports that the CPI and the Indian Iron and Steel Company management have reached a secret agreement and that the CPI receives a regular bribe to keep it relatively quiet.

At the three public sector steel plants, which have only recently gone into production, the labor force has heretofore consisted almost entirely of construction workers. The AITUC and INTUC have both been chary of committing their prestige in organizing such temporary workers. Both the AITUC and INTUC have, however, given indications of intention to organize the workers in the newly opened plants. As yet there is no firm evidence of marked activity by either group.

(b) IRON ORE — The principal iron mines in India, which produce 80% of the nation's iron ore, are in the Bihār-Orissa border area. The ownership of most of the mines is in the hands of three major companies—the Tata Iron and Steel Company, the Indian Iron and Steel Company, and Bird and Company. The principal mining areas are Gua, Noāmundi, Birmitrapur, Bedampahar, and Barabil. Total employment is 30,000–40,000.

Union competition in the iron mines takes place entirely between the INTUC and AITUC. With one exception the INTUC unions, generally led by Michael John and other organizers from Bihār, are recognized by the mine management. Although AITUC did not start its organizational work in the mines until 1954, it was in a strong position by 1956, especially at Barabil and Gua. At the Barabil mines of Bird and Company, the CPI in 1956 gained control of the union formerly affiliated with the INTUC and presented additional workers' demands, in part to forestall the growth of a new INTUC union. The company retaliated with a long lockout which in turn provoked Communist mob violence during which the police opened fire on the demonstrators. The strike failed to produce concessions from management.

As a result, the union lost some prestige with the workers but is still in control and very active. In the Gua-Noāmundi area, the AITUC union in 1956–57 posed a major challenge to the recognized INTUC union. A series of clashes culminated in an attack by about 100 CPI followers on the INTUC headquarters in which two INTUC workers were killed. In the ensuing murder trial the leader of the Communist union was sentenced to life imprisonment and several other leaders to lesser prison terms. This was a severe setback to the CPI and left the INTUC, at least for the time being, in a relatively unthreatened position in this area.

(c) COAL — The most important coalfields are the Rānīganj field in West Bengal and the Jharia field in Bihār which together produce 80% of the coal mined in India. Together with other fields in West Bengal and Bihār they employ about 275,000 miners in some 700 active mines, many of which are very small.

In the Rānīganj field and many of the other fields in West Bengal the most prominent union is the Colliery Mazdoor Congress (CMC). This union is affiliated with the Socialist HMS but is infiltrated by Communists, whose influence has grown to the point where it is doubtful whether the CMC could undertake major activities without CPI approval. The Communists are not, however, in a position to commit the CMC to any course without the consent of HMS leaders at the top. In some other coalfields Communist unions are dominant. These unions are affiliated nationally with the AITUC and with the AITUC-affiliated Indian Mine Workers' Federation.

The Communists, although active, have made little headway in challenging the dominant position of the INTUC in the Jharia coalfield in Bihār. They are, however, making efforts to organize the new coalfields in Bihār and Madhya Pradesh which are being developed under the second five-year plan.

(d) OTHER INDUSTRIES — Heavy manufacturing and chemical factories have been established in conjunction with the coal-iron-steel complex, and more are continually being established. In the Jamshedpur area of West Bengal, Communist unions or Communist fractions in other unions are not yet in a position to disrupt production at will, but they offer a serious challenge to the dominant position of the INTUC unions. In the Asanol area of West Bengal the AITUC seems in general to be in a strong position, although seldom the recognized union. Exceptions to the general Communist strength in the West Bengal-Bihār area are the Government of India-owned Chittaranjan Locomotive Works in West Bengal and the Sindri Fertilizer Works in Bihār, where no AITUC fractions are yet visible.

(6) *Railroads* — The largest federation of railroad workers in India is the All-India Railwaymen's Federation (AIRF), which claims a membership of 300,000, or over half the total organized railroad workers. The AIRF is affiliated with the Socialist HMS and is controlled by HMS leaders, although some of its constituent unions are dominated by Communists. The All-India Station Masters' and Assistant Station Masters' Association (20,000 claimed membership), which is affiliated with the AIRF, is headed by Rajani Patel, a leading AITUC trade union leader in the Bombay area. That there may be some Communist influence in the AIRF at the national level is suggested by the fact that S. A. Dange, Communist Party leader and general secretary of the AITUC, was invited to the 1957 convention of this federation.

The only union of railroad workers affiliated with the AITUC is the Southern Railway Labor Union (SRLU), which claims a membership of 20,000 railroad workers in the southern part of Madras State. The SRLU was a recognized union until 1949 when recognition was withdrawn by the Government of India because the SRLU, in common with other Communist unions in India, adopted a policy of violence and sabotage in accordance with the CPI tactical line of that time. Despite a lack of recognition, the SRLU has maintained its membership. At its last annual conference at its headquarters near Tiruchirappalli, 400 delegates from 34 branches attended. Workers' rallies were held and were reportedly attended by some 50,000 people. Among the speakers were A. K. Gopalan, Deputy Leader of the CPI in the *Lok Sabha,* and P. Ramamurti, then a CPI Politburo member. The demand for recognition was prominent in the resolutions and all the speeches. In October 1958 the secretary of the union, K. Anandan Nambiar, started a fast which focused attention on SRLU's charge that the Government of India was being politically discriminatory in refusing recognition. The fast was broken when a mildly conciliatory, although unyielding note was received by A. K. Gopalan from Prime Minister Nehru, with whom he had interceded on Nambiar's behalf.

(7) *Textiles* — Major labor organizations in the textile industry, whose main centers are Ahmadābād and Bombay, are dominated by the Congress-controlled INTUC. Affiliated with the INTUC textile federation is the Ahmadābād Textile Labor Association (ATLA), which is a Con-

gress showpiece as a progressive, although paternalistic, union. In Bombay City, also, the INTUC union, with 98,000 claimed members, is the recognized union, although the Communists have traditionally been fairly strong in this area.

The Communist position in the Bombay textile industry improved in February 1959 with the formation of a united front union, the Mumbai Girni Kamgar Union (MGKU-Bombay Mill Workers' Union). The union grew out of a political organization, the *Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti* (United Maharashtra Committee), organized to work for the establishment of a Marathi-speaking state with Bombay as the capital city. Two individuals who were among the most active in planning for the new labor union were the Praja Socialist S. M. Joshi and the Communist S. A. Dange, who are now the union's president and general secretary, respectively. Leaders of the Praja Socialist Party and of the HMS have expressed their disapproval of S. M. Joshi's making common cause with the Communists but have taken no disciplinary action against him, probably because Joshi is one of the most effective PSP workers in Bombay and also because past experience has indicated that he would not be amenable to central party or HMS direction on this issue.

As of mid-March 1959 the new union had enrolled 87,000 members. This number apparently included the membership (18,000 in 1956) of the former AITUC-controlled Mill Mazdoor Union. On the basis of its membership, which exceeded that of the INTUC union, the MGKU was demanding recognition by the state government in March 1959 as the "representative union" of textile workers in Bombay.

(8) *Kerala* — In the 1957 Indian general election the Communists won a plurality in the south Indian state of Kerala (see this Supplement, SECTION 4, under Parliamentary Role). When they formed the state government, a new and unusual relationship between the state government and the Kerala wing of the Indian Communist labor movement was established.

The Communist election victory resulted in part from Communist labor strength in the state; Communists dominate most segments of labor, and Party leaders had built their political careers mainly on a foundation of militant trade unionism whose *modus operandi* included not only legitimate techniques but also incitement to violence and occasionally murder. Upon assuming office the Communists, needing labor tranquillity to attract new industry and investment to the state, shifted their emphasis and adopted a policy of peace in industry, direct negotiations between employers and employees, and three-year "truce" pacts. The new Kerala Labor Minister, T. V. Thomas, who was previously a militant leader of coir and transport workers, soon had to his credit a considerable number of notably successful negotiated settlements, particularly in the plantation industry. Many employers went along with the new governmental policy and concluded "truce" pacts with Communist unions in an effort to ensure industrial peace.

This moderate governmental policy was not without opposition within the CPI. Some Party members, as well as others outside the CPI, believed that many labor awards were more promanagement than prolabor and that the Communist government was sacrificing the workers' interests in favor of industrial harmony. This resentment was exacerbated in mid-1958 when the government made an agreement with the Gwalior Rayon Manufacturing Co., owned by the conservative industrial firm of Birla, which conceded almost carte blanche powers to management on personnel and labor questions. The government was no doubt aware that this contravened earlier Communist policy, but the need for new industries was apparently politically compulsive. The standing of the Kerala government among laborers suffered further in July 1958 when police, dispatched to protect management while finished goods were removed from a locked-out factory, fired on a demonstrating crowd of cashewnut workers near Quilon, causing two deaths.

When the CPI Central Executive Committee met in the Kerala capital city of Trivandrum in August 1958, the moderate labor policy of the Kerala government was severely criticized by some Party leaders. Labor Minister T. V. Thomas' successor among the Kerala coir workers castigated the state government for failing to bring heavy industry into the state. Several delegates blamed the state cabinet for the police firing near Quilon. The most severe criticism, however, came from the leaders of AITUC plantation unions in Kerala. They pointed out that in the May 1958 by-election in Devikolam constituency, the successful Communist candidate and Labor Minister Thomas had assured the plantation workers that in the event of a Communist victory the AITUC union would secure a large bonus payment for plantation workers throughout the state; only a small bonus, however, had been paid.

As a result of this criticism the Kerala government promised the national CPI officials to adopt a more militant labor policy. A meeting of Kerala AITUC officers was called, and it was decided that the first target for the new Communist labor policy would be the tea and coffee plantations, INTUC's major area of strength in the state, and in particular the Kannan Devan Hill Produce Company, a British-owned enterprise located in and around Munnar. The Communist plantation unions gained membership in this region during a strike in October 1958, since many workers joined in hope of greater gains or in fear of Communist intimidation. However, the strike was terminated in early November without achieving major concessions from management. The strike's failure and the violence it precipitated detracted from the Communist's reputation among the workers in Kerala, and some of the newly won AITUC support on the plantations was lost. However, it is likely that the Communists are still stronger on the plantations than when the CPI government assumed office in April 1957. On the other hand, they have failed, despite strenuous efforts, to make serious inroads among port labor in Cochin. The Communists were strong in Kerala labor before the elections, and on a statewide basis, they have gained somewhat since.

(9) *Others* — Calcutta shipowners have told a U.S. official that Communists dominate the inland waterways' unions in West Bengal and East Pakistan. Leaders come from the industry. Employers have admittedly paid both INTUC and HMS labor leaders to form rival unions, but the Communists have not been dislodged from their position.

Communists completely dominate the engineering industry in and around Calcutta. INTUC and HMS unions are weak and refuse to challenge the AITUC.

During 1958, the Communist union at the Kolār Gold Fields (now government owned) in Mysore State grew considerably stronger. Communist unions in several manganese ore mines in Madhya Pradesh also gained in strength. The Communists appear to dominate organized labor in the tobacco industry, being particularly strong in Madras and Andhra Pradesh.

The AITUC affiliated All-India Petroleum Workers' Federation dominates the petroleum industry, particularly in Bombay. However, there are indications that a new INTUC-sponsored federation supported by the non-Communist Petroleum Workers' International Federation is being organized as a rival to the Communist federation.

The rather small union in the civil aviation industry is Communist dominated and the INTUC has not been able to launch a rival organization. Teachers' organizations sometimes operate as trade unions, and some of these are under Communist influence or control. The Communists appear to be strongest among teachers' associations (no such organizations exist in Kerala) in West Bengal, where they have given a Communist orientation to the largest teachers' organization, the All Bengal Teachers' Association. The general secretary of this organization is also the secretary of the secondary teachers' group and the principal Communist leader in the All-India Federation of Educational Associations (AIFEA). The AIFEA top leadership managed, however, to keep the Communist minority in the organization under control.

C. Penetration of peasants and agricultural labor

1. All-India Kisan Sabha

The Comintern in 1926 established a special section of the *Krestintern* (the Comintern's peasant international) to carry on work among Indian peasants, but little effective activity took place until a national peasant organization was formed in India in 1936. Within this organization four elements fought for control: The Communists, the Congress Socialists, and two regionally oriented groups. The Communists exploited differences among the other groups and rapidly gained dominance over the organization, which in 1938 took the name All-India Kisan Sabha (AIKS), but their tendency to regard the AIKS as a subsidiary of the CPI led to the resignation of many non-Communists, and by 1945 the Communists were virtually alone in the AIKS.

This organization, like the CPI, suffered a loss of prestige owing to the Communists' collaboration with the British during World War II. It declined further as a result of the Communist embarkment on a militant leftist strategy from 1948–51 which resulted in police repression and which practically eliminated the AIKS as a national organization. Almost the entire membership of the Central Kisan Council (see below) was either in jail or underground, and no meetings of the Annual Session were held between 1948 and 1952. Since 1952, although meetings have been held, the AIKS has not succeeded in gaining significant strength.

a. STRUCTURE — The AIKS, as provided by its constitution, consists of a hierarchy of three national governing bodies and three units at lower levels, as follows:

Annual Session of elected delegates
All-India Kisan Committee
Central Kisan Council
Provincial Kisan Sabhas
District Kisan Sabhas
Primary Kisan Sabhas

Any peasant (*kisan*) 16 years of age or over may enroll as a member in the AIKS by joining one of the Primary Kisan Sabhas and by paying the dues fixed by the provincial unit. The relationships among the Primary, District, and Provincial Kisan Sabhas are determined by the provincial constitutions, which differ from area to area. The provincial constitutions also determine the manner in which delegates to the Annual Session of the AIKS are selected. Delegates are allocated on a provincial basis on a ratio of one for every 2,000 primary members, subject to a minimum of five delegates per state.

The Annual Session is supposed to be the primary policymaking body of the AIKS, but in practice it has generally served as a rubber stamp. The next largest body in the AIKS is the All-Indian Kisan Committee. Each province is represented on this committee according to its strength, members being elected from among the delegates to the Annual Session on the basis of one committee member for every five delegates. The committee in turn determines the size of the Central Kisan Council (CKC), in effect the executive board of the committee, and elects its members.

That the AIKS has been declining in vigor is suggested by the difficulties it has had in maintaining its organizational structure. Not only has attendance at Annual Sessions been spotty and payment of provincial dues to the central organization uncertain and irregular (see below), but meetings of the important Central Kisan Council have been poorly attended. Only three CKC meetings were held between the 1953 and 1954 Annual Sessions, and one of these had to be postponed for lack of a quorum (one-third of the members). Between the 1955 and 1957 sessions, CKC meetings were not productive, according to a leading Communist, partly because on two occasions a quorum was lacking. In 1956 the CKC membership was reduced from 43 to 25, thus reducing the quorum to nine.

b. MEMBERSHIP — Membership claimed by the AIKS (no information is available on actual as opposed to claimed membership) has been as follows at the times of the Annual Sessions:

1947	800,000	1955	1,100,000
1953	1,000,000	1956	693,205
1954	1,087,247	1957	600,000

The decline in 1956 was particularly striking since the CKC set a goal of 1,890,000 for the year. A goal of about 1,500,000 for 1957 was also not met. Membership drives, according to Communist sources, were not carried out as directed in many areas.

Membership claims for various regions fluctuate widely, but it appears that the Communist peasant movement is strongest in Kerala, Punjab, and West Bengal. According to the official organ of the West Bengal branch of the CPI, at the time of the 1957 Annual Session of the AIKS the memberships for these states, accounting for over two-thirds of the total claimed AIKS membership, were as follows: Kerala, 185,521; Punjab, 125,000; and West Bengal, 101,997.

c. LEADERSHIP — The AIKS officers normally include a president, a general secretary, two or three vice presidents, two to four joint secretaries, and a treasurer. The presidency is largely an honorary position, and incumbents of this office have not as a rule governed the organization. The present incumbent, A. K. Gopalan, who took office in 1956, is a capable peasant leader as well as a member of the CPI Central Executive Committee and deputy leader of the Communist group in the *Lok Sabha*. The pressure of other duties, however, has left him little time for the AIKS.

The general secretary is the most important official in the AIKS. Since 1953 this post has been held by N. Prasada Rao, a member of the CPI Central Executive Committee. He also represents the dominant faction in the Andhra Pradesh branch of the CPI,which is the chief advocate of an agrarian-based revolution. Rao has been obliged to run the AIKS almost singlehandedly and claims to be the only official functioning full time from the organization's central office in New Delhi.

Since 1953 the treasurer of the organization has been Baba Gurumukh Singh, a Punjabi whose age (born c. 1883) and long revolutionary career, including about 17 years in jail, give him prestige which is of value in soliciting contributions for the AIKS.

d. FINANCES — The financial resources of the AIKS and of its constituent branches are generally inadequate, the main source of income being membership fees. A member must pay an annual subscription, the amount to be determined by the Provincial Kisan Sabhas, with a minimum of about two cents. The Provincial Kisan Sabhas are supposed to forward this money to the center, but it appears that they either do not collect or do not forward the money regularly. For the fiscal year ending October 31, 1957, membership fees paid to the AIKS totaled 3,952.86 rupees, or only about one-tenth of what the claimed membership should have produced. In addition to membership fees, the AIKS should receive affiliation fees from the Provincial Kisan Sabhas at the rate of one paisa (a fraction of one cent) per member plus such other quotas as may be fixed by the

CKC or AIKS. Most if not all of the Provincial Kisan Sabhas are remiss in meeting their financial obligations to the central organization, and at any one time several are likely to be disaffiliated for nonpayment of dues. At the 1956 Annual Session eight Provincial Kisan Sabhas were unrepresented, and at the 1957 session five (of about fifteen) were unrepresented for this reason.

Donations are the second major source of AIKS income. In 1957 donations amounted to 683 rupees, a sum hardly sufficient to ease the financial pressure on the organization. While the Communist trade union wing secures substantial sums from the CPI and from the Soviet Union through the CPI, the Indian Communists' agrarian wing is virtually unsupported from foreign sources. This fact indicates that the Indian peasantry has been relegated to a secondary position by the international Communist movement.

e. POLICIES — There is a sharp cleavage within the AIKS on basic policy, with the major controversy centering around the degree of support, if any, which the Communists should give to the agrarian policies and programs of the Congress Party government. This basic split was manifest, for example, at the Annual Session of the AIKS at Bangaon, West Bengal, in October-November 1957, despite the efforts of the Central Kisan Council to smooth over differences before the meeting convened. The general secretary, N. Prasada Rao, in his report to the Annual Session delivered a blistering attack on nearly every aspect of the Congress Party's agrarian policies and emphasized the need for a class struggle against the government's program of "capitalism in agriculture." Rao claimed that land reform measures which had been enacted were ineffective and, in fact, had been designed to be ineffective. While the AIKS must rely primarily on legal methods, he said, this does not exclude agitational measures. He called for land reform without compensation and an all out effort against "monopoly and capitalism" in agriculture.

This approach, typical of the Andhra peasant faction of which Rao is the leader, is opposed by other elements within the AIKS, particularly the West Bengal and Kerala groups. Spokesmen of these less militant factions claim that governmental land reform measures, particularly abolition of zamindari holdings, have altered the former feudalistic rural pattern. The AIKS should thus seek to unite the landless worker and the small landowner instead of adding to existing frictions between these groups. The West Bengal and Kerala factions also favor AIKS participation in governmental extension services, cooperatives, and rural movements such as *Bhoodan* (land gift), all of which are derided by the militant wing. This basic schism within the organization is not likely to be resolved in the near future, but it is likely that major emphasis will be on moderate measures as long as the CPI adheres to its present tactical line.

f. INTERNATIONAL CONNECTIONS — The AIKS is not affiliated with any international organization. The president of the organization attempted in 1953–54 to secure AIKS affiliation with the Trade Union International of Agricultural and Forestry Workers, a section of the WFTU. However, discussion on this issue by the All-India Kisan Committee was postponed and there is no indication that the matter was ever again taken up.

2. Present strengths and weaknesses

It may be that the growing weakness of the AIKS, outlined above, does not accurately reflect the status of Communist influence in rural areas. There are factors which weaken the national organization—linguistic regionalism, for example—which may not adversely affect the position of Communist peasant groups locally. That a provincial unit fails to contribute funds, or even to report, to central headquarters, does not necessarily indicate that it is defunct. There may in fact be some truth in the repeated protestations of CPI leaders that despite the national deterioration in AIKS functioning, the CPI's influence among the peasants is growing. However, this growth, which in any event is small as yet, has resulted primarily from activities of the CPI rather than those of its peasant front.

Peasant groups organized by the Socialists, the Congress, and other political parties and factions are even less effective than the Communist peasant associations in most areas, with the one major exception of Bihār State where the Praja Socialist Party dominates the peasant movement. In most other areas the principal competition to the AIKS is posed by the central and state governments. Governmental measures, such as the abolition of certain types of large landholdings and legislation in some states protecting tenants from arbitrary eviction, although limited in scope and filled with loopholes, nevertheless represent progress toward a better life for the peasantry. Thus far these measures, together with the peasants' basic lack of political interest, have enabled the Congress Party to retain major electoral support among the peasants. However, there are indications, particularly in West Bengal, that dissatisfaction among the rural population is on the increase and that the Congress Party's position may be endangered in the long run if further concessions, which would be opposed by the strong landed elements within that party, are not made.

Communist efforts to attract mass support among the peasantry have failed thus far owing to a combination of factors. First, the AIKS itself is faction ridden, financially weak, and ineffective on a national scale. In addition, the Communists' peasant program is primarily political and is geared to furthering the political objectives of the Party. It is the opinion of some qualified observers that the Communists will not gain substantial strength among this segment of the population unless they incorporate in their program the provision of the technical advice and assistance which the peasant wants and which he is currently receiving in some areas through the government's Community Development and National Extension Service schemes. Communist efforts are further handicapped by the general conservatism of the peasant, his illiteracy, and his continued subservience to local village headmen and landowners. In some areas, particularly Bihār State, Vinoba Bhave's *Bhoodan* (voluntary land redistribution) program has undercut the Communists, although this movement is not effective nationally.

One of the most serious factors limiting Communist success among rural elements has been the Party's quandary regarding the landless agricultural workers. Constituting an estimated 37% of the agricultural population in some areas, they are employed, generally at extremely low wages, by tenant farmers, small landowning peasants, and wealthy landlords. Their grievances would be ideally suited to exploitation by the Communists were it not for the fact that such exploitation would run counter to the interests of the small peasants, also a Communist target group. The effective organization of the landless laborers to obtain higher wages or land would hurt the peasant employers and would reduce the prospects of achieving additional support among this group which provides the backbone for the AIKS. This problem is further complicated by caste considerations. Most landless laborers are of low castes considered inferior and ritually impure by the castes comprising the bulk of the small landowners and tenant farmers. Thus an influx of agricultural laborers into the AIKS would result in an exodus of many peasants and would discourage further recruitment among these groups.

There appears to be a consensus among the Communists that agricultural laborers should be organized into separate unions and that these organizations should not be affiliated with the local *kisan sabhas* and the AIKS; recent Communist Party resolutions advocate their affiliation with the AITUC. Little has been done as yet in organizing agricultural workers except in Andhra Pradesh and Punjab. In Andhra Pradesh the Agricultural Laborers' Association claims 65,000 members (probably an exaggeration) as against 20,000 in the Provincial Kisan Sabha. Local units of this association have applied to the government for registration as trade unions but have not been recognized. In Punjab the Communists have organized an Agricultural Laborers' Association (*Dehati Mazdoor Sabha*) which claims a membership of 38,000. However, the Communists have not found a way to take full advantage of the dissatisfaction among agricultural laborers without losing support among the small landowning and tenant peasants who constitute a major portion of the rural population.

6. *Infiltration and Exploitation of Miscellaneous Groups*

A. Target groups

Most policy directives issued by the Communist Party of India since 1951, when the Party discontinued its efforts to foment revolution in India, have stressed the need for more intensive "mass" activity among students and youth, cultural groups, and intellectuals. However, available evidence indicates that, with the exception of the Communist "peace" front, these directives have not been followed by the measures necessary to increase Party support among these groups. Industrial labor and the peasantry remain the major targets of CPI organizational and propaganda techniques, and it is among these groups, particularly the former, that the Party has achieved its greatest success (see this Supplement, SECTION 5). Moreover, Indian Communists have been primarily concerned during recent years with winning elections and forming "united fronts" with other political parties, and activity among miscellaneous groups (all target groups except laborers and peasants) has, of necessity, been given a relatively low priority.

Actual supervision of the Party's activities among these secondary groups appears to be somewhat haphazard. Theoretically, national control rests with the 25-member Central Executive Committee which, under the April 1958 constitution, is given responsibility for "direction of the Party's work in all-Indian mass organizations (or mass fronts)." Provincial executive committees are empowered to direct Party activities in such organizations on the state level, and district executive committees have responsibility for "guidance and practical assistance to the mass organizations," presumably on the local level. However, it appears that these executive bodies, which have broad responsibility for all Party affairs, have little time for front groups. Perhaps in an attempt to remedy this deficiency, the 101-member National Council announced in October 1958 the appointment of special subcommittees on education, trade unions, peasants, women, students and youth, culture, and peace. The membership of these subcommittees includes such prominent Party figures as B. T. Ranadive, P. C. Joshi, and M. N. Govindan Nair on the subcommittee on education; Romesh Chandra on the cultural subcommittee; and Renu Chakravarti on the subcommittee for women's affairs. The functions of these subcommittees are not known, but it is assumed that they will act as coordinating bodies for Party activities in the various fields.

In the decade before World War II the CPI directed its attention among miscellaneous groups primarily toward students and writers. The All-India Progressive Writers' Association (AIPWA) was founded by the Communists in 1935, and in 1940 Communists captured control over the All-India Students' Federation (AISF), formerly dominated by the Congress Party. Communist efforts among these and other target groups intensified after 1942 when the CPI became a legal party and had a free hand owing to the imprisonment of Congress Party leaders for opposing India's participation in the war. During World War II the CPI captured the leading Congress Party organizations among laborers and the peasantry. The Indian People's Theater Association (IPTA) was organized by the Communists in 1943, and the All-India Friends of the Soviet Union was constituted on a national basis in 1944. The influence of Communist front groups began to decline in 1946 when Congress Party leaders, recently released from prison, embarked on a program of rebuilding Congress-oriented mass organizations. The decision of the CPI in 1948 to adopt a policy of violence in an attempt to overthrow the government dealt a further blow to the Party's front groups, and it was not until this tactical line was repudiated in 1951 and the formation of a coalition government of "people's democracy" became the Party's immediate objective that front groups again assumed a position of importance. During recent years the Communist Party has concentrated chiefly on winning the intellectual and professional classes by enlisting their support in the All-India Peace Council (AIPC), the various "friendship associations" organized to popularize Communist countries, cultural organizations, AIPWA, and the All-India Association of Democratic Lawyers (AIADL).

The success with which the Communists have been able since 1951 to infiltrate miscellaneous target groups and attract sympathizers has varied. Their efforts to dominate the student community have not been successful. The close identification of the All-India Students' Federation with the CPI and unpopular developments within the Sino-Soviet bloc during recent years have detracted from the federation's appeal. Communist success in the women's movement has been limited primarily to Andhra Pradesh, where the National Federation of Indian Women (NFIW) is active, and to West Bengal, where Communists control the Women's Self Defence Organization (*Mahila Atma Raksha Samiti*—MARS). Recent directives call for organizing women's sections within the other front organizations in an attempt to expand Party activities among this segment of the population. Several well-known writers are active in the All-India Progressive Writers' Association and many authors and journalists are leftist in outlook, but there is little information on the membership or influence of AIPWA. The Communist organization for actors and musicians, the Indian People's Theater Association, is active in certain localities. Many of the workers in the Bombay film industry are pro-Communist, and several screen writers and actors appear regularly at meetings of various front groups (see this Supplement, SECTION 3 under Propaganda). The Communists have met with their greatest success during recent years in the peace movement, the Afro-Asian solidarity campaign, and several of the friendship associations. The All-India Peace Council, the Indo-Soviet Cultural Society (ISCUS), and the India-China Friendship Association (ICFA) have successfully capitalized on Indian interest in peace and in the economic progress made by the Sino-Soviet bloc. These groups have attracted considerable support, particularly in urban areas, and have sponsored numerous programs at which prominent people, including government officials and members of the Congress Party, have participated. The Government of India considers membership in a known Communist-front group to be derogatory information affecting civil service employment and recruitment in the armed forces. In December 1958 the Government of India instructed state governors and central and state cabinet members to refrain from participating in front organizations formed "with mixed intentions." The major friendship associations were subsequently removed from the proscribed list, but top government officials are prohibited from participating in the peace front and most other Communist-dominated movements.

Although the Communists have failed to build many of their front groups into effective nation-wide organizations, some of these are nonetheless of local importance since they complement Party activities in its areas of greatest strength (Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, and West Bengal) and since non-Communist organizations have been even less successful in most fields of front activity. The failures of the Communist-front groups can seldom, if ever, be laid to effective competition from non-Communist organizations. There are no effective non-Communist groups that correspond to the All-India Peace Council or the Indian Association for Afro-Asian Solidarity (IAAAS). Indo-American associations function in some of the larger cities, but only the Delhi group is known to be active. There are several groups aimed at preserving ties of friendship between Britain and India, such as the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association and several university alumni groups, but none of these, in contrast with the bloc friendship associations, is sponsored directly or indirectly by a political party.

In the student movement there is no unified nation-wide non-Communist organization. After the split in the prewar All-India Students' Federation, non-Communist students formed the All-India Students' Congress, but political rivalries soon made this organization ineffective. In 1950, the Students' Congress was succeeded by the National Union of Students (NUS) which has no direct connection with any of the non-Communist parties, but this, too, has split into two competing factions centered in New Delhi and Hyderābād. There are no estimates of the strength of this organization, but its activities appear to have been limited to portions of the states of Bombay, Rājasthān, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, and Andhra Pradesh. According to an officer of the NUS, the organization has functioned occasionally in other areas, such as Madras, Calcutta, and Bihār, but it is evident that the NUS is not an effective all-India organization, and its activities in many key areas, such as Calcutta, have been limited. In addition to this nonpolitical organization there are student groups which are affiliated with non-Communist political parties, although, with the exception of the student front organized by the Dravidian Progressive Federation in Madras State, these are usually small. A student association backed by the Praja Socialist Party won some student elections in Kerala in 1958. The *Yuba* (Youth) Congress, an arm of the Congress Party, claims a membership of 200,000, but this figure is highly exaggerated, and the organization does not appear to be effective.

The leading non-Communist women's organization is the All-India Women's Conference which is considered to be pro-Congress. This organization, which claims a membership of 56,000 is over 30 years old and has units throughout India. Many of India's most prominent women have been leaders of the conference. Although the All-India Women's Conference is more widely established throughout India than the Communist-front NFIW, its appeal is limited primarily to middle-class women. There are no significant organizations sponsored by non-Communist parties for writers, artists, and other professional groups which might compete on a political level with IPTA, AIPWA, and AIADL.

During recent years the Communists have regarded intellectuals, members of the professions, refugees from East Pakistan, depressed castes, minority linguistic groups, students, youth, and women (probably in that order) as the major target groups for front activity. However, there are no significant Communist groups among several of these elements. The Communists have made no known organizational efforts to exploit the caste system per se but have attempted to capture existing groups organized among depressed social and economic classes. In Kerala, for example, the Communists have attempted to capture the Congress-controlled *Sri Narayana Dharma Paripalana Yogam,* a pressure group organized among the Ezhavas, a low-caste group. While they have not succeeded in gaining control over the organization, they have nonetheless gained support among members of this community by playing upon their social and economic disabilities. Communist efforts among the refugees from East Pakistan have been channeled through the United Central Refugee Council (UCRC), a united front of several radical leftist parties in West Bengal. Similarly, the only significant Communist organizations among professional people are AIPWA, AIADL, and several groups among school teachers; the last-named organizations function primarily as labor unions and are discussed in SECTION 5 of this Supplement. Communists have been successful in infiltrating the Indian press, both at the reportorial and editorial levels, although there is no front organization designed to appeal exclusively to journalists. Attempts to infiltrate the Congress Party and the other opposition parties have been largely unsuccessful with the exception of several small anti-Moscow Marxist groups limited primarily to the Calcutta region.

The Communists have attempted to enlist support among linguistic and ethnic minorities, but there are no known front organizations formed solely to function among these groups. Rather, Party efforts have been directed primarily toward participating in and, if possible, taking over existing groups, primarily political, operating among these elements. The most important such organizations in early 1959 were the *Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti* (United Maharashtra Committee) and the *Mahagujarāt Janata Parishad* (Gujarati People's Organization), two organizations among the major linguistic groups in Bombay State advocating partition of the state (see this Supplement, SECTION 4). Although CPI participation in both groups has enabled the Party to extend its support in Bombay, the Communists have been unable to capture control over either.

Several vulnerabilities in Indian life and attitudes have enabled the Communists to gain support among Indians who have little or no sympathy for communism but who can support specific causes espoused by the CPI. The strong feelings held by most Indians against colonialism and racial discrimination make them susceptible to Communist propaganda and attract them toward front organizations ostensibly designed to combat these evils. Because Indians associate the West with colonialism and race consciousness, Communist propaganda on these issues redounds against the West. Envy of Western, especially U.S., prosperity also motivates some Indians to take an anti-Western view. The belief that American culture is materialistic and inferior to Indian culture is widely held and is fostered by pro-Communists. Many Indians accept the Communist line that the United States used the atomic bomb against "Asian" Japan rather than against "European" Germany. The Communists also contrast "race conscious" and "war-mongering" policies of the United States with the "peaceful" policies of the Soviet Union—a "fellow Asian nation" which has made great strides in economic and technological advancement. In addition, the Indian emotional bias against the West stems from specific issues such as opposition to U.S. military aid to Pakistan and to Western military alliances. Finally, Indians feel a cultural and emotional affinity with Communist China, which is struggling, like India, to achieve economic and social development. Although most Indian intellectuals disagree with the repressive methods employed by the Chinese Communists and believe that these methods are not suited to the Indian environment, they nonetheless tend to accept, often unquestioningly, the exaggerated claims to progress made by the Chinese. All these factors tend to enhance the popular appeal of the various friendship associations and of the Communists' peace front. Moreover, Indian interest in African nationalism and in the other recently independent nations of Asia provides a receptive audience for "Afro-Asian solidarity" propaganda.

Some policies of the Indian government have assisted the Communists in their front activities, particularly with respect to those organized on international issues. Since the CPI is a legal party, front groups are not bound by the stringent regulations under which they function in many other countries. The fact that some Indian positions on international issues are similar to those of the Sino-Soviet bloc probably aids the Indian Communist cause. Soviet economic assistance to India is given disproportionate publicity by the Indian press. Also, the participation of members of the Congress Party (and of those government officials who still occasionally participate in Communist-front activities despite the December 1958 ban) in meetings and rallies sponsored by front groups tends to give respectability to such activities.

Economic factors are also significant in determining the susceptibility of various groups to Communist blandishments. Communists have exploited the interest of the Indian people in raising their low standard of living by publicizing the advances made in the Soviet Union and suggesting that communism would work similar miracles in India. The desperate poverty in which most Indians live and the rising level of expectation increase the effectiveness of such propaganda. Communist propaganda based on purely economic motives is directed primarily at the working class and is channeled through front groups among labor and the peasantry. The only other major Communist-sponsored or -infiltrated organizations appealing almost solely to economic interests are the United Central Refugee Council and the Anti-Price Rise and Famine Relief Committee, two united fronts formed by radical leftist parties in West Bengal. Although the Party views the middle class and "nationalist *bourgeoisie*" as "allies," the CPI has no specific front groups of significance designed to appeal to these classes. Rather, it attempts to attract these elements into its other front activities organized around international or cultural themes.

The intellectuals (loosely defined in India as those with college diplomas) have historically provided the leadership of radical and leftwing movements in India and exercise considerable influence in molding public opinion among the middle and, insofar as articulate opinion exists among this group, the lower classes. A relatively high percentage of those belonging to the CPI or supporting its objectives are drawn from the intellectual group which is particularly susceptible to the Communists' "peace" and "colonial" themes. Some Indian intellectuals participate in CPI front groups owing to personal frustration because they have been shunted aside and are no longer in positions of prominence. The most notable example is C. Rajagopalachari, former Governor General of India, G.O.I. Home Minister and Chief Minister of Madras State, who has participated actively in the peace front during recent years. Others participate in these organizations owing to their lack of political sophistication and their adherence to Gandhian idealism and pacifism. Still others, as for example, R. K. Karanjia, editor of the pro-Communist tabloid *Blitz,* lend their support to these groups because they believe in Communist objectives. However, potentially the most disruptive segment of the intellectual class is the educated unemployed group; many members of this group have been recruited to the Communist cause in which they serve as paid organizers, writers, and agitators. The appeal of communism to this group is both practical and emotional. For young men who have no jobs and who have been educated away from the traditional values of their society, communism offers an outlet and a philosophy. Not only does it furnish an ideology, but it holds out the example of the U.S.S.R., where intellectual activities are subsidized by the state and, according to Communist propaganda, where university graduates are guaranteed employment. The political importance of this group has been illustrated in Kerala State, which has been governed by a Communist-dominated ministry since April 1957. An estimated 10,000 to 12,000 university graduates enter the employment market annually in this state, and probably no more than 3,000 find suitable positions. The remainder accept jobs as manual workers, which they believe to be beneath their dignity, or they join their idle colleagues in the coffee shops where Communist propaganda is readily available.

In addition to the real threat of unemployment after graduation, the Communists profit from the tradition of political activity among students. Before Indian independence, the Congress Party encouraged students to agitate against the British. Since 1947 that party has attempted, without success, to channel the students' energies into other fields. In 1957 the president of the Congress Party stated that since students should not participate in politics the Congress Party would make no further attempts to organize this group. As a result, organizational activity among students has been left by default to the Communists and to regional parties in the various states. In attempting to attract the student community, the Communists usually start with issues directly affecting student interests, such as tuition fees or alleged maladministration of the universities, and then they seek to involve the students in broader activities. A number of U.S. citizens who have lectured at Indian universities have reported that many students seem to accept the Communist line.

B. Techniques

The Communists have utilized two methods of attracting support among target groups: establishing new organizations and taking over those already active under non-Communist direction. An example of the first method is the All-India Peace Council, which the Communists founded; of the second, the All-India Students' Federation, which the Communists successfully infiltrated. When infiltrating an organization, CPI workers first join and become active in the group, then seek election as officers and, from that position, attempt to direct the policies of the organization. When the intent of the Communists becomes clear, the non-Communists sometimes leave the group, as in the case of the AISF, and the Communists assume full control. If the Communists organize a new front group, they usually (the ICFA is a notable exception) retain the key positions. They select an innocuous name or one embodying a widely held sentiment, such as "peace" or "Afro-Asian solidarity," and attempt to bring in prominent non-Communists. Actual control usually rests with the general secretary, who is a Party member and who controls a disciplined Communist "fraction" within the organization. The president, in many cases a figurehead, is often a well-known non-Communist. In at least one case, this situation has led to disputes between the president and general secretary. S. D. Kitchlew, a prominent fellow traveler who formerly headed the All-India Peace Council, resigned in 1958 because of a disagreement with Romesh Chandra, the CPI member who served as general secretary, over the management of AIPC affairs. There is no special organizational apparatus connecting the CPI with the various front groups, but discipline among Communist members of organizations which are already front groups, as well as those which the Party is attempting to capture, is maintained through the traditional Communist system of "fractions": All Party members in these organizations function as a disciplined unit under the guidance of the top-ranking Communist member who presumably receives instructions from the appropriate national or local CPI headquarters.

Some of the methods used by the Communists in promoting their front groups are particularly suited to conditions in India. International Communist front conferences stimulate activity among some local front groups. Since the choosing of the delegates, whose transportation is usually paid by the front organizations or the Sino-Soviet bloc, is in the hands of the Indian affiliate of the international group, many non-Communists who are eager for travel abroad become active in the Indian organization in the hope of being selected as delegates. The use of entertainment is also well adapted to the Indian scene. By advertising "cultural evenings" featuring Indian music and dancing, front groups are able in many cases to attract larger audiences than would be the case with mere speeches. Drawn by interest in seeing the artists perform, audiences usually are subjected to Communist propaganda before the entertainment begins.

In choosing propaganda themes, the Communists have taken into consideration the interests and prejudices of the Indian population. All front groups stress issues dear to Indian hearts—Asian renascence, atomic weapons control, anticolonialism, *panch shila* (the five principles of peaceful coexistence), as well as certain issues tailored to particular groups. Communist propaganda directed at women emphasizes their social inequality and economic exploitation. The All-Indian Students' Federation stresses the poor facilities and inadequate living quarters for many students. Besides stressing certain issues and taking grievances of particular groups into account, the Communists also deemphasize certain aspects of Communist doctrine so as better to influence target groups. Because many of the front groups are aimed at the middle class, aspects of Communist theory emphasizing the interests of the proletariat are frequently ignored in favor of the promotion of middle-class interests. Indian Communists also play down communism's traditional atheism. They do not inquire into the religious beliefs of Party applicants or members, and they often present religious dramas at public meetings to attract larger crowds. The success of these tactics is indicated by the fact that the CPI has successfully infiltrated *Desh Bhagat,* a religious organization in Punjab which seeks a foothold in the bodies controlling the Sikh community.

C. Front organizations

A few Communist-front groups, notably the All-Indian Students' Federation, serve as recruitment and training centers for CPI members, but most function primarily as propaganda vehicles. Communist-front and mass organizations have been formed to appeal to particular target groups, to attract a broad cross section of the public, or to publicize a specific issue and, when the agitation ends, the organization usually disbands. Available information on most of these organizations is limited and does not present a complete picture of these groups or of their interrelationships.

The most important Communist-front groups (those clearly under Communist control) are listed in FIGURE 6–1 (under Reference Data) together with available descriptive data; these organizations are described more fully below. In addition to these groups, there are others which are dominated by the Communists or in which the Party has a significant foothold. However, the lack of information on these organizations prevents detailed coverage. Some are united fronts of political parties, as for example the two linguistic organizations in Bombay State, while others are local bodies functioning among various target groups on the state, district, or town level. Some, like the various Youth Leagues, appear to be components of regional or perhaps national organizations, but no further information is available on these groups. FIGURE 6–2 (under Reference Data) presents a listing of these organizations, identified from various intelligence reports, together with the fragmentary descriptive data which are available.

1. Peace and Afro-Asian solidarity

The All-Indian Peace Council, an affiliate of the World Peace Council, was one of the most successful Communist-front organizations in India during the early 1950's. By 1959 it had declined markedly in importance probably because its familiar propaganda themes had worn thin and Soviet actions had detracted from the U.S.S.R.'s claim to champion world peace. Although the AIPC was still important in early 1959 as a refuge for a few frustrated intellectuals, its continuation as a separate entity was in doubt (see below).

The Indian peace movement was launched in 1949 following instructions from Moscow giving this campaign precedence over other Communist-front activities and temporarily relegating the class warfare theme to a secondary position. Between 1949 and 1951 dissension within the peace front, as in the CPI, between "rightists" and "leftists" (see this Supplement, SECTION 4) precluded effective functioning of the front group. The original All-Indian Peace Committee, formed in 1949 by the "leftists" and led by U. Chakkarai Chettiar, president of the All-India Trade Union Congress, was superseded in March 1951 by the All-India Peace Council. Under the new moderate CPI tactical line adopted that year, the AIPC was envisaged as a vehicle which would attract support among the middle class and "nationalist *bourgeoisie*." It included several non-CPI members and was headed by Dr. Saifuddin Kitchlew, a Muslim long active in the Congress Party but now clearly identified as a fellow traveler. However, Krishan Chandar, an active Party member, occupied the important position of general secretary and was *de facto* leader of the organization. A short time later, presumably at the third AIPC congress in 1952, Chandar was replaced by Romesh Chandra, another CPI member who has continued to serve as general secretary since that time. FIGURE 6–3 (under Reference Data) shows AIPC officeholders following the organization's Congresses in 1952, 1954, and 1957. Where possible, they are identified as Party members of fellow travelers; most of those not so identified, owing to lack of information, are believed to be non-Communists who support the objectives of the "peace" movement.

Between 1951 and 1953 the AIPC held a series of meetings in the various states to protest U.S. "aggression" in Korea, organized several large conferences (the All-India Conference of Women for Peace, the All-India Cultural Conference for Peace, and a Preparatory Committee to discuss India's representation at the International Economic Conference), and sent delegations to the Soviet Union and Communist China. AIPC activities attracted numerous well-known Indians who were not affiliated with the CPI. Several Congress Party members of Parliament and S. K. Patil, then president of the Bombay Pradesh Congress Committee and now a member of the central cabinet, ignored the advice of the Congress working committee and participated in "peace" activities. Others attracted by this movement included Mrs. Sucheta Kripalani, a member of Parliament and wife of Socialist leader Acharya J. B. Kripalani; Dr. J. C. Kumarappa, a well-known Gandhian economist; *Blitz* Editor R. K. Karanjia; and Mulk Raj Anand and K. A. Abbas, both left-wing authors.

Three new themes were included in the AIPC propaganda line during 1954. The CPI, acting on instructions from the Soviet Union, revised its earlier view that India was not independent but remained subservient to British imperialism. As a natural concomitant, Britain was replaced in the formulation of the CPI tactical line by the United States as India's "main enemy." The first major opportunity for extensive anti-American propaganda over an issue directly affecting India was the signing of the U.S.-Pakistan Mutual Security Agreement in May 1954, a move which was resented by virtually all Indians. However, the strong position taken by the Indian government against the military aid agreement undercut the CPI and AIPC to some extent. With Nehru and the Congress Party the rallying point for opposition, the Communists were unable to capture the issue for their exclusive use. Another theme that gained prominence during this period was that of Asian interests and solidarity, and the AIPC began to devote increasing attention to "Asian culture" and to extol its superiority to "Western materialism." Finally, the Nehru-Chou En-lai declaration espousing *panch shila* (the five principles of peaceful coexistence) was publicized by the AIPC as an alternative to aggressive policies of the Western bloc, and reiteration of this theme has been a prominent feature of Communist and AIPC propaganda since that time.

Although these new tactical lines were formulated around appealing issues and gained support for the AIPC, there were nonetheless indications that the leaders of the movement were dissatisfied that this support was not aiding the Party's attempt to build a broad-based united front. Party leaders charged that comrades in some areas were using the peace movement to promote "narrow" Party interests; others, speaking at the third Communist Party Congress in 1954, alleged that "the whole peace movement has been neglected by the Party." In addition, attendance at some AIPC functions was below expectations. However, despite these handicaps, the movement had gained important adherents by 1954, and its activities were receiving extensive publicity throughout India.

In 1956, one of India's prominent elder statesmen, C. Rajagopalachari, who as G.O.I. Home Minister had refused permission for the All-India Peace Convention to meet in New Delhi in 1951, became associated with the peace group. In September he addressed the second Madras State Peace Conference and in November sent a tape-recorded message to the Annual All-India Peace Congress which was held in Calcutta. He also inaugurated the All-India Peace Convention, which met in Bangalore in May 1957 and which marked the beginning of an intensive campaign against nuclear tests by the Western powers, an issue which the AIPC has continued to exploit.

Although the Communists have continued to rely on the same appealing issues to popularize their peace front, the AIPC has declined in importance during recent years. The sectarianism still prevalent among Communist Party members has carried over to the peace front. At its meeting in Jaipur in June 1956, the AIPC called for unification of all forces working for peace and suggested seeking common national issues on which to base united action. At a later meeting, the council expressed regret that some AIPC workers did not support the peace policy of the Indian government inasmuch as this gave the impression that the AIPC was an "opposition" group. A document prepared for the Calcutta All-India Peace Congress in 1956 observed that "our own prejudices and suspicions against other forces of peace" have prevented "the fullest development of those forms of activity and organization which could really widen and strengthen the movement for peace." A report prepared for an AIPC conference in February 1958, listed Andhra Pradesh, Bihār, Uttar Pradesh, and Madras as states where peace committees were "inactive." It was also reported at that time that steps were being taken to reorganize committees which had ceased to function in Delhi, Punjab, Orissa, Kerala, and Maharashtra. Meetings held in 1958 by most branches evoked little response from the press or the public. Neither the All-Kerala Peace Conference held in December 1957 nor the Madras State People's Convention, held the following June to support the Stockholm Congress for Disarmament and International Cooperation, attracted much interest outside of Communist circles. Other recent conferences have suffered the same fate—attendance has been restricted to Communists and a few fellow travelers. When larger crowds have been present, the attraction in most cases has been the promise of musical and dance programs.

No information is available on the membership of the peace movement or its sources of finance. Membership fees probably provide a portion of revenues and, in addition, fees are charged delegates at some peace conferences. It is probable that the AIPC receives funds from its international affiliate, the World Peace Council. S. D. Kitchlew reportedly contributed to the Indian peace effort all or at least a sizable portion of the 150,000 rupees he received with the Stalin Peace Prize in 1953. The AIPC has published the *Peace Review* in English and several counterparts in various vernacular languages, but available information does not indicate whether all of these are still being issued.

Dr. Kitchlew, who had served as president of the AIPC since its formation in 1951, resigned in 1958 after a dispute with General Secretary Romesh Chandra over the policy and the management of the organization. He reportedly complained that Chandra made all the decisions and that AIPC affairs were not well managed under his direction. In matters of policy Kitchlew reportedly favored building a more militant organization. One of the vice presidents, Pandit Sundarlal, a well-known fellow traveller who has also been active in the ICFA, is now president.

In early 1959 there were reports that the AIPC had been dissolved and its functions taken over by the Indian Association for Afro-Asian Solidarity. This has been denied by Pandit Sundarlal, but most observers believe the AIPC will be eclipsed in importance by, if not actually merged with, the IAAAS. The down-grading of the AIPC indicates that the Communists are now finding "Afro-Asian solidarity" a better propaganda vehicle than the more generalized "peace" theme.

The dissension in the leadership of the organization, which led to Kitchlew's resignation, may also have contributed to the decision to deemphasize the AIPC. It has also been reported, without confirmation, that the Chinese Communists influenced this policy change as they believed the AIPC lacked a "proletarian philosophy" and was susceptible to "revisionism." According to recent reports, the CPI has appointed a five-member committee to reorganize the AIPC and supervise the work of the IAAAS. This committee includes CPI Central Executive Committee members Romesh Chandra, A. K. Gopalan, and Z. A. Ahmed; National Council member Sajjad Zaheer; and Mrs. Ali Ahmed.

The Indian Association for Afro-Asian Solidarity, founded in 1955 following the Conference on Asian Countries held in New Delhi, is associated with an international Communist front group, the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, which grew out of the International Conference for Relaxation of Tension held in Stockholm during 1954. There has always been close liaison between the AIPC and the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. Many of those active in the peace front also hold positions in IAAAS. Included among this group are the IAAAS president, Mrs. Rameshwari Nehru, who is a cousin by marriage of the Indian Prime Minister, a leading leftwing feminist, and an honorary adviser to the Women's Section of the central Ministry of Rehabilitation; the secretary, Romesh Chandra, General Secretary of the AIPC; Major General (retired) S. S. Sokhey, an eminent medical scientist and one of India's most active fellow travelers; and Pandit Sunderlal, Mulk Raj Anand, and R. K. Karanjia. The issues stressed by the two groups have often been identical—support for *panch shila,* UN membership for Communist China, and opposition to colonialism. The declared aims of the association are to promote social and cultural relations between India and other Asian and African countries; to spread information on Asia and Africa, especially on the struggle against colonialism; to facilitate the exchange of information between Asian and African nations; and to promote world peace and understanding as well as the ideals of *panch shila* and the Bandung Conference.

The Bombay Association of Afro-Asian Solidarity, formed in the spring of 1958 when the Anti-Colonial Convention in Bombay joined the IAAAS, is one of the most active local affiliates. Included among its members are Daniel Latifi, P. V. Sharma, Balraj Sahni, B. A. Dalal, and Mangaldas Pakvasa who serves as the affiliate's president. Latifi, a Bombay lawyer active in numerous front groups, is reportedly a source of funds for the Bombay group. The organization's business office is located temporarily in the office of the Bombay branch of the India-China Friendship Association. Some of the activities undertaken by this group include a campaign against U.S. policy toward Communist China and a reception for a group of Indonesian visitors. The Bombay branch also passed a resolution at one of its meetings urging India's recognition of the Algerian government-in-exile and heard a report on the "Fourth World Conference against A and H Bombs" from one of the delegates.

No information is available on IAAAS membership or the number of branches it has created.

2. Students and youth

Although the Communist Party realizes the importance of gaining a following among the students of India, it has not been successful in its efforts to build a mass organization among this group. The All-India Students' Federation, the most important Communist-front student group, has declined in strength during recent years. The organization claimed a membership of 120,000 in 1958, but this figure is undoubtedly inflated. The virtual monopoly of the AISF on college unions has been broken in its former stronghold of West Bengal; whereas 90% of the college unions were dominated by AISF leaders in 1954, only 13 out of 26 unions are now under their control. In Andhra Pradesh the AISF controls only one college union, and the Delhi and Uttar Pradesh branches are reported to be inactive.

The AISF was founded in 1936 during a student conference inaugurated by Jawaharlal Nehru and chaired by Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan. From its inception the organization was split between pro-Congress and Communist factions. The two groups finally split in December 1940 when they could not reach agreement on Gandhi's "individual *satyagraha*" (passive resistance against the British) campaign. The Communist organization retained the name All-India Students' Federation; the non-Communists formed the All-India Student Congress.

The Communists hoped in taking over the AISF to establish an organization through which they could influence students toward communism and recruit and train workers for the CPI. There are several reasons why the Indian student group in particular seemed to present a ready target for Communist efforts. Not only are students intensely interested in politics, but they have also historically participated freely in direct action such as strikes and demonstrations. They also have many personal grievances. They often live in extreme poverty and are further frustrated by the threat of unemployment following graduation. Despite these student vulnerabilities, the AISF has been unable to capture the student movement. It is, however, the largest political organization functioning within the student community.

During the past two years, the Communists have tried to better their position in the student front. In preparation for the Sixth World Youth Festival held in Moscow in 1957, a number of local youth festivals were held. Preparatory committees were formed in West Bengal, New Delhi, Bombay, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Mysore, and Bihar. The Bombay group sponsored a "Bandung Day" and other special events. The West Bengal Festival, largest such event ever held in that state, featured cultural and sports events and attracted approximately 10,000 people a day. One purpose of the local festivals was to select delegates to the Moscow Conference. This, in part, explains the response to the festivals, since many students, regardless of their attitudes toward communism, would welcome selection as a delegate to an international Communist conference to receive an expense-paid trip. In West Bengal alone, more than 1,500 applied for passports for travel to the Soviet Union, although all of India had been allotted only 750 delegates.

The dissolution of the AISF was under discussion in early 1957; a CPI policy directive issued in July of the same year ordered continuation of the federation but set a new direction to the Communist youth movement. Deciding that "the college unions are emerging as the common forums of activity for the masses of students," the CPI directed that the main role of the AISF should be to work within the student unions for a national federation of these unions. This report pointed to a lack of interest among Party members in the student movement and the virtual abandonment of "Party-building tasks" within the AISF. It also proposed that subcommittees be established within the state and district branches of the CPI to expand Party activities among students. The national headquarters of the AISF was moved from New Delhi to Calcutta, where the AISF was more active, in an attempt to stimulate the organization, but the actual effect was to weaken it further by detracting from its position as a national organization.

In accordance with the decision to work within the framework of the college unions, the AISF has attempted to form a National Union of Students (NUS) in West Bengal and to infiltrate the existing non-Communist NUS in other regions. The non-Communist NUS, an outgrowth of the All-India Student Congress, was established in 1950 and although active in some areas, is not an effective national organization. It is strongest in Uttar Pradesh, and it is here that the Communists have made their most intensive efforts to infiltrate the organization. In other areas, the AISF has appropriated the name of NUS and launched its own organizations. In West Bengal, efforts of the state branch of the AISF to organize an NUS which would unite all college unions of the area failed, and the result was that two NUS organizations, one Communist and the other non-Communist, were formed.

One possible exception to the general decline in AISF strength may be Kerala, where the local branch claimed to have increased its membership from 15,000 to 45,000 during 1958 by "sustained constructive work and organizing principled discussions among the mass of students"; this membership claim is undoubtedly exaggerated, but the Kerala group may at least have maintained its earlier support. There have also been reports that the Andhra Pradesh branch of the AISF was working hard to regain its hold on the student group and that the federation had revived its monthly bulletin, *Student News*.

The AISF held a national conference, its first meeting in several years, at Udaipur in early January 1959 and elected new officers. Marshal Nautiyal, who had been active in the student front in Banaras, was chosen president. Hiren Das Gupta, who had served as general secretary since the former incumbent, Sukhendu Majumdar, began working with WFDY, was elected to that office. A student leader from Kerala, Chandrappan, was elected one of the vice presidents. According to the Communist weekly *New Age*, delegations from every state except Assam and Madras attended the conference, and attendance reached 10,000 at the closing session. The conference decided to continue working for a National Union of Students as the only way of uniting the Indian student movement and also announced its intention to organize study camps for AISF workers.

There is little information on the structure of the AISF. As with most organizations of this type, the national organization is the strongest. Below this there are various provincial and local federations. Reportedly, many of the town and district federations function only at certain times, such as when preparations are being made for a youth festival. Officers of the AISF include a president, a general secretary, and several vice presidents and joint secretaries. At least some of these officers are no longer students but are older persons who work full time for the federation. In 1955, at least two of the top leaders, Sukhendu Majumdar, then the general secretary, and Krishna Anand, a joint secretary, were widely known as full-time CPI workers. The new leaders elected in 1959, Nautiyal and Hiren Das Gupta, are also paid Party workers. No definite information is available on the organization's finances. The International Union of Students probably contributes to the AISF. There is a nominal membership fee, which is often not collected; admission is frequently charged to cultural programs sponsored by the federation; and delegates to conferences and conventions must pay delegates' fees. In some cases, articles are sold for a profit; for example, the Bombay federation sold 20,000 flags to raise money for a festival. The AISF has apparently had difficulty financing its activities, and lack of money may be one reason why the AISF publication, *Student News,* has appeared (until recently) only a few times in the past several years. There have been reports that the CPI has drastically reduced its expenditures for student activity during the past few years.

The Communists have also tried to create a mass youth organization to promote Communist causes among young people who are not students. A Bombay Youth Conference was held in November 1952 for "working-class youth," refugees, and "young middle-class employees." Indian youths have also attended the various Communist-sponsored World Youth Congresses. As of March 1959 there was no nation-wide Communist youth organization, but there were democratic youth leagues and youth federations in various parts of India (see FIGURE 6–2, under Reference Data) which were affiliated with the World Federation of Democratic Youth. In December 1958 Communist youth and student leaders recommended that a nation-wide youth organization be formed. By March 1959 plans were well advanced for a national youth conference the following month.

The Andhra Democratic Youth Federation, the most important of the local organizations, was formed in 1945. It acts as a coordinating body for the local youth organizations in Andhra Pradesh and has organized sports and cultural events, evening lectures, and adult education classes. Its activities are aimed at attacking and exposing "the prevailing backward customs which are a hindrance to the social progress of the youth and the nation." The federation claimed that membership "at a peak period" had reached 80,000, but even if this figure is correct, present membership is undoubtedly much lower. The *Kalikata Yuba Sangh* (Calcutta Youth Federation) came into being during the years 1951–53 which saw the birth of so many Communist fronts. It claims to have 20,000 members, some of whom are affiliated through federated groups. The federation publishes a monthly journal, *Jawban* (Youth). This organization lists its aims as: participating in national reconstruction, raising the social consciousness of the people, sponsoring anti-illiteracy campaigns, organizing sports and cultural functions, fighting for the rights of youth, agitating on national issues, and working for peace. One of its major activities is holding youth festivals, and the preparatory committee plans to hold local festivals throughout West Bengal in preparation for the Seventh World Youth Festival to be held at Vienna in July 1959. Other activities include conducting night school classes and participating in a cholera inoculation campaign. No detailed information is available on the activities of other youth groups.

3. International friendship associations

ISCUS, the Indo-Soviet Cultural Society, was founded in March 1952 by a group of fellow travelers in Bombay City as the successor to an earlier organization, the All-India Friends of the Soviet Union, which had been active in the 1940's but ceased to exist as an effective front shortly after World War II. Its purpose is to create a climate of opinion favorable to the Soviet Union among a broad mass of people. Accordingly, ISCUS has sought to depict the Soviet Union as a progressive and democratic land with a rising standard of living and has flattered Indian sensitivities by claiming that there exists in the Soviet Union a great interest in Indian art, history, and literature.

The major activities of ISCUS include sponsoring delegations to the Soviet Union and entertaining visiting Russians; film showings; exhibitions of Soviet photographs, books, crafts, and so forth; Russian language classes; libraries of Soviet books and periodicals; and fostering correspondence between Indians and Russians. The quarterly magazine, *ISCUS,* published since January 1954, has an estimated circulation of 1,200 copies and includes news of the local cultural societies as well as articles by Soviet, Indian and other writers. One of the most successful ISCUS functions is the showing of Soviet films. According to figures published in the spring 1958 edition of *ISCUS,* the National Council, the organization's largest executive body, has 562 copies of 134 different titles which are shown by ISCUS branches or loaned to institutions and organizations for the freight charges plus a small fee. The organization claimed during the two-year period 1957–58 to have furnished films to 30 branches and to more than 100 other organizations in areas where there were no branches. The National Council and these 30 branches claimed to have held 3,834 film showings during this period, including both 16 and 35 mm. films, for a total of 2,792,905 spectators. These showings were concentrated in urban areas, particularly in Bombay, West Bengal, and the Hindi-speaking states of North India, as shown by the following tabulation which lists ISCUS branches that presented more than 100 separate film showings during the two-year period (these figures do not include films received directly from the Cultural Section of the Soviet Embassy in New Delhi):

BRANCH	FILM SHOWINGS	NUMBER OF SPECTATORS
Ahmadābād	105	162,900
Baroda	111	46,500
Bombay	788	372,760
Calcutta	422	274,545
Ghāziābād	105	82,300
Kānpur	117	172,940
Lucknow	359	186,000
Morādābād	201	175,000
Mysore	103	105,150

The Penfriendship Section of ISCUS, which fosters correspondence between Indians and Russians, claimed to have 1,350 Indians and "half as many Soviet members" on its register at the end of 1958. The National Council deplored the "disparity" between the number of Indian and Soviet registrants but commented that this was gradually being overcome by the receipt of additional Soviet addresses. According to the National Council's report to the Fourth National Conference of ISCUS in December 1958, the "Russian-language section of the National Council provides translation of Russian letters into English at a very nominal charge." This report also observed that during 1957–58 various ISCUS branches played host to a Soviet delegation, led by E. I. Afanasendo, Minister of Education of the R.S.F.S.R., which came to India to attend the Third National ISCUS Conference. During this same period, three ISCUS delegations visited the Soviet Union on invitation from the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS) and the Soviet-Indian Cultural Relations Society. Russian-language classes are reportedly conducted by ISCUS at Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi, and a few other urban centers whereas in the smaller towns self-study groups are encouraged. Other significant activities during this period included an exhibition on 40 years of Soviet cinematography in Bombay and Calcutta; exhibitions on Soviet education in Bombay, Bangalore, Hyderābād, Kānpur, Mysore, and Calcutta; and exhibitions in other areas on Soviet books, showing the interest of the Soviet people in Indian culture, and publicizing consumer's cooperatives in the U.S.S.R. Successful launching of the first Soviet satellite occasioned a number of ISCUS activities which depicted the event as a triumph for Soviet science. Public lectures on "Sputnik" were given at Bombay, Calcutta, and Kānpur, and a Soviet film, *Sputnik,* was shown by several branches. Twenty-one branches reportedly held special celebrations commemorating the 40th anniversary of the Russian revolution.

According to a report at the Fourth National Conference in 1958, ISCUS has "nearly 60" branches. This report observes that total membership figures are not available, but that the membership of the 31 branches which have submitted figures is "about 10,000." The Bombay City branch, with a claimed membership of 2,953, is the largest, followed by West Bengal State (1,000), Morādābād city (635), Baroda (600), Ajmer (437), Farrukhābād (405), and Bangalore (400).

The national organization of ISCUS consists of the National Council and the Executive Committee. Day-to-day direction of the central office and the branches is given by the Executive Committee, which holds frequent meetings. This group was established by an amendment to the ISCUS constitution several years ago when it was felt that the National Council was too large to give adequate guidance to the organization. The Executive Committee is elected by the National Council, and all of its members, except the top officeholders, must live in the town where the national office is situated (i.e., Bombay). Important leaders include the president, Dr. Baliga, a Bombay surgeon who headed a medical delegation to the Soviet Union in 1951; Jaswant Singh, general secretary; Rajni Patel, a lawyer and president of the Bombay chapter of ISCUS; Daniel Latifi, a well-known fellow traveler; and Dr. Abraham Sholum Erulkar.

Little is known of the financial backing of ISCUS. Members pay annual dues of 50 naye paise (about US$.10) to the branches, and the branches send a portion of this sum to the national office. However, it has been reported that the National Council received from this source only 203 rupees in 1957 and 323 during 1958. Some ISCUS members are listed as "donors" (153 of the 2,953 in Bombay City are so listed), and it is assumed that these members contribute to ISCUS coffers. Small amounts are apparently also received from the nominal charge for the use of films and the fee charged for the translation of letters from the U.S.S.R.

Many ISCUS activities have attracted little public attention. The 1956 national conference received little public response and almost no publicity. An exhibit of photographs in Madras drew few visitors, and an ISCUS conference in Bihār reportedly made little impact on the public. The conference of the West Bengal chapter of ISCUS in November 1958, revealed a drop in membership from 4,000 in 1956 to 1,000. It also disclosed a serious factional split within the organization over the leadership of the West Bengal branch. However, the number of branches has grown, and the activities of ISCUS, taken in conjunction with present Soviet policy toward India and the impact of Soviet economic aid, suggest that some people have been influenced toward a more pro-Soviet frame of mind.

The functions of the India-China Friendship Association (ICFA) are similar to those of ISCUS. The group entertains visiting Chinese delegations and sends Indian delegations to China, arranges film festivals and photographic exhibits, and sponsors Chinese language classes. In 1956, ICFA planned various activities to commemorate the 2,500th anniversary of the birth of Buddha. Although ICFA promotes the admission of Red China to the UN, the association refrains from too vigorous a championing of Chinese interests. Similarly, it does not make invidious comparisons between economic progress in India and China but stresses "the common background and aspirations of the Indian and Chinese people."

This organization grew out of a local China Friendship Association which was inaugurated in Bombay in 1951 by R. K. Karanjia, pro-Communist editor of *Blitz*. The first national conference of the ICFA was held in New Delhi in December 1953, following a preliminary meeting in May of that year. Both of these meetings were attended by many well-known non-Communists. The presidium elected included Dr. Gyan Chand, Saifuddin Kitchlew, Mulk Raj Anand, and Gen. S. S. Sokhey, all prominent members of the AIPC. A 21-member Executive Committee and a National Council with more than 100 members were formed. Officers elected at the 1953 meeting included Pandit Sunderlal as president, and Chatur Narain Malaviya, a Congress MP, as general secretary. Although Malaviya had been associated with Communist-organized activities, it is significant that a non-Communist was elected to the post of general secretary of the ICFA, since this position is traditionally held by a Communist in Party front organizations. In 1958, a Congress Party member of Parliament, Chowdury Brahm Prakash, was serving as general secretary. Pandit Sunderlal continued as president and Mrs. Uma Nehru, a Congress Party member, became vice president. A Communist MP, K. G. Wodeyar, was appointed secretary and the office secretary was a CPI member, Duijendra Nandi.

The second national conference of the ICFA at Calcutta in April 1955 was attended by prominent members of the Congress Party. Among the resolutions passed were two calling for the withdrawal of the United States from Taiwan and admission of Communist China to the UN. Indian Defense Minister V. K. Krishna Menon inaugurated the third annual conference of the ICFA, which met at Bombay in February 1958, and this meeting was also attended by many other Congress Party members.

In 1958 ICFA claimed to have 100,000 members, but it probably had only 15,000–20,000. At the 1958 annual conference, ICFA announced that it had 18 state or regional branches and 140 district or primary branches. The Bombay branch was the largest and most active, owing primarily to the efforts of R. K. Karanjia. The West Bengal ICFA had a membership of 714 in July 1958, a decline over the figure of 1,095 given in 1955. The third state conference of the West Bengal ICFA in August 1958 was not well attended, and this branch also complained of financial difficulties. The annual membership fee for the West Bengal ICFA was 50 naye paise (10 cents). Much of the association's financial support comes from wealthy Bengalis who harbor friendly feelings toward China.

The National Council of the ICFA met at New Delhi in September 1958. It called for an India-China Friendship Fortnight from September 15 to October 1 which was to culminate in the observance of Chinese National Day on October 1. In Delhi, a Chinese Film Festival, inaugurated by Union Minister Humayun Kabir, was held as part of the fortnight activities. The National Council also announced an intensive drive for signatures to the "National Petition to the U.N.O." adopted by the Third National Conference of the ICFA. ICFA also planned to establish a library in memory of two Indians, Dr. Atal and Dr. Kotnis, who had been active in the Friendship Association, to be financed in part by a 10,000-rupee donation from the China-India Friendship Association (the Communist Chinese counterpart of ICFA). There were plans in early 1959 for starting a Chinese-language class in New Delhi and publishing an English-language quarterly. Reports of the ICFA state that the financial position of the National Council is serious and that the fees from the branches are not being received. According to ICFA, the receipts of the organization for the year ending March 31, 1958, totaled 11,614.75 rupees (US$2,470). No information is available on the source of this money or on expenditures.

In addition to the two large friendship societies, ISCUS and ICFA, there are several satellite friendship associations. There are nine branches of an Indo-Bulgarian Friendship Society, three branches of an Indo-Czechoslovakian group, and five of an

Indo-Polish Cultural Society. There are also friendship societies for Hungary, Mongolia, North Korea, and Rumania. The Rumanian association was formed in 1958. Two branches of the Indo-Bulgarian association were founded in Madras and Trivandrum in preparation for an exhibit of Bulgarian paintings and photographs. Other associations have been organized to fete groups of folk dancers or other cultural delegations. These associations are usually formed by the same coterie that is active in the AIPC and the major friendship associations just before the visit of a delegation or the opening of an exhibit. They serve a specific purpose and usually do not continue as active organizations, although they may be revived for special occasions.

4. Miscellaneous fronts

The National Federation of Indian Women (NFIW) is the Indian affiliate of the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF). It was founded in June 1954 after Communist organizers failed in their attempt to infiltrate and capture the All-India Women's Conference. It claimed to have 40 branches and a membership of 100,000 in June 1957, but these figures are undoubtedly inflated. Most of the NFIW strength lies in Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal, and although it purports to be a broad-based organization, it receives little support from middle-class women. Its leadership is composed of Communists or well-known fellow travelers. The NFIW publishes a periodical, *Women's News,* and conducts agitations on issues of special concern to women as well as international political problems. Women active in the NFIW include General Secretary Hajrah Begum, a CPI member and wife of Z. A. Ahmed; Renu Chakravarti, a deputy leader of the Communist bloc in the *Lok Sabha;* and fellow travelers Anasuya Gyan Chand and Pushpamoyee Bose.

The All-India Association of Democratic Lawyers (AIADL) owes its founding primarily to Shehangshu Kumar Acharya who, after attending meetings of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL) and founding local lawyers' groups in Allahābād and West Bengal, established the all-India association in September 1954. Resolutions were passed at the association's first meeting supporting *panch shila* and advocating a ban on nuclear weapons. Some of the declared aims of the association were to defend "the status of India as a sovereign democratic Republic," to defend "persons victimized by undemocratic laws or arbitrary and illegal executive action," and to safeguard world peace.

The first activity of the association was to convene an Asian Lawyers' Conference at Calcutta January 1955. Eighteen Asian countries were represented at the meeting. D. N. Pritt of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers presided. Some members of the AIADL, led by N. R. Das Gupta, toured Communist China in 1955, and S. K. Acharya attended the IADL meeting in Brussels in 1956. A member of the CPI and a man of wealth, it is probable that Acharya provides some of the financial support for the organization. At the time of its founding, the organizers claimed there were democratic lawyers' associations in many states and that total membership of the organization was approximately 3,000 persons. The officers elected at that time were P. R. Das, president, and S. K. Acharya and Daniel Latifi, joint secretaries.

The All-India Progressive Writers' Association (AIPWA), the Communist-front writers' group, was established in 1935. Several important non-Communists, such as Sarojini Naidu and Rabindranath Tagore, participated in early meetings of this organization, whose purpose is to infuse a Communist slant into contemporary Indian literature and journalism. The AIPWA has sponsored conferences for writers in the various Indian languages as, for example, a conference of Hindi writers held in Allahābād in December 1957. It has been particularly active among Urdu writers, and there is also a Punjabi Writers' Association which is apparently affiliated with AIPWA.

The most important project of the AIPWA was the Asian Writers' Conference held in New Delhi during December 1956. AIPWA had hoped to use the meeting as an instrument of Communist propaganda and had planned to organize an Asia-wide writers' organization which would be Communist controlled. However, a group of non-Communist writers took control of the conference, defeated the proposal to establish a permanent organization, and thwarted the Communist's purpose. Members of AIPWA were instrumental in securing a largely pro-Communist Indian delegation for the second Asian-African Writers' Conference which met during October 1958 at Tashkent. However, the controversies which arose over the method of selecting delegates more clearly identified AIPWA as a Communist front and may boomerang against the organization.

Those who have been active recently in AIPWA affairs include leftwing authors Mulk Raj Anand and K. A. Abbas; CPI members Krishen Chandar and Sajjad Zaheer; and Tara Shanker Bannerjee, a non-Communist writer who attended the Tashkent conference. The history of the association has included many factional disputes as to the inclusion of non-Communist members and the purpose of the organization. Sajjad Zaheer is reported to lead a faction which favored the inclusion of some non-Communists in the delegation to the Tashkent conference. This position was opposed by a more militant group. In 1957, AIPWA was reported to be in a "weakened condition," perhaps as a result of factionalism. During 1958 Mulk Raj Anand organized an All-India Writers' Conference. One state convention of this organization has been held in Calcutta and another is scheduled to be held in Madras. This organization was described by a non-Communist member of India's delegation to the Tashkent conference as a "representative organization of writers." However, as organized by Anand, a fellow traveler with contacts in many front groups, the All-Indian Writers' Conference is susceptible to Communist domination; it seems to be an attempt to form a new writers' front which is less openly associated with the CPI.

The Indian People's Theater Association (IPTA) was formed in 1943 in Bombay. Its purpose is to present dance performances and plays portraying Communist themes. This association sends troupes of artists on tour throughout India and often furnishes entertainment during meetings organized by other front groups. IPTA has produced a feature film, *Dharti-ke-lal* (Children of the Soil). One of the most famous IPTA dramas, *You Made Me a Communist,* was performed 1,007 times in the old state of Travancore-Cochin (now a part of Kerala) before being banned by the state government. An affiliate of IPTA, the Kerala People's Art Club, performed *You Made Me a Communist* and *Prodigal Son* at Bombay in November 1958 before a total audience of 20,000. The Eighth Conference and Festival of IPTA was held in Delhi from December 23, 1957, to January 2, 1958. This meeting was a propaganda victory for the Communist cause, for it received support from prominent artists and government officials. The festival was inaugurated by Vice President Radhakrishnan and drew daily audiences of from 5,000 to 10,000. IPTA workers were assisted in making arrangements for this conference by employees of the Soviet Embassy Information Department. However, the work of some of the IPTA branches has not progressed satisfactorily. Reportedly, the CPI has charged the West Bengal branch, which claimed 1,200 members in 1955, with corruption and "un-Party" activities and threatened dissolution of the branch if these defects were not remedied. Officers elected by IPTA in 1958 include Sachin Sen Gupta, a Bengali artist and fellow traveler, president; Vishnu Prasad Rava, Rajindar Singh Raghubansi, Balraj Sahni, and K. Subramaniam, vice presidents; and Niranjan Sen, reportedly a CPI member, general secretary. IPTA has published an English periodical, *Unity,* and a Hindi newsletter, *Abhinay* (Theater), but available information does not indicate whether these are being published at present.

D. Reference data

The tables in this Subsection present detailed data in the general order of reference in the text.

FIGURE 6-1. LEADING COMMUNIST-FRONT GROUPS, INDIA

ORGANIZATION	OBJECTIVES AND INTERNATIONAL AFFILIATION	LEADERSHIP	CLAIMED MEMBERSHIP
All-India Association of Democratic Lawyers.	To provide legal advice to Communists and infiltrate the legal profession; affiliated with International Association of Democratic Lawyers.	Snehangshu K. Acharya, P. R. Das, Daniel Latifi.	n a
All-India Peace Council	To disseminate Communist "peace" propaganda; affiliated with the World Peace Council.	Romesh Chandra, Pandit Sunderlal, S. S. Sokhey, Mulk Raj Anand, J. C. Kumarappa.	n a
All-India Progressive Writers' Association.	To strengthen the CPI among authors and inject Communist content into contemporary Indian writing.	Mulk Raj Anand, K. A. Abbas, Sajjad Zaheer, K. Damodaran, Hirendra Nath Mukerjee.	n a
All-India Students' Federation	To disseminate Communist views among the student community and recruit members for the CPI; affiliated with the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY).	Nautiyal, Chandrappan, Hiren Das Gupta.	120,000 (1958).
All-India Youth League	Affiliated with the WFDY	Chitto Bose, K. N. Sandilya, Khemesh Bhattacharya.	90,000 (1957).

FIGURE 6–1 (*Continued*)

ORGANIZATION	OBJECTIVES AND INTERNATIONAL AFFILIATION	LEADERSHIP	CLAIMED MEMBERSHIP
Andhra Democratic Youth Federation.	To promote Communist ideology and activities among the youth in Andhra Pradesh; affiliated with WFDY.	*n a*	80,000 (At a "peak period").
Bihār Democratic Youth Federation.	To promote Communist ideology and activities among youth in Bihār State; affiliated with WFDY.	Krishna Chandra Chowdury	25,000.
Bombay City Youth League	To promote Communist ideology and activities among youth; affiliated with WFDY.	Sushil Chakravarty	*n a*
Federation of Indian Youth	To organize a Communist-dominated federation of youth organizations; decided against affiliation with WFDY in order to increase popular appeal.	Arvind Ghosal, C. Panigrahi, Raj Narain, Harish Chandra.	*n a*
India-China Friendship Association.	To promote sympathy for Communist China.	Pandit Sunderlal, Mrs. Uma Nehru, Chowdhury Brahm Prakash, Tara Chand, Gyan Chand, R. K. Karanjia.	100,000 (1958).
Indian Association for Afro-Asian Solidarity.	To promote the "Afro-Asian" and "peace" propaganda themes; affiliated with the Afro-Asian Peace and Solidarity Committee.	Mrs. Rameshwari Nehru, Dr. Anup Singh, Daniel Latifi, Mangaldas Pakvasa, P. V. Sharma, S. S. Sokhey.	*n a*
Indian People's Theater Association.	To present dramas and other entertainment with a Communist propaganda content.	Sachin Sen Gupta, Niranjan Sen Gupta, Bulraj Sahani, P. C. Joshi, Tara Chand, Nirmal Ghosh, Hirendra Nath Mukerjee.	22,000 (West Bengal branch only).
Indo-Soviet Cultural Society	Promote increased interest in the U.S.S.R.	Dr. A. V. Baliga, Rajni Patel, Daniel Latifi.	10,000 (31 of 60 branches in 1958).
Kalikata Yuba Sangh (Calcutta Youth Federation).	To promote Communist ideas among the youth of Calcutta; to recruit CPI members; affiliated with the WFDY.	Gautam Chattopadhya, Sharda Mitra, Sukumar Gupta.	20,000 (1958).
Mahila Atma Raksha Samiti (Women's Self Defense Organization).	Attract women of West Bengal into the Communist movement; affiliated with Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF).	Uma Sehanobia, Bina Ganguly, Manikuntala Sen, Hajrah Begum.	400.
National Federation of Indian Women.	Attract Indian women into the Communist movement; affiliated with WIDF.	Anasuya Gyanchand, Renu Chakravarti, Hajrah Begum, Puspamoye Bose, Mrs. Sarah Latifi.	100,000 (1957).
Students' Health Home	Win a following among Calcutta students and demonstrate Communist concern with students' health; affiliated with International Union of Students (IUS).	*n a*	25,000 (1957).
United Central Refugee Council	Win adherents among Calcutta's refugee population; includes other leftist parties.	Ambika Chakravarty, Samar Mukerjee, Srirhid Mullick.	*n a*
Utkal Democratic Youth Federation.	Gain a following for the CPI among the youth in Orissa; affiliated with the WFDY.	Nand Kishore Patnaik, Chintamani Panigrahi.	5,000 (1957).
Uttar Pradesh Democratic Youth League.	Formed as a united non-partisan organization; now works among students and laborers, particularly in Kānpur; affiliated with the WFDY.	Suresh Pandey, C. M. Sadri, Romesh Chandra.	*n a*

FIGURE 6–2. COMMUNIST-INFILTRATED GROUPS AND MINOR FRONTS

ORGANIZATION	COMMENTS
African Students' Association.	Composed of African students studying in Bombay; has cooperated with the IAAAS and has contacts with the IUS but is not known to be affiliated with the latter organization.
All-India Federation of National Churches.	Reportedly Communist infiltrated; no information available on purposes or strength of organization.
All-India Progressive Student Bloc.	An affiliate of the WFDY.
All-India Student Congress	Led by CPI member Chintamani Panigrahi; reported to be inactive.
All-India Writers' Conference.	Formed in 1958 by Mulk Raj Anand; reportedly considering affiliation with the Afro-Asian Writers' Conference.
All-Manipur Youth League	A WFDY affiliate active in the federal territory of Manipur; may be a branch of the All-India Youth League.
Anti-Nuclear Convention of All Religious Organizations.	Said to be controlled by the AIPC.
Anti-Price Rise and Famine Relief Committee.	A united front of radical leftist parties in West Bengal; conducted antigovernment agitations during 1958 against the shortage of food and the price level.
Bhopal Federation of Youth.	Associated with the FIY; active in Bhopal district, Madhya Pradesh State.
Bhulabhai Desai Memorial Institute.	A cultural center in Bombay City which provides housing for leftwingers and non-Communists; led by S. S. Batliwala, formerly a CPI Politburo member.
Bombay City Students' Union.	
Bombay Youth Association	
Bombay Youth Congress	
Calcutta Film Society	CPI dominated; active among the motion picture colony in Calcutta.
Chandernagore Democratic Youth League.	A youth organization active in Chandernagore, West Bengal State.
Civil Liberties League	Active in West Bengal.
Council of Medical Students.	
Delhi Youth Federation	Led by Harish Chandra; believed to be inactive.
Democratic Youth Federation of Delhi.	An affiliate of the WFDY.
Democratic Youth League of India.	An affiliate of the WFDY; helped organize the FIY.
Desh Bhagat	A cultural organization active among the Sikh community; reportedly has substantial Communist infiltration.
Film Writers' Association	
Garbheta Democratic Youth League.	An affiliate of the WFDY; presumably formed in Garbheta, Orissa State.
India-Indonesian Society	Has cooperated with the IAAAS.
Indian Council of Foreign Trade.	
Indian Council for Promotion of International Trade.	Associated with the organization are Murarji Vaidya, K. Arvindkumari, L. C. Hira Chand, D. R. Mukerjee.
Indo-Arab Society	
Indo-Bulgarian Friendship Society.	Run by Mrs. Sarah Latifi, K. A. P. Nambiar, V. G. Row, and A. S. K. Ayyengar; has branches in the major cities of India but is largely inactive.
Indo-Czechoslovakian Friendship Society.	Led by Dr. Abraham Sholum Erulkar and Daniel Latifi; not active.
Indo-German Cultural Society.	Formed to promote greater interest in East Germany; cooperated with ISCUS in 1957 when Marshal Zhukov visited Bombay; led by M. T. Vyas.
Indo-Korean Cultural Society.	Formed to promote interest in North Korea; led by P. N. Sharma.
Indo-Latin American Writers' Society.	
Indo-Mongolian Cultural Society.	Led by Dr. Rajha Vira.
Indo-Polish Cultural Society.	Led by Mrs. Manmohni Sehgal, Balwant Singh, and Jamendra Kumar Jain.
Indo-Rumanian Friendship Society.	
Kala Samiti (Cultural Association).	Active in Kerala State; supported by the Communist state ministry.
Kashmīr Committee	Active in New Delhi where it works to popularize the Kashmīr government of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed; one of the most prominent members is Aruna Asaf Ali, but the real power is said to be held by CPI member M. Farooqi.
Kerala People's Art Club	Presents dramas with Communist themes; an affiliate of IPTA.
Little Theater	CPI dominated; active in West Bengal.
Loka Raksha Dal (Peasant Youth Association).	
Mahagujarāt Janata Parishad (Gujarati People's Organization).	A united front of the major opposition parties in the Gujarati-speaking region of Bombay State; favors dividing Bombay between its two major linguistic groups.
Malayalee Samajam (Malayalee Association).	Active in West Bengal among the Malayalee population (inhabitants of Kerala); CPI dominated.
Marxist Study Club	Active in West Bengal.
People's Educational Film Center.	Presents Soviet films in West Bengal; reportedly merged with ISCUS in 1958.
People's Relief Committee	Active in West Bengal; provides health services and food.

FIGURE 6–2 (*Continued*)

ORGANIZATION	COMMENTS
Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti (United Maharashtra Committee).	A united front of all major opposition parties in the Marathi-speaking area of Bombay State; favors division of the state among its two major linguistic groups.
Sangeet Nataka Akademi (Academy of Arts).	A cultural organization active in Kerala.
Shovanik	A theater group in West Bengal; CPI dominated.
Society for Contemporary Studies.	Stated purpose is to attract journalists, politicians, social workers, and the like into meetings where current problems are discussed; publishes *Contemporary*.
Sri Narayana Dharma Paripalana Yogam.	Social welfare organization active among the low-caste Ezhava community in Kerala State; leadership is pro-Congress Party, but the CPI has gained substantial support from the membership.
Tanjore Democratic Youth League.	A WFDY affiliate active in the Tanjore district of Madras State.
Three Colors and Five Stars.	Active in Allahābād University during 1956 in promoting India-China friendship; no information on its activities since that time.
Vile Parle Youth Congress	Active in the Bombay suburb of Vile Parle.
West Bengal Democratic Youth Federation.	

FIGURE 6–3. OFFICERS OF THE ALL-INDIA PEACE COUNCIL, 1952–57

OFFICE	THIRD CONGRESS JULLUNDUR, 1952	FOURTH CONGRESS MADRAS, 1954	ALL-INDIA PEACE CONVENTION, BANGALORE, 1957
President	Saifuddin Kitchlew*	Saifuddin Kitchlew*	Saifuddin Kitchlew.*
General Secretary	Romesh Chandra**	Romesh Chandra**	Romesh Chandra.**
Vice Presidents	Mulk Raj Anand*	Mulk Raj Anand*	Mulk Raj Anand.*
	M. L. Atal*	M. L. Atal*	M. L. Atal.*
	Prithvi Raj Kapoor*	Prithvi Raj Kapoor*	Joseph Mundaserry.**
	D. D. Kosambi*	D. D. Kosambi*	K. Bashyam.
	J. C. Kumarappa*	J. C. Kumarappa*	J. C. Kumarappa.*
	G. M. Sadiq*	G. M. Sadiq*	G. M. Sadiq.*
	Gurbaksh Singh*	Gurbaksh Singh*	Gurbaksh Singh.*
	Rana Jang Bahadur Singh	Rana Jang Bahadur Singh	Rana Jang Bahadur Singh.
	Vivekananda Mukerji	Vivekananda Mukerji	Vivekananda Mukerji.
	K. Subramaniam	K. Subramaniam	Miss P. Bose.
		S. S. Sokhey*	S. S. Sokhey.*
		Pandit Sunderlal*	Pandit Sunderlal.*
		Omkarnath Thakur	Omkarnath Thakur.
		Indulal Yagnik	Indulal Yagnik.
		T. M. Kirshnaswamy Aiyer	
Secretaries	*n a*	Satyapriya Bannerjee	
		Bala Kondaiah	Dilip Bose.
		K. Madhavanar	K. Madhavanar.
		V. Parameswaran	V. Parameswaran.
		Mahesk Dutt Misra	Chatur Narain Malaviya.*
		Lajpat Rai*	A. Sen.
Treasurer	*n a*	Chatur Narain Malaviya*	*n a*

* Prominent fellow travelers.

** CPI members.

7. *Covert Organization, Illegal Activity, and Government Infiltration*

A. Significance and scope

The Communist Party of India works outside as well as within the law. Major emphasis is placed at present on legal, parliamentary actions and legal, overt organizational forms, while illegal activity and covert organization are subordinated. This adherence to a moderate tactical line is in accord with directives from Moscow, and it is reinforced by the memory of the Party's loss of support and prestige during the 1948–51 period of illegal and insurrectionary activity.

In early 1948 the CPI embarked on the offensive phase of its strategy. It changed its tactical approach by subordinating legal, parliamentary activity and support for the Congress Party governments at the national and state levels to illegal activity (armed struggle in particular) and opposition to these governments. The Party apparently intended to submerge shortly after adopting this new tactical line, but swift action by the state governments caught it before it could do so effectively. Leading Communists were arrested, the Party was declared illegal in several states, and Party offices were closed. The impact of this repression on the Party, which was then organized largely on an overt basis, was serious. According to a document prepared in 1951 by the Andhra Provincial Committee, when repression hit the Party in 1948:

> Secret cell functioning and Bolshevik tenacity were wanting. Party organization began tumbling down . . . in the face of the enemy's repressive onslaught. Secrecy and strength, that are the primary requisites of a secret organization, were lacking . . . Party cells closed down and many members resigned and returned home.

Despite this initial setback the Party continued for more than two years to engage in guerrilla warfare, sabotage, robbery, assault, arson, and murder. Parallel governments were formed in a few rural districts of Telengana (the Telegu-speaking region of what was then Hyderābād State) and the northeastern frontier area. Camps were established to train Communists in guerrilla tactics, and a few small-arms factories were opened. However, the combination of governmental repression and the failure of the populace to respond to the Communists' call for revolution predetermined failure for this attempt to capture India through violent means. The Communists were unable to form a "national liberation" army even on a skeletal scale, their isolated parallel governments were overthrown, and their use of violence caused Party membership to decline from about 90,000 in 1948 to an estimated 20,000 in 1950. At no time did the Communist insurrection pose a serious threat to the newly independent India.

CPI capabilities for sabotage, guerrilla warfare, and paramilitary activity are, on the whole, even less today than in 1948. While the Party has greater numerical strength at present, better financial resources, increased experience in parliamentary as well as violent activities, and actual control over the administration of one state, these conditions are more than offset by the fact that general conditions in India are not as explosive or exploitable as in 1948 when the government was grappling with serious economic and political dislocations resulting from World War II, the sudden withdrawal of the British, and partition of the Indian subcontinent.

Since the adoption of a moderate tactical line in 1951, the CPI has made notable advances in building a mass base, and, more importantly, it won control over Kerala State by constitutional means in 1957. The CPI now poses a real, long-range political threat to the Congress Party—potentially a far more serious threat than the subversion that took place in 1948–51 during the period of armed struggle. Perhaps in anticipation of a changing political climate in India as the CPI grows stronger, Moscow has recently advised the CPI to focus increased attention on its presently small covert organization. In its present state of being almost completely above ground, the CPI is vulnerable to repression by the central or state governments.

Of more immediate importance than potential for armed struggle is Communist infiltration of the government and of private organizations and groups. Some Communists have infiltrated into the Indian army and navy, where they are in a position to engage in espionage and where they have attempted to spread unrest by playing upon the grievances of personnel. A few pro-Communists have been identified in other departments of the central government, but infiltration of both the military and civilian departments of the Government of India is reportedly small. Infiltration at the state level is more serious, particularly in Kerala, and to a much lesser extent in Kashmīr and West Bengal. In Kerala the CPI has used its position as the ruling party to place Communists and Party sympathizers in the police force and in virtually all governmental departments.

B. Covert organization

From 1929, the year of its formation, until 1942 the CPI was organized primarily on a covert basis even though it functioned as a legal party from 1929 to 1934. While covert, the Party attempted to work in and through legal labor, peasant, and youth organizations and political parties, and during the latter half of the 1930's the Communists achieved important success in infiltrating the Congress Socialist Party and through it the parent Congress Party.

In 1942 the CPI again became a legal organization (it had been banned in 1934) and was able to come out in the open. From then on there was little felt need for covert organization, and apparently the Party became almost completely surfaced. This situation continued until 1948 when the CPI changed its tactical line and called upon the people to take violent action against the Congress Party and governments. With the failure of this tactic the Party reverted in 1951 to legal struggle and legal, open forms of organization.

Information on recent covert activities is extremely sparse, but scattered references in intelligence reports and Party documents give some indication of the scope of its underground organizational structure. The CPI's small covert apparatus apparently consists of a number of cells, now called "special branches," some attached directly to the central Secretariat or Central Executive Committee and some attached to the various state secretariats or committees and responsible to only one or two men on the parent body. Apparently from time to time, as circumstances dictate, the center assumes direct control over the covert cells in a particular state, relieving the state secretariat or committee of its responsibility.

In mid-1953, S. A. Dange, now a member of the Secretariat, was reportedly the person at the center in charge of the covert technical apparatus. Later reports indicate that S. V. Ghate, chairman of the Central Control Commission, now occupies this position, although these reports have not been confirmed. There are also other experienced Party leaders who are quite capable of leading clandestine activities. They include P. Sundarayya, a member of the Politburo from 1953–58 and now a member of the less important National Council; Harikishan Singh Surjit, formerly a Politburo member and now on the Central Executive Committee, who is reportedly one of two CPI members responsible for Communist activities in Kashmīr and who guides liaison between Indian Communists and those in Nepal; G. M. Adhikari, a former Politburo member and now on the National Council; and Abdul Halim of the Central Control Commission who has had extensive experience in illegal activities.

Some "special branches" exist in the governmental services, armed forces, police, and probably in defense and ordnance factories. The espionage network of the CPI is undoubtedly based in large part on cells such as these. Another part of the covert apparatus consists of an informal network of couriers through which important communications are transmitted within the Party and to persons outside. Yet another part appears to be concerned with obtaining, through donations from persons who wish to remain anonymous and through Party-operated commercial enterprises (particularly publishing houses, see this Supplement, SECTION 3 under Propaganda), a portion of the money needed to finance CPI activities; occasional references in Party documents to "contact cells" are presumed to refer to this section of the covert apparatus. There is also within the Party a counterintelligence group which checks the *bona fides* of Party members and sympathizers to prevent infiltration by governmental agents. In the past when the CPI was operating under conditions of repression there were (and may still be) units concerned with the clandestine production and distribution of Party literature.

That the West Bengal unit of the Party has the most highly developed underground apparatus is suggested by the nature of the people (Bengal has traditionally been a hotbed of radical and subversive movements), the size of the overt Party apparatus in Calcutta, and the state's strategic location. West Bengal is ideally situated to serve as a liaison or control center for the East Pakistan Communist Party since inhabitants of the two areas share a common language and cultural heritage.

In July 1954, when governor's rule (control by the central government of Pakistan) was imposed in East Pakistan and the Communist Party of Pakistan was banned in the province, the West Bengal branch of the CPI gave underground support to the East Pakistan Communists in the form of advice, personnel, printed pamphlets, and funds. Liaison between the two groups apparently continues, for there have been numerous reports of contact between Indian and Pakistani Communists since the imposition of military rule in Pakistan in October 1958. It is likely that this contact is handled through a covert wing of the CPI located in Calcutta. Sajjad Zaheer, member of the CPI National Council, is reportedly in charge of this operation. Information on the size of the covert apparatus in West Bengal is fragmentary, but it is estimated to consist of no more than 75 persons.

The Punjab branch of the CPI probably fulfills a role in the western part of India similar to that played by the West Bengal branch in the east. Satwant Singh of the Punjab Provincial Committee has from time to time reportedly met with Pakistani Communist leaders, and it is likely that CPI aid to the West Pakistan section of the Communist Party of Pakistan is channeled through this committee. The Punjab Provincial Committee is also responsible for Party operations in Kashmīr where no overt provincial or district committees have been established, and where the CPI operates on a covert basis within the two major political parties, the National Conference and the newly formed Democratic National Conference. Satwant Singh and Harikishan Singh Surjit are said to be responsible for operations in Kashmīr.

The absence of a strong covert apparatus in the CPI that is prepared to cope with a change in the Indian political climate has caused concern among some Party members since the 1951 tactical shift. In October 1953 the Bombay committee of the CPI stated that while maximum use must be made of legal and open activities, care must at the same time be taken to defend the Party organization from possible repression. In mid-1954 the Andhra Provincial Committee recommended to the Politburo that a "special cadre" be established in the state for carrying on underground work since all top leaders were well known to the public and the police and it would be difficult for them to engage in clandestine activities without being detected. In late 1954 a member of the Maharashtra section of the Party reportedly stated that "if the G.O.I. attacks the CPI at this time, the government would be able to destroy it for a long time to come."

In late 1957, during the celebration of the 40th Anniversary of the Communists' assumption of power in Moscow, the Kremlin reportedly advised CPI delegates that every Communist Party should have a well-knit covert apparatus prepared for armed struggle if and when necessary. This guidance was reportedly repeated in February 1958 by the political First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in New Delhi. The Soviet Union, as well as the "leftist" faction within the CPI, is apparently concerned over the possibility that the CPI might suddenly become the target for repression, perhaps as a result of Nehru's death and the assumption of control by conservative elements within the Congress Party. On the other hand, "rightists" within the Party reportedly feared that concentration on underground activities would belie the Party's claim to moderation and would endanger its chances of capturing India through the formation of united fronts with other parties. CPI General Secretary Ajoy Ghosh, who formerly opposed any move that might compromise the Party's present moderate tactical line, was reportedly won over to the need for greater emphasis on covert organization during a visit to Moscow in mid-1958. According to one report, the headquarters for the revitalized underground apparatus will be located in Andhra Pradesh and will be led by P. Sundarayya. This trend toward greater stress on covert organization was given a boost by the series of military coups in neighboring countries and by the Communists' fear that a similar move might eventually take place in India. In February 1959, the Central Executive Committee reportedly resolved that the CPI would move ahead as rapidly as possible in its efforts to strengthen its covert organizational structure and that it would intensify its efforts to infiltrate the government and the armed forces.

C. Illegal activity

Since 1951, when the CPI adopted a moderate tactical line, illegal activity has been closely circumscribed by the Communists' desire to foster the impression that the CPI is a respectable political party seeking power by peaceful means. Instances of Communist-led sabotage and paramilitary or insurrectionary activity declined steadily and rapidly after mid-1951, and there is no evidence that such activity is included in the present Party tactics. Communists have occasionally given a violent turn to popular agitation as, for example, during agitations in Bombay State designed to force the government to divide the state between its two major linguistic groups and during labor disputes in various parts of the country, but this activity is usually spontaneous and not part of a concerted drive to disrupt India by violent means.

Illegal Communist activity today appears to consist primarily of espionage, smuggling, illegal entry and exit, and possibly caching arms for future use. Espionage is believed directed primarily against the Indian armed forces and strategic sectors of the economy in which the Communist-sponsored trade union movement is strong: railroad transportation, posts, telegraph and telephone communications, petroleum, defense, and heavy industries. Information on these installations, collected through covert cells or normal Party or trade union channels, is undoubtedly forwarded to the Soviet Union and also retained by the CPI for use should future Party tactics necessitate an attempt to paralyze the Indian economy. Smuggling and illegal migration are employed particularly in the exchange of personnel and materials between the CPI and Communists in East Pakistan. There have also been unconfirmed reports that gold has been smuggled to the Indian Communists from foreign sources through covert landings along India's long coastline.

D. Government infiltration

1. Central government

a. MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND THE ARMED SERVICES — The CPI was the only important Indian political party that supported the British war effort during World War II. The Party pledged to recruit from among its members and sympathizers "suicide squads" to sabotage the enemy's rear lines and serve as the nuclei around which guerrilla bands could be formed. It also promised to promote recruitment for the Indian armed forces. The British accepted these Communist offers, initiated a program for training a guerrilla army comprised largely of Communist volunteers, and permitted Communist enlistment in the Indian armed services. Thus, during the Second World War, the CPI was presented with an ideal opportunity to infiltrate the armed forces. The actual extent of CPI penetration during this period is not known, but it was apparently limited primarily to the lower ranks.

After the CPI came out in opposition to the Congress government in 1948, the Government of India adopted a policy of eliminating Communists from the armed forces. Party members and sympathizers were placed under close surveillance, and when sufficient evidence was accumulated against them they were discharged. In November 1949, for example, 10 men were reportedly discharged for Communist leanings, and one man was discharged for the same reason in December 1949. Others, including a few of officer rank, were discharged during subsequent months.

Present Communist infiltration in the armed services appears to be negligible. General Thimayya, Chief of Staff of the Indian army, reportedly stated in early 1958 that only 28 Communists were then under observation in the army. There probably are Communists within the Indian army (480,000 men) who are not known to the G.O.I., but presumably they number less than one-half of one percent. Most Communists or reported sympathizers are in subordinate positions, with the possible exception of Major General B. M. Kaul who served as Chief of Staff to General Thimayya when the latter was Chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in Korea. Kaul is not known to be a Party member, but appears to be sympathetic toward communism (in Korea he reportedly preferred social contact with officers from Communist rather than non-Communist countries).

According to a report in early 1959, infiltration of the Indian navy is also negligible and is limited to three small groups in touch with the CPI and the Revolutionary Communist Party, a Marxist splinter group. The first consists of 17 enlisted men scattered throughout the navy who have been instructed to solicit money for the West Bengal and Kerala branches of the CPI and to collect information on the following subjects among others: behavior of officers, naval restrictions applying to enlisted men but not to officers, disparities in pay between officers and enlisted men, living conditions for enlisted men, and security practices. The second group, composed of seven men on the Indian navy's flagship, the INS Mysore, has reportedly been instructed to spread dissatisfaction among the crew, enlist the support of senior noncommissioned officers, secure pages from the classified code books, and gain control over the ship's central communications center. The third group consists of a small cell in the Cochin Naval Base which is apparently engaged primarily in espionage.

No information is available on infiltration in the Indian air force.

The potential for infiltration of the armed forces is probably enhanced by the fact that Defense Minister V. K. Krishna Menon is a member of the extreme left wing of the Congress Party and has associated with known Communists and fellow travelers. He is highly ambitious and would probably cooperate with and accept support from any group which might enhance his prospects for becoming Prime Minister. He reportedly has contacts with fellow travelers in Bombay city and has backed a weekly news magazine called *Link* which has on its editorial staff a number of CPI members or sympathizers. This magazine reportedly circulates in reading rooms within Indian military establishments.

The Communists' inability thus far seriously to infiltrate the Indian armed forces results in part from the pro-Western orientation of most top officers of the three services and, to a lesser extent, from the conservative village background of many recruits. However, these factors are not in themselves effective deterrents to infiltration. In order to keep subversive elements at a minimum the armed forces have traditionally followed a screening process in which local police and civil officials are asked to file reports on the antecedents, political activity, and party affiliation of prospective recruits. If these reports reveal a record of Communist activity or sympathy, the recruit is rejected. Any connection with communism within three generations is reportedly grounds for rejection of an applicant for, or dismissal of an enlisted man from, the Indian navy. In the army, brigade commanders have the authority in peacetime to discharge without appeal enlisted men whose political loyalty is in doubt. Those who become active in the Communist movement after joining the army are reportedly eliminated by this method. Information regarding the procedures for dismissing officers on political grounds is not available. Apparently, however, these procedures are cumbersome; officers suspected of Communist leanings are frequently permitted to remain within the service under surveillance, while their contacts, methods of operation, and habits are studied.

Communist control over Kerala State has to a certain extent compromised the procedure for preventing the enlistment of known Communists, since the armed forces can no longer place complete confidence on reports from officials in that state. There are conflicting statements on what measures the armed forces are adopting to meet this problem. According to one report, the services have unofficially adopted a policy of rejecting all recruits from Kerala, regardless of the nature of the political report, on individual grounds such as physical unfitness or lack of aptitude.

In 1958, B. T. Ranadive, a member of the CPI Secretariat, reportedly admitted privately that the Party had "lost contact" with the armed forces, and several Party documents circulated among CPI leaders during the year stressed the need for more effective Party work among the military. In addition, it has been reported that in February 1959 the Central Executive Committee, concerned over military coups in neighboring countries, resolved that the Party should intensify its efforts to penetrate the army and police. Responsibility for coordinating these efforts at penetration was reportedly given to a Communist leader in Andhra Pradesh, P. Sundarayya. The Communists' growing interest in the armed services was demonstrated during late 1958 and early 1959 by increasing publicity in the Communist press on disparities between the benefits given to enlisted men and officers, more intensive efforts to popularize Communist bookshops among the military, and additional efforts to attract support among retired military men who enjoy positions of prestige in their native villages.

b. OTHER MINISTRIES AND ATTACHED DEPARTMENTS — There are few reports of Communist infiltration in other ministries and attached departments of the central government, and it is likely that there is little such infiltration. Few cases of subversive activity have come before the authorities under the provisions of the Civil Service (Safeguarding of National Security) Rules promulgated in 1949 to strengthen the hand of the government in dealing with subversive elements in public service and to check the spread of subversive influences among public servants. Only 37 cases of suspected subversives, and all of these were not suspected of being Communists, were brought before the authorities for hearing under these rules during the period 1950/51–1954/55. Of the 37, only 20 were discharged from government service. The government claimed in 1953 that the promulgation of the rules and the action taken under them had had a salutary effect in checking disloyal activities among government employees. However, the rules have been kept in abeyance for unknown reasons since April 1955, and no action has been taken under them since that time. In late November 1956 a high official in the Ministry of Home Affairs reportedly stated that although the ministry knew the identity of Communists in the Government of India, it was not always able to take appropriate action to remove them.

Only two persons in the Ministry of External Affairs have been reported to be Communist sympathizers: Sadar Kavalam Madhava Panikkar and Triloki Nath Kaul. Panikkar, a Malayali whose daughter and son-in-law are Communist leaders in Kerala, became known for his pro-Communist bias while serving as India's first ambassador to Communist China in the early 1950's. After his assignment in Communist China he was sent to Egypt as ambassador, and after service on the States Reorganization Committee he returned to diplomatic service, becoming India's Ambassador to France. Kaul, who is related to Nehru by marriage, has been called by some observers an out-and-out sympathizer with the Chinese Communists. Kaul was reportedly instrumental in getting India to recognize the Mao regime. He went to Peiping in 1950 as Counselor, and in 1952 he became Minister of the Embassy in Peiping. In 1953 Kaul was appointed Joint Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs, and in 1954 he served as Deputy Chief of the Indian delegation to negotiate the Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet. Later in 1954 he became Chief of the Indian delegation on the International Control Commission for Vietnam. At present Kaul is ambassador to Iran.

There was a report in early 1953 of Communist infiltration of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, but this remains unconfirmed. However, the pro-Communist poet, dramatist, and actor, Harindranath Chattopadhyaya, has written, produced, and acted in many All-India Radio (AIR) programs. Other talented people who have frequently been associated with Communist-front groups such as the All-India Progressive Writers' Association have also had selections from their works broadcast by AIR or reproduced in the *March of India,* a cultural periodical published by the ministry. Of the various departments attached to this ministry, All-India Radio is now perhaps the most vulnerable to Communist infiltration, for two of AIR's regional stations are located in the Communist-controlled state of Kerala, at Trivandrum and Kozhikode. However, in mid-1957 the directors of the two stations reportedly told the Central Intelligence Bureau that the state government had made no attempt to interfere with the normal operation of the stations.

The Indian Statistical Institute, an autonomous organization which does work for the government on contract and which plays a prominent role in India's planning for economic development, has reportedly had two or three CPI members on its staff at various times during the past four years. Soviet technicians have aided this institute, and the director, P. C. Mahalanobis, is reportedly a leftist, although information on his exact political views is not available.

2. State and local governments

a. **KERALA** — Communist infiltration in the state and local governments in Kerala is significant. This infiltration provides a case study of what might be expected in other states should they come under Communist control, and it underlines what the CPI itself readily acknowledges: the assumption of power by a Communist government is not the end but only the beginning of the struggle to establish the dictatorship of the Communist-led proletariat.

The new Communist government in Kerala apparently decided in April 1957 not to move precipitately toward infiltrating the government services. In fact, in an attempt to establish its *bona fides,* the new cabinet rescinded a regulation passed by the previous regime which had reduced the control of the Kerala Public Service Commission over recruitment to the state governmental services and increased the cabinet's power to appoint and promote civil servants. The Communist government actually went even further and expanded the powers of the Public Service Commission by bringing some previously exempted governmental positions under the commission's jurisdiction.

After four months of rule, however, the Communists were ready to move. On August 27, the Chief Minister of Kerala announced on the floor of the assembly that the state government had lifted the existing ban on the employment of CPI members and sympathizers in governmental services, and that it was attempting to absorb those who were dismissed or previously refused appointment on political grounds. Most departments of the government were reorganized, and many new posts were created. A portion of these were filled with Communist members and actual or potential sympathizers—a process which is still going on. By December 1957, 181 new governmental positions carrying a monthly salary of 300 rupees (US$64) or more had been created. The positions included transport officers, welfare officers, labor officers, press and information officers, education officers, and health officers. Communists or pro-Communists have reportedly been appointed to every ministry in the government. Appointments to clerical positions and above in the State Secretariat alone were reported in late 1957 to include 25 known CPI members and 21 sympathizers (including six relatives of known Communists). An even larger number of Party members were probably employed as drivers and laborers in the governmental Secretariat and in government-operated industrial enterprises.

The Communist regime has filled many additional governmental positions with members of groups among which it hopes to extend its influence. In July 1957 the Kerala government promulgated a new rule providing that 40% of all civil-service appointments in Kerala be reserved for "backward classes"—Ezhavas, Thiyyas, Muslims, Latin (Roman) Catholics, and others—and 10% for scheduled castes and tribes. In April 1958 the state government announced that it would appoint ex-convicts to governmental service in accord with certain "liberal principles" and in consultation with the Public Service Commission. In June 1958 it announced that in determining the age limit prescribed for employment in government services it would thenceforth subtract from the age of any ex-serviceman the number of years he had served in the armed forces.

Many government employees who have proved unsympathetic to the Communist regime or its policies have been transferred, suspended, or demoted. In July 1958 the ministry ordered the transfer of a subinspector of police in Trivandrum as a result of a petition by local Communists alleging that he had behaved "rudely" towards them. In October 1958 it ordered the transfer of the superintendent of police in Kottayam district, and the inspector and subinspector of police at the town of Munnar for firing on Communist workers during a plantation strike. In July 1958 the government demoted a first-class magistrate in Trivandrum to the rank of second class, allegedly because he rejected a petition to withdraw a case involving violence which was pending against some Communist Party members. In the latter part of February 1958 the government suspended for alleged corruption 12 officials in the Police Department, 7 in the Transport Department, and 18 in the Forest Department. Charging officials with corruption and suspending them at reduced pay for several months pending full inquiry provides the state government with a device for bringing pressure on officials who have refused to cooperate with the new regime.

While trying to infiltrate and subvert the state's traditional administrative machinery, the CPI is simultaneously taking the more important step of divesting the state government of some of its power and redistributing it at lower levels, where the Communists are strong. This policy is referred to by the Communists as "decentralization and people's control." In 1957 the state government set up an Administrative Reforms Committee to recommend ways of "decentralizing" powers at various levels and "democratizing" governmental bodies by securing "effective participation of local self-governing institutions or other representative bodies in administration." As an example of the shift, the Communists began in mid-1957 to give workers in state-owned industries a voice in the management of these concerns; as a first step, a representative of the workers was included in a newly formed State Transport Board which has wide powers of control and management over the State Transport Department. Another instance of decentralization was the government's abolition of the posts of Divisional Education Officer in January 1958 and the transfer of their powers and functions to the lower district educational officers. The Health Department was also reorganized and decentralized. Village libraries were given power to select their own books. In judicial affairs, the number of civil cases being registered in the Trivandrum courts has declined, and villagers are being encouraged to take their cases to the village *panchayat* (council) for arbitration rather than to a constituted court of law.

(1) *Police Department* — Under the Indian constitution the maintenance of internal security and direction of police operations are assigned to the state government. In each state the police are integrated into a single police force organized on a statewide basis with no separate local or municipal police systems. By forming a Communist government in Kerala the CPI has been placed in a position where it can exercise extensive influence on the police system.

The main obstacle in its way is the fact that all top-ranking state police officials must be drawn from the Indian Police Service (IPS), in which recruitment, training, and advancement are administered by the Home Ministry of the Government of India. Police officers of the rank of assistant superintendent of police and above are usually IPS men, while other police personnel belong to the state civil service. In mid-1957 there were only 32 IPS officers in Kerala out of a state police force of approximately 10,000.

Shortly after the Communist government took office it reportedly ordered Inspector General of Police, N. Chandrasekharan Nair, the top police officer in the state, to withdraw his nominations for four senior officers to receive training in specialized police functions in Calcutta and in the United States and substitute four junior officers recommended by Communist Party leaders. Nair's refusal to accede to this and to other requests of the Communist government made him a target for attack by the CPI press; it charged him with failure to cooperate with the ministers and with communicating with New Delhi over the heads of the state government. Nair, who had reached retirement age but had been continued in office by the previous state government, was retired in 1957. Rather than taking the too obvious move of replacing Nair with a Communist or a Party sympathizer, the Communists split the functions formerly exercised by the Inspector General. Broad administration of the police organization was vested in the Inspector General (General), and a capable and respected officer next in line from a standpoint of seniority was appointed to fill this post. However, several key functions—including the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), the Railway Police, and the Armed Reserve Police—were placed under the control of the Inspector General (Special), and N. R. Srinivasa Iyer, a weak man subject to Communist pressure and according to several sources a Party sympathizer, was appointed to this position. The CID, the elite of the state police, has responsibility for keeping the government informed on political activity in the state. This function is performed by keeping foreigners and members of the political opposition under surveillance, by following the activities of all political and semipolitical organizations, and by monitoring messages sent through the postal, telegraph, and telephone systems in the state. Formerly one of the CID's main targets was the CPI, but under Iyer's administration the CID has reportedly been expanded, reoriented, and seriously infiltrated by Communists. Superintendent of police V. P. Nair, who served as Chief of the Special Police Branch of the CID and was a strong opponent of the Communists, has been transferred. Whereas in the past the Kerala CID cooperated with the local branch of the Central Intelligence Bureau (CIB) of the G.O.I. Home Ministry, this close working relationship has now been completely disrupted. The CIB must rely entirely on its own agents to follow Communist activity in Kerala; the state CID, for its part, is now engaged in spying on CIB personnel.

The Armed Reserve Police, which is also under the Inspector General of Police (Special), is a fixed reserve quartered at various district and subdivisional headquarters throughout Kerala and equipped on a semimilitary basis. The armed reserve is called in to handle assignments that are too demanding for the regular district police. In the past it has frequently been brought into action against Communist-led strikes or mass agitations; however, in 1956, 600 members of the armed reserve in Malabar (then a district of Madras State but now part of Kerala), known as the Malabar Special Police, were dismissed for participation in a Communist-inspired strike. Since it has come to power, the Communist government has ordered the reinstatement of these men. The Communist Party is reported to have cells in armed reserve units at Kozhikode and Malappuram and presumably among other units, although no additional information is available.

In a move to curry favor, the present government has given the regular police increased pay and housing allowances. At the same time, it outlined a new police policy, declaring that the ministry would not permit the police to function in an "antipeople" manner, that it was not the function of the police to interfere in labor disputes, and that the authority to use sections of the Criminal Procedure Code relating to the use of police weapons rests with the ministers and not with district officials. Despite the government's attempt to correct the "antipeople" attitude of the police, the latter apparently have not always acceded to the demands of local Communist Party members or extended them full cooperation. As a result there were numerous transfers of police officials during the first year of Communist rule, and in August 1958 the government discontinued overtime and housing allowances for the police. Law Minister Krishna Aiyer announced in the state assembly in March 1958 that 584 police officers had been transferred "for reasons of efficiency." Actually, many of these transfers took place because local police officers came into conflict with the local branch of the CPI. Most officers concerned were exiled to less desirable posts, and in many cases they were replaced by officers who are more tractable or by promotion from the ranks of subordinates who owe their new positions to the Communists.

Following extensive criticism within the CPI over the police's opening fire on striking Communist-led tea workers during 1958, the Kerala branch of the Party proposed in November the appointment of a committee to draft a new police code for the state. The proposed committee was to consider, among other matters, the conditions and circumstances under which firearms might be used by the police, the feasibility of "associating the public" with the work of the police, and the establishment of village police or at least an association of the village *panchayats* with the police in some manner. A 5-member committee was established by the ministry in January 1959 with the following composition: two members of Communist unions, a senior advocate of the Supreme Court of India, the secretary of the All-India Manufacturer's Association, and M. Krishna Menon, the state's Inspector General of Police (General). In appointing the latter to the committee, on which he will apparently serve full time, the Kerala government found a way to shunt Menon from his post at least temporarily and reintegrate the functions of Inspector General of Police in one man, N. R. Srinivasa Iyer.

(2) *Education Department* — In India, government control of education is exercised primarily at the state level. The various state governments through their ministries of education establish local educational policy, administer state schools, and exercise indirect control over private schools through a system of recognition, inspection, and grants-in-aid. The formation of a Communist ministry in Kerala put the Communist Party in an excellent position to infiltrate and redirect the educational system in that state.

Soon after assuming office, the Communist Education Minister ordered an increase in salary scales of primary school teachers in both government and state-aided private schools. This was followed in September 1957 by a comprehensive education bill designed to tighten the government's control over the elaborate private school system in Kerala, a good part of which is in the hands of various Christian churches but partially dependent on government grants. The bill as passed by the state assembly (a measure of this nature requires assent by the Indian President before it becomes law) stipulated that all teachers in state-aided schools would be appointed from a government-maintained register of eligible persons. It also provided that teachers in private schools were to be paid directly by the government, rather than indirectly through the managers of these schools. This legislation was subsequently modified at the request of the central government, but the Kerala ministry nevertheless retains extensive power to control private schools and the stipulation that teachers must be selected from a government register remains.

Before the Communists assumed office, teachers were not required to register before employment, but in February 1958 the Director of Public Instruction ordered those who wished to teach in public schools during the academic year beginning in June 1958 to register with district educational officers, and directed that new teachers must be appointed and assigned within the district of their residence. At the same time, district committees of the CPI in Kerala were reportedly drawing up their own lists of all Communist or fellow-traveling teachers. In October 1958 the ministry ordered the restoration of teaching certificates to those teachers who had lost them in the past on grounds of Communist activity.

Besides attempting to penetrate and extend their influence over the teaching staff in the Kerala school system, the Communists have also sought to extend themselves in the administrative machinery and in the Department of Education through new appointments, transfers, and promotions. In August 1958, A. K. N. Nambiar, the brother of Communist leader A. K. Gopalan, was reportedly promoted over the heads of 12 senior officers to the position of Deputy Director of Education in Kozhikode district.

b. OTHER STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS — The only other states in which Communist penetration of the government is known to be significant are Kashmīr and possibly West Bengal. Although the CPI has no provincial organization in Kashmīr, Communists and Communist sympathizers have for years been interested in that state. Before 1947, when Kashmīr was still a princely state, Communist elements were closely associated with the popular struggle for freedom from the Maharaja's rule. They operated within the National Conference, the party which led this struggle and which formed the government in Indian-occupied Kashmīr after the state's accession to India. Two persons with pro-Communist leanings, Ghulam Muhammad Sadiq and his brother, Ghulam Mohiuddin Kharra, served as ministers in Sheikh Abdullah's cabinet. A well-known Indian Communist, B. P. I. Bedi, served as Adviser in Chief to Sheikh Abdullah and chief of his counterpropaganda department during Abdullah's Emergency Administration and for two years thereafter; Bedi's European wife, who is also a Communist, headed the Plebiscite Department during the Emergency Administration and later served as a member of the State Textbook Committee. Another Communist fellow traveller in the Sheikh Abdullah government was Durga Prasad Dhar who served as Home Secretary and Deputy Home Minister. In 1952 it was reported that some secretaries to the government and a number of officers scattered throughout all departments of government, including the National Militia, were Communists or fellow travelers and that Communist sympathizers were numerous in clerical and administrative positions.

In 1957 Sadiq and Dhar withdrew from the National Conference and formed the rival National Democratic Conference. They are not now in the government. A number of Communist and Party sympathizers probably continue to hold positions in the state government, although no recent information is available.

Information on Communist infiltration in West Bengal is fragmentary, but there is a belief among some sources that the state police is seriously infiltrated by Communists and CPI sympathizers. It has frequently been reported, for example, that the CPI has been able to obtain information from police files in the state. One probable reason for the shift of CPI headquarters from Bombay to Calcutta, capital of West Bengal, in 1949 (headquarters were subsequently moved to Madras and later to New Delhi) was that the CPI leaders considered some of the Calcutta police to be sympathetic toward their program.

During the early 1950's there was some infiltration of government in the Telegu-speaking region of southern India: excerpts from classified documents prepared by the Hyderābād CID appeared in CPI documents; the Andhra provincial CPI committee stated in a report that many government servants and teachers had attended Party training schools for members and cadres, as sympathizers although not as members. There is some infiltration in the municipal administration of Delhi where the Communists dominate the municipal workers union.

There is probably some Communist infiltration in the Bombay municipal administration. A Bombay provincial committee organizational report made to the Politburo in October 1952 stated that there was some form of Party organization among municipal employees. There is evidence that the education officer of Bombay city, Miss Kapila Khandawalla, is pro-Communist although she claims membership in the Congress Party. A member of the Bombay corporation was reported in early 1958 to have asked the municipal commissioner to investigate allegations that the education officer had repeatedly used her position to arrange for Bombay public school children to attend Communist-sponsored functions. Certainly, Bombay city's educational system has been infiltrated by the Communists at the teaching level. The wives of several leading Bombay CPI officials hold prominent positions in the Primary School Teachers' Association which likewise has been accused of pressuring Bombay school children into attending Communist-backed functions.

On the state level in Bombay, two Communist cells were uncovered in the State Education Department in early 1947. In early 1956 the Central Intelligence Bureau (CIB) reportedly suspected a former acting Governor of Bombay State, Mangaldas Pakvasa, of serving as a channel for financing Chinese Communist propaganda activities in the Bombay area. In 1957 it was reported that there has been no successful Communist attempt to penetrate the Bombay state police service or CID.

According to one report, the total number of CPI members or sympathizers in early 1958 in the Bihār State service or in central services located in that state was 113. Of these, 11 were dismissed and the remainder were under surveillance. The state government was apparently unable to initiate dismissal action against those under surveillance since no orders establishing procedures to be followed in such cases had been received from the central government. None of these suspected Communists is known to occupy an important position.

E. Role of foreign Communists

Foreign Communist agents came to India on a covert basis and engaged in illegal activity during the British period before World War II. Most of these agents appear to have been sent by the Communist Party of Great Britain which had primary responsibility for directing Communist activity in India after 1925. Foreign agents also came to India in late 1947 and early 1948 and appear to have engaged in illegal activity by urging the CPI to enter the offensive phase of the "people's democracy" strategy and adopt armed activity as its principal form of struggle. During recent years illegal activity appears to have been restricted primarily to Communist diplomatic and quasi-diplomatic missions. The Soviet Embassy in New Delhi, TASS, and trade agents representing various Communist nations engage in subversive activity at least to the extent of providing financial aid to the CPI and furnishing a safe channel of communication with Moscow.

Communist China may have some covert agents working among India's small Chinese community. During the Chinese Communist seizure of Tibet in 1950, there were a few reports of smuggling of arms and supplies into that area from West Bengal and Assam.

Another case of illegal activity has been the penetration of Indian territory by small detachments of Chinese troops. Usually these troops withdraw across the frontier into Tibet upon encountering an Indian patrol; however, in mid-October 1956 approximately 150 Chinese Communist troops in civilian clothes were reportedly apprehended well inside the Indian protectorate of Sikkim near Gangtok. They were said to have been led by a lieutenant whose identity documents and uniform were found when his personal effects were searched by Indian authorities.

It appears that Soviet personnel, particularly the staff of the Soviet Embassy in New Delhi, and possibly representatives of other Sino-Soviet bloc missions, are kept under surveillance by the G.O.I. Home Ministry. In 1958 the Soviet representative of Intourist, the Soviet travel agency, was reportedly denied a visa to return to India from home leave in the U.S.S.R. The reason for this denial is said to have been the Indian Home Ministry's suspicion that he was engaging in activity inimical to the security interests of the Government of India.

8. *Personalities*

A. General

The leaders of the Communist Party of India (CPI), both on the state and national level, are a hard core of well-trained tacticians and strategists. While they come predominantly from the middle class, all classes are represented, from peasant to Brahmin. Included are dissident Christians and Muslims, members of the major and minor professions, laborers, and intellectuals. Many hold the highest academic degrees obtainable from some of the leading universities in India and Europe. Several are elected members of the Indian Parliament, including both the *Lok Sabha* (lower house), and the *Rajya Sabha* (upper house). Still others are members of the various state legislatures. In addition, the CPI has the support of a group of high-caliber fellow travelers.

Some of the CPI leaders joined the Party through the militant left-wing labor movement in the late 1920's, when general conditions of unrest and growing political consciousness provided a fertile field not only for nationalism but for the development of socialist ideas. Others were formerly associated with the Congress Party and its left-wing affiliate, the Congress Socialist Party (CSP). Many joined the CPI after 1942 when the Party entered upon a period of rapid expansion. The reasons advanced for defection to the CPI from the Congress Party and the CSP have not always been logical or clear cut, but it appears that discontent fostered by centuries-old customs, caste prejudice, and unemployment drove many fence-sitters into the Communist camp, and disillusionment with the Congress movement and indifference on the part of its leadership were certainly significant factors. For many of the malcontents and opportunists, the CPI, more than any other political group, established itself as the "great sympathizer," at the same time offering a diagnosis and cure for all Indian ailments.

Several of the Communist leaders, as well as some of their fellow travelers, have close connections with leading civil servants, and a few have contact with the higher echelons of the ruling Congress Party. In some instances this is the result of the Communists in question occupying elective positions; in other cases the ties are those of family or friendship.

A Communist government was elected in Kerala in 1957 by democratic process in an election that was more a defeat of discredited Congressmen than a victory for communism. The CPI's publicity machinery, both statewide and countrywide, seems to have been more successful in favorably publicizing Kerala than the non-Communist press has been in giving it a bad name.

The Kerala experiment, and the April 1958 Amritsar Congress with its formal acquiescence in the parliamentary approach, represent perhaps the two most significant events in CPI history. In spite of the parliamentary approach (which is used mainly for tactical reasons), the leadership appears to be firm, refusing to permit talk of "co-existence" and "peace" to blunt its ideological sharpness or its perspectives on ultimate Party goals. There does exist a factional line-up among both state and national leaders, based to a considerable extent on tactics and strategy. However, this has not lessened to any appreciable degree the cohesiveness of purpose of the leadership in general.

CPI leaders, who are to a considerable extent the offspring of middle-class landlords and small traders, take an optimistic view of the Indian political scene, where they see the Congress Party permeated with dissension and worn by deterioration, increasing public awareness of the government's shortcomings, and other political groups weak and divided among themselves. They look with confidence to the forthcoming national elections and with even greater confidence to the still distant 1972 elections.

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This publication, issued separately for flexibility in production and use, is one of the integral components in the National Intelligence Survey of comprehensive basic intelligence on this NIS Area.

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